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The Worldwide Influence of the United States
Constitution as a Charter of Human Rights
William J. Brennan, Jr.*
Recently Anthony Lester, Q.C., the famed British barrister and
world-renowned human rights advocate, delivered a speech entitled
"The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights."1 His focus was
on the Bill of Rights, although at the same time he accepted the
broader truth that, as Professor Albert P. Blaustein phrased it, "the
United States Constitution has inevitably been an influence for consti-
tutionalism. Every nation that has a one-document constitution (or is
committed in principle to having one) is inevitably following the United
States precedent-model." 2
One reason for the influence of the American Constitution abroad,
Professor Blaustein asserts, is "[t]he American penchant for constitu-
tional proselytizing. ... From the earliest days of the American revolu-
tionary movement, its leaders were conscious that they were doing
something of worldwide significance. They had convinced themselves
that they were creating a new Eden, not only for America but for all of
mankind. They had a story to tell and a message to deliver. They were
proselytizers."3
Perhaps these views reflect a degree of immodesty or perhaps only
an excess of enthusiasm. Yet, Mr. Lester informs us that today there is
an ever-increasing overseas trade in the American Bill of Rights that is
"brisk and vitally important."'4 It is, he says, a trade conducted both
internationally (before fora such as the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights) and nationally (in constitutional litigation in-
* 0 1991 by William J. Brennan, Jr.
William J. Brennan is a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. This text was prepared for the speech Justice Brennan delivered at the
Columbia Law School Bicentennial Celebration (November 20, 1987). The Nova Law
Review wishes to thank Justice Brennan for his permission to publish the address.
1. Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 537 (1988).
2. A. BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD 7 (1986).
3. Id. at 12.
4. Lester, supra note 1, at 541.
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volving norms derived from American constitutional law): "When life
or liberty is at stake [he asserts], the landmark judgments of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, giving fresh meaning to the princi-
ples of the Bill of Rights, are studied with as much attention in New
Delhi or Strausbourg, as they are in Washington, D.C., or the State of
Washington, or Springfield, Illinois." 5
These comments from such distinguished authorities as Mr. Lester
and Professor Blaustein prompt me tonight to essay an examination of
"The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a char-
ter of Human Rights."
The profound influence claimed for our Constitution on the nations
of the world has been attributed to many things. Ours was, of course,
the first written constitution in history. Moreover, as the charter of one
of the most powerful and largest nations on earth, our Constitution has
always been among the most conspicuous. And, as I already mentioned,
lest anyone dare forget its prominence, the Framers and their succes-
sors took it upon themselves to proselytize the Constitution abroad.
All those factors have, no doubt, contributed to our Constitution's
influence abroad, but they go only part way in explaining it. There
must be something about the Constitution's substance that accounts for
its worldwide appeal. That elusive something, I believe, is the Constitu-
tion's status as a charter of human rights. Three distinct characteristics
of American constitutionalism coalesce to distinguish our Constitution
as a human rights charter. First, is the very premise on which the Con-
stitution is based - that government springs from the People. Second,
is the Constitution's enumeration of specific rights that are guaranteed
against government intrusion. Third, and in my view most important, is
the Constitution's implementation of a mechanism - judicial enforce-
ment - that makes those enumerated rights meaningful. Those three
human-rights elements have, to varying degrees and in various ways,
infiltrated their way into the constitutional schemes of our neighbors
abroad.
Perhaps the Constitution's greatest innovation and undoubtedly its
most profound impact abroad is a concept that is today so well and
pervasively established that its revolutionary character is readily over-
looked. It is the very premise on which the Constitution is based -
that sovereign individuals, "We the People," can create a government.
Our Constitution was, in that respect, the ultimate effectuation of the
5. Id.
[Vol. 15
5
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Justice Brennan
Enlightenment, an effectuation that went beyond the wildest musings
even of some of the most prominent thinkers of the time. As one histo-
rian observes, the "European thinkers, in all their discussion of a politi-
cal or social contract, of government by consent and of sovereignty of
the people, had not clearly imagined the people as actually contriving a
constitution and creating the organs of government. They lacked the
idea of the people as a constituent power."6 Our Constitution, built on
that vision of the People as a constituent power, was itself a charter of
human rights and self determination, quite apart from its specific
content.
The vision caught like wildfire. Within two years, France ratified a
constitution which, although it lasted only two years, served as a model
for the 1812 Spanish constitution and the constitutions of Naples, Sic-
ily and much of Latin America. So, too, did Poland, whose constitution
recognized that "all authority in human society takes its beginning in
the will of the people." Shortly. thereafter, Venezuelans, Mexicans, and
Argentinians, to name a few, seized upon our Constitution as inspira-
tion to revolt against tyranny and oppression, and to fashion govern-
ments of the People. Today, there exist a total of 162 constitutions. All
but six nations - three that follow the Koran and three that are based
on the principle of parliamentary supremacy - either follow a written
constitution or (in the case of the twenty that have suspended their
constitutions) are committed to doing so.
Implicit in the notion that the People can and do create govern-
ment is the corollary that it is the People's prerogative and responsibil-
ity to limit the power of the government that they create. The Constitu-
tion's accommodation of that corollary, by enumerating individual
rights that the government may not invade, is the second, and perhaps
most conspicuous, attribute that distinguishes it as a charter of human
rights.
At the risk of preaching heresy, I will offer one simple admonition
about this second attribute: As human-rights achievements go, the
value of our Constitution's enumeration of specific rights, however con-
spicuous and however inspirational to our sister nations they may be,
ought not to be overrated. Let me explain. In so belittling the Constitu-
tion's enumeration of rights, I am referring neither to the Framers' ini-
tial decision to omit from its text all but a handful of what today we
consider fundamental rights, nor to the fact that its content was not
6. R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HIS-
TORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800 215 (1959).
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particularly novel.
As to the initial omission of a Bill of Rights: that decision in no
way suggests that the Framers considered those rights unimportant.
Rather, they were initially content to leave the protection of other
rights to the states, some of which had extraordinarily protective con-
stitutions. In fact, some of the Framers, Hamilton among them, es-
chewed explicit federal rights for fear that they might be understood
inferentially to permit the extension of federal powers beyond those
enumerated.7 Moreover, that the People themselves insisted on express
guarantees of certain fundamental rights as a condition for their ac-
ceptance of the Constitution evinces both the primacy and the foresight
of the People in creating - and limiting - government.
And as to the novelty of our Bill of Rights: Although it is true that
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man directly inspired the
Bill of Rights, the former in turn was inspired at least partially by the
constitutions of several of our own states, and authored in part by such
American notables as Thomas Jefferson and Gouverneur Morris.
I intend, therefore, to impugn neither the vigilance or the original-
ity of the Framers. My admonition boils down to the simple proposition
that merely to enumerate rights on paper is not to guarantee them.
Madison, himself, expressed doubts whether the "parchment barriers"
of declared rights would be effective in a republic.8 The rights of the
People - even if expressly enumerated - are not worth the parch-
ment they are written on if they are easily abrogated, unenforceable, or
anachronistic. So even if we cannot fairly credit the Framers of our
Constitution with the notion of enumerated individual rights, and even
if their articulation of those rights was less than original, we can still
acclaim the genius of a system that effectively implements, not just
enumerates, those rights.
A truly meaningful implementation of rights must, I think, include
at least three elements: stability, enforceability, and adaptability. By
"stability" I mean not necessarily permanence, but resistance to abro-
gation. A constitutional right is of little comfort if the government is
free whimsically to repeal it the moment it is invoked. Wary of the
fragility of constitutional guarantees, the Framers of our Constitution
devised an amendment process that all but precludes the diminution of
the textual rights. They made it extraordinarily difficult to amend any
of the Constitution's terms including the rights that were themselves
7. THE FEDERALIST, No. 84, at 537 (A. Hamilton) (B. F. Wright ed. 1961).
8. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 942, 943 (M. Peterson ed. 1984).
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appended by amendment.
With the hindsight of two centuries, that device might not seem
particularly remarkable. But comparing our Constitution's amendment
process to the permissive amendment processes that, until recently, pre-
vailed among most of our neighbors (with the notable exception of
Australia) evinces the Framers' wisdom. For the 150-year period fol-
lowing the ratification of our Constitution, it was common among Euro-
pean nations, for example, to permit amendment of their constitution
by the simple expedient of legislation. In fact, there evolved a practice
- as exemplified by the constitution of the Weimar Republic - of
qualifying every articulation of a particular right with the words, "un-
less the law provides otherwise." A legislative act could, under those
schemes, constitutionally abrogate any constitutional right.
Since World War II, however, a trend toward burdening the
amendment process has emerged. Such changes have been made often
with express attribution to our Constitution. The German experience is
most instructive. In reaction to Hitler's manipulation of the Weimar
constitution through parliament, Article 79 of the German constitution
requires that any amendment be accomplished expressly, and be ap-
proved by a two-thirds super-majority of both houses of parliament. In
practice, a constitutional amendment cannot pass unless supported by a
national consensus. And the German constitution squarely prohibits
any interference by amendment with the democratic order or basic
human rights.
The resistance of a proclamation of rights to convenient amend-
ment only goes part of the way toward full implementation of rights.
After all, without enforceability - that is, a mechanism by which to
enforce those rights - even an unalterable proclamation of rights
could amount to little more than an impotent proclamation. (In fact,
some would maintain that unenforceable pronouncements of rights are
not rights at all. But that is an issue that I leave to the philosophers
among us.) At any rate, the French Declaration of Rights of Man,
however well-intentioned and foresighted, fell to desuetude precisely
because it instituted no mechanism by which individuals could chal-
lenge infringement of the rights they purported to guarantee. The same
has been said of the extensive panoply of rights that the Soviet Consti-
tution purports to guarantee.
In the enforcement of constitutional rights under our system, the
judiciary plays the pivotal role. Since Chief Justice Marshall's holding
in Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
1991]
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duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is,"9 judicial re-
view has been accepted as a permanent and indispensable feature of
American constitutionalism. There is a sense in which judicial review is
decidedly counter-majoritarian. The judiciary does not sit to count
votes. It rests on the principle, expressed in the Constitution, that there
are circumstances in which the majority must yield to the greater na-
tional interest in the protection of rights.
Chief Justice Marshall was therefore quite understandably at
some pain, as Hamilton was in The Federalist, No. 78, to square judi-
cial review with America's dedication to government by the consent of
the governed. To cede to Congress the power claimed for the Supreme
Court would be to give the legislature "practical and real omnipo-
tence," making a mockery of the people's attempt "to limit a power, in
its own nature, illimitable." 10 The American people's chosen instrument
for keeping all their governors strictly within the limits of their as-
signed powers is the power of judicial review entrusted by that Consti-
tution to the Supreme Court.11 As Alpheus Mason has said:
Judicial review is an adjunct of democracy; without it, the supreme
will of the people, embodied in the Constitution, [c]ould be flouted,
and the distinction between fundamental law and ordinary acts of
Congress, would be broken down.... [Thus,] [w]hen the Court
upholds the Constitution and disregards an act of Congress con-
trary to it, what prevails is not the Court's will but the people's will
as embodied in the Constitution .... [J]udicial review sustains pop-
ular power; it does not disrupt it.1 2
The reception abroad of our Constitution's vision of judicial review
has, again, until recently, been lukewarm. In the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, a handful of nations, concentrated in Central America, adopted
schemes of judicial review patterned after ours. But they were excep-
tional; in most of the world, judicial review was not well-received. For
example, the Swiss ratified a constitution that expressly withdrew from
the judiciary any power to review legislation. England, for its part, has
also definitely rejected Blackstone's suggestion that the British courts
ought, in the exercise of their common-law powers, sometimes overrule
acts of Parliament.
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
10. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 88 (1962).
11. See id.
12. A. MASON, supra note 10, at 88-89.
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The concept of judicial review became infinitely more attractive
after World War II, once history has taught the somber lesson that
totalitarian regimes could make a mockery of constitutionally guaran-
teed rights in precisely the manner that Hamilton and Marshall had
feared 150 years earlier. Just as the movement began to stabilize con-
stitutions against convenient amendment, there emerged a trend toward
increased review of the popularly elected branches by a neutral branch,
shielded from popular control. I understand that varying degrees of ju-
dicial review have emerged in Germany, France, Italy, and Austria.
Perhaps the most important guardians of constitutional rights in Eu-
rope are the administrative courts (or councils of state) that review ex-
ecutive action for consistency with the constitution.
It seems clear that other nations have been influenced, at least
conceptually, by our Constitution's accommodation of the interests of
stability and enforceability in the implementation of rights. It is more
difficult to measure the impact abroad of the third requisite element of
meaningful rights implementation that I mentioned - flexibility in the
face of changing times. None of the Framers of our Constitution was so
optimistic or naive as to think that delineations of power on a piece of
parchment would prevent any attempted abuse of governmental power.
They were practical as well as wise men and we impugn their crafts-
manship if we assume that they were blind to the inevitability of con-
fficts among the federal branches, between the federal government and
the states, and between the individual and both governments. Of
course, they knew that turf battles would develop over what belonged
to which sovereignty, and how much either might infringe the liberty of
the individual. Such are the limitations of human imagination, that no
constitution could have delineated the precise boundaries of the author-
ity assigned the several repositories of governmental power. Nor, in the
nature of things, could the Framers have fashioned guidelines for the
resolution of the myriad collisions between power exercised by any of
these repositories, and the guarantees of individual liberty erected to
restrain governmental oppression whatever its source.
Accordingly, we know that the Framers' choice of general lan-
guage was deliberate. They were formulating a Constitution for the il-
limitable future. They wrote in broad outlines so that the past would
not too much govern the future. In recognition of the Framers' in-
tended flexibility, the Supreme Court has always breathed life into the
Constitution's words by reexamining its interpretation in light of the
changing times and emerging values.
There are those who find legitimacy in fidelity to what they call
1991]
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"the intentions of the Framers" or "original intent." In its most doctri-
naire incarnation, this view demands that judges attempt to discern ex-
actly what the Framers or ratifiers thought in 1789, or 1791, or 1866,
about the question under consideration in 1987 and simply follow that
intention in resolving the case before them. It is a view that feigns self-
effacing deference to the specific judgments of those who forged our
original social compact. But, I ask, how can we gauge accurately the
intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, contempo-
rary questions? All too often, sources of potential enlightenment such
as records of the ratification debates provide sparse or ambiguous evi-
dence of the original intention. Typically, all that can be gleaned is
that the Framers themselves disagreed about the application of particu-
lar constitutional provisions and cloaked their differences in generality,
or agreed only that the constitutional provision should not be governed
by their own specific intentions. Apart from the problematic nature of
the sources, our distance of two centuries cannot but work as a prism
refracting all we perceive. Those who would restrict claims of right to
the values of 1791 specifically articulated in the Constitution turn a
blind eye to social progress and eschew adaptation of overarching prin-
ciples to changes of social circumstance.
I frankly conclude that I approach my responsibility as a Justice
to read the Constitution in the only way that I can: as a Twentieth
Century American. I look to the text, to the history of the time of
framing, and to the intervening history of interpretation, of course. The
complexity and range of constitutional issues before the Court changes
to reflect the times. The Court's work is actually a daily mirror of the
battles of forces going on outside the Court. So the ultimate question
for me must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For
the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its
great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. The
Constitution's wisdom in other times cannot be their measure to the
vision of our time.
The vision of human dignity embodied in our Constitution
throughout most of its interpretive history is, at least for me, deeply
moving. It is timeless. It has inspired citizens of this country and others
for two centuries. If we are to continue to be an example to the nations
of the world, it will be because of our ceaseless pursuit of the constitu-
tional ideal of human dignity. The political and legal ideals that form
the foundation of much that is best in American institutions - ideals
jealously preserved and guarded throughout most of our history - still
[Vol. 15
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form the vital force in creative political thought and activity within the
nation today.
I close these remarks with the prayer with which Mr. Lester
closed his speech. "I hope that, [he prayed], during the third century of
the Constitution, the United States will accept that the obligation to
protect human rights is an international obligation to be accepted by
the United States themselves. I also hope that the United States judici-
ary will not retreat from the strong interpretation of the Bill of Rights
into literalism, positivism and historicism. If American human rights
are diminished, so are the rights of the rest of humanity."' 3 My re-
sponse is to repeat my conviction that as Americans we adopt our insti-
tutions to the ever-changing conditions of national and international
life, those ideals of human dignity - liberty and justice for all individ-
uals - will continue to inspire and guide us because they form the core
of our Constitution. The Constitution with its Bill of Rights thus has a
bright future, as well as a glorious past, for its spirit inheres in the
aspirations not only of all Americans, but of all the people throughout
the world who yearn for dignity and freedom.
13. Lester, supra note 1, at 561.
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Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
Justice Daniel J. O'Hern*
I am honored to be asked to write a tribute to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. for the Nova Law Review. One of the most difficult as-
pects about a personal encounter with this most warm human being is
the realization that we are in the presence of one of the great figures of
the twentieth century.
Should you go to the United States Supreme Court Building in
Washington, D.C. you will find a small museum in the basement with a
majestic statute of John Marshall. And in the hallway upstairs are the
busts of the Chief Justices who have served the Court over its years.
Those somber faces evoke our customary idea of great jurists. Justice
Brennan eludes this stereotype. His charming Irish wit and engaging
warmth have never seemed to be attributes that could be carved into
marble.
Yet Justice Brennan was the Senior Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court since the retirement of William 0.
Douglas in 1975. Appointed by President Eisenhower in 1956, Justice
Brennan served on the Court longer than all but a handful of Justices.
Marshall and Story sat on the Court some thirty-four years. Justice
Brennan was in his thirty-third year when he announced his retirement.
Although the era of greatest change in that span is known as that
of the "Warren Court," Justice Brennan often led the way with his
opinions on issues critical to the direction of the Court. Chief Justice
Earl Warren's biographer has recognized Justice Brennan as the Chief
Justice's most capable lieutenant and the one to whom "the Chief Jus-
tice was to assign the opinions in some of the most important cases
decided by the Court." This period could perhaps be better called that
of "the Brennan Court."
Many of that Court's decisions provoked strong criticism and con-
troversy when they were handed down. Yet the words "Miranda warn-
ing" are easily understood and casually accepted by television viewers
today who cannot recall the controversy evoked by the Court's decision
* Associate Justice of The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1981 - present; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1957. Justice O'Hern clerked for Justice Brennan during the
1957-58 Term.
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in Miranda v. Arizona' requiring police to inform a suspect of the right
to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. It is hard for us
to recall today that decisions such as Gideon v. Wainwright,2 mandat-
ing counsel for the indigent in criminal cases, or Mapp v. Ohio,3 pro-
tecting citizens from warrantless searches, came in the aftermath of
one of the most politically repressive periods in American history. Art-
ists, writers, public officials, could then be blacklisted, essentially
barred from society, if their views did not conform to the prevalent
party line. So great today is our self-confidence as a nation in the right
of each of our citizens to speak and write freely that even the most
repulsive speech, even the burning of a flag, is constitutionally
protected.
I do not think that I exaggerate when I suggest that Justice Bren-
nan is one of the most influential persons of the twentieth century in or
out of the law. His unrelenting respect for human dignity and individ-
ual rights in the face of bureaucratic forces of government has carried
the day in our country. By one of those ironic turns of fate, those from
the right who have most denounced his views may be reaping the great-
est benefits of Justice Brennan's respect for freedom and individual
rights. I say this because the yearnings for self-government that we
have seen in Russia, in Poland, in China, in Eastern Europe - indeed,
throughout the world - express a burning desire for the freedom that
we often take for granted in our society, but which has been so care-
fully preserved and nurtured by Justice Brennan.
Like many Americans, I accepted, with insufficient reflection, Jus-
tice Brennan's contributions to the life of the law, but I have had the
good fortune in recent years to be in attendance at various ceremonies
in his honor and have seen the respect, bordering on awe, in which he is
held by law students, lawyers, and judges, even by those who probably
would have never shared his opinions if they had been in the same posi-
tion of power. These experiences revealed to me the shining light that
Justice Brennan has upheld for all in shaping many of the freedoms
which we now enjoy. And every time I visit with him I learn something
more. I had occasion recently to attend a lecture on his contributions to
the law (will you believe it?) of land-use planning. His overarching
principle of decision - that the Constitution protects people against
their government - means that government may no more invade the
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[Vol. 15
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property rights of citizens than it may invade their personal rights.
And, finally, in the field of international human rights, which is
the subject of his 1987 speech at the Columbia Law School Bicenten-
nial, he explains how the Jeffersonian and Madisonian ideals enshrined
in our Constitution and Bill of Rights provide a charter for freedom
throughout the world. How paradoxical it must seem to the conserva-
tive right, which has denounced him so often, that these ideals so long
nurtured by Justice Brennan should be the wellspring of freedom for
leaders throughout the globe. Did not Vaclav Havel, the poet, play-
wright, and political leader of Czechoslovakia, express in his speech to
the United States Congress that world-wide yearning for freedom
under law that Justice Brennan has come to symbolize? Speaking of
our constitutional documents before the United States Congress he
said, "They inspire us all. They inspire us despite the fact that they are
over two hundred years old. They inspire us to be citizens."" Did not
Nelson Mandela, the long-imprisoned leader of the South African free-
dom movement, express the same respect for our constitutional ideals?
He said:
We fight for and visualize a future in which all shall, without
regard to race, color, creed or sex, have the right to vote and to be
voted into all elective organs of state. We are engaged in struggle
to ensure that the rights of every individual are guaranteed and
protected, through a democratic constitution, the rule of law, an
entrenched bill of rights, which should be enforced by an indepen-
dent judiciary, as well as a multi-party political system.5
Is not the preservation of the Bill of Rights by an independent
judiciary the enduring legacy of Justice Brennan's life on the Court?
This was the example that he gave.
In Justice Brennan's words to us, published here today for all to
read, he exhorts us that "if we are to continue to be an example to the
nations of the world, it will be because of our ceaseless pursuit of the
constitutional ideal of human dignity."
Leaders yet to be born throughout the world will be nurtured by
the ideals of the American Constitution if we but follow the course that
Justice Brennan has charted for us.
4. 136 CONG. REc. S1356 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1990).
5. 136 CONG. REc. H4136 (daily ed. June 26, 1990).
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An Appreciation of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
William A. Fletcher*
Thirty-four years is a long time in the life of a man, and even of
our nation. I wish it had been longer.
Justice William J. Brennan's years on the Supreme Court reach
back to a Constitution that was shaped by a different vision than our
Constitution today. When Justice Brennan was nominated by President
Eisenhower in 1956, the first Brown v. Board of Education" had only'
been decided two years before. The "all deliberate speed" formulation
of the second Brown v. Board2 was a year old. States were constitution-
ally free to weight the votes of their citizens as unequally as they
pleased, 3 so long as they did not engage in deliberate and grotesque
racial gerrymanders.4 The states were under very limited constitutional
obligation to provide lawyers to those accused of crimes but unable to
pay for representation.5 The practices of the police in investigating
criminal behavior were largely uncontrolled by the Constitution.6 Evi-
dence seized illegally by state police was admissible in criminal trials.7
Federal habeas corpus had limited power to free state prisoners con-
victed and imprisoned after trials that violated federal constitutional
standards.8 State defamation laws provided little protection to untruth-
ful but non-malicious statements about public figures. 9 States were free
to prohibit the sale of contraceptives, and even to prohibit the giving of
advice concerning their use.10 States were free to criminalize a wo-
* Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berke-
ley. Harvard, A.B., 1968; Oxford, B.A., 1970; Yale, J.D., 1975. Professor Fletcher
served as law clerk for Justice Brennan during the October 1976 term.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
3. Compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
5. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), later effectively overruled by
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
9. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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man's decision not to bear an unwanted child.11 The federal and state
governments were constitutionally free to discriminate against women
in employment and other matters. 2
During his thirty-four years on the Court, Justice Brennan helped
to shape the Constitution under which we now live. This b:rief apprecia-
tion is far too short to analyze in detail his contribution, but I can
sketch its outline.
Justice Brennan's approach to constitutional adjudication was a
sort of eclectic intentionalism. He was faithful to the vision of the Con-
stitution contained in the document itself, but the method by which he
determined that vision was pragmatic, catholic (using the word in its
non-sectarian sense), and aspirational. Justice Brennan did not pretend
that the narrow and specific "original intent" of the framers could de-
termine the course of constitutional adjudication. This, for him, was the
"facile historicism" of "persons who have no familiarity with the his-
torical record."' 8 Nor was constitutional adjudication determined by a
personal vision, but rather by a faithful "public reading"' 4 of the text
of the document, "public" both in the sense of a reading conducted in
public view and in the sense of reading on behalf of the public. That
reading was informed by the past but shaped by the present:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that
we can: as Twentieth Century Americans. We look to the history
of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpreta-
tion. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the
text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not
in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
11. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
13. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
19 U.C.DAvIs L. REV. 2, 5 (1985) (speech given on October 12, 1985, at Georgetown
University as part of its Text and Teaching Symposium). When Justice Brennan gave
this speech, it was widely thought to be a direct response to Attorney General Edwin
Meese, who had advocated a jurisprudence of original intent in a July 9, 1985 speech
to the American Bar Association. See, e.g., Taylor, Brennan Opposes Legal View
Urged by Administration, N.Y Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 2. It is obvious that
Justice Brennan's remarks were relevant to the ongoing debate about the proper role of
original intent in constitutional adjudication, but in fact his speech had been prepared
before Attorney General Meese spoke to the bar association and his remarks were not
directed specifically to the Attorney General.
14. See Brennan, supra note 13.
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gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and current needs.15
Justice Brennan's constitutional vision is necessarily complex, as
complex as the government constituted by the document. We may dis-
cern two primary strands.
First, Justice Brennan had a deep concern for the proper structure
and operation of government, which he combined with a sense that the
Constitution has meaning beyond the bare words of the text. Many
provisions - for example, that the President be a "natural born Citi-
zen" and have "attained to the Age of thirty five Years"; 6 that mem-
bers of the House of Representatives be "chosen every second Year";
17
and so forth - have such obvious applications that judicial interpreta-
tion has been, and likely will always be, unnecessary. But other parts of
the Constitution are much less determinate, almost constitutional
truths in search of a text. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Principal-
ity of Monaco v. Mississippi:m  "[b]ehind the words of the constitu-
tional provisions are postulates which limit and control."
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Baker v. Carr9 is at the
heart of the constitutional vision of the Warren Court. Chief Justice
Warren, in retirement, called it the most important decision of his time
on the Court.2" Baker v. Carr, of course, held the question of numerical
malapportionment of state legislatures a justiciable question, and was
soon extended to the national legislature as well.2 Justice Frankfurter
dissented vigorously.22 Justice Brennan, a Harvard Law School gradu-
ate, takes great delight in telling the reaction of Justice Frankfurter, a
former Harvard Law School professor, to his new colleague on the
Court: "I always taught my students to think for themselves, but Bren-
nan takes it too far."
The vision of Baker v. Carr was that of an activist judiciary, but it
was an activism based on a democratic vision of the equality of citizens
and the primacy of popular power. The decision quite deliberately re-
placed the previous constitutional order, and it did so without the com-
15. See Brennan, supra note 13.
16. US.CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
17. U.S.CONsT. art. I, § 2.
18. 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
19. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
20. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
21. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
22. Baker, 369 U.S. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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pulsion of a clear textual mandate. But for Justice Brennan, it was not
the personal vision of the individual justices that produced Baker v.
Carr, for "[w]hen Justices interpret the Constitution they speak for
their community, not for themselves alone. ' '23 And it was not a decision
arrogating power to the judiciary. Rather, it was fundamentally a deci-
sion empowering and legitimating legislative power by requiring that
legislative bodies be elected in a manner that accords with the deepest
ideals of American democracy.24
Justice Brennan's constitutional vision of the relation between the
state and federal governments cannot be captured in a single formula.
He read the Constitution to prefer national solutions to national eco-
nomic problems, at least where the national political process had indi-
cated its solution.25 But where the state and federal government each
had plausible claims to regulate private economic behavior, he was re-
luctant to impose a national solution as a stand-in for the national po-
litical solution that Congress could have, but had not, supplied.26 He
read the Constitution to require national solutions to the problem of
protecting individual rights against government, siding consistently
with those who found key provisions of the Bill of Rights incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment and applicable against the states. But
where the national Constitution did not provide a protection of individ-
ual rights, Justice Brennan actively encouraged the state judiciaries to
23. Brennan, supra note 13, at 4.
24. See Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L. J. 227,
232 (1972)("[T]he premise of equality of citizenship [is] a constitutive principle in
American politics for its own sake, as a means to no 'realistic' end other than a re-
newed sense of the principled legitimacy of the whole political enterprise.") (emphasis
in original).
25. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
26. See, e.g., Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679
(1981).
27. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 363 (1966); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 213 (1967); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969); Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 ("As is
well known, . . . I believe that the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment fully applied the provi-
sions of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states, thereby creating a federal floor of
protection and that the Constitution and the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment allow diversity
only above and beyond this federal constitutional floor.") (emphasis in original).
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find that protection in their own state constitutions.28
Our federalism is uniquely American. It is not a system for its own
sake, but rather a system whose genius is that it can always be used for
substantive aims beyond itself. Justice Brennan had a more direct un-
derstanding of this than most. He started his judicial career as a state
court judge in New Jersey for six years, the last two of them on the
New Jersey Supreme Court. I worked for Justice Brennan during Octo-
ber Term 1976. I remember the pride with which he recalled his opin-
ion for the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fary29 twenty-one
years earlier, stating that a criminal defendant was privileged from
having self-incriminating grand jury testimony used against him if he
had been a target of investigation, even if he had failed to make an
affirmative claim of that privilege while he was being questioned. Jus-
tice Brennan carefully inserted a citation to State v. Fary in his dissent
to United States v. Washington,"0 in which the Court allowed such self-
incriminating testimony to be used. He did not indicate in his dissent
the author of State v. Fary. One would have had to have been an un-
usually thorough student of the Court to know that the state "labora-
tory" in which the case was decided was the Justice's own.31
Second, Justice Brennan was deeply concerned about the relation
between the government and private individuals. The relationship goes
both ways. Private citizens affect and control the government. And the
government, for its part, acts directly on private individuals, both con-
ferring benefits and inflicting pain. As much as any person who has
ever sat on the Court, Justice Brennan has sought to provide the tools
by which we may both control our government and protect ourselves
from it. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 2 Justice Brennan wrote
for the Court, holding that damages cannot be recovered by a public
figure for false and defamatory speech unless uttered with "malice."
And in Dombrowski v. Pfister"3 he provided the phrase "chilling effect"
by which we now describe and assess constraints on the exercise of free
speech. In both cases, we see Justice Brennan equipping the citizenry
28. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
29. 19 N.J. 431, 117 A.2d 499 (N.J. 1955).
30. 431 U.S. 181, 194 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Fary, 19 N.J. at
437-38, 117 A.2d at 503).
31. See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 460-62 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (discussing Fary).
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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for self-government and for the control of their governmental
institutions.
In a separate line of cases, Justice Brennan tried, usually success-
fully, to protect individual rights by controlling government through di-
rect judicial order and holding it accountable for harm it has caused.
In Green v. New Kent County School Boards4 he spoke for the Court in
saying, "[t]he burden on a school board today is to come forward with
a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now." Justice Powell, who at the time of Green was active in
school board affairs in Richmond, Virginia, later told Justice Brennan
that it was this opinion, more than any other, that signalled to those
resisting desegregation in the south that the Supreme Court really
meant business. Monell v. Department of Social Services," in which
he persuaded his colleagues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided for damage
recoveries against subdivisions of the state, was a notable triumph. It
encapsulated the idea that government should compensate for harm it
has caused, and that government should be deterred from wrongdoing
to the extent that damage awards can do so. Justice Brennan would go
farther still, and effectively do away with the sovereign immunity of the
states themselves in cases where the states have violated protected fed-
eral rights. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,36 Justice Brennan
laid out in eloquent detail the historical case for reading the Eleventh
Amendment not to bar suit in federal court, but his more conservative
colleagues, who are ordinarily vigorous in insisting that the the Court
be governed by the intent of the framers, declined to follow Justice
Brennan's lead.37
In a wide range of cases, Justice Brennan has protected individuals
from the coercive power of government. The most numerous are crimi-
nal procedure cases protecting the rights of the accused. Out of the
many cases, I choose Fay v. Noia"8 which was effectively overruled by
the Court in 1976. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in Fay, estab-
lishing the principle that a state prisoner could not be foreclosed by a
state procedural rule from raising a federal constitutional objection on
34. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
35. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
36. 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
37. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Justices Powell, White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 109 S.Ct. 2273 (1989) (at 2289, Justice Kennedy; at 2295, Justice Scalia).
38. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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federal habeas corpus unless he had "deliberately bypassed" the oppor-
tunity to raise the question in state court. This was classic Brennan. At
one level is theory: Constitutional rights are too important to be lost in
a web of procedure and technicality. At another level is practice: In the
real world, defense lawyers do make procedural mistakes to the detri-
ment of their clients. And at the heart is a concern for fundamental
justice: Such mistakes should not be held against a client in a criminal
case unless their cure poses a serious threat to the state's ability to
administer its criminal justice system.
The most controversial are the cases in which the Court has pro-
tected private decisions of individuals in domestic and reproductive
matters against interference by the government. Of these, the most no-
table is Roe v. Wade,39 in which the Court struck down a Texas statute
criminalizing the decision of a woman to terminate an unwanted preg-
nancy. The case is, of course, about freedom from state compulsion.
But there is more to it than that. With the freedom from government
control comes the responsibility of individuals for their own decisions.
The constitutional faith of the Court, and of Justice Brennan, is that
the Constitution preserved for individuals the freedom to make these
profoundly important choices, informed by their own moral and reli-
gious views. This respect for the dignity, integrity, and deep seriousness
of the private decisions of our citizenry lies at the heart of the privacy
cases.
Two years years ago, Justice Brennan and his wife, Mary, came to
Boalt Hall for the Justice to judge a moot court. My wife, Linda, and I
drove the Justice and Mary back and forth between Berkeley and their
hotel in San Francisco. Linda said at the time that she was nervous
about driving through the city and crossing the Bay Bridge because we
were carrying a "national treasure" in our car. (As it turned out, the.
bridge didn't go down until a year later.) We do not have a formal
system in this country, as they do in Japan, for formally designating
individuals as national treasures. But if we did, Linda (and I) would be
first in line to nominate Justice Brennan.
The Justice had slightly over one hundred law clerks during his
thirty four years on the Court, the earliest of whom are now older than
the Justice when he first took his seat. All of us will tell variations of
the same story. The Justice is a warm and affectionate man. He was
quick to listen to us and slow to tell us we were wrong. He has an
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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amazingly retentive memory and a lightning fast analytical capacity,
yet at the same time was patient with clerks, who were, on many days
and on many topics, little more than law students. He helped and ad-
vised virtually all of us in the years following our year clerking for him.
He instructed us by his example how a genuinely good person conducts
himself in both his professional and personal life. And he inspired us all
by the strength and wisdom of his "public reading" of the Constitution,
faithful not to his personal vision and personal predeliction but to his
understanding of the meaning of that document in our government and
our history.
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Dear Boss: A Law Clerk's Tribute to Justice Brennan
E. Joshua Rosenkranz*
Dear Boss,
An unfamiliar voice on my answering machine was the first to tell
me you retired. He claimed to be a booker from Nightline who wanted
to ask a former law clerk some background questions about you. Bad
joke, I thought. The next message, a commiserating friend bearing the
same report, convinced me otherwise. Bad dream. Countless messages
repeated the theme. Try as I might, I could not rouse myself. The
harsh reality crept in: Bad news.
I did not return any of my numerous messages that day. As to Ted
Koppel, he would understand that I would rather speak with his booker
next time, when he bears good news. As to my friends and colleagues
who offered empathy, I was grateful. But I doubted that they would
understand how I felt, and I lacked the words and the energy to articu-
late it. It has taken me until now to assimilate the barrage of thoughts
and emotions your retirement triggered. Even now I write with the dis-
heartening caveat that my words could never do you justice. I pray only
that they do not cross the line separating heartfelt homage from maud-
lin mush.
In the moments after I eased the telephone receiver into its cradle,
I was puzzled not so much by your decision to retire as by my own
profound sense of loss. I thought I had prepared myself for the news.
At times, part of me even wished it would arrive already. After thirty-
four years wedded to the Supreme Court - forty-one years to the
bench - you deserve some time to yourself. And after seven years
wedded to each other, Mary and you deserve some time together. So I
would never begrudge you the rest you so richly deserve. Nevertheless,
the news left me with a void. While I probably could not have articu-
lated the loss precisely, I knew it was different from the loss that so
many in the general public felt.
Like others, I worry about the future of the law. From any legal
perspective, your retirement is a loss. The Court's liberal minority lost
* The author is Supervising Attorney of the Office of the Appellate Defender in
New York City. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Case Western Re-
serve University. He clerked for Justice Brennan during the 1987-88 Term.
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its anchor. The American people lost their most loyal and vocal advo-
cate for equality, liberty, privacy, and justice. Every downtrodden indi-
vidual in the country - the homeless, the needy, the victim of bigotry,
the religiously oppressed, the political gadfly, the handicapped, the im-
migrant, the criminal defendant, the prisoner - lost a sympathetic ear.
The Court lost whatever balance it had; you would no longer be there
to defy all odds and whomp up an occasional astounding victory as if
out of a top hat. Each of these losses is distressing.
As profound as these losses are, however, they are not the losses
that I most lament. Perhaps that is because everyone else is so preoccu-
pied with the survival of the Republic that my anxiety would be redun-
dant. More likely, it is because I consider the hysteria exaggerated.
I share (or, more accurately, I inherited) your faith in the Court. I
therefore have little fear that anyone could dismantle the jurispruden-
tial fortress you built over a lifetime. You built it of durable stuff -
compassion, justice, and eternal truths. The passage of time and the
heat of debate have served only to temper it. The onslaught of eager
new judicial personnel may fret your fortress's parapets, but will never
penetrate its walls.
Nor am I among those who bemoan your retirement as if it
squelched your dissenting voice. Even if you never utter another word
of comment on the law (an unfathomable thought, indeed), your voice,
immortalized in 140 volumes of United States Reports, will continue to
"soar with passion and ring with rhetoric."1 Like you, I am optimistic
that your dissents of yesterday will become next century's laws. You
have penned much of the script that the Court will follow when it
hands down edicts to my children.
So, you see, Boss, my confidence that the law and the Court will
survive your departure is not so much a slight as it is a salute to the
central role you have played.
Like everyone who has known you, I was saddened also by your
acknowledgement that poor health forced you off the bench. It goes
without saying that I feel your pain.
I confess that your submission opened up an emotion other than
pure empathy, a feeling as disturbing as it was elusive. It seemed at
first incongruous. Before I met you, I thought of you as a superhero -
a warrior of boundless strength, undying commitment, limitless com-
passion, incisive intellect. You reinforced and deepened that impression
1. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431 (1986).
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with every contact we had..As infantile as it may seem (especially for
one as irreverent as I), I was never willing to entertain the possibility
that any harm could penetrate you. When you publicly acknowledged a
weakness, I thought you would have to relinquish your superhero
status.
That thought passed quickly though. You could still be my
superhero without being superhuman. In fact, that made so much more
sense. In the first place, you have always been more content to view
yourself as a "flesh-and-blood human being[]" than as a "demigod[] to
whom objective truth has been revealed."' 2 More importantly, it is your
humanity, limitations and all, that makes you so worthy of admiration
and emulation. Your personal victories are all the more awe inspiring
when viewed in light of constraints you overcame to achieve them; the
most extraordinary feat becomes unremarkable when the absence of
obstacles preordains success. Similarly, I could never even aspire to em-
ulate you without some sense that you and I suffer some of the same
human constraints.
The sense of loss that struck me hardest and has lingered longest
stems from something that none of the pundits or commentators, in all
their hysteria, ever mentioned. Not that I can blame them for missing
it. It derives from an experience they never had: Your retirement
means the end of a line of Brennan law clerks.
I wonder whether you could ever fully appreciate how deeply you
have touched each of us law clerks - 109 in all. I trust that you could
sense our love and admiration better than I am about to describe it.
I went to law school because I wanted to be Atticus Finch, Harper
Lee's unflinchingly ethical and kindhearted lawyer who undertook the
hopeless defense of a black laborer unjustly accused of raping a white
woman.3 Law school taught me perhaps how to reason like a lawyer,
but Atticus taught me what it means to be a lawyer.
When I joined your Chambers one year out of law school, you
became my Atticus of the judiciary. I already knew how judges reason,
but you taught me what it means to be a judge. Not until I saw you in
action did I fully understand that the judge's final question in every
case should be not, "is this logical?," but "is this right?" As you have
so eloquently put it, "[s]ensitivity to one's intuitive and passionate re-
sponses, and awareness of the range of human experience, is ... not
2. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law", 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 3, 5 (1988).
3. H. LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
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only an inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial process, an aspect
more to be nurtured than feared."4 You taught me that "the greatest
threat to" liberties "is formal reason severed from the insights of pas-
sion."' 5 A judge "who operates on the basis of reason alone" can never
adequately address "[w]hether the government treats its citizens with
dignity," because such a judge cuts himself off "from the wellspring
from which concepts such as dignity, decency, and fairness flow." 6
Your opinions are rife with illustrations of these principles. For me
these principles come alive more in your approach to the death penalty
than anywhere else. It should be no surprise to anyone that you were
the first on the Court to argue that an execution is, under all circum-
stances, "cruel and unusual punishment."'7 That proposition followed
naturally from your conviction that everyone, "even the vilest crimi-
nal[,] remains a human being possessed of common human dignity,"8
and that the state's "calculated killing of a human being" amounts to
the most cynical "denial of the executed person's humanity."
You penned those words in 1972, fifteen years before my clerkship
began. Yet the words, and the sentiments they carried, recurred more
often during my year at the Court ihan anything else you wrote.
Whenever a state has executed a human being, you have issued the
same words, purporting to convey no more than the reaffirmation that
you were "[a]dhering to [your] view." In the dark-eyed night, when
most executions occurred, I often telephoned the Clerk's office to con-
vey that you were filing "the standard dissent," as if there was some-
thing prosaic about it: Another death, another dissent.
There wasn't. The words remain the same, but each execution is a
wrenching experience in your Chambers. Each execution sends another
pang through your heart. Even though some find you "simply contrary,
tiresome, or quixotic,"'10 you refuse to play any part in an injustice that
so thoroughly hacks away at "common human dignity." Your repeated
incantation in the face of majority will is your way of saying what At-
ticus captured in the precept, "before I can live with other folks I've
got to live with myself. The one thing that doesn't abide by majority
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id. at 17.
6. Id. at 21-22.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 290.
10. Brennan, supra note 1, at 437.
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rule is a person's conscience.""i It is your own statement, "as an indi-
vidual: 'here I draw the line.' "12
You defend that line with the vigor and valor of a knight defend-
ing the king's palace. I learned this one day when I handed you a draft
of a dissent from the Court's decision to deny a stay of execution. It
was a particularly troublesome case. This indigent prisoner would not
be facing execution if his court-appointed trial lawyer had been mini-
mally competent. The last paragraph of my draft contained the most
spirited attack that I had ever drafted. I said to you, "Boss, please
focus closely on the last paragraph. I think it may cross the line." You
took the draft with one hand and held my arm with the other and in-
terrupted, "Josh, when it comes to state-sponsored death, there is no
line."
We lost that one. The prisoner met his death on schedule at pre-
cisely 1:00 a.m. (midnight in Louisiana). At 1:45 a.m., I left my office.
On my way home I gazed up at the inscription that capped the Court's
towering columns: the facade of "Equal Justice Under Law."
The hypocrisy still burned in my mind the next morning, when I
delivered the news to you. I asked you the same question Atticus's son
asked after the jury of twelve white men returned a cowardly guilty
verdict: "How could they do it, how could they?" Atticus's answer was:
"I don't know, but they did it. They've done it before and they did it
tonight and they'll do it again and when they do it - seems that only
children weep."' 3
Your response, eloquent in its silence, was at the same time dis-
turbingly similar and comfortingly different. First, you held up five fin-
gers, a gesture whose meaning we understood all too well: "Five jus-
tices have the power to do whatever they want. They've done it before
and they did it last night and they'll do it again." Then you un-
characteristically turned away from me. As you did, I saw a tear in the
corner of your eye. To this day, I am not sure why you tried to hide it
from me. Didn't you realize that it meant everything to me to know
that Atticus was partially wrong? Sometimes the children are not
alone.
Remarkably, though, your tears are never bitter or prostrate.
Through thick and thin, you retain your optimism that one day - and
it will be "a great day for our country, [because] it will be a great day
11. H. LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 109 (1960).
12. Brennan, supra note 1, at 437.
13. H. LEE, supra note 11, at 215.
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for our Constitution"14 - the Court will look back at the enormity of
its mistake and adopt your view. That optimism, as much as your com-
passion and keen intellect have combined to make you a model judge.
As much as you taught me about being a judge, you taught me
even more about being a human being.
My mind wanders to you often, more often these days than even
when I first left those marble halls. The picture of you that usually
comes to mind is not the picture one might expect. It is not the portrait
that peers at me from the wall of my office, that robed figure who
would look austere but for the sparkle in his eyes. It is not the image of
you on the bench, listening intently to every twist of every argument,
hanging on to every word of your colleagues' questions for the slightest
hint of their inclination. It is not even the picture of you that I grew
most accustomed to seeing: the Boss, dwarfed behind that enormous
double desk that used to be Louis Brandeis', poring over an opinion.
The picture that comes to mind most often is this: You are talking
to someone in the hallway or on the stairs - a guard, a gardener, a
janitor. You pick up your previous conversation with him, and remem-
ber it as if he were your closest friend. You talk about him, and never
about yourself. You use his name in every sentence. Or you call him,
"Pal." You grasp onto his arm while talking, and you never let go as
long as the conversation lasts. (We used to call it "taking the pulse." I
would bet that each of your law clerks at some point dreamt up some
inane topic to discuss with you, just to feel the assurance of your grip.)
As you part, you reiterate how delighted you are to have seen him. And
he believes that he has made your day just by talking to you. He feels
that way not because you put on a good act, but because it is true.
That same tenderness permeates every one of your relationships,
whether with friends, colleagues, family, or passing acquaintances.
Your law clerks all felt it. I will never forget the first time I handed
you a proposed draft of a dissent. I had spent weeks planning it, re-
searching it, and writing it. In keeping with our routine, my three co-
clerks all tinkered with it before you laid eyes on it. You took the draft
and exclaimed, "Oh, splendid, Josh. Thank you very, very much." To
hear your tone, one would have thought I had just contributed pro-
foundly to the law.
I am embarrassed to confess that, for a moment, you had me be-
lieving that was true. Just then something drew my eyes to the book-
14. Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from
the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 331 (1986).
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shelf to your left. The bottom three shelves were filled with those tired
old books - probably 50 or so - with dusty red bindings. Each bore
the same title: "The Opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan." The first one
was dated 1956. As I turned to leave, my head still in the clouds, the
absurdity hit me. You were thanking me, as if the opinion would never
have been written but for me; as if the U.S. Reports would have had
twenty-three blank pages under the caption, "BRENNAN, J., dissent-
ing." You really meant it. But you had been authoring Supreme Court
opinions without my help for six years longer than I had been alive.
Even so, no matter how many corrections you make; you return
every draft, emblazoned with the word, "SPLENDID," followed by a
battalion of exclamation points. (The running joke is, we can tell how
much you really like a draft by counting the exclamation points. Any
less than four is the Brennan equivalent of, "this sucks.")
Your gentleness and generosity to those around you is surpassed
only by your graciousness. At the last clerk's reunion, one of my prede-
cessors recounted a particularly telling illustration, with which we are
all familiar. The only task, outside of our legal work, that you ever
permitted us to perform for you was to prepare your coffee when we
met with you each morning at 9:00 a.m. sharp. Like the Levites' offer-
ings, it became a ritual that was passed down from one "Coffee Clerk"
to the next. "Decaf, black, no sugar," was the formula. "Be sure it is
very weak, like dishwater." Finally, "always check to see how much he
drank, because he will never tell you if you've done it wrong."
There is a humorous, and equally telling, epilogue to this story. I
was the designated Coffee Clerk among my generation of clerks. (The
honor fell automatically to the only one of us who was unmarried and
therefore had no claim of entitlement to be in bed at 7:30 a.m., when
you arrived at the Court.) You polished off the cup on the first day. I
congratulated myself heartily for mastering the technique, and pains-
takingly adhered to the same formula every morning for a year with
equally satisfying results.
It was not until two years later that I learned the truth, Boss. The
revelation came from your last Coffee Clerk. As she tells it, one morn-
ing the whole group went down to the cafeteria because the Chambers
coffee machine was on the blink. She noticed you serving yourself undi-
luted decaf, and adding milk and sugar. Only through rigorous cross-
examination did she extract your confession that this was how you have
always preferred your coffee. As an avid coffee drinker, I am incredu-
lous at the grace of a man who could tolerate years of drinking our
tepid concoction just to avoid any possibility of embarrassing us.
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All these reminiscences bring me back to a comment that a friend
made not too long ago. It referred to the time you, Mary, and I went
out to dinner in Georgetown. We were with close friends, so I aban-
doned the formality that I might have displayed in public, and called
you, "Boss" - like we all did in Chambers - rather than "Justice."
Months later, one of our dinner companions commented to me that the
title sounded too informal, even disrespectful. I explained that he could
not have been further from the truth: "Boss" is a term of endearment,
a way of expressing both our love and our deep admiration for you.
"Boss" evokes all those wonderful images of you - on the bench deliv-
ering opinions brimming with passion and dissents rife with optimism;
behind your massive desk, scrawling, "Splendid," on a clerk's draft;
listening patiently to an admiring acquaintance; advising and caring for
your clerks. At least eleven other people in the building could be called
"Justice," but no one else merits the title, "Boss."
Just after you resigned, The New York Times interviewed a
would-be law clerk, who no longer had a Brennan clerkship to complete
her legal education. Her closing thought was this: "His clerks called
him 'Boss' and I don't think I ever will. I felt kind of sad that that
would never happen."1 I suspect she could not have appreciated the
full significance of her words.
I feel privileged to be among the group who will always call you
"Boss." I lament the loss for all those would-be law clerks over the
years who will not have the chance.
15. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1990, at B6, col. 1.
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A Labor Lawyer's Guide to the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990*
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I. Introduction
On July 26, 1990, in a joyous ceremony on the south lawn of the
White House, President George Bush signed the "Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990"lx into law. Before over 2000 invited guests, the
President declared:
The Americans with Disabilities- Act represents the full flowering
of our democratic principles, and it gives me great pleasure to sign
it into law today. . . .It promises to open up all aspects of Ameri-
can life to individuals with disabilities-employment opportunities,
government services, public accommodations, transportation and
telecommunications.2
In signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter
"ADA") into law, President Bush fulfilled a campaign pledge to pro-
vide people with disabilities with the same civil rights protections appli-
cable to women and minorities.3
* © 1990 by Evan J. Kemp, Jr. and Christopher G. Bell
** Chairman, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington,
D.C. and former director of the Disability Rights Center, Washington, D.C.
*** Attorney-Advisor to the Chairman, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Washington, D.C. and author of numerous articles on the rights and obli-
gations of persons with disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the authors. No offi-
cial support or endorsement by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or any other ageny of the United States Government is intended or
should be inferred.
1. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-
378 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.; 47 U.S.C. § 225, 611).
2. Statement on Signing the American With Disabilities Act of 1990, 26
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc 1165 (July 26, 1990).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2 (1990) [hereinafter
HousE REPORT] (quoting Statement of Vice President George Bush on Disabled
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The Administration strongly supported enactment of the ADA be-
cause of the staggering social and economic cost of disability depen-
dency and discrimination. As Vice President, George Bush stated:
On the cost side, the National Council on the Handicapped states
that current [federal] spending on disability benefits and programs
exceeds $60 billion annually. Excluding the millions of disabled
who want to work from the employment ranks cost[s] society liter-
ally billions of dollars annually in support payments and lost in-
come tax revenues.'
A private economist recently estimated that in 1986 total federal,
state, and private expenditures on disability exceeded $169.4 billion an-
nually.5 Discrimination undermines the governmental efforts at rehabil-
itation and education of disabled children and adults. The federal and
state governments spend billions of dollars annually on such programs,
the beneficiaries of which then find their entry or re-entry into the
workforce barred by discrimination. The ADA, combined with simple
self-interest, should begin to break down the barriers to opportunity for
people with disabilities. A shrinking labor force caused by the aging
baby boom generation compels business to turn to segments of society
that have not participated fully in the labor force, including people
with disabilities.6
The need for the ADA is clear. In enacting the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Congress made the following findings:
o Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individu-
als with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem;
* Discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommoda-
tions, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institu-
tionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services;
e Individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms
Americans, March 31, 1988 at 2).
4. Id. at 43 (quoting Statement by Vice President George Bush on Disabled
Americans, March 31, 1988 at 2).
5. Berkowitz, Monroe, et al., Enhanced Understandings of the Economics of
Disability Final Report, Grant No: NIDRR G008300151 submitted to the State of
Virginia Department of Rehabilitative Services, August 31, 1988, p. II-1.
6. Id. at 44.
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of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the dis-
criminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communi-
cation barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary quali-
fication standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
- Census data, national polls, and other studies have documented
that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status
in our society, and are severally disadvantaged socially, vocation-
ally, economically, and educationally;
* The Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, indepen-
dent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
* The continued existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination
and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from de-
pendency and non-productivity.7
As President Bush stated, "the statistics consistently demonstrate
that disabled people are the poorest, least educated and largest minor-
ity in America."8 The Committee reports describe the appalling socio-
economic status of individuals with disabilities. The House Committee
on Education and Labor made the following comments in its report on
the ADA:
According to a recent Louis Harris poll, "not working" is perhaps
the truest definition of what it means to be disabled in America.
Two-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64
are [not] working at all; yet, a large majority of those not working
say that they want to work. Sixty-six percent of working-age dis-
abled persons who are not working, say that they would like to
have a job.9
In 1988, men who reported a work disability earned 36 percent less
than men with no disability; in the same year women with a work disa-
7. Americans With Disabilities Act §§ 2(a), (3), (5), (6), (8), (9).
8. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 32-33 (quoting Statement of Vice President
George Bush on Disabled Americans, March 31, 1988 at 2).
9. Id. at 32 (citing Louis Harris and Associates, The ICD Survey of Disabled
Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (March 1986)).
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bility earned 38 % less than women without a work disability.10 Ameri-
cans with disabilities had a high school drop-out rate three times
greater than that of other Americans." Household income for persons
with disabilities is also significantly below that of non-disabled persons.
Fifty percent of all disabled adults had incomes of $15,000 or less in
1984 as compared with only 25 percent of non-disabled adults. 12 A ma-
jority of the people with disabilities who are not working and are out of
the labor force depend on insurance payments or government benefits
for support.' 3
The ADA was crafted to respond to the principal barriers to equal
opportunity facing people with disabilities. With respect to employ-
ment, the House Committee on Education and Labor identified the
following:
[T]he major categories of job discrimination faced by people with
disabilities include: use of standards and criteria that have the ef-
fect of denying such individuals equal job opportunities; failure to
provide or make available reasonable accommodations; refusal to
hire based on presumptions, stereotypes and myths about job per-
formance, safety, insurance costs, absenteeism, and acceptance by
others; placement into dead-end jobs; under-employment and lack
of promotion opportunities; and use of application forms and other
pre-employment inquiries that inquire about the existence of a dis-
ability rather than about the ability to perform the essential func-
tions of a job.14
This article provides an overview of the employment provisions of
the ADA, drawing on the statute, its legislative history, and pertinent
regulations and case law under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended.
The employment provisions of the ADA become effective on July
10. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, LABOR
FORCE STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 1981-
1988, Current Population Reports, Special Studies Series P-23, No. 160, Table D, at
5).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 33.
14. Id. (citing to Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcommittee on Select
Education and the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53-73 (1989) (testimony of
Arlene Meyerson, Directing Attorney, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund).
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26, 1992, two years after the date of enactment."' The substantive re-
quirements of Title I are drawn directly, and in many cases word-for-
word from regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. These regulations, first promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, defined terms such as "handicapped
person,". "qualified handicapped person," "reasonable accommodation,"
the definition of discrimination, and the prohibition against certain pre-
employment inquiries.
The entities covered by the ADA and its enforcement scheme, on
the other hand, are drawn from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, sections of which are incorporated into the ADA by reference."l
II. Overview of the Act
A. Who Must Comply
Title I applies to an employer, employment agency, labor organi-
zation, or a joint labor-management committee, collectively referred to
as "covered entities. 17 The employment prohibitions are phased in
over a four year period to give smaller employers more time to learn of
their obligations.18 Beginning on July 26, 1992, the Act applies to em-
ployers with 25 or more employees; on July 26, 1994, this coverage is
extended to employers with 15 to 24 employees. 19
The term "employer" includes virtually every form of business or-
ganization, as well as state and local governments, that employs the
requisite number of individuals for each working day for 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.20 Certain entities are
exempted from coverage. The federal government, already covered by
similar requirements under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, is not cov-
ered. 21 Indian tribes and tax-exempt bona fide private membership
clubs are also exempt.22
15. Americans With Disabilities Act § 108.
16. Id. at §§ 101(7), 107.
17. Id. at § 101(2).
18. Id. at § 101(5)(A).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at § 101(5)(B)(i).
22. Id. at § 101(5)(B)(ii).
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B. What Employment Practices are Affected
The ADA prohibits discrimination in all stages of employment, in-
cluding "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee'compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."2a This statutory list
of employment practices is not exclusive; Congress intended to regulate
all of the employment practices covered by the regulations implement-
ing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.24
C. Who is Protected from Discrimination by the ADA
Instead of providing a list of conditions constituting a covered dis-
ability, the ADA utilizes a functional definition that is almost identical
to the definition used in the Rehabilitation Act, as amended in 1974.25
The term "disability" is defined broadly to include not only persons
with actual handicaps but persons who have a history of or who are
perceived as disabled.28
1. Persons with actual disabilities
The first category of persons protected are those who have "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual. '27 Regulations implement-
ing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provide a definition of several
key terms used in the ADA's definition of disability and are cited with
approval in the Committee reports. As in the section 504 regulations,
the term "impairment" encompasses a wide range of diseases, condi-
tions, infections and disorders, 28 including: HIV disease; orthopedic im-
23. Id. at § 102(a).
24. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 25 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE RE-
PORT]; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 35 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (b)
(1988)).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (1988).
26. Id.
27. Section 3(2) of the Act defines "disability" as follows:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
28. The House Committee on Education and Labor states:
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pairments; vision, speech, and hearing impairments; multiple sclerosis;
muscular dystrophy; cerebral palsy; mental retardation; cancer; heart
disease; diabetes; drug addiction and alcoholism; and many other con-
ditions.29 Certain personal characteristics, such as age or left-handed-
ness, and economic or social disadvantages, such as illiteracy or convic-
tion for a criminal offense, are not "impairments" and are therefore not
covered by the Act.30
The more difficult question is what it means for an impairment to
"substantially limit one or more [of an individual's] major life activi-
ties." Neither the term "substantially limits" nor the term "major life
activities" is defined in the statute. The Committee reports do, how-
ever, shed some light on the meaning of this phrase. The House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor noted in its report that not all impair-
ments are substantially limiting:
A person with a minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple
infected finger is not impaired in a major life activity. A person is
considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first
prong of the definition when the individual's important life activi-
ties are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under
which they can be performed in comparison to most people. A per-
son who can walk for ten miles continuously is not substantially
limited in walking merely because on the eleventh mile, he or she
begins to experience pain because most people would not be able to
walk eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.3"
The Committee reports also sanction the list of major life activities
,provided in the section 504 regulations: "functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
The first prong of the definition includes any individual who has a
"physical or mental impairment." A physical or mental impairment means
(1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurolog-
ical; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive; genitourinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (2) any mental or psychological disor-
der, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 51; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 22.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 52; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 23.
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breathing, learning, and working."' 2
In most cases, it will not be difficult to determine whether a person
is substantially limited in a major life activity. A paraplegic is substan-
tially limited in walking; a person with mental retardation is substan-
tially limited in learning; a person who is deaf is substantially limited
in hearing; and a person with serious lung disease is substantially lim-
ited in breathing. 3
The Committee reports also indicate that mitigating measures
such as reasonable accommodation, auxiliary aids or medication should
not be considered when determining whether an individual has a disa-
bility. Thus, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in
hearing even if the hearing loss is corrected with hearing aids, and a
person with epilepsy may be substantially limited in one or more major
life activities even if the condition is controlled with medication.3 4
Two other categories of the definition protect individuals for whom
fears, myths and stereotypes rather than the impact of any impairment
have proven to be the basis for discrimination. This subgroup includes
persons who have a "record of" a substantially limiting impairment35
and those who are "regarded as" having such an impairment.36
2. Persons with a record of a disability
Persons who have a "record of" a disability include those who have
recovered in whole or in part from a disability, such as cancer or
mental illness, as well as persons who have been misclassified as having
a disability that the individual in fact does not have. 3
3. Persons regarded as being disabled
More controversial, and difficult to analyze, is the third prong of
the definition applying to persons being "regarded as" having a disabil-
ity. As with the other two categories of the definition, the third cate-
gory was adopted from the section 504 regulations:
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 22.
33. Id. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 52.
34. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 22; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3.
35. Americans With Disabilities Act § 3(2)(B).
36. Id. at § 3(2)(C).
37. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 52-53; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at
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"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical
or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a
limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such impairment; or (C) has none of the impair-
ments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section but is treated
by a recipient as having such an impairment.38
The "regarded as" part of the definition covers a person who does
not have an actual disability. This includes a person who has no impair-
ment. It also includes an individual with an impairment that does not
substantially limit a major life activity if an employer treats the im-
pairment as imposing greater limitations on an individual's activities
than it does in fact. Finally, where an employer treats an individual
adversely because of the possible negative reactions of third parties,
such as customers, co-workers or insurers, an individual with a non-
disabling impairment may also be protected. 9 Being regarded as dis-
abled focuses on the intent and state of mind of others rather than the
self-perception of the person with an impairment.40
Congress recognized that "disability" was not simply defined by
physiology but also by the reaction of others to a person's impairment.
Persons with stigmatizing impairments that do not limit a person's ac-
tivities may be victims of discrimination because of widespread fears or
stereotypes about the impairment or its effect on others. The Commit-
tee reports cite severe burn victims as one example of such discrimina-
tion. 1 As the Committee reports discuss, the need to define the defini-
tion of disability broadly to protect against societal discrimination also
was recognized by the Supreme Court in interpreting section 504.
The rationale for this third prong was clearly articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.42
The Court noted that Congress included this third prong because it was
as concerned about the effect of an impairment on others as it was
38. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, pt. 3, at 29 (quoting 45 C.F.R. §84.3
(j)(2)(iv)); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 53.
39. Burgdorf, Legal Analysis, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE 93-96 (1990).
40. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
41. Id.
42. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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about its effect on the individual. As the Court noted, the third prong
of the definition is designed to protect individuals who have impair-
ments that do not in fact substantially limit their functioning.43 The
Court explained: "Such an impairment might not diminish a person's
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially
limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions
of others to the impairment. 4 4
The Court went on to conclude:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include
not only those who are actually physically impaired but also those
who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substan-
tially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that
society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment.4 5
4. Denial of a single job for a single employer
Significant conceptual difficulties are raised when the definition of
disability is applied to an individual claiming to be disabled only in the
major life activity of working as a result of being denied an employ-
ment opportunity because of an actual or perceived impairment. It is
possible to argue that any adverse employment action taken on the ba-
sis of a person's impairment means that such person was substantially
limited in the major life activity of working or regarded as such by the
employer.46 Commentators have attacked this interpretation as ex-
panding the definition of disability to the point of being meaningless, 47
a conclusion reached by at least one court.48
The legislative history is unclear and inconsistent on this issue.
The House Judiciary Committee acknowledged that factors unique to a
particular job or job site that prevented a person from performing a
43. Id. at 283.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.2 (6th Cir.
1985).
47. Note, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Focusing the Definition of a Handi-
capped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 149, 170 (1988).
48. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C. D. Cal. 1984).
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particular job because of an impairment did not render the person sub-
stantially limited in working, but then noted:
However, if a person is employed as a painter and is assigned
to work with a unique paint which caused severe allergies, such as
skin rashes or seizures, the person would be substantially limited in
a major life activity, by virtue of the resulting skin disease or
seizure disorder.
49
It is not clear from the Committee's example whether the individual
with the skin rash is substantially limited in working or some other
unspecified major life activity. The Committee also noted: "A person
with an impairment who is discriminated against in employment is also
limited in the major life activity of working."50
Cases arising under section 504 have grappled with this question
as more and more persons with minor impairments have sought the
protection of the Rehabilitation Act after being denied employment or
discharged from a job. The weight of judicial authority under the Re-
habilitation Act indicates that denial of one job for one particular em-
ployer does not establish that a person is substantially limited in work-
ing.51 While a clearly defined legal standard has not yet emerged under
the Rehabilitation Act, several courts have looked to the number and
49. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 29. It is worth noting that the original
version of the bill, the "Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988," S. 2345, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), prohibited discrimination because of a physical or mental im-
pairment, perceived impairment or record of impairment, regardless of whether an im-
pairment substantially limited a major life activity.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); Jasany v. U.S.
Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985); Miller v. AT&T Network Sys-
tems, 722 F. Supp. 633, 639 (D. Or. 1989), Trembczsynski v. Calumet City, LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file, 8117 (N.D. I11. 1987); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
659 F. Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1987), affd without opinion, 863 F.2d 881 (5th
Cir. 1988); Wright v. Tisch, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 151, 153 (E.D. Va.
1987); McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 225, 228 (E.D.
Mich. 1985); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984);
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated,
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 1183 (D Haw. 1981).
However, one commentator directly involved in the drafting of the legislation pointed
to certain parts of the legislative history and the minority judicial view under the Reha-
bilitation Act, and interpreted the definition broadly to cover any individual who is
denied a job because of any impairment, no matter how minor the disability. See
Burgdorf, supra note 39.
1991]
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/14
Nova Law Review
types of jobs from which the individual is excluded, the geographical
area to which the individual has reasonable access, and the individual's
job expectations and education in order to establish whether a person's
employment opportunities are seriously affected by an impairment.5 2
The legislative history is only slightly more helpful in determining
whether a person is always "regarded as" disabled when denied an em-
ployment opportunity by an employer because of an impairment. One
committee stated broadly:
A person who is excluded from any basic life activity, or is other-
wise discriminated against, because of a covered entity's negative
attitudes toward that person's impairment is treated as having a
disability. Thus, for example, if an employer refuses to hire some-
one because of a fear of the "negative reactions" of others to the
individual, or because of the employer's perception that the appli-
cant has an impairment which prevents that person from working,
that person is covered under the third prong of the definition of
disability.53
Another Committee noted:
Thus, a person who is rejected from a job because of the
myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be
covered under this third test, whether or not the employer's percep-
tion was shared by others in the field and whether or riot the per-
son's physical or mental condition would be considered a disability
under the first or second part of the definition.
Sociologists have identified common barriers that frequently
result in employers excluding disabled persons. These include con-
cerns regarding productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attend-
ance, cost of accommodation and accessibility, and acceptance by
workers and customers.
This list of frequent workplace concerns is not exhaustive. It
illustrates, however, the attitudinal barriers that Congress clearly
intended to include within the meaning of "regarded as" having a
52. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); Jasany v. U.S.
Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985) (following the analysis set forth in
E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated,
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 1183 (D. Haw. 1981)).
53. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 53 (citing School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)); Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1989); Doe v. Centenela Hosp. LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, 8401 (C.D. Cal.
1988).
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disability under the Rehabilitation Act and now under the ADA.
It is not necessary for the covered entity to articulate one of
these concerns. In the employment context, if a person is disquali-
fied on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental condi-
tion, and the employer can articulate no legitimate job-related rea-
son for the rejection, a perceived concern about employing persons
with disabilities could be inferred and the plaintiff would qualify
for coverage under the "regarded as" test. A person who is covered
because of being regarded as having an impairment is not required
to show that the employer's perception is inaccurate, e.g., that he
will be accepted by others, or that insurance rates will not increase,
in order to be qualified for the job.
For example, many people are rejected from jobs because a
back x-ray reveals some anomaly, even though the person has no
symptoms of a back impairment. The reasons for the rejection are
often the fear of injury, as well as increased insurance or worker's
compensation costs. These reasons for rejection rely on common
barriers to employment for persons with disabilities and therefore,
the person is perceived to be disabled under the third test."
Case law arising under the Rehabilitation Act has not always in-
terpreted this aspect of the definition as broadly. For example, in For-
risi v. Bowen,5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
jected the claim of a utility systems engineer who asserted that he was
regarded as handicapped when he was denied a job because his acro-
phobia prevented him from climbing a ladder. The court, however, con-
cluded that "[flar from being regarded as having a substantial limita-
tion in employability, Forrisi was seen as unsuited for one position in
one plant-and nothing more." 56 Said the court, "[t]he Rehabilitation
Act seeks to remedy perceived handicaps that, like actual disabilities,
extend beyond this isolated mismatch of employer and employee. '57
Most other courts have reached similar conclusions.58
54. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 30-31.
55. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
56. Id. at 935
57. Id.
58. Lekelt v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909
F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); De
La Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affid, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th.
Cir. 1986); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984); E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp 1088 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated, E.E. Black, Ltd.
v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 1183 (D.Haw. 1981); Wright v. Tisch, 45
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 151 (E.D. Va 1987). But see Thornhill v. Marsh, 866
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5. Persons with a known association with a disabled person
In addition to protecting persons with disabilities, the ADA also
prohibits discrimination against a person who is known to associate
with a disabled person.59 The provision is limited to persons who are
qualified and who suffer discrimination because of their known associa-
tion with a person whose disability is also known to the employer.6 0
Efforts to limit the scope of the provision to relationship by blood, mar-
riage, guardianship or adoption were twice rejected. 61 The provision is
intended to prohibit employers from denying employment to a qualified
applicant with a disabled spouse because the employer is under the
mistaken assumption that the applicant will miss too much work caring
for the spouse with a disability. Of course, if the applicant is hired and
misses work in violation of the employer's policy on attendance or tar-
diness for this reason, the employer is free to discharge the employee
for poor attendance and need make no allowance even if the cause of
the poor attendance or tardiness is because the employee is caring for
the disabled spouse.62
6. Exclusions from the definition of disability
Excluded from the definition is any person who currently engages
in the illegal use of drugs if the employer acts on the basis of such
illegal use.63 Also excluded as not constituting impairments are homo-
sexuality and bisexuality. Additionally, transvestitism, transsexualism,
voyeurism, pedophilia and certain other gender identity disorders are
not covered. Persons who are compulsive gamblers, have kleptomania
or pyromania, and persons with psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from current illegal use of drugs are also not protected from
discrimination by the Act.6 4
D. Who is a "'Qualified Individual with a Disability?"
The ADA protects only those persons with a disability who are
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
59. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(4).
60. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 38.
61. Id., pt. 2, at 60-61.
62. Id. at 61-62.
63. Americans With Disabilities Act §§ 104(a),(b), & 510.
64. Id. at §§ 508, 511.
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qualified to perform a particular job in spite of their disability.6" The
statute defines the term to mean "an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."68 The individual with a disability must possess the necessary
knowledge, skills and physical and mental ability to perform the essen-
tial job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.6
Congress provided little guidance on the distinction between essen-
tial and non-essential job functions except to indicate:
As the 1977 regulations issued by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare pointed out "inclusion of this phrase is useful
in emphasizing that handicapped persons should not be disqualified
simply because they may have difficulty in performing tasks that
bear only a marginal relationship to a particular job." 42 Fed. Reg.
22686 (1977). For example, many employers have a policy that, in
order to qualify for a job, an employee must have a driver's license
even though the job does not involve driving. The employer may
believe that someone who drives will be on time for work or may be
able to do an occasional errand. This requirement, however, would
be marginal and should not be used to exclude persons with disabil-
ities who can do the essential functions of the job that do not in-
clude driving.68
In determining what functions of a job are essential rather than
marginal, Congress directed that a job description, prepared in advance
of advertising or interviewing for a job, be considered as evidence of
what the employer considers to be essential, and that the employer's
judgment must be considered. However, both the legislative history of
the ADA69 and case law under the Rehabilitation Act indicate that an
employer's judgment is subject to challenge and rebuttal by a
65. Id. at §§ 101(8), 102(a). "[T]his legislation does not undermine an employ-
ers ability to choose and maintain qualified workers. This legislation simply provides
that employment decisions must not have the purpose or effect of subjecting a qualified
individual with a disability to discrimination on the basis of his or her disability."
66. Id. at § 101(8).
67. HOusE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 64-65; SENATE REPORT, supra note
24, at 33-34.
68. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 55.
69. 136 CONG. REC. H2469-70 (daily ed. May 17, 1990); HousE REPORT, supra
note 3, pt. 2, at 55; pt. 3, at 33.
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plaintiff.1 0
The definition of "qualified individual with a disability" also indi-
cates that if an individual is not qualified because a disability prevents
performance of essential job functions, the individual may become
qualified with a reasonable accommodation. That an unqualified person
may become qualified through an employer provided reasonable accom-
modation is a central requirement of disability nondiscrimination law.71
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a similar two step analysis in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline.7 2 First, an employer must deter-
mine whether an applicant with a disability can perform the essential
functions of the position in spite of the disability and, if not, whether
the employer can provide a reasonable accommodation that would per-
mit the individual to perform those functions.7 3 In order to avoid "dep-
rivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear," courts
and administrative agencies "will need to conduct an individualized in-
quiry and make appropriate findings of fact. 74
E. Qualification Standards and Selection Criteria
The ADA provides that it is discriminatory to:
us[e] qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the stan-
dard, test or other selection criteria as used by the covered entity is
shown to be job-related for the position in question and consistent
70. See, e.g., Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1079-80 (6th
Cir. 1988); Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 454 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
71. Burgdorf, supra note 39, at 109.
72. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
73. Id. at 287 n.17.
74. Id. at 287. Although recognizing that blanket criteria that exclude an entire
class of disabled persons are disfavored because they preclude an individualized assess-
ment of ability, some courts have approved blanket exclusions in particular circum-
stances: Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3rd
Cir. 1989) (insulin-dependent diabetics excluded from being FBI special agents); Local
1812, American Fed. of Gov't. Employees v. Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C.
1987) (persons with HIV disease excluded from State Department Foreign Service po-
sitions); Sharon v. Larson, 650 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (visually-impaired per-
sons with bioptic lenses excluded from obtaining drivers license); Anderson v. USAir,
619 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (prohibiting
blind persons next to emergency plane exits).
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with business necessity .... 75
Drawn from section 504 regulations, this standard is intended to ensure
that persons with disabilities are not excluded from jobs by selection
criteria that are not in fact necessary for effective job performance.
While this limitation on selection criteria bears a distant relationship to
the disparate impact theory of discrimination developed by the courts
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,76 it is quite different in
several important details. First, unlike Title VII, a statistical showing
that a class of individuals has been disparately affected by a neutral
standard is not required. The neutral selection criteria need only screen
out "an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disa-
bilities . ,. ." As the analysis to the original section 504 regulations
indicated, "the small number of handicapped persons taking tests
would make statistical showings of 'disproportionate, adverse effect'
difficult and burdensome. '77
Second, the ADA appears to place the burden of proving that a
selection criteria is job related and consistent with business necessity on
the employer rather than the claimant, as is currently the case under
Title VII. The Committee reports indicate that the burden of proof
should be assigned as it is under section 504 implementing regulations
which explicitly required employers to justify challenged selection crite-
ria.78 Section 504 case law similarly required employers to show that
qualifications and selection criteria were reasonable, necessary and le-
gitimate.79 The Committee reports make clear that employers may still
establish physical ability criteria so long as they are job-related:
Under this standard, employers may continue to establish le-
gitimate, job-related physical requirements for a particular posi-
tion. Thus, for example, an employer may adopt a physical crite-
rion that an applicant be able to lift fifty pounds, if that ability is
75. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(6).
76. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989); Watson v. Ft.
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1987); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
77. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 352 (1988).
78. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 72; pt. 3, at 42.
79. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 409 (1979);
Strathie v. Dep't of Transportation, 716 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1983) Simon v. St. Louis
County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Bentivegna v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); Prewitt v. United States
Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 306, 321 (5th Cir. 1981).
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necessary to an individual's ability to perform the essential func-
tions of the job in question. Or, for example, security concerns may
constitute valid job criteria. For example, jewelry stores often em-
ploy security officers because of the frequency of "snatch and run"
thefts. Mobility and dexterity may be essential job criteria in such
jobs.80
Formal job validation studies were not required under the Rehabilita-
tion Act to demonstrate job-relatedness. 81
The Committee reports also instruct how the legitimacy of selec-
tion criteria and qualification standards relate to an employer's deter-
mination whether an applicant with a disability is qualified with or
without a reasonable accommodation:
The three pivotal provisions to assure a fit between job criteria and
an applicant's actual ability to do the job are:
(1) the requirement that individuals with disabilities not be
disqualified because of their inability to perform non-essential or
marginal functions of the job;
(2) the requirement that any selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities be job-related and
consistent with business necessity; and
(3) the requirement to provide a reasonable accommodation to
assist individuals with disabilities to meet legitimate criteria.
These three legal requirements. . . work together to provide a
high degree of protection to eliminate the current pervasive bias
against employing persons with disabilities in the selection process.
The interrelationship of these requirements of the selection
process procedure is as follows: If a person with a disability applies
for a job and meets all selection criteria except one that he or she
cannot meet because of a disability, the criterion must concern an
essential, non-marginal aspect of the job, and be carefully tailored
to measure the person's actual ability to do this essential function
of the job. If the criterion meets this test, it is nondiscriminatory on
its face and it is otherwise lawful under the legislation. However,
80. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 56; see also SENATE REPORT, supra
note 24, at 27.
81. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 352 states: "A recipient is no longer limited to
using predictive validity studies as a method for demonstrating that a test or other
selection criterion is in fact job-related. Nor, in all cases, are predictive validity studies
sufficient to demonstrate that a test or criterion is job-related." Ths Uniform Guide-
lines on Employee Selection Procedures (UGESP) do not apply to cases arising under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(d) (1990).
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the criterion may not be used to exclude an applicant with a disa-
bility if the criterion can be satisfied by the applicant with a rea-
sonable accommodation. A reasonable accommodation may entail
adopting an alternative, less discriminatory criterion.82
The Committees' explanation of the interplay was embodied in the
statute, which provides that an employer is not liable if a person with a
disability is adversely affected in employment because of the applica-
tion of a qualification standard that is job-related and consistent with
business necessity and the person with a disability cannot satisfy the
standard with a reasonable accommodation. 83
F. Qualifications Relating to the Safety of Others
The ADA also provides that employers may require, as a qualifica-
tion standard, that an individual not "pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals in the workplace."84 The term "direct
threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. '8 5 The ADA's leg-
islative history indicates that this provision codifies the Supreme
Court's decision in Arline.86 In remanding the case back to the district
court to determine whether a school teacher who had tuberculosis
would pose a risk of harm to her school children, the district court was
instructed to make:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk
(b) the duration of the risk . . .(c) the severity of the risk
and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will
cause varying degrees of harm.8 7
82. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 71; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24,
at 62.
83. Americans With Disabilities Act § 103(a).
84. Id. at § 103(b).
85. Id. at § 101(3).
86. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
87. Id. at 288. On remand, the district court concluded that 1laintiff Arline was
discharged illegally from her employment in violation of section 504 and the school
board was ordered to reinstate her or offer her front pay. Arline v. School Bd. of Nas-
sau County, 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988). The Conference Report also provides
that an employer may:
take action to protect the rights of its employees and other individuals in
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As in the ADA, the court concluded that if a significant risk of
harm was found to exist as a result of the individualized inquiry, the
district court must then inquire as to the availability of a reasonable
accommodation."8 The court indicated that "[a] person who poses a
significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the
workplace will not be .. .qualified for his or her job if reasonable
accommodation will not eliminate that risk."' 9
The ADA also provides that the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) shall publish and update annually
a list of communicable and infectious diseases which are transmitted by
handling food. Any individual having a communicable disease con-
tained on the HHS list may be denied a job involving food handling
unless the risk can be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.9"
G. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
The reasonable accommodation requirement is a key element in
disability nondiscrimination law. First mandated by Department of La-
bor regulations issued in 1976 to implement section 503 of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973, the requirement has been a controversial one since
its inception. The rationale for such a requirement was clearly articu-
lated by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in its 1983 report, Ac-
commodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities:
Discrimination against handicapped people cannot be eliminated if
programs, activities and tasks are always structured in the ways
people with "normal" physical and mental abilities customarily un-
dertake them. Adjustments or modifications of opportunities to per-
the workplace. Such employer action would include not assigning an indi-
vidual to a job if such an assignment would pose a direct threat to individ-
uals in the workplace and such a threat could not be eliminated by reason-
able accommodation .... In determining what constitutes a significant
risk, the Conferees intend that the employer may take into consideration
such factors as the magnitude, severity or likelihood of risk to other indi-
viduals in the workplace and that the burden would be on the employer to
show the relevance of such factors in relying on the qualification standard.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE CON-
FERENCE REPORT].
88. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
89. Id. at 287 n.16.
90. Americans With Disabilities Act § 103(d); see also HousE CONFERENCE RE-
PORT, supra note 87.
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mit handicapped people to participate fully have been broadly
termed reasonable accommodation."'
The concept of reasonable accommodation as individualizing employ-
ment opportunities is applied in the ADA. The ADA defines as prohib-
ited discrimination:
(A) not making reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless the cov-
ered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,
if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments
of the employee or applicant.92
The Committee reports make clear that determining what accom-
modation is required necessitates a highly fact specific inquiry.93 As the
House Judiciary Committee stated: "A reasonable accommodation
should be tailored to the needs of the individual and the requirements
of the job."" Reasonable accommodation, however, is defined in the
statute only by a list of examples:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include-
(A) making existing facilities used by employers readily acces-
sible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of quali-
fied readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities. 95
91. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individ-
ual Abilities, 102 [hereinafter Civil Rights].
92. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(5).
93. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 31; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 62; pt. 3 at 39.
94. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 39.
95. Americans With Disabilities Act § 101(9).
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The statutory list of examples is taken from regulations imple-
menting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,96 and is not
intended to be exhaustive. 97
The addition of "reassignment to a vacant position" settles a dis-
pute that arose in the courts under section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act where a majority of courts had held that reassignment was not a
form of reasonable accommodation. 98 The Committee reports indicate,
however, that efforts should be made to accommodate the employee in
his or her current position before reassignment to a vacant position is
considered and that bumping another employee to create a vacant posi-
tion is not required.99
96. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(regulation implementing § 504).
97. See Civil Rights, supra note 91.
98. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987)
("Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a
handicapped employee. Although they are not required to find another job for an em-
ployee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an em-
ployee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employers
existing policies."); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987); Davis v. United
States Postal Service, 675 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Dancy v. Kline, 639 F. Supp.
1076 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985); Alderson v.
Postmaster General of the United States, 598 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1984); Jasany
v. United States Postal Service, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1115 (N.D. Ohio
1983), aff'd on other grounds, 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); Wright v. Tisch, 45 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 151 (E.D. Va. 1987). But see Coley v. Secretary of the
Army, 689 F. Supp. 519 (D.Md. 1987); Rhone v. United States Dep't of the Army,
665 F.,Supp. 734 (E.D. Mo. 1987). Accord American Federation of Government Em-
ployees Local 51 v. Baker, 677 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
99. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 32; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 63. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is proposing to address the
issue of reassignment as part of its restructuring of the federal government's equal
employment opportunity complaint process. Under proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g)
(1990), reassignment is considered an affirmative action obligation of federal agencies
pursuant to section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
791(b) (1988), rather than a part of an agency's reasonable accommodation obligation.
The proposal limits the affirmative duty to reassign to non-probationary employees who
are unable to perform satisfactorily in their current positions even with reasonable ac-
commodation. When a non-probationary employee becomes unable, because of a disa-
bility, to perform his or her current position, an agency is obligated to reassign the
employee to a funded vacant position within the same appointing authority for which
the person is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation. The vacant position
should be within the same commuting area and at the same pay level or at the next
highest pay level available below the employee's current pay level. If the vacant posi-
tion has already been announced at the time the agency determined the individual to
be incapable of performing in his or her current position, however, the individual need
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With respect to alterations to existing facilities, the employment
title does not appear to require employers to undertake the wholesale
retrofitting of existing buildings in order to provide full accessibility for
people with disabilities generally, in advance of an individual's request
and without regard to a particular person's needs. Accessibility require-
ments applicable to public accommodations, on the other hand, focus
on barrier removal for mobility-impaired and sensory- impaired persons
as a class. The public accommodation title requires differing degrees of
accessibility for new construction major renovations, and readily
achievable modifications to existing facilities. The focus of barrier re-
moval as a reasonable accommodation under Title I is on the needs of a
specific applicant or employee with a disability and is subject to the
undue hardship limitation, not the much lower "readily achievable"
standard applicable to modifications made to an existing facility of a
public accommodation to provide access for customers.100
With respect to job-restructuring, the Committee reports indicate
that "[j]ob restructuring means modifying a job so that a person with a
disability can perform the essential functions of the position," and that
this legislation does not require an employer to make any adjustment,
modification or change in the job description or policy that an employer
can demonstrate would fundamentally alter the essential functions of
the job in question.' 0' Case law under the Rehabilitation Act is clear
that job restructuring does not require the elimination of essential job
functions nor the creation of a new job by combining essential job tasks
from other jobs. 10 2 Similarly, an employer is not required to lower per-
formance standards relating to the quantity or quality of an employee's
work.103 Technological advances have produced a wide array of prod-
not be reassigned but must be allowed to compete on an equal basis for the position.
Reassignment is not applicable to employees of the U.S. Postal Service if such reas-
signment would conffict with the terms of an applicable collective bargaining
agreement.
100. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 109; pt. 3, at 59-62. Of course, an
employer in a large metropolitan area where there is likely to be a large number of
mobility-impaired persons may well wish to make its existing facilities accessible based
on the likelihood that it will receive such a request.
101. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 109; pt. 3, at 59-62.
102. Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988); Wal-
lace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988); Dancy v. Kline, 44 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 380 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
103. Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (6th Cir.
1985)(section 504 did not require recipients to lower or substantially modify their stan-
dards) (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979));
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ucts that enable individuals with disabilities to compete successfully in
the workplace. The provisions of such assistive devices are a common
form of reasonable accommodation. Committee reports refer to adap-
tive computer hardware and software, electronic visual aids, talking
calculators, magnifiers, audio or braille material for blind and visually
impaired persons. Deaf persons can also benefit from the use of techno-
logical devices including Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf
(TDDs), telephone headset amplifiers, and telephones compatible with
hearing aids. However, hearing aids, eyeglasses or other personal use
items are not considered reasonable accommodations.0
Appropriate adjustment of examinations and training materials
may be required; training should be offered in accessible locations and
material should be offered in an accessible format.0 5 In addition, the
see also Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987) (agency not required to
provide stool or platform to person with dwarfism as that would reduce efficiency below
a tolerable level). But see Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (assuming
that lowering an employee's quantity of work standard was an accommodation); Brueg-
ging v. Burke, 696 F. Supp. 674 (D.D.C. 1988) (reduction in volume of work is a
reasonable accommodation but lowering the high degree of accuracy required as a crit-
ical element of position is not an accommodation), cert. denied, Bruegging v. Wilson,
488 U.S. 1009 (1989).
104. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 32-33; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt.
2, at 64.
105. Id. The obligation to make training accessible to all employees without re-
gard to disability, like other ADA obligations, applies whether the training is provided
by the employer directly or by contract with third parties. See Americans With Disa-
bilities Act § 102(b)(2). The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor
explains:
For example, assume that an employer is seeking to contract with a
company to provide training for the first entity's employees. Whatever re-
sponsibilities and limitations of reasonable accommodation that would ap-
ply to the employer if it provided the training itself would apply as well in
the contractual situation. Thus, if the training company were planning to
hold its program in a physically inaccessible location, thus making it im-
possible for an employee who used a wheelchair to attend the program, the
employer would have a duty to consider various reasonable accommoda-
tions. These could include, for example, (1) asking the training company
to identify other sites for the training that are accessible; (2) identifying
other training companies that use accessible sites; (3) paying to have the
training company train the disabled employee (either one on one or with
other employees who may have missed the training for other reasons), or
any other accommodation that might result in making the training availa-
ble to the employee.
If no accommodations were available that would make the training
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ADA explicitly requires that employers select and administer examina-
tions in a manner calculated to measure the knowledge, skills, and abil-
ities of the applicant or employee, rather than his or her impaired man-
ual, sensory or speaking skills.106
The provision of qualified readers and interpreters has been in-
cluded as a form of reasonable accommodation since the section 504
regulations were first issued in 1977.07 The committee reports also in-
dicate that provision of an attendant may also be an appropriate
program accessible, or if the only options that were available would impose
an undue hardship on the employer, the employer would then have met its
requirements under the Act. The Committee anticipates, however, that
certainly some form of accommodation could be made such that the dis-
abled employee would not be completely precluded from receiving training
that the employer may consider necessary.
As a further example, assume that an employer contracts with a hotel
for a conference held for the employer's employees. Under the Act, the
employer has an affirmative duty to investigate the accessibility of a loca-
tion that it plans to use for its own employees. Suggested approaches for
determining accessibility would be for the employer to check out the hotel
first-hand, if possible, or to ask a local disability group to check out the
hotel. In any event, the employer can always protect itself in such situa-
tions by simply ensuring that the contract with the hotel specifies that all
rooms to be used for the conference, including the exhibit and meeting
rooms, be accessible in accordance with applicable standards. If the hotel
breaches this accessibility provision, the hotel will be liable to the employer
for the cost of any accommodation needed to provide access to the disabled
individual during the conference, as well as for any other costs accrued by
the employer. Placing.a duty on the employer to investigate accessibility of
places that it contracts for will, in all likelihood, be the impetus for ensur-
ing that these types of contractual provisions become commonplace in our
society.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 60.
106. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(7); see, e.g., HousE REPORT,
supra note 3, pt. 2, at 71-72 (discussing Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir.
1983)).
107. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(1989). See, e.g., Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp.
369 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (readers), aff'd mem., 732 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1188 (1985); Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (readers);
United States v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 908 F.2d 740 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(University obligated by section 504 to provide interpreters for deaf students); Roths-
child v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1990) (school district obligated by section
504 to provide interpreter for deaf parents of pupil); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559
(9th Cir. 1989) (state corrections agency obligated to provide an interpreter for deaf
blind prisoner).
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accommodation.Y8
1. Who is eligible for reasonable accommodation
An employer's obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation
may arise at any stage in the employment process, including applicant
testing and interviewing, hiring and placement, training, promotion,
transfer, and discharge or retirement. Any time a person's job or disa-
bility changes, a new accommodation may be required or an existing
accommodation may have to be adjusted. The statute is clear that an
applicant or employee must be an individual with a disability in order
to qualify for an accommodation.
Second, as the statutory language indicates, the duty to accommo-
date is to the "known" physical or mental limitations of a person with a
disability.10 9 This provision codifies section 504 case law which indi-
cated that an employer is not obligated to accommodate a person's
physical or mental limitations of which it had no knowledge. 110 This
usually means that an employee must make his or her disability known
and request an accommodation before an employer has a duty to pro-
vide one."" Since it is a stereotype that all people with disabilities will
need accommodation, an employer should not assume, in the absence of
a request, that a particular individual will require an accommoda-
tion,"' and it is discriminatory to force an accommodation on a dis-
abled person who does not need one."13 Indeed, the ADA specifically
provides that "[n]othing in this Act ...require[s] an individual to
accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit which
such individual chooses not to accept."" 4
108. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 33; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 64; pt. 3, at 39.
109. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(5)(A).
110. The employer's obligation to accommodate is triggered only when the em-
ployer has actual knowledge of the impairment and the need for accommodation. Lut-
ter v. Fowler, 41 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1227 (D.D.C. 1986), affid, 808 F.2d
137 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Walker v. Atty. Gen. of the United States, 572 F. Supp. 100 (D.
D.C. 1983).
111. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 34; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 65; pt. 3, at 39. Of course, if an individual with a known disability is having diffi-
culty performing on the job, an employer may wish to inquire whether an accommoda-
tion would be of assistance. Id.
112. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 39.
113. See, e.g., Chalk v. Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
114. Americans With Disabilities Act § 501(d).
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Third, only an "otherwise qualified" individual with a disability is
entitled to accommodation. The term "otherwise qualified" should not
be confused with that term as used in section 504, where it meant
"qualified in spite of a handicap." Rather, the legislative history indi-
cates that "otherwise qualified" refers to an applicant or employee who
is able to meet all of an employer's job-related selection criteria except
the criterion the individual cannot meet because of a disability. Thus,
the individual must be able to satisfy all legitimate knowledge, educa-
tion, and experience requirements in order to be considered for an ac-
commodation.' 1 5 Providing a reasonable accommodation then permits
the individual to satisfy the remaining criterion by enabling the individ-
ual to perform the essential functions of the job.11 6
2. The reasonable accommodation process
Because the reasonable accommodation requirement responds to
the unique abilities and limitations of an applicant or employee in rela-
tion to specific job duties, it is not possible to set out specific rules dic-
tating what accommodations are required for specific disabilities and
specific jobs. Employers must have the flexibility to make accommoda-
tion decisions that reflect both the employee's needs and the particulars
of the job to be performed. The House Committee on Education and
Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources an-
alyze reasonable accommodation as a process:
The Committee believes that the reasonable accommodation
requirement is best understood as a process in which barriers to a
particular individual's equal employment opportunity are removed.
The accommodation process focuses on the needs of a particular
individual in relation to problems in performance of a particular
job because of a physical or mental impairment. A problem-solving
approach should be used to identify the particular tasks or aspects
of the work environment that limit performance and to identify
possible accommodations that will result in a meaningful equal op-
portunity for the individual with a disability.' 17
Frequently, the applicant or employee will know exactly what ac-
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 33-34; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt.
2, at 64-65; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1990).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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commodation is needed from prior experience in similar employment or
in coping with the disability on a daily basis. The Committee reports
recognize, however, that this will not always be the case. Where an
individual with a disability is unable to identify an accommodation that
will enable successful job performance without imposing undue hard-
ship on the employer, the Committees suggest that the employer under-
take "four informal steps" to identify and provide an appropriate
accommodation.
The first step is to identify the barriers to the employment oppor-
tunity. An employer must distinguish between essential and marginal
functions of the job. Next, with the cooperation of the disabled person,
the employer must identify the abilities and limitations of the applicant
or employee. The employer is then in a position to identify the essential
functions of the job or aspects of the work environment that the dis-
abled person cannot satisfy because of his or her disability.
The second informal step is to identify possible accommodations.
The disabled person should be consulted first and throughout the ac-
commodation process. The Committee reports indicate that, where nec-
essary, an employer may need to consult the state vocational rehabilita-
tion services agency, the Job Accommodation Network of the
President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, or
other employers.
The degree of an employer's affirmative duty to find possible ac-
commodations is not clear. A majority of the case law under section
504 has held that once a plaintiff makes a facial showing that reasona-
ble accommodation is possible, the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that no accommodation was available that would enable
the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job or that the
only accommodations would impose an undue hardship. Then the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the employer's evidence. 18 A
number of courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have indicated
that employers have a duty to use experts to identify possible accom-
modations. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
118. Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1989); Gardner v. Morris, 752
F.2d 1271, 1280 (8th Cir. 1985); Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d
1244, 49-50 (6th Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292,
307 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Simon v. St. Louis County, 735
F.2d 1082, 84 (8th Cir. 1984); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 475 (1lth Cir.
1983).
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cuit stated that, "an employer has a duty under the [Rehabilitation]
Act to gather sufficient information from the applicant and from quali-
fied experts as needed to determine what accommodations are neces-
sary to enable the applicant to perform the job safely."11" 9
On the other hand, it is clear that an employer's duty to investi-
gate possible accommodations is not limitless. A court recently ruled
that an employer had made sufficient efforts to accommodate an em-
ployee allergic to dust and chemical fumes when it transferred him five
times and gave him a respirator which he refused to wear. 120
The third informal step is to assess the possible accommodations
identified in terms of their effectiveness, reliability, and ability to be
provided without undue delay. The Committees emphasized that a rea-
sonable accommodation is to provide a "meaningful equal employment
opportunity," which the committees defined as "an opportunity to at-
tain the same level of performance as is available to non-disabled em-
ployees having similar skills and abilities."1 2'
The final step in the accommodation process is selection and im-
plementation of the appropriate accommodation. The Committees note
that although the employee's preferred accommodation is to be given
"primary consideration," the ultimate choice is the employer's. An em-
ployer is free to choose among effective accommodations and to select
the accommodation that is less expensive or easier to implement as long
as the selected accommodation provides a meaningful equal employ-
ment opportunity.122
3. Undue hardship
A particular reasonable accommodation is not required if an em-
119. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in
original); see also AFGE Local 51 v. Baker, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. 1393(BNA) (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
120. Rosiak v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 679 F. Supp. 444 (M. D. Pa. 1987).
121. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 66.; SENATE REPORT, supra note
24, at 35.
122. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed a district court's statement of the legal standard under the Rehabilitation
Act: "[A]ithough the government is not obligated under the statute to provide plaintiff
with every accommodation he may request, the government must, at a minimum, pro-
vide reasonable accommodation as is necessary to enable him to perform his essential
functions." Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Carter v. Ben-
nett, 651 F. Supp. 1299, 1301).
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ployer can demonstrate that it would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its business. a2' The ADA defines "undue hardship" as "an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when viewed in light
of four factors.
The House Committee on the Judiciary indicates that a definition
of "undue hardship" was provided in order to distinguish it from the de
minimis undue hardship standard applicable to religious reasonable ac-
commodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and to
differentiate the employment limitation from the definition of "readily
achievable" applicable to the removal of structural barriers in existing
facilities of public accommodations. 24 The Senate Committee on La-
bor and Human Resources and the House Committee on Education
and Labor indicate that "significant difficulty or expense" means an
action "that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that
will fundamentally alter the nature of the program."' a 5 A specified dol-
lar figure or numerical formula was not provided by Congress. Efforts
to create a presumption that an accommodation costing 10 % of an em-
ployee's annual salary would constitute undue hardship, were rejected
by the House Judiciary Committee 26 and on the floor of the House of
Representatives as arbitrary and unduly restrictive. 12 7
The statutory language and legislative history also indicate that
what constitutes a "significant difficulty or expense" is relative rather
than absolute and will depend on the particular employer's operation
and resources in relation to the nature and cost of the accommodation.
Accordingly, whether an accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on a covered entity must be made on a case-by-case basis, by ap-
plying four statutory factors:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed . ..
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the num-
ber of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number
123. Americans With Disabilities Act §§ 105, 101(10).
124. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3 at 40.
125. Id.
126. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 41.
127. 136 CONG. REC. H2470-2475 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
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of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type or types of operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or financial re-
lationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity. 2
While the factors indicate that larger employers may be required
to accept a greater level of cost for a needed accommodation than
smaller employers, the resources of the employer alone are not necessa-
rily determinative. The House Judiciary Committee report explained
why Congress adopted factors permitting the EEOC and the courts to
consider the impact of an accommodation on the facility providing it,
as well as the effects on the overall employer:
The ADA also sets forth additional factors which are specifi-
cally addressed to entities which operate more than one facility.
Concerns were expressed that a court would look only at the re-
sources of the local facility involved, or only at the resources of the
parent company, in determining whether an accommodation im-
posed an undue hardship. The Committee believes that both of
these alternatives are unsatisfactory. Instead, the Committee in-
tends that the resources of both the local facility involved and of
the parent company as well as the relationship between the two, be
relevant to the undue hardship determination.
The Committee is responding particularly to concerns about
employers who operate in depressed or rural areas and are operat-
ing at the margin or at a loss. Specifically, concern was expressed
that an employer may elect to close a store if it is losing money or
only marginally profitable rather than undertake significant invest-
ments to make reasonable accommodations to employees with disa-
bilities. The Committee does not intend for the requirements of the
Act to result in the closure of neighborhood stores or in loss of jobs.
The Committee intends for courts to consider in determining "un-
due hardship," whether the local store is threatened with closure by
the parent company or is faced with job loss as a result of the re-
quirements of this Act.129
The House Education and Labor Committee report also notes that
additional factors may be considered in determining whether an accom-
128. Americans With Disabilities Act § 101(10)(B).
129. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 40-41.
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modation imposes an undue hardship. These factors include whether an
accommodation may be shared by or used by other applicants and em-
ployees with disabilities and whether external funding, e.g., a tax
credit, tax deduction, 130 or payment from a vocational rehabilitation
agency, is available to pay for all or a part of the cost of an accommo-
dation. Only the net cost to the employer should be used in determining
undue hardship where external funding is received or could be
received.'
H. Illegal Use of Drugs and Alcohol
While persons who are addicted to the use of illegal drugs have a
"disability" as that term is defined under the ADA,13 2 the illegal use of
drugs',3 removes a person from the protection of the Act when an em-
ployer discharges or fails to hire a person because of such drug us-
age. 34 However, an individual who has successfully completed a drug
rehabilitation program or who is erroneously regarded as illegally using
drugs or who is successfully rehabilitated and is no longer using drugs
illegally is not excluded from the definition of a "qualified individual
with a disability."'' 3 5 Congress was concerned that the ADA not be
130. As amended in 1990, the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction of up
to $15,000 per year for expenses associated with the removal of qualified architectural
and transportation barriers. The 1990 amendment also permits eligible small businesses
to receive a tax credit for certain costs of compliance with the ADA. An eligible small
business is one whose gross receipts do not exceed $1,000,000 or whose workforce does
not consist of more than 30 full-time workers. Qualifying businesses may claim a credit
of up to 50 percent of eligible access expenditures that exceed $250 but do not exceed
$10,250. Examples of eligible access expenditures include the necessary and reasonable
costs of removing barriers, providing readers and interpreters, and acquiring or modify-
ing equipment or devices.
131. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 69.
132. Id. at pt. 2, at 51; pt. 3, at 28.
133. A "drug" is defined in section 101(6)(B) as a "controlled substance" as
defined in schedules I through V of the Controlled Substance Act. In general, these
schedules include drugs with varying degrees of potential for addiction and abuse, some
of which also have legitimate medical uses and which may be prescribed by a
physician.
134. Americans With Disabilities Act § 104(a). In addition, such an individual is
also removed from the definition of an individual with a disability pursuant to section
510(a). A similar provision was made applicable to Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 by amending the latter act's definition of an "individual with handicaps." See 29
U.S.C. § 706(8).
135. Americans With Disabilities Act § 104(b).
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used as a weapon by persons using illegal drugs against an employer
who was trying to rid its workplace of drugs and drug users. The Con-
ference Committee made this point plainly:
The provision excluding an individual who engages in the illegal
use of drugs from protection is intended to ensure that employers
may discharge or deny employment to persons who illegally use
drugs on that basis, without fear of being held liable for discrimi-
nation. The provision is not intended to be limited to persons who
use drugs on the day of, or within a matter of days or weeks before,
the employment action in question. Rather, the provision is in-
tended to apply to a person whose illegal use of drugs occurred
recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person's drug
use is current.136
In order to protect employers, the ADA specifically provides that
an employer may prohibit the use of illegal drugs or alcohol in the
workplace and to prohibit employees from being under the influence of
illegal drugs or alcohol while on the job. An employer may hold an
employee who is an alcoholic or drug user to the same standards of
performance and conduct that it requires of all its employees even if
performance or behavior problems result from the illegal use of drugs
or the use of alcohol. Employers may comply with the requirements of
the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, S  and otherwise comply with
any regulations pertaining to drug or alcohol use by employees in in-
dustries regulated by the Department of Defense, the Department of
Transportation, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.138 Finally,
the ADA explicitly permits employers to utilize drug tests to screen
applicants and employees and to take action based upon the results of
such a test. 39
136. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 64.
137. 41 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.
138. Americans With Disabilities Act § 104(c).
139. Id. at § 104(d)(2). A drug test is not considered a medical examination
under the ADA. § 104(d)(1). A person with a positive drug test that indicates the
illegal use of drugs still may challenge the accuracy of the test and allege that he or
she is being "erroneously regarded" as an illegal user of drugs pursuant to section
104(b)(3). The ADA itself does not provide any standard by which the accuracy or
validity of a drug test result is to be determined. H.R. REP. No. 101-596, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 65 (1990).
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I. Medical Examinations and Inquiries About Disability
Historically, job applications and medical examinations frequently
inquired about an applicant's general health and fitness and were used
as screening devices to exclude persons with disabilities from positions
without any inquiry into an applicant's capacity to perform the position
in question.140 The ADA strictly regulates such inquiries. An employer
may not, in a job application or in an interview, ask whether an appli-
cant has a disability or about the nature or severity of a disability. The
Act permits employers to inquire of an applicant's ability to do essen-
tial job functions. An employer may require post-offer, pre-entry medi-
cal examinations if required of all new employees for a particular job
classification (e.g., firefighters, and police officers) regardless of disabil-
ity. The medical examination is allowed if conducted prior to assuming
job duties and if the results of the examination are used in compliance
with the legislation, including provisions for a reasonable accommoda-
tion for an applicant whose medical examination reveals an inability to
perform an essential function of the job. The results of such an exami-
nation must be kept confidential and in separate medical files, except
where it is necessary to inform supervisors or managers of work restric-
tions or needed accommodations, safety personnel if the disability
might require emergency treatment or government officials investigat-
ing compliance with the ADA. 41
Inquiries concerning an employee's health or disability status must
be job-related and consistent with business necessity. 4 Examinations
and inquiries permitted under this standard include those mandated by
federal, state or local law applicable to the transportation industry and
other industries where public safety is a paramount concern ."4 Also
explicitly permitted are voluntary medical examinations offered by an
employer as part of an employee health program."4 Examinations and
inquiries of current employees are subject to the same confidentiality
restrictions and the same prohibition against discriminatory use of the
information that are applicable to pre-employment inquiries. 145
140. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 37; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 73.
141. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(c)(2).
142. Id. at § 102(c)(4)(A).
143. Id.
144. Id. at § 102(c)(4)(B).
145. Id. at § 102(c)(4)(C).
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J. Enforcement and Administration
The ADA incorporates the powers, remedies and procedures of Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for its enforcement scheme. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is charged with responsi-
bility for implementing and enforcing the ADA's employment provi-
sions, except with respect to litigation against state and local govern-
ments, which is granted to the-Attorney General. 46 The Commission
must issue substantive regulations by July 26, 1991.141 An individual
who believes he or she has been discriminated against in employment
on the basis of disability may file an administrative charge of discrimi-
nation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or with
state or local fair employment agencies having work-sharing agree-
ments with the Commission. In addition to possible litigation by the
Commission, a charging party may institute a private action in federal
or state court after receiving a right to sue letter from the Commission.
The remedies available for violations of the ADA are the same as
under Title VII: equitable and injunctive relief including hiring or rein-
statement, backpay, restoration of benefits148 and attorneys' fees for the
prevailing party.149 The ADA also prohibits any covered entity from
retaliating against any individual who opposes a practice he or she be-
lieves is unlawful under the Act or who files a charge or participates in
any proceeding under the ADA. Also prohibited is any attempt to co-
erce, intimidate or threaten any person from the enjoyment of any right
provided by the ADA.150
146. Section 107(a) incorporates by reference §§ 705, 706, 707 and 710 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, -4,-5,-6,-8,-9 (1988).
147. Americans With Disabilities Act § 106.
148. Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1988).
149. Curiously, the ADA has two different attorneys' fees provisions, applicable
to employment litigation. Section 706(k) of Title VII, provides for attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party other the the government as part of the award of court costs. Section
505 provides for attorneys' fees for administrative and judicial proceedings and specifi-
cally authorizes the award of "litigation expenses." Americans With Disabilities Act §
505.
150. Id. at § 503.
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Burdens of Proof Under Title VII in the 90's: Wards
Cove vs. The Civil Rights Act of 1990
By Kenni F. Judd*
Introduction
Equal employment opportunity ("EEO") law, despite a roaring
start in the late 1960's and early 70's,1 fell into a quiet decline in the
1980's, under the Reagan/Bush administrations. Agency enforcement
declined,2 while scant attorneys' fee awards, coerced fee waivers and
other difficulties discouraged private representation of EEO plaintiffs. 3
Last term, the United States Supreme Court rendered a series of sig-
nificant EEO decisions.4 These decisions substantially altered the
* Kenni F. Judd is a commercial litigation associate with Holland & Knight. She
graduated with highest honors from the University of Florida College of Law and
earned a Masters in Business Administration, also with highest honors, in 1986. She is
currently admitted to practice before the United States District Courts for the South-
ern and Middle Districts of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as well
as the Florida state courts.
1. During its first five years of existence, the EEOC investigated more than 8,000
charges of sex discrimination; in 1972, the number of charges filed was still increasing.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2137, 2139.
2. The EEOC filed seventy percent fewer cases in 1982 than in 1981. Options for
Conducting a Pay Equity Study of Federal Pay and Classification Systems, Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1986) (testimony of Judy
Goldsmith, President, National Organization for Women). Ms. Goldsmith attributes
the decline to personnel and budget cuts overseen by President Reagan and to the
appointment of "high level personnel who are hostile to effective enforcement." Id. at
236-37; contra id. at 662 (testimony of Clarence Thomas, Chair, EEOC) (most of the
10,000 EEO charges filed annually with the EEOC resolved within one year).
3. Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiffs Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation:
A Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 LAB. LAW. (No. 1) 63 (Winter 1989); see also Bronner,
Civil Rights Act of 1990: Inside the Negotiations, Boston Globe, July 23, 1990, Na-
tional/Foreign Section, at 1 (judges appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush per-
ceived as less likely to rule in favor of discrimination victims); Weiner, With Addition
of Souter to Court, Conservative Bulwark is in Place, Miami Herald, Oct. 14, 1990, at
18A (federal "bench has grown increasingly hostile to claims brought by women and
minorities") (quote attributed to Nan Aron, Alliance for Justice).
4. The primary decisions targeted by the Civil Rights Act of 1990 are: Wards
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framework for determining EEO cases by raising significant additional
barriers to potential discrimination suits. Congress reacted by passing
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, S. 2104 (1990), designed to
restore and, in a few instances, strengthen the rights and remedies pre-
viously available to EEO plaintiffs.
Despite substantial amendments aimed at making the bill accept-
able to the Bush administration, 5 the proposed Civil Rights Act contin-
ues to face the threat of a presidential veto. The veto threat is based
primarily upon the Act's provisions concerning the burden of proof in
cases based upon "unintentional" discrimination.6 President Bush, and
other opponents of the bill, claim that the bill will lead to the use of
hiring quotas.7 According to the bill's detractors, employers will insti-
tute hiring quotas to ensure that their work forces contain appropriate
percentages of women and racial, ethnic or religious minorities to avoid
potential litigation in which they would be required to demonstrate the
job-related nature of their employment practices.8 The bill's propo-
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989) (burden of proof and evidentiary
standards in disparate impact cases); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989) (finality
of judgments mandating affirmative action programs); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
109 S.Ct. 2261 (1989) (statutes of limitations for challenging discriminatory seniority
systems); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989) (burden of proof in
mixed motive cases); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988) (en-
forcement of contracts under section 1981).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 68-75. The initial version of the bill (H.R.
4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., introduced February 7, 1990) and the version which
passed the Senate (S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.) are included in an Appendix to this
article. The Senate passed the amended bill by a 65-34 vote, despite the threatened
presidential veto. Senators OK Bill to Protect Civil Rights, Miami Herald, July 19,
1990, at IA, col. 1; Editorial, Fill Civil-Rights Needs, Miami Herald, August 2, 1990,
at 20A, col. 1. The House of Representatives subsequently passed a substantially iden-
tical amended bill by a vote of 272-154. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CoNG. DIG.
196, 205 (August-September 1990).
6. See, e.g., A Red Herring in Black and White, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1990, at
14A; Edelman, How Will the President Play His Civil Rights Card?, Broward Review,
June 19, 1990, at 2.
7. "The number one concern that has been voiced by the bill's opponents was the
danger that the original language would result in hiring quotas." The Civil Rights Act
of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 214 (statement of Senator Dodd); Senators OK Bill to Pro-
tect Civil Rights, Miami Herald, July 19, 1990, at IA, 12A ("Most of the controversy"
surrounding the bill comes from provisions overruling Wards Cove).
8. E.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 213 (statement of Sena-
tor Hatch). The bill's opponents have ignored the holding of Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982), that a "bottom line" appropriate racial balance is no defense to a
Title VII claim. The proposed Civil Rights-Act does not purport to overrule Teal. Ad-
[Vol. 15
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nents, on the other hand, claim that the bill, for the most part, simply
re-establishes long-standing precedent concerning the burden of proof
in such cases. 9 Advocates of the bill further stress the absence of any
evidence that the standards to be restored by the bill have encouraged
the use of quotas. 10 These burden of proof issues will be the primary
focus of this article. 11
ditionally, at least some of the quota fears are based on misperceptions concerning the
availability of compensatory and punitive damages. The bill permits such damages only
in cases of intentional discrimination, not in adverse impact cases. See CONG. DIG. at
210 (statement of Senator Kennedy).
9. E.g., Quota Hogwash-Bogus Objections to Civil-Rights Bill, Seattle Times,
July 24, 1990, at A6 [hereinafter Quota Hogwash]; Editorial, Battle of the Minorities,
Miami Herald, May 28, 1990, at 14A, col. 1.
10. A Red Herring in Black and White, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1990, at 14A
("The best evidence of that danger [quota hiring] would be that from 1971 to 1989,
many employers in fact adopted quotas. But the Administration cites no such evi-
dence."); Battle of the Minorities, Miami Herald, May 28, 1990, at 14A ("When
pressed to say when in the past these criteria had created such quotas, Mr. Thornburgh
couldn't."); The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 218 (statement of Senator
Simon); see also infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
11. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 also:
a. seeks to assure the availability of counsel to prospective plaintiffs by prohibiting
settlements predicated upon fee waivers. This section simply provides that cases may
not be settled, either by stipulation or dismissal, unless the parties or their counsel
attest to the court that a waiver of all or substantially all attorney's fees was not com-
pelled as a condition of the settlement. Such a provision is a necessary and predictable
solution to the moral, ethical and financial dilemma facing the plaintiff's lawyer con-
fronted with a settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees. See Terry, supra note
3, at 71.
b. authorizes compensatory and punitive damage awards in cases of intentional
discrimination. These remedies were previously available only to victims of race dis-
crimination under section 1981, but not to Title VII or age discrimination claimants.
According to Senator Graham, a ten-year study of intentional race discrimination cases
found that no damages were awarded in 85 percent of the cases; the average award in
the remaining fifteen percent of the cases was about $40,000.00. The Civil Rights Act
of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 220 (remarks of Senator Graham, D-FL). If cases involving
allegations of intentional discrimination on other bases follow this pattern, the resulting
litigation is unlikely to pose a critical problem for employers. Moreover, as Senator
Kennedy put it, "[w]omen and minorities are not second-class citizens; they do not
deserve second-class remedies under the civil rights laws." Id. at 208.
c. limits challenges to court-ordered affirmative action programs;
d. provides that the statute of limitations for challenging seniority systems begins
to run when discriminatory effects occur, not when the systems themselves are first
implemented;
e. modifies the holding of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989),
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HISTORY OF EEO DEVELOPMENT
One of the earliest significant federal EEO statutes was enacted as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Title VII, as the statute came to
be known, prohibited discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.13 Protections for older em-
ployees and for handicapped workers in the public sector followed; the
frameworks developed in Title VII litigation were adapted for use in
these new areas as well.
14
Intentional Discrimination vs. Adverse Impact
The simplest and most obvious form of discrimination prohibited
by Title VII, intentional discrimination against members of a protected
class, came to be known as "disparate treatment. ' ' 15 When Title VII
became effective in mid-1965, intentional race and sex discrimination
was rampant and, to a great extent, socially acceptable. Indeed, news-
papers continued to run sex-segregated "help wanted" ads for several
more years. Employers, and many segments of the public, saw nothing
wrong in refusing to hire women or minorities for certain positions, or
paying them less than white males for similar work.18
concerning mixed-motive cases of intentional discrimination, to provide that any signifi-
cant reliance upon discriminatory motives constitutes a violation of the Act (see infra
note 28); and
f. overrules Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988), by restor-
ing Section 1981's application to the enforcement as well as the making and termina-
tion of employment contracts.
12. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, several earlier statutes
(included within the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1983 and 1985) began to be used to fight employment discrimination. Not until
1968, however, did the Court permit section 1981 to be used against private employers.
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Other limitations continue to restrict
the utility of these statutes, including the recent holding in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989), one of the cases the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990
would overturn.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
14. E.g., Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983); Wood v.
Exxon Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (Title VII models of proof apply in
cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-637(1988)).
15. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
16. Options for Conducting a Pay Equity Study of Federal .Pay and Classifica-
tion Systems, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61
[Vol. 15
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In time, the concept of intentional discrimination came to be pub-
licly frowned upon, perhaps because of the enforcement of Title VII.
Instances of blatant, clearly intentional discrimination declined. The
overall problem of employment discrimination, however, had hardly
been dented. By 1970, Congress recognized employment discrimination
as "a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon," appropriately de-
scribed in terms of "systems" rather than isolated intentional acts.17
Even now, persistent patterns of job segregation separating white men
from women and men of color,18 and the ever-present wage gap,19 sug-
gest that employment discrimination remains a substantial factor in the
modern American marketplace.20
In 1971, the Supreme Court recognized this dilemma and decided
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 21 In Griggs, the Court held that Title VII
did not contain an intent requirement, but instead prohibited "not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in practice. ' 22 As a result, the facially neutral criteria im-
posed by the Griggs employer-a high school degree requirement and
intelligence/aptitude tests-were subject to challenge under Title VII
because black employees and applicants were more often adversely af-
fected by the requirements than were white employees and applicants.
The Griggs Court went on to hold, however, that such facially neutral
criteria, even if discriminatory in practice, were nevertheless permissi-
(1985) (testimony of Dennis Dresang, Chair, Wisconsin Task Force on Comparable
Worth), 516-17 (statement by the Nat'l Federation of Fed. Employees), 594 (dissent-
ing Statement of Mary Frances Berry and Blandina Cardenas Ramirez of the U.S.
Comm. on Civil Rights); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 399, 402-07 (1979);
The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 222 (August-September 1990) (re-
marks of Senator Reigle (D-Mich.) during July 18, 1990, Senate Floor Debate on
S.2104).
17. S. REP. No. 1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970) (Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare). See generally M. E. GOLD, A DIALOG ON COMPARABLE WORTH
(1983); D. J. TREIMAN & H. I. HARTMANN, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES (1981).
18. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN, COMPARABLE
WORTH: THE PAY EQUITY ISSUE (Informational Bulletin LRB-84-IB-2, June 1984).
19. Nat'l Comm. on Pay Equity, Newsnotes 15 (Dec. 1989).
20. See generally Judd & Gomez-Mejia, Comparable Worth: A Sensible Way to
End Pay Discrimination, or the "Looniest Idea Since Looney Tunes"?, in NEW PER-
SPECTIVES ON COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 61 (D. Balkin & L. Gomez-Mejia eds.
1987).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Id. at 431.
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ble if they were demonstrably job-related:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring proce-
dures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is
giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they
are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Con-
gress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over
the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such
qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, national-
ity, and sex become irrelevant.23
These types of cases, which do not require proof of discriminatory in-
tent, are commonly called "adverse impact" cases.24
Models of Proof
Intentional Discrimination
The standard model of proof for intentional discrimination (dispa-
rate treatment) cases became firmly established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green25 and its progeny.28 In these cases, the plaintiff must
present a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. 2" The employer
23. Id. at 436.
24. In practice, many courts and commentators use terms such as "disparate im-
pact" (probably a corruption of "disproportionate impact") and other labels to describe
adverse impact cases. To avoid the confusion generated by the use of two such similar
terms as "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact," this article will use only the
term "adverse impact" in referring to cases based upon unintentional discrimination.
25. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
26. E.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
27. The precise parameters of the prima facie case will vary depending upon the
type of allegedly discriminatory employment practice. In a hiring case, for example, a
plaintiff would be required to demonstrate membership in a protected class, qualifica-
tion for the position applied for, rejection, and subsequent efforts by the employer to fill
the position with a person of similar qualifications. Promotion, compensation and dis-
charge cases require similar but not identical proofs. Of course, in the rare case in
which a Title VII plaintiff has compelling direct evidence of discrimination, he or she
need not use the McDonnell Douglas model. E.g., Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715
F.2d 1552, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1983). In this day and time, however, most employers
are too sophisticated to permit the availability of such direct evidence. E.g., id. at 1556;
see also LEDVINKA, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMPENSATION ADMIISTRATION 51, 55
(D. Balkin & L. Gomez-Mejia eds. 1987) ("[E]vidence of intent is usually hard to
find. Managers know that differential treatment of men and women is illegal, and they
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is then required to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action against the plaintiff. The articula-
tion standard requires no quantum of proof; the employer need only
state a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
The plaintiff must then prove that the employer's articulated reason is
a pretext, masking a discriminatory intent. The burden of proving the
employer's discriminatory intent remains at all times with the plain-
tiff.28 With the exception of mixed motive cases,2 9 this model of proof
was not affected by last term's decisions, nor is it addressed by the
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990.0
are unlikely to do, say, or write anything indicating that they are aware of any such
treatment."); Weisberg, Sex Bias 'Victory' May Really Be a Sham, Broward Review,
July 16, 1990, at 10, 11 ("employers have become increasingly sophisticated about
concealing unlawful discrimination"); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW 15 (2d ed. 1983) ("Direct evidence of discriminatory motivation is
now relatively unusual.").
28. E.g., Watson v. Forth Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2788-89
(1988). So-called "mixed motive" cases may be deemed a narrow exception to this
rule. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (plurality
opinion). In a mixed-motive case, where the plaintiff establishes that a discriminatory
motive played some role in causing the adverse employment decision, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance standard, that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not been influenced by the discriminatory motive.
If it can do so, it will not be found to have violated Title VII. Id. at 1787-92. The focus
in a mixed motive case, however, is primarily on causation. The plaintiff is still re-
quired to prove the existence of discriminatory intent.
The proposed Act addresses this decision by clarifying the fact that any reliance at
all upon discriminatory motives violates Title VII, even though available remedies may
be limited if the employer can establish that it would have reached the same decision
absent the improper motive. This section appears consistent with the position previously
taken by the Eighth Circuit in Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985)
(en banc). Four Circuits had previously required plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation,
while five had shifted the burden of proof to the employer to show that it would have
taken the same action regardless of the discriminatory factors. Of these, four required
only a preponderance of the evidence, while one required clear and convincing proof.
The Circuits had also been divided upon the issue of whether such a showing negated a
violation of Title VII, or merely prevented the imposition of equitable relief such as
reinstatement. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1784 & n.2.
29. See supra note 28.
30. The Act does, however, expand the available remedies in this type of litiga-
tion to conform to the remedies available to victims of intentional race discrimination
under section 1981. See supra note 11.
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Adverse Impact
In adverse impact cases, a different model of proof developed. The
plaintiff's prima facie case required proof that the challenged criteria
had a significantly disproportionate adverse impact upon otherwise
qualified members of a protected class. Plaintiffs typically accom-
plished this proof through statistics comparing the percentage of pro-
tected class members in the relevant workforce to the percentage of
qualified protected class members in the relevant labor market,31 and
showing that the imbalance was caused by the challenged practices.32
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,3 for example, women comprised almost 37
percent of the total labor force, but less than 13 percent of the state's
correctional counselors. The reasons for the imbalance were minimum
height and weight requirements which excluded far more women than
men.
3 4
Several tests developed to determine whether the adverse impact
caused by a particular selection device was "significantly disproportion-
ate," none of which has gained uniform acceptance. The EEOC guide-
lines proposed a "four-fifths" or "eighty percent" rule of thumb: a cri-
terion is generally 5 deemed discriminatory if it results in a selection
rate, for any protected class, of less than eighty percent of the rate of
selection for the class with the highest selection rate under the same
criterion.38 Some courts have adopted this rule; others look to see if the
differential exceeds two or three "standard deviations.137 Still others
31. This segment of the plaintiff's case may not always be necessary, as evi-
denced by Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See supra note 8.
32. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("[T]o establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral
standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory
pattern.").
33. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
34. The height requirement, for example, disqualified about a third of all women,
but only a little over one percent of all men. The weight requirement excluded 22.29
percent of women and only 2.35 percent of men. The combination of the two require-
ments excluded over forty percent of Alabama's female workers from the position in
question. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-30.
35. The eighty percent rule is neither a safe haven nor an absolute minimum.
Smaller disparities have been found discriminatory, and larger disparities have been
found acceptable. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1990).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D), 1607.16(R) (1990).
37. A standard deviation is a statistical term describing some of the properties of
a data distribution. Most populations, when measured for any particular property, will
form a bell curve in which the majority of the population clusters around the average
[Vol. 15
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simply judge the significance of the adverse impact on a case by case
basis. 8
If the plaintiff proved his or her prima facie case, the employer
was then required to establish "business necessity." Business necessity
has traditionally been treated as an affirmative defense, so that the bur-
den of proof on that issue has been allocated to the employer. Accord-
ingly, the employer has been required to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged criteria were important to successful job performance. " Prior to
the Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,4° an em-
ployer could justify the use of tests or other devices shown to have a
discriminatory impact only by demonstrating through "professionally
accepted methods," that the criteria were "predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or
are relevant to the job or jobs for which the candidates are being evalu-
ated. 41 If an employer established that the challenged practices were
sufficiently job-related, the plaintiff was then given an opportunity to
show that less discriminatory methods would accomplish the same pur-
pose equally well.42
The Evolving Model of Proof in Adverse Impact Cases
Last term, by a scant 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court decided
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.4' The Wards Cove employers oper-
ated canneries in remote areas of Alaska during the summer "salmon
run" season. Each cannery had two general types of positions: unskilled
cannery jobs and skilled non-cannery jobs. At each cannery, the un-
point, or "mean." The size of the population and the spread of its scores combine to
determine the size of a standard deviation. Pure chance will cause a small percentage
of the population to fall more than two standard deviations away from the average in
each direction, but statisticians believe that a difference of more than three standard
deviations indicates the presence of some distorting factor. See J. MCCLAVE & P. BEN-
SON, STATISTICS FOR BusINEss AND ECONOMics 491-92 (3d ed. 1985).
38. B. SCHLE & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 98-99.
39. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 (1975) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)).
40. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
41. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 431; accord Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
42. E.g., Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dept. v. Civil Serv.
Comm., 630 F.2d 79, 110 (2d Cir. 1980). Few opinions have even reached this step,
and in none of them has the plaintiff succeeded in demonstrating the viability of a less
discriminatory alternative. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 156-57.
43. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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skilled positions were filled predominantly by non-whites (Filipinos and
Native Alaskans) hired through a local union, while the skilled posi-
tions were held primarily by whites, hired through other offices of the
companies located on the mainland. The employers maintained sepa-
rate dormitories and mess halls for the skilled and unskilled workers."'
The Wards Cove plaintiffs were a class of nonwhites who were or
had been employed in unskilled cannery positions. They alleged that
the employers used a number of hiring practices which adversely im-
pacted their protected class: nepotism, a rehire preference, lack of ob-
jective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, and a policy against
promoting from within the workforce. The district court initially re-
fused to apply adverse impact analysis to any of the employers' subjec-
tive practices, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
reversed this holding. The Ninth Circuit panel determined that the
plaintiffs had made a prima facie adverse impact case, and remanded
the case to the district court for further proceedings with instructions
that the employer bear the burden of proving that its discriminatory
practices were job related.45
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court approved the application
of adverse impact analysis to subjective employment practices, but re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's determination that the plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie case. The Court held that the plaintiffs' statistics
did not compare the appropriate groups.46 Having resolved the issue
before it, the Wards Cove majority went on, in unabashed dicta, 47 to
impose new evidentiary burdens upon adverse impact plaintiffs and to
reallocate the burden of proof on the issue of business necessity.
44. Id. at 2119-20.
45. Id. at 2120.
46. Id. at 2121-22.
47. The Court specifically admitted that "any inquiry into whether the disparate
impact that any employment practice may have had was justified by business neces-
sity" was pretermitted by its finding that the statistics relied on by the Ninth Circuit
did not suffice to make out a prima facie case. Id. at 2124. The Court then continued,
however, to address additional issues which were likely to surface upon remand. Id. But
see County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 n.7 (1981) ("We are not
called upon in this case to . . . lay down standards for the further conduct of this
litigation.").
[Vol. 15
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New Evidentiary Requirements and Shifting the Burden of
Proof
First, relying on dicta from the plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust,48 the Wards Cove majority stated that adverse
impact plaintiffs must "isolat[e] and identify the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical dis-
parities. 49 Moreover, the Wards Cove standard will require proof that
"each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on em-
ployment opportunities for whites and nonwhites.15 0 Adverse impact
plaintiffs will never be permitted to challenge a group of employment
practices as a whole.
The Wards Cove majority attempted to justify this ruling on the
grounds that Title VII plaintiffs will have access to the records which
most employers are required to keep concerning their employment
practices under existing EEOC guidelines.51 There are, however, many
businesses which, although subject to Title VII, qualify for exemptions
or exceptions to the record-keeping requirements of the guidelines.
Ironically, the Wardi Cove employers themselves had not kept any
such records.52
Secondly, the Wards Cove majority, again relying upon dicta from
the Watson plurality opinion, reallocated the burden of proof on the
business necessity issue, thus implicitly overruling Griggs and the sub-
stantial body of case law applying the Griggs standard. According to
the Wards Cove majority, the employer bears only the burden of pro-
48. 108 S.Ct. 2777 (1988). In Watson, a unanimous Court held that adverse
impact analysis may be applied to subjective, as well as objective, employment prac-
tices, thus resolving a long-standing division among the federal circuit courts. A plural-
ity consisting of Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia then went on to dis-
cuss the allocation of the burdens of proof in adverse impact cases, thus laying the
groundwork for the Wards Cove decision. Justices Stevens and Blackman frankly ac-
knowledged that the issues discussed in the plurality opinion were unnecessary to the
resolution of the question presented. Id. at 2787 n.1. Some commentators interpreted
Watson as changing the rules of adverse impact analysis only when applied to subjec-
tive criteria, as in Watson itself. See, e.g., When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treat-
ment, Disparate Impact, and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1755 (1989). The Wards Cove Court, however, adopted the new analysis for use in all
adverse impact cases. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
49. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2125 (citing Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2787).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2125.
52. Id. at 2133 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ducing evidence of a business justification for the challenged practices.
The burden of persuasion, or proof, on this issue now falls on the plain-
tiff, who must demonstrate that the practice is not "job-related."
The Wards Cove majority avoided expressly overruling the volumi-
nous body of precedent applying the Griggs standard, under which the
employer bore the burden of proof of business necessity. They insisted
that these cases "should have been understood to mean an employer's
production-but not persuasion-burden."53  The language of the
Court's prior rulings, however, renders this evasion disingenuous.5
Griggs has long been understood by both courts55 and commentators56
to allocate the burden of proving business necessity to the employer.
53. Id. at 2126.
54. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("If the employer proves
that the challenged requirements are job related . . . "); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) ("Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that
are discriminatory in effect unless the employer meets 'the burden of showing that any
given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion.' "); id. at 407 ("if an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests
are 'job related' "); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("If an employment practice which oper-
ates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited."); id. at 432 ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden of show-
ing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question.").
55.. E.g., Powers v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1292 & n.11 (11th
Cir. 1988):
We are aware that four members of the Supreme Court recently have indi-
cated that the burden of proof on the absence of business necessity rests
with the plaintiff. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct.
2777, 2790, 101 L.Ed. 2d 827 (1988). A plurality opinion, however, is not
binding precedent, and in the meantime, we are bound'by several decisions
of this court (as well as the Supreme Court cases cited in the text) stating
flatly that the employer bears the burden of proving that a practice is job-
related.
(emphasis in original); Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (describ-
ing the term "'business necessity' defense" as a misnomer after Wards Cove because
"the 'defense' does not require a showing of necessity and is no longer an affirmative
defense"); see also Chrisner v. Complete Auto Trans., Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th
Cir. 1981) ("Once the defendant in a Title VII disparate impact case has rebutted the
plaintiff's prima facie case by proving a business necessity defense, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff.").
56. E.g., LEDVINKA, supra note 27, at 53-55 ("If the couxt decides that the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.
The defendant's burden is to rebut by presenting evidence that the practice is job-
related or a business necessity."); B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 81-92,
& 17 (Supp. 1983).
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Application of Wards Cove and Watson
Isolating the Impact of Each Specific Practice
The new evidentiary requirements established in Wards Cove may
be devastating to many potential Title VII plaintiffs, particularly where
statistical proof is involved. In many cases, it may be difficult or impos-
sible to isolate the effects of one of a group of employment practices
because two or more of the practices may be "multicolinear. ' ' 57 In
Griggs, for example, it seems likely that the high school degree require-
ment eliminated many of the same individuals who would also have
been eliminated by their scores on the intelligence/aptitude tests. A
statistical model testing the effects of both practices simultaneously,
therefore, could easily show that neither practice had a statistically sig-
nificant impact on black applicants.5 8 While there are statistical meth-
ods for detecting and correcting for such difficulties, they are far from
foolproof.
Another potential problem arises in cases in which the employers,
like those in Wards Cove, fail to keep the records necessary to permit
detailed statistical analyses of each individual employment practice.
Typical Title VII plaintiffs are in no position to maintain, or attempt to
reconstruct, such records. The typical plaintiffs are not privy to those
type of records because they typically do not hold upper management
positions. Often these plaintiffs have lost their jobs and are no longer
even authorized to be on the premises. Under Wards Cove, therefore, a
Title VII plaintiff's cause of action may be destroyed by an employer's
failure to keep adequate records-a result unlikely to be permitted in
any other area of the law. 9
Even more problematic are cases in which two or more practices
combine to have a significant discriminatory effect even though no sin-
gle practice, used alone, would do so.6 0 Under Wards Cove and Wat-
57. See J. MCCLAVE & P. BENSON, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
491-92 (3d ed. 1985).
58. See id. at 491.
59. In many areas of the law, the burden of proof has been shifted from one
party to another to combat such problems. 29 AM. JUR. 2D, Evidence § 131, at 164-65
(2d ed. 1967); see also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 787 (1984);
cf. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 752 F.2d 1552, 1558 & n.13 (11th Cir. 1983).
60. "One can envision a situation in which there are two subjective practices,
such as a performance rating by a supervisor and an interview, which work together to
produce a significant adverse impact." When Doctrines Collide: Disparate, Treatment
Disparate Impact, and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755,
Judd
79
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
son, a group of practices will never be subject to challenge. Not even
the amicus brief of the United States Solicitor General, submitted on
behalf of the employers, urged this result. The Solicitor General's brief
readily admitted that a complex, multi-factor selection test could be
challenged as a whole, at least where it was not feasible to separate the
effects of the individual factors.61
Proving Business Necessity
As Justice Stevens noted in his Wards Cove dissent, business ne-
cessity has, since the 1971 Griggs decision, been regarded as an affirm-
ative defense-a legal justification for the use of an employment prac-
tice despite its proven discriminatory effect.62 As such, the burden of
proof must fall on the defendant, as does the burden of proving all
manner of affirmative defenses in various fields of law."' The Wards
Cove majority, however, disregarded the defensive nature of the issue
and instead analogized to the "articulation" and "pretext" standards
used in disparate treatment cases.
The pretext standard serves as a means for determining the exis-
tence of discriminatory intent, which is a necessary element of proof in
disparate treatment cases. If a specific, isolated adverse employment
action was not motivated by discriminatory motive, then it was not dis-
criminatory for purposes of Title VII, even if the victim happened to
belong to a protected class.64 An unfair or irrational employment deci-
sion, motivated by non-discriminatory reasons, does not violate Title
VII. Pretext analysis, therefore, measures a necessary element of the
plaintiff's case.
In impact cases, on the other hand, intent is not at issue. Impact
analysis focuses upon widely-used employment practices which affect
many employees, not on specific employment actions affecting only one
employee. Business necessity does not come into play until after such a
1781 n.134 (1989).
61. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the
Solicitor General's brief at page 22).
62. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1270-71, at
411-47 (2d ed. 1990).
63. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D, Evidence §§ 129-30, at 162-64 (2d ed. 1967); 23 FLA.
JUR. 2D, Evidence and Witnesses §§ 67, 75, 94-95, 102-03 (1980).
64. Title VII prohibits "discrimination rather than simple arbitrariness or ca-
price." Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 338 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
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practice has been shown to discriminate against protected class mem-
bers. Business necessity is then used to justify or excuse the established
discrimination. Business necessity, therefore, unlike pretext analysis,
fits the classic definition of an affirmative defense: It acknowledges the
existence of a prima facie case, but offers a means of avoiding liability.
Accordingly, the Wards Cove analogy between pretext and business ne-
cessity either mixes apples (elements) and oranges (defenses), or im-
plies a hidden intent requirement-a requirement that facially neutral
employment practices be used as a "mere pretext" to hide intentional
discrimination-where there has been no such requirement for nearly
twenty years.
The Civil Rights Act of 1990
The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, as originally introduced in
the House on February 7, 1990, addressed the Watson/Wards Cove
opinions by expressly providing that Title VII plaintiffs may challenge
a group of employment practices, defined as "a combination of employ-
ment practices or an overall employment process," without being re-
quired to demonstrate which particular practice or practices caused the
adverse impact.65 Additionally, the initial version of H.R. 4000 specifi-
cally placed the burdens of both proof and production of business ne-
cessity on the employer.66 Moreover, the original version of H.R. 4000
incorporated one of the Court's most stringent characterizations of the
business necessity defense: "essential to effective job performance. 67
These provisions provoked a storm of protests that the bill would
require employers to use "quotas" to avoid racial, ethnic or gender im-
balances in their work forces to avoid Title VII liability.68 The revised
65. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (Feb. 7, 1990) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
2000e).
66. Id. at § 4 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(k)).
67. Id. § 3 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(o)). This characterization of the busi-
ness necessity defense was apparently drawn from Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
331, 332 n.14 (1977) ("[A] discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be
necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge.").
Most cases do not apply such a strict definition of business necessity, and use the term
more or less interchangeably with the term "job relatedness." E.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at
424.
68. E.g., Kilpatrick, Employee Provision Unfair-and Perverts Bias Fight,
Miami Herald, July 19, 1990, at A2; see also Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2122
(1989).
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bill, as passed by the Senate, eliminates much of the basis for such
fears, but remains unacceptable to the Bush administration. 9 The re-
vised bill70 allows plaintiffs to challenge a discrete group of practices,
but not to simply claim that the "overall employment process" discrim-
inates. Moreover, multi-practice challenges can be blocked "if the court
finds that the complaining party can identify, from records or other
information of the respondent reasonably available[,]" the specific
practice or practices responsible for the disproportionate adverse im-
pact.7 ' In that event, Title VII plaintiffs will be required to follow the
Wards Cove standards in isolating the specific practices allegedly re-
sponsible for the adverse impact. Only when the effects of multiple em-
ployment practices are inextricably mingled, whether because of their
inherent natures or because of inadequate employer records, will plain-
tiffs be permitted to proceed against the practices as a group. Because
the employer controls both the practices used and the recordkeeping
process,7 2 such an exception seems both fair and reasonable, particu-
larly when compared with the alternative. The revised bill also replaces
the onerous "essential to effective job performance" definition of the
initial bill with more detailed language, set forth below, coupled with a
proviso that the bill's intent is to restore the Griggs "job related" stan-
dard. The detailed definitional section provides:
(o)(1) The term 'required by business necessity' means--
(A) in the case of [selection] practices . . ., the practice or
group of practices must bear a significant relationship to s;uccessful
performance of the job; or
(B) in the case of employment practices that do not involve
selection, the practice or group of practices must bear a significant
relationship to a significant business objective of the employer.7 1
The revised bill, unlike its predecessor, goes on to describe the quantum
of proof an employer must present to prevail on a business necessity
defense:
69. Bronner, Civil Rights Act of 1990: Inside the Negotiations, Boston Globe,
July 23, 1990, National/Foreign Section, at 1.
70. See Appendix following this article of S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
71. Id. at § 4(k)(1)(B)(iii).
72. "[It is the employer who designs and evaluates job requirements and pos-
sesses all the evidence and information relating to its own hiring practices." CONG.
DIG., supra note 8, at 222 (statement of Senator Reigle).
73. See supra note 70, at § 3(o)(1).
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(2) In deciding whether the standards in paragraph (1) for busi-
ness necessity have been met, unsubstantiated opinion and hearsay
are not sufficient; demonstrable evidence is required. The defendant
may offer as evidence statistical reports, validation studies, expert
testimony, prior successful experience and other evidence as per-
mitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the court shall give
such weight, if any, to such evidence as is appropriate.74
These provisions essentially restore and clarify the Griggs standard
which, in eighteen years of application, has never been shown to cause
any employer to resort to the use of a "quota" system. 5
On July 31, 1990, the House Judiciary Committee reported H.R.
4000 to the House floor with revisions almost identical to those made
by the Senate. The revised bill subsequently passed the House by a vote
of 272-154.71 Both versions of the bill expressly provide that they are
not to be construed to require the use of quotas. The technical differ-
ences between the House and Senate versions of the proposed Act were
easily reconciled via House-Senate conference, but the Act still could
not avoid presidential veto.7 The Act missed "veto-proof' status by
only two votes in the Senate, but by twelve in the House.
7 8
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that Wards Cove and the other decisions
targeted by the Civil Rights Act of 1990 represent a serious departure
from an established body of precedent applying Title VII adverse im-
pact analysis. The Court often attempts to underplay the importance of
74. Id. at § 3(o)(2).
75. Quota Hogwash, supra note 9; Red Herring in Black and White, supra note
6; Gerstel, Threat of Racial Quotas Dogs Civil Rights Bill, Washington News, July
19, 1990; Edelman, supra note 6; CONG. DIG., supra note 8, at 218 (remarks of Sena-
tor Graham from Senate floor debate of July 18, 1990) ("In a series of four hearings
on the bill, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources discovered no evi-
dence to suggest that the Griggs standard-which this bill will return to--has led to
quotas.").
76. CONG. DIG., supra note 8, at 205. The House version contains an additional
subsection concerning the burden of proof in impact cases which expressly provides
that a mere statistical imbalance in a workforce may not constitute a prima facie case
of adverse impact discrimination.
77. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at IA.
78. CoNG. DIG., supra note 8, at 205; N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at IA.
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its rulings by pointing to Congress' ability to overturn them.79 Reliance
upon that maxim in the case of last term's decisions, however, is as
transparently inappropriate as the Wards Cove Court's denial that its
decision reversed the voluminous body of case law applying the Griggs
standard. Congress has had many opportunities to review the Griggs
opinion since that case was decided in 1971. Its election not to do so
constitutes at least tacit approval of the decision. Moreover, many com-
mentators construe the 1972 amendments to Title VII as an express
legislative approval of the Griggs doctrine.80 The Wards Cove Court
preempted Congress' prerogative by overruling established case law,
thus forcing Congress to act to simply maintain the approved status
quo. Such conduct is as much an example of judicial activism as many
of the decisions derided by the Justices who, although allegedly sub-
scribing to theories of judicial restraint, made up the Wards Cove
majority.
Although it should not have been required to do so, Congress has
now acted to restore the settled and approved application of Title VII.
The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, despite the flood of rhetoric
launched by its critics, does not deserve the notoriety it has gained' The
most controversial provision of the bill does little more than restore
long-standing, legislatively-ratified precedent in the field of EEO law.
The Griggs standard, which the Act would restore, became known and
understood by all participants in the employment law arena during its
eighteen years of operation, 81 without resulting in the use of quota sys-
tems or crippling litigation. Passage of the Act will simply restore that
familiar standard.
The Watson/Wards Cove standards, on the other hand, would de-
prive many deserving EEO plaintiffs of any opportunity for relief, and
encourage the continued use of ineffective, discriminatory employment
practices that cannot be shown to have any relationship to the jobs in
question. To permit these decisions to stand would eviscerate the ad-
verse impact doctrine and eliminate years of progress in the battle for
79. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2362, 2373 (1988);
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 423.
80. See Halverson, Title VII: Application of Impact Analysis to Subjective Em-
ployment Criteria-Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777 (1988), 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 264, 268 & n.27 (1989).
81. LEDVINKA, supra note 27, at 53 ("Personnel specialists are quite familiar
with the concept of disparate impact, partly because so many personnel practices are
undertaken with the best of motives but end up working to the disadvantage of some
race, sex, or ethnic group.").
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equal employment opportunity for all qualified workers.
Author's Note:
As this article went to press, President Bush vetoed this bill, and
the Senate failed, by one vote, to override the veto. The bill's sponsors,
however, have already announced plans to reintroduce it in 1991.
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APPENDIX 1
H. R. 4000
101st CONGRESS
2D SESSION
A BILL
To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restore and strengthen civil
rights laws that ban discrimination in employment, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1990".
SEC. 2 FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.-Congress finds that-
(1) in a series of recent decisions addressing employment
discrimination claims under Federal law, the Supreme Court cut
back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights
protections; and
(2) existing protections and remedies under Federal law are
not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate
victims of such discrimination.
(b) PURPOSEs.-The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited
by those decisions; and
(2) to strengthen existing protections and remedies available
under Federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence
and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
"(1) The term 'complaining party' means the Commission,
the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or
proceeding under this title.
"(m) The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of
production and persuasion.
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a
combination of employment practices or an overall employment
process.
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"(o) The term 'required by business necessity' means essential
to effective job performance.
"(p) The term 'respondent' means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or
those Federal entities subject to the provisions of section 717.".
SEC. 4 RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE
IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.-
"(1) An unlawful employment practice is established under
this subsection when-
"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an
employment practice results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practice is required
by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of
employment practices results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practices are
required by business necessity, except that-
"(i) if a complaining party demonstrates that a
group of employment practices results in a disparate
impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices within the group
results in such disparate impact; and
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific
employment practice within such group of employment
practices does not contribute to the disparate impact, the
respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity.
"(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is
required by business necessity may be used as a defense only
against a claim under this subsection.".
SEC. 5. CLARIFYING PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPERMISSIBLE
CONSIDERATION OF RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX OR
NATIONAL ORIGIN IN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) (as amended by section 4) is further amended by
1991]
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adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(1) Discriminatory Practice Need not be Sole Motivating
Factor.-Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though such
practice was also motivated by other factors."
(b) ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS.-Section 706(g) of such Act (42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)) is amended by inserting before the period in the
last sentence the following: "or, in a case where a violation is
established under section 703(1), if the respondent establishes that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of any
discrimination".
SEC. 6. FACILITATING PROMPT AND ORDERLY RESOLUTION
OF CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYMENT ]PRACTICES
IMPLEMENTING LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
(as amended by sections 4 and 5) is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new subsection:
"(m) FINALITY OF LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.-
"(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except
as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that
implements a litigated or consent judgment or order resolving a
claim of employment discrimination under the United States
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged in
a claim under the United States Constitution or Federal civil
rights law-
"(A) by a person who, prior to the entry of such
judgment or order, had-
"(i) notice from any source of the proposed
judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that
such judgment or order might affect the interests of such
person; and
"(ii) a reasonable opportunity to present objections
to such judgment or order;
"(B) by a person with respect to whom the requirements
of subparagraph (A) are not satisfied, if the court determines
that the interests of such person were adequately represented
by another person who challenged such judgment or order
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prior to or after the entry of such judgment or order; or
"(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order
determines that reasonable efforts were made to provide
notice to interested persons.
A determination under subparagraph (C) shall be made prior to
the entry of the judgment or order, except that if the judgment or
order was entered prior to the date of the enactment of this
subsection, the determination may be made at any reasonable
time.
"(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-
"(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
"(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which
the litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of
members of a class represented or sought to be represented in
such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief
was sought in such action by the Federal government; or
"(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent
judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order
was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently
invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction.
"(3) Any action, not precluded under this subsection, that
challenges an employment practice that implements a litigated or
consent judgment or order of the type referred to in paragraph (1)
shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that
entered such judgment or order.".
SEC. 7. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; APPLICATION TO
CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS.
(a) STATUTE OF LMITATIONS.-Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)) is amended-
(1) by striking out "one hundred and eighty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "2 years";
(2) by inserting after "occurred" the first time it appears "or
has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved,
whichever is later.";
(3) by striking out ", except that in" and inserting in lieu
thereof ".In"; and
(4) by striking out "such charge shall be filed" and all that
follows through "whichever is earlier, and".
(b) APPLICATION TO CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS-
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Section 703(h) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by
inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: "Where a
seniority system or seniority practice is part of a collective bargaining
agreement and such system or practice was included in such agreement
with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, the application of such system or practice during the
period that such collective bargaining agreement is in effect shall be an
unlawful employment practice.".
SEC. 8. PROVIDING FOR DAMAGES IN CASES OF
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION.
Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(g)) is amended by inserting before the last sentence the following
new sentences: "With respect to an unlawful employment practice
(other than an unlawful employment practice established in accordance
with section 703(k))-
"(A) compensatory damages may be awarded; and
"(B) if the respondent (other than a government, government
agency, or a political subdivision) engaged in the unlawful
employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others, punitive
damages may be awarded against such respondent;
in addition to the relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this
subsection, except that compensatory damages shall not include
backpay or any interest thereon. If compensatory or punitive damages
are sought with respect to a claim arising under this title, any party
may demand a trial by jury.".
SEC. 9. CLARIFYING ATTORNEYS' FEES PROVISION.
Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(k)) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(k)";
(2) by inserting "(including expert fees and other
litigation expenses) and" after "attorney's fee,";
(3) by striking out "as part of the"; and
(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraphs:
"(2) A court shall not enter a consent order or judgment
settling a claim under this title, unless the parties and their
counsel attest that a waiver of all or substantially all
attorneys' fees was not compelled as a condition of the
settlement.
"(3) In any action or proceeding in which any judgment
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or order granting relief under this title is challenged, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party in the
original action (other than the Commission or the United
States) to recover from the party against whom relief was
granted in the original action a reasonable attorney's fee
(including expert fees and other litigation expenses) and costs
reasonably incurred in defending (as a party, intervenor or
otherwise) such judgment or order.".
SEC. 10. PROVIDING FOR INTEREST, AND EXTENDING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IN ACTIONS AGAINST THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16)
is amended-
(1) in subsection (c), by striking out "thirty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "ninety days"; and
(2) in subsection (d), by inserting before the period ", and the
same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be
available as in cases involving non-public parties".
SEC. 11. CONSTRUCTION.
Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000h et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
"SEC. 1107. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWS
"(a) EFFECTUATION OF PuRPOsE.-All Federal laws protecting the
civil rights of persons shall be broadly construed to effectuate the
purpose of such laws to eliminate discrimination and provide effective
remedies.
"(b) NONLIMITATION.-Except as expressly provided, no Federal
law protecting the civil rights of persons shall be construed to restrict
or limit the rights, procedures, or remedies available under any other
Federal law protecting such civil rights.".
SEC. 12 RESTORING PROHIBITION AGAINST ALL RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF
CONTRACTS.
Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42
U.S.C. 1981) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "All persons within"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(b) For purposes of this section, the right to 'make and enforce
contracts' shall include the making, performance, modification and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
Judd
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terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.".
SEC. 13. LAWFUL COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS
NOT AFFECTED.
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements that are otherwise in accordance with the law.
SEC. 14. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this Act,
or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is
held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made
by this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons and
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 15. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS AND TRANSITION
RULES.
(a) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-The amendments made by-
(1) section 4 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 5, 1989;
(2) section 5 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after May 1, 1989;
(3) section 6 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 12, 1989;
(4) sections 7(a)(1), 7(b), 8, 9, 10, and 11 shall apply to all
proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment
of this Act;
(5) paragraphs (2) through (4) of section 7(a) shall apply to
all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 12, 1989; and
(6) section 12 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 15, 1989.
(b) TRANSITION RULES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Any orders entered by a court between the
effective dates described in subsection (a) and the date of
enactment of this Act that are inconsistent with the amendments
made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2) through (4), or 12, shall be vacated
if, not later than 1 year after such date of enactment, a request for
such relief is made.
(2) SECTION 6.-Any orders entered between June 12, 1989
and the date of enactment of this Act, that permit a challenge to
an employment practice that implements a litigated or consent
judgment or order and that is inconsistent with the amendment
made by section 6, shall be vacated if, not later than 6 months
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after the date of enactment of this Act, a request for such relief is
made. For the 1-year period beginning on the date of enactment of
this Act, an individual whose challenge to an employment practice
that implements a litigated or consent judgment or order is denied
under the amendment made by section 6, or whose order or relief
obtained under such challenge is vacated under such section, shall
have the same right of intervention in the case in which the
challenged litigated or consent judgment or order was entered as
that individual had on June 12, 1989.
(c) PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS.-The period of limitations for the
filing of a claim or charge shall be tolled from the applicable effective
date described in subsection (a) until the date of enactment of this Act,
on a showing that the claim or charge was not filed because of a rule or
decision altered by the amendments made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2)
through (4), or 12.
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APPENDIX 2
101st CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2104
AN ACT
To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restore and strenghten
civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1990".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINS.-Congress finds that-
(1) in a series of recent decisions addressing employment
discrimination claims under Federal law, the Supreme Court cut
back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights
protections; and
(2) existing protections and remedies under Federal law are
not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate
victims of such discrimination.
(b) PuRPosES.-It is the purpose of this Act to--
(1) respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited
by those decisions; and
(2) strengthen existing protections and remedies available
under Federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence
and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
"(1) The term 'complaining party' means the Commission, the
Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or
proceeding under this title.
"(m) The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of
production and persuasion.
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a
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" combination of employment practices that produces one or more
decisions with respect to employment, employment referral, or
admission to a labor organization, apprenticeship or other training
or retraining program.
"(o)(1) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
"(A) in the case of employment practices involving
selection (such as hiring, assignment, transfer, promotion,
training, apprenticeship, referral, retention, or membership in
a labor organization), the practice or group of practices must
bear a significant relationship to successful performance of
the job; or
"(B) in the case of employment practices that do not
involve selection, the practice or group of practices must bear
a significant relationship to a significant business objective of
the employer.
"(2) In deciding whether the standards in paragraph (1) for
business necessity have been met, unsubstantiated opinion and
hearsay are not sufficient; demonstrable evidence is required. The
defendant may offer as evidence statistical reports, validation
studies, expert testimony, prior successful experience and other
evidence as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the
court shall give such weight, if any, to such evidence as is
appropriate.
"(3) This subsection is meant to codify the meaning of
'business necessity' as used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S.
424 (1971)) and to overrule Ward's Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio (109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)).
"(p) The term 'respondent' means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining
programs, including on-the-job training programs, or those Federal
entities subject to the provisions of section 717 (or the heads
thereof).".
SEC. 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE
IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.-
"(1) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this section when-
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"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an
employment practice results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practice is required
by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of
employment practices results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such group of
employment practices are required by business necessity,
except that-
"(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a
complaining party demonstrates that a group of
employment practices results in a disparate impact, such
party shall not be reqtiired to demonstrate which specific
practice or practices within the group results in such
disparate impact;
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific
employment practice within such group of employment
practices does not contribute to the disparate impact, the
respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity; and
"(iii) if the court finds that the complaining party
can identify, from records or other information of the
respondent reasonably available (through discovery or
otherwise), which specific practice or practices
contributed to the disparate impact-
"(I) the complaining party shall be required to
demonstrate which specific practioe or practices
contributed to the disparate impact; and
"(II) the respondent shall be required to
demonstrate business necessity only as to the specific
practice or practices demonstrated by the
complaining party to have contributed to the
disparate impact.
"(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is
required by business necessity may be used as a defense only
against a claim under this subsection.
"(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a rule
barring the employment of an individual who currently and
knowingly uses or possesses an illegal drug as defined in Schedules
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I and II of section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a drug taken
under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or any
other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances
Act or any other provision of Federal law, shall be considered an
unlawful employment practice under this title only if such rule is
adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.".
SEC. 5. CLARIFYING PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPERMISSIBLE
CONSIDERATION OF RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX OR
NATIONAL ORIGIN IN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) (as amended by Section 4) is further
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(1) Discriminatory Practice Need Not Be Sole Contributing
Factor.-Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
a contributing factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also contributed to such practice.".
(b) ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS.-Section 706(g) of such Act
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)) is amended by inserting before the period
in the last sentence the following: "or, in a case where a violation
is established under section 703(1), if the respondent establishes
that it would have taken the same action in the absence of any
discrimination. In any case in which a violation is established
under section 703(1), damages may be awarded only for injury
that is attributable to the unlawful employment practice".
SEC. 6. FACILITATING PROMPT AND ORDERLY RESOLUTION
OF CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
IMPLEMENTING LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
(as amended by sections 4 and 5) is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new subsection:
"(m) FINALITY OF LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.-
"(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except
as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that
implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent
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judgment or order resolving a claim of employment discrimination
under the United States Constitution or Federal civil rights laws
may not be challenged in a claim under the United States
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws-
"(A) by a person who, prior to the entry of such
judgment or order, had-
"(i) actual notice from any source of the proposed
judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that
such judgment or order might affect the interests of such
person and that an opportunity was available to present
objections to such judgment or order; and
"(ii) a reasonable opportunity to present objections
to such judgment or order;
"(B) by a person with respect to whom the requirements
of subparagraph (A) are not satisfied, if the court determines
that the interests of such person were adequately represented
by another person who challenged such judgment or other
prior to or after the entry of such judgment or order; or
"(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order
determines that reasonable efforts were made to provide
notice to interested persons.
A determination under subparagraph (C) shall be made prior to
the entry of the judgment or order, except that if the judgment or
order was entered prior to the date of the enactment of this
subsection, the determination may be made at any reasonable
time.
"(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-
"(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of
parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule
in the proceeding in which they intervened;
"(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which
the litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of
members of a class represented or sought to be represented in
such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief
was sought in such action by the Federal government;
"(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent
judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order
was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently
invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction; or
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"(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the
due process of law required by the United States Constitution.
"(3) Any action, not precluded under this subsection, that
challenges an employment practice that implements and is within
the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order of the type
referred to in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if
possible before th judge, that entered such judgment or order.
Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action
pursuant to section 1404 of title 28, United States Code.".
SEC. 7. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; APPLICATION TO
CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS.
(a) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)) is amended-
(1) by striking out "one hundred and eighty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "2 years";
(2) by inserting after "occurred" the first time it appears "or
has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved,
whichever is later,";
(3) by striking out ", except that in" and inserting in lieu
thereof ". In"; and
(4) by striking out "such charge shall be filed" and all that
follows through "whichever is earlier, and".
(b) APPLICATION TO CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS.-
Section 703(h) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by
inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: "Where a
seniority system or seniority practice is part of a collective bargaining
agreement and such system or practice was included in such agreement
with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, the application of such system or practice during the
period that such collective bargaining agreement is in effect shall be an
unlawful employment practice.".
SEC. 8. PROVIDING FOR DAMAGES IN CASES OF
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(g)) is amended by inserting before the last sentence the following
new sentences: "With respect to an unlawful employment practice
(other than an unlawful employment practice established in accordance
with section 703(k), or in the case of an unlawful employment practice
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, other than an
unlawful employment practice established in accordance with
paragraph (3)(A) or paragraph (6) of section 102 of that Act, as it
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related to standards and criteria that tend to screen out individuals
with disabilities)-
"(A) compensatory damages may be awarded; and
"(B) if the respondent (other than a government, government
agency, or a political subdivision) engaged in the unlawful
employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others, punitive
damages may be awarded against such respondent;
in addition to the relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this
subsection, except that compensatory damages shall not include
backpay or any interest thereon. Compensatory and punitive damages
and jury trials shall be available only for claims of intentional
discrimination. If compensatory or punitive damages are sought with
respect to a claim of intentional discrimination arising under this title,
any party may demand a trial by jury.".
SEC. 9. CLARIFYING ATTORNEYS' FEES PROVISION.
Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(k)) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(k)";
(2) by inserting "(including expert fees and other litigation
expenses) and" after "attorney's fee,";
(3) by striking out "as part of the"; and
(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraphs:
"(2) No consent order or judgment settling a claim under this
title shall be entered, and no stipulation of dismissal of a claim
under this title shall be effective, unless the parties or their counsel
attest to the court that a waiver of all or substantially all
attorneys' fees was not compelled as a condition of the settlement.
"(3) In any action or proceeding in which any judgment or
order granting relief under this title is challenged, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party in the original action
(other than the Commission or the United States) to recover from
the party against whom relief was granted in the original action a
reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees and other litigation
expenses) and costs reasonably incurred in defending (as a party,
intervenor or otherwise) such judgment or order.".
SEC. 10. PROVIDING FOR INTEREST, AND EXTENDING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IN ACTIONS AGAINST THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16)
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is amended-
(1) in subsection (c), by striking out "thirty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "ninety days"; and
(2) in subsection (d), by inserting before the period ", and the
same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be
available as in cases involving non-public parties, except that
prejudgment interest may not be awarded on compensatory
damages".
SEC. 11. CONSTRUCTION.
Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000h et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
SEC. 1107. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWS.
"(a) EFFECTUATION OF PURPOSE.-All Federal laws protecting the
civil rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent with the intent of
such laws, and shall be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of
such laws to provide equal opportunity and provide effective remedies.
"(b) NONLIMITATION.-Except as expressly provided, no Federal
law protecting the civil rights of persons shall be construed to repeal or
amend by implication any other Federal law protecting such civil
rights.
"(C) INTERPRETATION.-In interpreting Federal civil rights laws,
including laws protecting against discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, sex, religion, age, and disability, courts and
administrative agencies shall not rely on the amendments made by the
Civil Rights Act of 1990 as a basis for limiting the theories of liability,
rights, and remedies available under civil rights laws not expressly
amended by such Act.".
SEC. 12. RESTORING PROHIBITION AGAINST ALL RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF
CONTRACTS.
Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42
U.S.C. 1981) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "All persons within"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsections:
"(b) For purposes of this section, the right to 'make and enforce
contracts' shall include the making, performance, modification and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.
"(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against
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impairment by nongovernmental discrimination as well as against
impairment under color of State law.".
SEC. 13. LAWFUL COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS
NOT AFFECTED.
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to require an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin: Provided, however, that
nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to
affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements that are otherwise in accordance with the law.
SEC. 14. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this Act,
or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is
held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made
by this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons and
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 15. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS AND TRANSITION
RULES.
(a) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-The amendments made by-
(1) section 4 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 5, 1989;
(2) section 5 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after May 1, 1989;
(3) section 6 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 12, 1989;
(4) sections 7(a)(1), 7(a)(3) and 7(a)(4), 7(b), 8, 9, 10, and
11 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after
the date of enactment of this Act;
(5) section 7(a)(2) shall apply to all proceedings pending on
or commenced after June 12, 1989; and
(6) section 12 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 15, 1989.
(b) TRANSITION RULES.-
(1) In general.-Any orders entered by a court between the
effective dates described in subsection (a) and the date of
enactment of this Act that are inconsistent with the amendments
made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2), or 12, shall be vacated if, not later
than 1 year after such date of enactment, a request for such relief
is made.
(2) Section 6.-Any orders entered between June 12, 1989
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and the date of enactment of this Act, that permit a challenge to
an employment practice that implements a litigated or consent
judgment or order and that is inconsistent with the amendment
made by section 6, shall be vacated if, not later than 6 months
after the date of enactment of this Act, a request for such relief is
made. For the 1-year period beginning on the date of enactment of
this Act, an individual whose challenge to an employment practice
that implements a litigated or consent judgment or order is denied
under the amendment made by section 6, or whose order or relief
obtained under such challenge is vacated under such section, shall
have the same right of intervention in the case in which the
challenged litigated or consent judgment or order was entered as
that individual had on June 12, 1989.
(c) Period of Limitations.-The period of limitations for the filing
of a claim or charge shall be tolled from the applicable effective date
described in subsection (a) until the date of enactment of this Act, on a
showing that the claim or charge was not filed because of a rule or
decision altered by the amendments made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2), or
12.
SEC. 16. CONGRESSIONAL COVERAGE.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
SEC. 719. CONGRESSIONAL COVERAGE.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the provisions of
this title shall apply to the Congress of the United States, and the
means for enforcing this title as such applies to each House of Congress
shall be as determined by such House of Congress.".
Passed the Senate July 18 (legislative day, July 10), 1990.
Attest:
Secretary.
Judd
103
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
The Federal Courts in the 21st Century
Maurice Rosenberg*
Introduction
In forecasting the future, one should undoubtedly pick a target
date far enough ahead to assure that mortality will get here first.1 My
safe selection is the year 2033, which will be the 100th anniversary of
FDR's New Deal. Picking that year allows us to conjure up the pros-
pect of a New Deal for the federal courts. If it comes, what sort of new
deal will the nation be giving to and getting from its judiciary? That
depends on what kind of federal judicial system we ideally would want.
This in turn depends, at least in part, on what changes the next 43
years will bring, and especially, what effect the changes will have on
phenomena that might shape the work, structure, operations and per-
sonnel of the federal courts.
Luckily, this forecasting enterprise can draw upon the results of a
recently completed study by a very capable congressionally established
committee that set itself a similar goal. Its target was about 25 years
out instead of 43, but I see no problem in using its product as a spring-
board for this discussion on the coming role of the federal courts.
The Federal Courts Study Committee
In November 1988 in response to widespread, though not unani-
mous, fears that the federal judicial system was in serious and worsen-
ing difficulties, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Study Act.2 The
Act created a Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC) to be set up
* Harold R. Medina, Professor Emeritus of Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia
University School of Law, A.B., 1940, Syracuse University; LL.B., 1947, Columbia
University School of Law.
1. In 1967 I delivered a crystal-ball-gazing talk at the National Judicial College
in Reno, Nevada entitled: "The Adversary Proceeding in the Year 2000," 1 PROSPEC-
TUS 5 (1968), reprinted in 74 CASE & COMMENT 39 (No. 4, 1969); 26 J. Mo. B. 277
(1970). As the new millennium approaches I see the prospect of many unfulfilled pre-
dictions and am thinking of turning in my prophet's license.
2. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE FEDERAL COURTS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 31 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter
REPORT].
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within the Judicial Conference of the United States, with 15 members
and a 15-month lease on life. The Committee was to "make a complete
study of the courts of the United States and of the several States and
transmit a report to the President, the Chief Justice of the United
States, the Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
Conference of Chief Justices, and the State Justice Institute."3 It did
so. On April 2, 1990, the FCSC delivered a thoughtful, comprehensive
and lucid assessment of the problems facing the United States federal
courts,4 and made more than 100 recommendations for their cure or
alleviation.5 Each recommendation was explicitly directed either to
Congress, the courts, the Department of Justice, the Executive branch
generally, or, in a few instances, to the State Justice Institute and the
state courts.6
Besides calling for an examination of current federal court
problems, Congress required the Committee to develop a long-range
plan for the future of the federal judiciary, identifying four subjects on
which assessments were needed: (1) alternative methods of dispute res-
olution; (2) the structure and administration of the Federal court sys-
tem; (3) methods of resolving intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts in
the courts of appeals; and (4) the types of disputes resolved by the
Federal courts.7
In January 1989 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed
Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit to chair the committee and named as members two
other circuit courts of appeals judges, two district judges, two United
States Senators, two Representatives, an Assistant Attorney General,
several practitioners, a state chief justice and a university president.8 A
small full-time staff and a large number of unpaid advisers and consul-
tants aided the FCSC in the remarkably intensive and expeditious dis-
3. Id.
4. The Report did not deal in a substantial way with problems of the state
courts.
5. REPORT, supra note 2, at 172-85. Addressing each recommendation to an
identified agency is an excellent way to focus attention. It undoubtedly has shortened
the time to implement a number of recommendations. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1990, H.R. 5316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990).
6. REPORT, supra note 2, at 172-85.
7. Id. at 189-91.
8. Id. at 31, 193-98.
[Vol. 15
105
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Rosenberg
charge of its duties.9
At its outset the final report of the Committee identifies the flood
of incoming cases as a threat to the effective functioning of the federal
courts:"0
It is no doubt a compliment to the federal judiciary that so many
people are so eager to use its services in preference to those of
other adjudicatory institutions. Many of these people do not real-
ize, however - or do not care - that the demands they place on
the system make it less able to serve the needs of other groups, or
even their own needs in the long run.11
Similarly straightforward is the FCSC's response to the problem
of perceived overuse of the federal courts:
The committee believes. . that the primary and preferred course,
while time exists, is to limit the federal judiciary to just those func-
tions that its unique federal role requires, so as to avoid the per-
haps overwhelming impact of further unchecked growth. We have
therefore concentrated upon incremental reforms that may at least
postpone the need for more extreme ones. 2
Before examining the recommended reforms we should note briefly
how the Committee went about its work. In its early days the FCSC
organized itself into three subcommittees corresponding to its main
concerns.' 3 One was the Subcommittee on Workload, which focused on:
the size and mix of the federal courts' civil and criminal caseload; al-
ternative dispute resolution methods; complex multi-district litigation;
and improving the courts' capacity to deal with scientific evidence. An-
other was the Subcommittee on Role and Relationships, concerned
with the federal courts' relation to Congress, Article I courts, adminis-
trative agencies and state courts. The third, the Subcommittee on Ad-
ministration, Management and Structure, concentrated on the way the
system is organized and run, with emphasis on appellate structure.
9. Id. at 32, 199-203.
10. REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. In part this is due to the nationalization of many
areas of the law as a result of the communications revolution and other centralizing
forces. However, state-law based diversity suits regularly contribute about a quarter of
the civil caseload.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 187.
13. Id. at 31.
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To identify specific issues for its agenda the FCSC conducted a
survey of federal judges and citizens' groups, bar organizations, re-
search groups, civil rights groups, professors and others. It held public
hearings in 13 cities, drawing testimony from more than 250 wit-
nesses.1 4 The Committee also had the benefit of written comments from
hundreds of sources.15 In the end, the FCSC produced in a commenda-
bly short period of time a report that may well be the most comprehen-
sive and searching study of the federal courts in their 200-year
history.16
Recommendations of the FCSC
The FCSC grouped its recommendations under eight subject mat-
ter headings: (1) reallocating business between the state and federal
systems; (2) creating non-judicial alternative forums for some types of
cases; (3) enlarging the federal courts' capacity; (4) reducing the com-
plexity and speeding the flow of litigation; (5) mitigating appellate
court overload; (6) revising sentencing rules; (7) improving federal
court administration; and (8) protecting against bias in the judicial
branch and its processes. 7 For present purposes those headings are
somewhat diffuse. I find it useful to limit this discussion to a few of the
headings, to revise them somewhat and to rearrange the contents. My
aim is to highlight several of the large problems.
First, some of the recommendations would reduce the volume and
workload of the Article III courts. In part this would be accomplished
by diverting whole categories of cases to other tribunals, mainly state
courts and non-judicial forums.1 8 In part it would be achieved by expe-
diting dispositions through more settlements and simplified litigation
procedures.1 9
Drug cases receive extended attention.20 The Report argues that,
in order to protect the federal courts from being capsized by drug cases
which the state courts could absorb, federal enforcement officials
14. Id. at 32-33.
15. Id. at 32.
16. REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id. at 35.
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 35.
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should target only the relatively few cases (those with international or
interstate elements) that state authorities cannot or will not effectively
prosecute.21
Federal jurisdiction based on diversity, now accounting for about
one in every four cases in the federal district courts, should be elimi-
nated, the Report urges, except for alienage, interpleader and a new
category of multistate litigation involving complex issues, such as mass
torts.22 If near-total elimination of diversity cases is not acceptable, the
FCSC falls back to lesser curtailments, such as barring plaintiffs from
invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home states.23
Disability claims,2 4 small-size tort claims against the federal gov-
ernment,25 tax cases,26 bankruptcy appeals,27 and claims by railway
workers and seamen for job injuries,28 should all be deflected from the
Article III courts to a variety of other tribunals, most of them to be
newly created.2 9 Another flood-control proposal would authorize the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to install a five-year pilot
program to arbitrate employment discrimination cases with the consent
of both parties.30
Second, there are proposals that deal with the structure of the ju-
dicial system, with a heavy emphasis on the appellate courts.3 The Re-
port opposes creation of a "national intermediate court of appeals" of
the kind proposed in 1975 by the Commission on Revision of the Fed-
eral Court Appellate System. 2 But, noting that "caseload pressures are
inexorable"3' in the courts of appeals, the Report describes and dia-
grams five alternative structures that are designed to increase the ca-
pacity of the courts of appeals without adding to the potential for in-
tercircuit or intracircuit conflicts.34 Besides urging serious study of the
21. REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
22. Id. at 38-40.
23. Id. at 42.
24. Id. at 55.
25. Id. at 81.
26. REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
27. Id. at 74.
28. Id. at 62.
29. Id. at 55.
30. Id. at 60.
31. REPORT, supra note 2, at 109, 116-17.
32. Id. at 116-17.
33. Id. at 117.
34. Id. at 117-23.
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alternative versions of the appellate system presented (none of which it
endorses), the Report calls upon Congress to authorize a five-year ex-
perimental project to deal with intercircuit conflicts. 35 The Supreme
Court could, if it chooses, refer selected cases to an en banc court of
appeals for a decision that would be a nationwide precedent.
Third, there are recommendations to increase available judge-
power: "More judges are essential. But they are not the ultimate solu-
tion to the federal courts' caseload crisis."36 In this category is the pro-
posal to limit incoming tax cases to the Article I trial division of the
Tax Court and to create an Article III appellate division with exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals in all tax cases.3 7
An Office of Judicial Impact Assessment is proposed.3 8 It would
act in liaison with Congress by advising on the impact on the courts of
contemplated legislation. The Committee also recommended that when
drafting laws, Congress use a checklist to eliminate the need for post-
enactment litigation and judicial interpretation. The checklist would in-
clude issues such as the applicable statute of limitations, whether the
statute means to preempt state law, whether the statute created a pri-
vate cause of action, and similar recurring questions."
Some of the FCSC's recommendations have already been put into
effect or into the legislative hopper. For instance, the Federal Courts
Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 calls for a study by the
Federal Judicial Center of Intercircuit Conflicts and :provides a fall-
back 4-year statute of limitations for future federal legislation that
omits to specify a limitations period.40
The Role of the Federal Courts
Not all observers accept the FCSC's premise that it is essential "to
limit the federal judiciary to just those functions that its unique role
requires, so as to avoid" the harmful effects of unchecked growth. Nev-
ertheless, the premise has a venerable pedigree. As far back as 1954,
Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., said that the "time has long been over-
due for a full dress examination by Congress of the use to which [the
35. Id. at 126.
36. REPORT, supra note 2, at 36.
37. Id. at 69.
38. Id. at 89.
39. Id. at 91.
40. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTATION AcT OF 1990, H.R.
5316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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federal] courts are being put."'" The reexamination is sure to spark a
fiery debate, for there are deep differences of opinion regarding the ba-
sic functions of the federal courts in American society. In my view, a
fair delineation goes something like this:
The federal courts' central purposes and functions are to pro-
tect the individual liberties, freedoms and rights of these people; to
give definitive interpretation and application to constitutional provi-
sions and federal laws, and to assure the continued vitality of dem-
ocratic processes of government. These are vital functions for the
welfare of the nation and its people. No other agency or institution
of government can perform these duties as effectively as the federal
courts."2
Because the question of which disputes belong in the federal courts
and which ones do not is so sensitive, any recommendation to pare their
jurisdiction must be approached with utmost caution. The decision
must rest on principled criteria that are as free as possible from politi-
cal or ideological agenda. A good example is the address of this subject
by the late Judge Henry J. Friendly in his 1972 Carpentier Lectures at
Columbia University. He described both a "minimum" and a "maxi-
mum" model of federal jurisdiction. Those who espouse the minimum
model, he pointed out, proceed on the theory that the best course is to
trust the state courts, subject to appropriate federal appellate review.
In the hypothetical minimum model he identified many types of cases
that were excluded from federal jurisdiction, but not cases where "eve-
rything is to be gained and nothing is to be lost by granting original
jurisdiction to inferior federal courts.' 43 The following categories of ac-
tions were in the minimum model: (1) cases where the United States is
seeking to enforce its own laws; (2) civil claims by the United States;
(3) suits against the United States; (4) civil cases in the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; (5) bankruptcy cases (but he went on to say
there is no reason why bankruptcy laws could not be confided to state
courts, since they involve only private rights)."4
Judge Friendly observed that the minimum model of federal juris-
diction would be broader than that of the First Judiciary Act, with the
41. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
42. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL SYSTEM, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1977).
43. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
44. Id. at 10.
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notable exception that diversity jurisdiction would not be present.45 The
minimum model would also eliminate general federal question jurisdic-
tion. Vindicating federal rights would be a job for the state courts, with
review by the Supreme Court or, if needed, by intermediate federal
appellate courts.
In contrast, the maximum model would go to the full extent of
constitutional judicial power. It would place considerable reliance on
the argument that federal courts provide a "juster justice" than state
courts; thus, the more cases in the federal system the better.46 Al-
though the issue of the proper allocation of jurisdiction to the federal
courts is today debated frequently on ideological lines, with conserva-
tives calling for studies of the proper division of federal-state judicial
competence and liberals opposing any such studies as likely to lead to
restrictions on the federal courts' jurisdiction, this was not always so.
The American Law Institute's landmark "Study of the Division of Ju-
risdiction Between the Federal and State Courts" (1969) originated in
a suggestion of Chief Justice Earl Warren in an address to the Institute
at its annual meeting in 1959. He said, "[I]t is essential that we
achieve a proper jurisdictional balance between the federal and state
court systems, assigning to each system those cases most appropriate in
the light of the basic principles of federalism. 41
Forecasting The Federal Court's Future
As already noted, forecasting the far-off needs and problems of the
federal courts is risky business. A sure way to be wrong is to project
present trends. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell was fond of
pointing out that based on the trend in Georgia's prison population, by
the year 2016 every inhabitant of the state would be in prison.48
Judge J. Clifford Wallace of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has observed that: "Not only do changing conditions affect the trend
lines, but sometimes the trends themselves result in a counteraction. 49
Yet, with all their unreliability as predictors, trends can stimulate the
imagination. A decade ago it was calculated that if trends for the pe-
45. Id. at 11.
46. Id. at 12.
47. 36 A.L.I. PROC. 33 (1959).
48. Wallace, Working Paper - Future of the Judiciary, 94 F.R.D. 225, 227
(1981).
49. Id. at 227.
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nod 1975-80 were to continue to the year 2000, the number of district
court judgeships would increase by about 50%, district court filings by
37 %, appellate court filings by 223 %, and appellate court judgeships
by 25 %.5o
To some extent, both the nature of the work the federal courts do
and the structure of the federal judicial system will depend upon the
demands for judicial time and energy. This requires translating the
data on the quantity of filed cases into more realistic dimensions -
that is, by assigning weights to the various components of the caseload
in order to reflect the work demands they will make. The result will be
to purge the caseload figures of statistical fluff in the form of thousands
of pro forma actions such as the student-loan collection cases brought
by the United States Government. These almost never produce opposi-
tion, let alone a trial. They require very little judicial energy and
should not be assigned statistical parity with antitrust and other com-
plex lawsuits. Determining the impact of intake volume on the courts
requires analyzing the nature as well as the number of filed cases.
Today there are about 835 authorized federal judgeships.5 1 Should
there be any resistance to continuing to expand the size of the federal
judiciary? How many more federal judges would it be desirable to
have? The FCSC suggested that 1,000 is the practical ceiling on the
number of judges if the Article III judiciary is to remain capable of
performing its essential functions without significant degradation of
quality.5 2 The FCSC offered this argument for limiting the number:
Even if a highly competent federal judiciary consisting of
thousands of judges could be created and maintained, the coordina-
tion of so many judges would be extraordinarily difficult. The more
trial judges there are, the more appeals judges there must be; the
more appeals judges there are, the higher the rate of appeal, be-
cause it becomes more difficult to predict the behavior of the appel-
late court; the more appeals there are, the more difficult it is for
the Supreme Court to maintain some minimum uniformity of fed-
eral decisional law, because its capacity to review decisions of the
50. Id. at 228.
51. The Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 (H.R. 5316), which passed both houses
of Congress on October 26, 1990, established 11 new court of appeals judgeships and
74 district court judgeships for a total of 85 new judgeships. As this article goes to
press, the authorizing legislation awaits President Bush's action.
52. REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
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lower federal courts is limited.53
Although this is a reasonable argument, it does not persuade the
large constituency that admires and trusts the federal courts above all
other agencies of government, state or federal. Members of that con-
stituency hold fast to the view that every federal right must be heard
by an Article III judge. If there are not enough federal judges, they
say, "Get more!" And, they add, there are thousands of qualified per-
sons among the three quarters of a million lawyers in America. In ef-
fect, they say: "If we need more, we can afford more, and we can 'find
more." Thus, the dilemma: systemic limits are on a collision course
with substantive expansion. Congress has been legislating new rights at
a merry and unchecked pace. Courts have been recognizing more and
more federal rights and some new federal defenses. Neither Congress
nor the courts are likely to stop legislating or creating rights and de-
fenses. That means that there will be more and more litigation. If we
can forecast anything about 2033, it is that barring some major change
in the psychology, economics or utility of litigating, Americans will
continue to litigate in huge numbers.
What factors in American society will affect the nature of legal
rights and the desire to litigate them in federal courts in the decades
ahead? That is a question futurists, jurists, and lawyers have been en-
ergetically discussing in recent times. Among the frequently mentioned
factors of change that may affect the courts are demography, science-
technology, and economics. How these amorphous phenomena may
make their effects felt on the work of the federal courts involves undis-
ciplined speculation, not prediction. So be it.
Among demographic problems: As the population gets grayer -
even white-haired - will there be contests between the younger, more
productive, and the older, more affluent, segments of the society for
scarce goods and services? As the population gets more heterogeneous,
will more than the English language be standard in the courts of the
United States? Will briefs have to be written in two languages? Or
perhaps we will return to the innocent idea of esperantist days - that
there ought to be a world-wide tongue.
Science and technology offer myriad possibilities of generating
great volumes of federal litigation. Environmental issues are a prime
example. In just a few centuries human beings have progressed from
garbage in the streets to garbage all over the globe - in land, water
53. Id. at 7.
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and in the atmosphere. The environment is here to stay, not only as a
resource but as a problem. Indeed, I see it as the major problem of the
twenty-first century. How shall we keep civilization from strangling in
its own waste, and what is the role of the federal courts in vindicating
the rights of people with conflicting views and priorities regarding envi-
ronmental issues?
With genetic engineering advancing at a feverish pace, the shape
of looming legal issues is apparent. Competing claims to replacement
parts for worn-out limbs and organs and the use of fetal tissue for med-
ical purposes are two such issues. Is the day coming when human be-
ings who give up the ghost, or who never get that far because they were
never born, are used for spare parts?
Communication advances have certainly not run their course. Ex-
ploding communications technology will not be without problems. Once
it becomes possible to see or hear activities behind closed doors and
thick walls, what happens to privacy? .How will Congress and federal
courts deal with those issues?!
Conclusion
If trends are unreliable predictors and if the advent of a
Gorbachev, an asbestos-case deluge, or a crack-cocaine epidemic is to-
tally unforeseeable - in short, if we are at the mercy of the unex-
pected - how can we forecast what needs and problems the federal
courts face in 40-odd years? I fear we cannot do even a poor job of
prophesying. That means we cannot program the federal judiciary to be
elite or populist, bureaucratic or individualistic, restricted in jurisdic-
tion or expansive, proceeding by general rules or by case management,
concerned with systemic fairness as well as case-by-case fairness, etc.
What we can and should do, in my opinion, is to prepare for
whatever the future holds by three steps. The first need is for a plan-
ning capability for the federal judicial system. It is certain the work of
the federal courts will continue to change rapidly and substantially.
The course of responsibility is to anticipate problems and develop possi-
ble responses before the problems reach a crisis stage. A long-range
planning capability within the Judicial Conference was proposed by the
FCSC. Although opinions may differ as to the exact structure and
makeup of the planning agency, the need seems clear and its location in
the third branch reasonable.
A second need is for built-in flexibility in the federal judiciary.
This can only come by understanding, through research and analysis,
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the dynamics of case flow, the indicia of case durability, and the
weighted judicial-time requirements of the caseload at both the trial
and appellate level. This will prepare the judiciary for dealing with
court problems of the future, whatever form they take.
A final need is to appreciate that the federal courts, like the state
courts, are part of a dispute resolution system that includes many alter-
natives to full-blown litigation as ways of resolving disputes. If that
concept can be absorbed and acted upon, the chances of a better deal
for the courts in 2033 will be much improved.
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EDITORS' NOTE
The Editors of this issue intended to send a cassette tape of the
controversial recording, As Nasty As They Wanna Be, along with this
book, as an exhibit for the following three articles on music and ob-
scenity. It is our belief that any legitimate inquiry into the constitution-
ality of banning the 2 Live Crew's music is not complete without actu-
ally listening to the work taken as a whole. Reading only the lyrics
skews the reader's impression of the material at issue, and cannot possi-
bly allow one to evaluate artistic value.
We considered, at great length, whether such a distribution would
violate state and federal obscenity statutes, subjecting ourselves, the
University, and even the recipients of the tape to serious criminal liabil-
ity. The Miller standard and the related statutes do not specifically
exempt material with "educational" value from prosecutorial zeal. Yet;
we concluded that such a limited distribution for a clearly academic
purpose had serious value and was justifiable despite the uncertainty in
the law.
Unfortunately, our decision was vetoed for non-academic, non-le-
gal considerations-in favor of protecting the perceived sensibilities
and sensitivities of those upon whose support this University is depen-
dent. Thus, we are reminded again of the power of speech, the fear it
engenders, and the preciousness of the right to litigate-when neces-
sary-for the freedoms protected by the first amendment.
116
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/14
Race, Rap and the Community Standards Test of
Obscenity: The Community of Culture*
Steven I. Friedland*
Most of us, I suspect, hardly know our neighbors if we know
them at all.1
I. Introduction
Controversy and obscenity laws appear to go hand in hand.2
Within the past year, for example, obscenity issues have cropped up in
disparate areas around the country, creating a public outcry3 stretching
far beyond the locales in which the issues arose.4 In Cincinnati, an ex-
* © 1990 by Steven I. Friedland. I would like to extend my thanks &
appreciation for useful comments on earlier drafts to Michael Cohn, Larry Corman,
Simone Sommer, Joseph Weiss, Jr., Michael Shames, Anthony Chase, Johnny Burris,
Bruce Rogow, Beverly Pohl, Shirley DeLuna, Brenda Pagliaro, and Leslie
Deckelbaum.
** Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1981; B.A., S.U.N.Y. Binghamton, 1978.
1. Bill Brancher, Trial Hassle Is a Repeat Performance, Miami Herald, Oct. 12,
1990, at 1 BR, 5BR, col. 4 (Broward County edition).
2. As one commentator aptly noted, "over the years, few tasks have proven more
frustrating and elusive for the Supreme Court than its attempt to define obscenity."
How A 'Reasonable Person' Might Define Obscenity, Nat'l L. J., May 18, 1987, at 5;
see, e.g., Gliedman, Obscenity Law: Definitions and Contemporary Standards, 1985
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 913 (1985); Kamp, Obscenity and the Supreme Court: A Commu-
nication Approach to a Persistent Judicial Problem, 2 COMM. AND THE LAW 1 (1980).
3. Cf. H. KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 6 (Harper and Rowe 1988) ("It is a paradox of modern life that speech,
although highly prized, enjoys its great protection in part because it is so often of no
concern to anyone. To an almost alarming degree, tolerance depends not on principle
but on indifference."); see also Bollinger, Harry Kalven, The Prost of the First
Amendment, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1576, 1578 (1989).
4. In fact, obscenity prosecutions by the Department of Justice increased from 37
in 1988 to 120 in 1989. Soocher, It's Bad, It's Def- Is It Obscene, Nat'l L.J., June 4,
1990, at 1. "We're definitely in the middle of an anti-obscenity boom. . . [a]nd when
you have a ratcheting up of obscenity prosecutions in one area of the arts, you have a
ratcheting up in other areas, too." Id. (quoting first amendment attorney Martin 117
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hibit by artist Robert Mappelthorpe was the source of an obscenity
prosecution against the museum curator who agreed to display the art-
ist's work.5 In Alabama, a district attorney brought criminal charges
against a New York cable television company (with subscribers nation-
wide) for beaming pornographic programs into the homes of 50 con-
senting families.' The charges effectively drove the company out of
business. In Congress, Jesse Helms led a determined movement to limit
funding by the National Endowment For the Arts to artists whose
works include sexually explicit scenes.7 In Broward County, Florida, a
rap group named 2 Live Crew, once known only to devotees of hip-hop
music, was thrust into the national spotlight when a federal district
court judge in Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro8 found the group's
recording, "As Nasty As They Wanna Be," to be obscene.9
The significance of these cases, particularly the ruling in
Skyywalker Records, Inc., is both direct and periphrastic. 10 At a mini-
Garbus).
5. City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Art Center and Dennis Barrie (Museum
Curator), Case Nos. 90 CRB 11699AB, and 90 CRB 1l700AB. These cases resulted
in an acquittal upon a trial by jury.
6. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1990, § B, at 4, col. 1 (late ed.).
7. See Soocher supra, note 4, at 1 ("At the national level, the use of restrictions
on federally funded arts projects containing sexually explicit material have been the
focus of heated Congressional debates on budgeting for the National Endowment for
the Arts.")
8. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
9. Id. A declaratory judgment action was brought by the members of the 2 Live
Crew and its leader's record company, Skyywalker Records, Final Order (2nd cir.)
(No. 90-6220-CIV-JAG) against the sheriff of Broward County, Nicholas Navarro.
The judge who decided this declaratory judgment action was federal district court
Judge Jose Gonzalez. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
plaintiffs' album was not only nasty, but legally obscene. In so doing, the federal dis-
trict court judge found that the song satisfied the requirements of Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). The three prong test of Miller concluded that material is obscene
only when:
the average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find that the words, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law . . . and ...
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value.
Id. at 24.
The case was a declaratory judgment action and not a criminal matter. Regardless,
further sale and distribution of the record in Broward County ceased.
10. Periphrastic is derived from the root "periphery" which refers to "the out-
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mum, this was the first time in the United States a federal district
court judge had ruled that a musical recording was obscene.,' In addi-
tion, the ruling created precedent regarding the scope of obscene mat-
ter, and opened the door for additional findings about other songs. On a
different level, the ruling sent economic and creative tremors12 through-
out the music industry,13 from performers to producers to other busi-
ness personnel.' 4
The most significant impact of these recent obscenity disputes,
however, is on the legal definition used to judge whether material is
obscene. The criticism of the Supreme Court's attempts to define ob-
scenity has been widespread since its initial declaration in 1957 in Roth
v. United States.'5 One observer has commented, "[T]his unlikely issue
has proved uniquely stubborn and resistant. The court has been handi-
capped by a treacherous political under-tow: the justification for ob-
scenity regulation may be faint, but the political passions invested in
the issue are fierce."18
Skyywalker Records, Inc., in particular, offered judges simply one
more text-book reminder of the recurring problem of defining obscen-
ity. This problem of epistemology has burdened not only the district
court judge in Skyywalker Records, Inc., but many members of the
Supreme Court as well.' 7 Members of the Supreme Court have ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with the obscenity test since the Court first
ward bounds of something as distinquished from its internal regions or center." WEB-
STER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1980).
11. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
12. See Philips, Obscenity Ruling Rocks Industry, L. A. Times, June 9, 1990, at
IF, col. 4; see also Higham, Crackdown on Risque Artists Growing, The Miami Her-
ald, June 11, 1990, at 10A, col. 1.
13. Soocher, supra note 4, at 1. The National Law Journal noted, "But the in-
dustry barely had time to catch its breath before anti-obscenity attacks over music
releases - particularly rap - increased at an alarming rate." Id.
14. The ruling received national attention, and participants in the case appeared
on "Nightline" on ABC, the Phil Donahue show, and numerous other media events.
See also Valbrun, Navarro, Crew Take Show on the Road, The Miami Herald, June
14, 1990, at 2B, col. 3; Valburun, The Flip Side of a Raw-Talk Rapper, The Miami
Herald, June 17, 1990, at 2A, col.4; Higham and Van Natta, Sheriff, Crew Share PR
Coup, The Miami Herald, June 12, 1990, at FP, col. 1.
15. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
16. H. KALVEN, supra note 2, at 34.
17. "Obscenity . . .is a hodge-podge." 413 U.S. 15, 43 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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attempted a generalized standard in Roth."' Even Justi- Brennan, the
author of the majority decision in Roth, subsequently noted that while
he attempted to find a workable definition for obscenity, he could not
do it.19 Instead, after years of trying, he was prepared to conclude that
a tolerably vague rule could not be constructed.20
The Court found the subjectivity of the obscenity definitions to be
particularly nettlesome. Justice Douglas succinctly summarized this
problem when he wrote, "what may be trash to me, may be prized by
others."21 Justice Stewart agreed with this assessment in Cohen v. Cali-
fornia,22 when he wrote "[ilt is often true that one man's vulgarity is
another man's lyric."23 Even those who believe that an administrable
definition of obscenity exists undoubtedly would be forced to conclude
that the Supreme Court's attempt to adequately define obscene speech
had taken the Supreme Court down a twisting and sometimes tortuous
path since Roth.24
Yet, the existing definition has had a somewhat stable existence
for more than sixteen years. The parameters of the present obscenity
definition are set forth in the seminal case of Miller v. California.25
There, former Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, offered a
three-pronged test for determining whether a particular work could be
found obscene: 28
18. Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
19. Justice Brennan stated:
Of course, the vagueness problem would be largely of our own creation if
it stemmed primarily from our failure to reach a consensus on any one
standard. But after 16 years of experimentation and debate, I am reluc-
tantly forced to the conclusions that none of the available formulas, includ-
ing the one announced today, can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83, 84 (1973).
20. Id.
21. United States v. 12 200-ft Reels of Super 8 MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
22. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
23. Id. at 25.
24. See, e.g., How a 'Reasonable Person' Might Define Obscenity, supra note 3,
at 5. "Last week the high court revisited the thorny issue [in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S.
497 (1987)] and cast more light, but not enough for some groups constantly drawn into
these murky waters, on how to judge allegedly obscene material." Id.
25. Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
26. Id.; see also Note, First Amendment - The Objective Standard for Social
Values in Obscenity Cases, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735 (1988).
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(1) that the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards, find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(2) that measured by contemporary community standards, the
work must depict or describe in a patently offensive way sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(3) that the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, ar-
tistic, political or scientific value.27
When these three prongs are applied to specific cases, numerous
questions about the prongs' application arise.28 One important but over-
looked issue is how to define "community standards," which is the mea-
suring device used for the first two prongs.29
The court in Skyywalker Records, Inc., for example, defined the
relevant community as comprising a geographic area of three contigu-
ous counties in Florida - Palm Beach, Broward and Dade.30 These
counties extend for approximately 100 miles within the southeast cor-
ner of the State, and contain more than 3 million people of many dif-
ferent races and ethnicity. 1 Ascertaining the "community" values of
such a large, diverse group of people would be difficult at best. Even if
a public opinion poll is used, new questions would arise. Would the
27. Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
28. The defendant in Miller sent five unsolicited advertising brochures through
the mail to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. These brochures advertised va-
rious books, including books titled "Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sexual Orgy Illus-
trated," and "An Illustrated History of Pornography." The brochures also advertised a
film entitled "Marital Intercourse." The brochures included graphic pictures of men
and women engaged in sexual activities. The defendant was convicted upon a jury trial
of violating the California Penal Code, which makes it a misdemeanor for "knowingly
distributing obscene matter." CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a). The defendant appealed to
the appellate department of the Supreme Court of California, but the appeal was sum-
marily denied.
29. The United States Supreme Court, in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987),
has held that the third prong of the Miller test should not be based on community
standards but on an objective test, based on the reasonable person. Yet, the question of
value for prong three is not resolved by labeling that value artistic, scientific, literary or
political; the determination of whether such value exists leaves open the question of
what kind of norms shall inculcate the predicate determination of the eventual signifi-
cance of the material. Thus, it is still unclear as to the role culture, technology, and
other important variables of modern day life play in determining whether any work has
scientific, literary, artistic or political value.
30. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp at 588.
31. Id.
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majority of those polled dictate the community's standards? How
would the undecided vote be considered? Would strength of conviction
be relevant? These and other administrability problems associated with
a geographic-based definition of community standards were not con-
fronted in the case of 2 Live Crew. Instead, in evaluating this tri-
county "community's" standards, the federal district court judge relied
on his own experiences within Broward County, without justifying or
articulating either the method by which he ascertained what the com-
munity's standards were, or how they intersected with his own views.32
This article proposes that the reliance on a geographically based
"community" to evaluate prongs one and two of the Miller test is con-
stitutionally infirm. The "geographic community" test is unworkable
because a geographic area does not provide an adequate measure of a
community's value structure or a sufficient indication of a group's col-
lective morality. Upon applying a geographic test, the community's val-
ues remain indeterminant. This lack of moral coherence occurs because
geographically based communities which exhibit some moral cohesive-
ness no longer predominate in the 1990's-if such communities ever
predominated at all, even in the 1950's and 1960's during the infancy
of Roth.
Instead, collective morality today is more dependent on cultural
influences and technology such as cable television, than on the geo-
graphic proximity of individuals. Thus, such cultural considerations
must be used to provide the moral content for any measure33 of com-
munity standards under Miller.3 4 In effect, the lack of content 5 in a
32. Id. at 590.
33. Even if it can be done, the speech form of obscenity would have sufficient
value to survive prong three of the Miller test. As Professor Ronald Dworkin has noted,
"[r]estricted publication leaves a certain hypothesis entirely unmade: the hypothesis
that sex should enter all levels of public culture on the same standing as soap opera
romance or movie trivia .... " Wright, Defining Obscenity. The Criterion of Value,
22 NEW ENG. L. REv. 315, 330 (1987-88) (quoting R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRIN-
CIPLE 342 (1985)).
34. While this article focuses on the detrimental relativism of the community
standards definition, it is further the belief of the author that the obscenity test is
invalid for several other reasons as well. One of these reasons is the inadministrability
of the third prong, which attempts to place a value on obscenity vis a vis other forms of
speech. This valuation notion is extremely subjective and cannot be applied in a consti-
tutionally acceptable manner.
35. One commentator noted that a community standards test must have a clear
and articulable definition: "the use of juries, expert evidence, or perhaps an administra-
tive board, may increase the credibility of a community standards test; however, these
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geographic-based test can only be overcome through the addition of
cultural concerns.
The article further notes, however, that even if cultural considera-
tions are used as a value-producing supplement to a geographic bound-
aries test, a local community's value structure still may be too dynamic
to serve as a constitutional guideline.36 The sub-cultures within the
community may simply prove to be too unstable to provide for a valid
measurement.
Yet, if the Miller approach is maintained, the article concludes
that using cultural considerations is substantially more effective than
not, regardless of the potential for cultural instability. Perhaps the
greatest significance of utilizing cultural concerns lies in the educa-
tional value of forcing jurors and judges to struggle with the question
of valuation and to consider disparate perspectives.
This article contains six sections. After the introduction, Section II
of the article traces the history of obscenity law. Section III discusses
the deficiencies of a geographically-based community standard. Section
IV demonstrates that a culturally-based analysis is more appropriate
than a geographically-based approach. Section V suggests that even if
cultural considerations are utilized as a supplement to geographic
boundaries, a stable set of community values still may be difficult to
ascertain. The last section provides a conclusion.
II. Obscenity and the First Amendment
The first amendment to the United States Constitution states in
part, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."' 7 Freedom of speech has long been considered one of the most
techniques should not be used in place of an articulate definition." C. MacDougall, The
Community Standards Test of Obscenity, 42 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 79 (1984).
36. The embracement of a particular valuation structure as evidenced in prong
three lacks a realizable definition since the terms literary, artistic, political or scientific
must be based upon varying mores emanating from culture, tradition, and technological
sources. The presence of these variables would be satisfactory if the jury was merely
determining whether an individual should be morally condemned for committing an act
in violation of minimally acceptable standards for a particular geographic community.
As a structure of constitutional law, however, this test is woefully inadequate. Any
attempt to place a particular value on a work that avoids objective criteria or that
relies on a community-based determination, cannot be adequately applied to meet con-
stitutional parameters of fairness and consistency.
37. U.S. CONsT. anend I. This provision is applicable against the states through
the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
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sacred of constitutional rights.3 8 Its protection is viewed as essential to
an informed electorate; the full and robust debate about ideas it pro-
motes are believed to lead to the truth.3 9 The conceptualization of the
first amendment is that it serves to promote "free trade in ideas." 40 In
this respect, it constitutes a preservative of other constitutional rights
and liberties, embodying the Western liberal traditions of, among
others, John Stewart Mill, Thomas Emerson and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. These traditions include a healthy respect for the extrinsic
value of speech as a facilitator of a vibrant and growing society.
Despite the strong traditional regard for free speech, not all forms
of speech are protected.4" Speech such as fighting words, perjury, defa-
mation and obscenity42 are considered to fall outside of the first amend-
ment's protection,4 s and may be prohibited by the state.44 The ratio-
nales for excluding certain types of speech from the protection of the
first amendment generally fall into two categories. One is the lack of
social or other value of the particular speech form, and the second is
the harm of the speech to others. With obscenity, it long has been be-
lieved that this form of speech corrupts the morals of a society, particu-
larly its youth. This concept extends back to the common law of Eng-
land.45 Even in modern times, studies have been performed attempting
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1942); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1924).
38. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
39. See id.; see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76.
40. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)(Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571; Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
42. Obscenity laws were originally motivated by religious purposes. See Note,
Balancing Community Standards Against Constitutional Freedoms of Speech and
Press: Pope v. Illinois, 41 Sw. L. J. 1023, 1025-27 (1987). The first state anti-obscenity
law was enacted in 1822 by Vermont. Id. at 1027. And the federal government fol-
lowed suit in 1842. Id; see also 5 STAT. 566, § 28 (1842) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1305 (1988)) (the major purpose of this law, apparently, was to permit the
confiscation of imported French postcards); F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBscENITY 10
(1976).
43. See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 485; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (1942); see
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 12-16 (1988); Berry & Wo-
lin, Regulating Rock Lyrics: A New Wave of Censorship?, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 595,
597 (1986).
44. The first statute regulating obscenity was adopted by the federal government
in 1842. See 5 STAT. 566 § 28 (1842).
45. See Kamp, supra note 3, at 6 n.14 (citing Regina v. Hickland, L.R. 3QB 360
(1868)).
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to link obscenity with other harms such as the commission of crimes.46
Important Supreme Court rulings supplemented the harm approach
with the premise that obscenity has no social value.47
To be obscene,' 8 speech must at a minimum be erotic.49 Yet, not
all speech about sex is obscene,50 and not all pornography is obscene. In
1957, the Court in Roth v. United States"1 set forth a test describing
the kind of material that is obscene. The Roth test posed a single ques-
tion: "whether to the average person applying contemporary commu-
nity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest. ' 52
Because of dissatisfaction with the Roth test, the Supreme Court
modified Roth in several respects in Memoirs v. Massachusetts.5" The
one prong test of Roth was expanded to three separate prongs, which
included the Roth test as the first prong. Justice Brennan, writing for
46. See, e.g., United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Report
on the Commission of Obscenity and Pornography, (1970); Cairns, Paul & Wishner,
Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evi-
dence, 46 MiNN. L. Ruv. 1009 (1962); Kamp, supra note 3, at 9 n.28 (citing Money
and Anthanasion, Pornography: Review and Bibliographic Annotations, AM. J. OHs.
AND GYN. 115 (1973)).
47. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966); Roth, 354
U.S. 476.
48. The definition of obscenity contains perhaps even more variables than other
forms of unprotected speech. The stringency of the test, for example, turns on whether
the speech involves children. See e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978); C. Berry & D. Wolin, supra note 43, at 599-600; see also Schauer, The Re-
turn of Variable Obscenity? 28 HASTINGS L. J. 1275, 1279 (1977); Note, supra note
26, at 751; Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in
Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L. J. 617, 648 (1989); Note, supra
note 42, at 1023. Wright, supra note 33, at 315. Furthermore, the test depends on local
community standards, since the first two prongs of the Miller test expressly rely on
those standards. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
49. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
50. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (requiring that the "work taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest"); see also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684, 687-88 (1959)(holding that a state may not deny the issuance of permission
to show a motion picture film simply because the film portrays adultery in a favorable
manner).
51. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
52. Id. at 489.
53. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The full name of this case was John Cleland's
"Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General. The book was more widely
known as "Fanny Hill." This book was originally penned by Cleland in 1748.
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the majority, added as a second test the question of whether the mate-
rial was patently offensive based on contemporary community stan-
dards as a result of the way the material depicted sexual matters."
Justice Brennan also added a third test requiring the material to be
"utterly without redeeming social value."' 55 This test emerged from lan-
guage found in Roth, which stated that the first amendment did not
protect material "utterly without redeeming social importance. ' 56
In the years following the enunciation of the Roth - Memoirs test,
the majority of the Supreme Court could not agree on how to apply
it.57 In his now famous statement, Justice Stewart, in his concurring
opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio58, stated that he might not be able to
define obscenity, but would know it when he saw it.59
The Court subsequently overhauled the Roth - Memoirs test in
Miller v. California in 1973.60 Miller eliminated the question of "ut-
terly without redeeming social value," and replaced it with a determi-
nation of whether the material was "without serious literary artistic,
scientific or political value."61
Chief Justice Burger concluded that:
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as writ-
ten or construed. We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites
will provide fair notice to a dealer of such materials that these pub-
lic and commercial activities may bring prosecution.62
Although the Court conceded that the language of these standards
may well be imprecise, it nevertheless pointed out that adequate warn-
54. Id. at 418.
55. Id.
56. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85.
57. In fact, for the seven years following Memoirs v. Massachusetts, the Su-
preme Court generally avoided obscenity cases by reversing obscenity convictions per
curiam. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (summarizing the
different approaches to obscenity cases relied on by the Supreme Court).
58. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
59. Id. at 197.
60. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
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hig existed.63 The existence of marginal cases, noted the Court, is not a
sufficient basis for adopting an "anything goes" approach to obscen-
ity.6" The Court in Miller stated, "[N]o amount of 'fatigue' should
lead us to adopt a 'convenient institutional' rationale - an absolutist,
'anything goes' view of the First Amendment - because it will lighten
our burdens.6 5
While the Court6 6 did not provide states with an illustrative stat-
ute that would survive a first amendment challenge, it did provide ex-
amples of areas of permissible state regulation. 7 The Court also at-
tempted to provide further guidance on the intent68 and scope 9 of its
new delineation of the obscenity standard.
The first two prongs of Miller are measured by the contemporary
community's own standards.7 0 The size of the relevant community and
the description of the average person in that community are questions
of fact determined by the trier of fact. 71 The third prong of the test,
which asks whether the material has any serious literary, artistic, scien-
tific or political value, is judged not by community standards, but by
the reasonable person standard, 2 taking the material as a whole.7
While the government has the burden of proving the three
prongs, 74 the government need not introduce specific evidence about the
'63. Id.
64. Miller, 413 U.S. at 29.
65. Id. at 29.
66. In addition, the three prongs of Miller do not merge together, but rather
must be considered separately. Unless a state can meet all three prongs, the material
will not be considered legally obscene. See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
67. These included: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ulti-
mate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive rep-
resentations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals." Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
68. The court rejected an attempt to evaluate the value of alleged obscene mate-
rial based on its "social importance." Id. at 25 n.7 (citing Justice White dissenting in
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 461).
69. The Court labeled the social importance standard an "ambiguous concept."
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 30.
72. One commentator has argued that the valuation prong, prong three, was
deemed to be based on an objective standard by the Court because the Court did not
want to create "a prospective of holding a work hostage to local tyranny ... "
Wright, supra note 33, at 338.
73. Id.
74. United States v. 2,200 Paperback Books, 565 F.2d 566,570 (9th Cir. 1977).
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community's standards. 75 The trier of fact may derive community stan-
dards from the hypothetical average person in the community,76 includ-
ing variables such as "the characteristics of the community, the differ-
ent attitudes within it, the extent to which persons reveal their true
opinions, and the nature of the 'hard core' material under attack."' 7
Thus, the trial judge, if acting as the trier of fact, may take into ac-
count his or her own knowledge of the members of the community.78
Significantly, the Court in Miller rejected a national community
standard,79 and stated that community standards "need not be precisely
defined."80 In leaving the definition of contemporary o:mmunity stan-
dards open, the Court left to speculation its constitutional scope.8 ' Sub-
sequent Supreme Court holdings attempted to limit the scope of the
community by noting that the primary focus of the "cozmmunity stan-
dards" test is to judge the material based on "its impact on an average
75. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
76. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132,
135 (2d Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 135-36.
78. This is what occurred in the case of 2 Live Crew. Id. at 136.
79. See, e.g., Hamling, 418 U.S. at 107. The progeny of Miller cleared up sev-
eral questions that were raised but not resolved in the case. The question of whether
the valuation prong, the third test, was based on community standards was confronted
in 1987 in Pope v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 497 (1987). Justice White, writing for the major-
ity, observed that the presence of scientific, literary, artistic or political value of mate-
rial is not dependent upon the local community; the proper method for determining the
presence and amount of that value was the reasonable person test. Id. at 500-01. In
essence, the Court stated that it was up to the jury to determine whether a reasonable
person would find serious literary, artistic, scientific or political value in the material in
question. Because the Court claimed that this standard did not vary from community
to community, it was in effect adopting a national standard for prong three. See Note,
Balancing Community Standards Against Constitutional Freedoms of Speech and
Press, Pope v. Illinois, 41 Sw. L.J. 1023, 1039 (1987); see also Note, First Amend-
ment - the Objective Standard for Social Value in Obscenity Cases, Pope v. Illinois,
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735 (1988).
80. See Various Articles of Obscene Merchandize, 709 F.2d 132, 135 at n. 4 (2d
Cir. 1983)(the court further noted that "[i]n this case Judge Swe-t properly equated
the district in which he sits with the 'community' ").
81. One issue is whether community standards refers to the majority of the com-
munity or a super majority of the population. See Krauss, Representing the Commu-
nity: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capitol Sentencing, 64
IND. L.J. 617, 623 (1989); see also Beckett & Bell, Community Standards: Admitting
a Public Opinion Poll into Evidence in an Obscenity Case, CASE AND CoM. 20, 22-24
(Mar.-Apr. 1979). See generally Wright, Defining Obscenity: The Criterion of Value,
22 NEw ENG. L. REv. 315, 320 (1987).
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person, 2 rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person - or
indeed a totally insensitive one."83 Thus, the triers of fact were to be
representatives of the community who make their decisions based on
"the community's moral sense, not their own.""
In some ways it is ironic that the legislature-a body elected to
represent the people-is not permitted to set obscenity guidelines pur-
suant to Miller and its progeny. 5 This restriction is perhaps under-
standable, however, since constitutional line drawing has been commit-
ted to the judicial branch from the time of Marbury v. Madison, which
was decided in 1803." The jurors, of course, may consider the legisla-
tive determinations as evidence of community standards, but are not
required to do so.87 One commentator has noted that, "[o]ne cannot
infer anything about a community's values from the existence (or the
lack) of an obscenity statute unless the law was enacted (or rejected)
by a legislature representing the identical 'community.' "8
The flexibility of the community standards analysis has been
tested by its use in many different contexts.8 9 It has been applied to a
82. Yet even if such an average person test is used, by including the notion of
community standards, there remains the epistemological problem of defining "the aver-
age person in the community." Two related ,problems arise. The first deals with the
method used to gather evidence or information leading to the revelation to community
standards. The second involves how that evidence is to be compiled and evaluated. One
commentator, in discussing the question of gathering input, noted, "[r]eliance on opin-
ion polls or other indications of popular sentiment is too fleeting a gauge upon which to
base a judicial standard." Gliedman, Obscenity Law: Definitions and Contemporary
Standards, ANN. SuRv. OF AM. L. 913, 919 (1985); see also Note, Community Stan-
dards and Federal Obscenity Prosecutions, 55 S.CAL. L. REV. 693 (1982).
83. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 (1973); see also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S.
293, 298-301 (1978).
84. Krauss, supra note 81, at 624; see also Kahn, Community in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE LJ. 1, 15 (1989).
85. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 307-08 (1977) (the lack of state stan-
dards regulating the distribution of pornography in a federal obscenity prosecution was
considered "relevant evidence of the mores of the [state wide] community ."..").
86. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The triers of fact, on the other hand, are
generally laypersons without prior knowledge of constitutional and first amendment
law, yet these laypersons are given plenary power to determine community standards
and, consequently, the parameters of the first amendment.
87. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 302-03 (1977).
88. Krauss, supra note 81, at 633 n. 73.
89. It was not applied to the comedy dialogue of George Carlin, however, which
the court concluded was indecent and therefore subject to F.C.C. regulation in
Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726.
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popular movie, "Carnal Knowledge,"9 to books without pictures,9 1 and
to practices which discriminate against women. The standard also has
been the backdrop of disputes over the subject matter of cable televi-
sion programming, and other matters. 2
While some Justices abandoned the community standards test
along with the rest of the definition advanced in Miller,98 the majority
of the Court has stood by it. It remains the law today.
III. The Problem with a Geographically-Based Community
Standard
"Many of my fellow judges live in Riverdale, but try as I might, I
cannot find a common approach among them on this obscenity
thing."'94 - Judge Howard Goldfuss, Criminal Court of New York.
While geographically defined "traditional" communities may still
exist in some locales, and people may still have a community of
friendly neighbors, the paradigm of the contiguous self-contained geo-
graphic area no longer dominates today, if it ever did at all.95 Instead,
a wide variety of considerations shape and define the value structure of
the modern community in America. These influences range from cul-
ture to technology to the different configurations of physical living con-
ditions. While geographic boundaries provide the limitation of a defi-
90. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
91. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
92. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, supra note 6.
93. Justice Brennan, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)
stated: "I am convinced that the approach initiated 16 years ago in Roth, 354 U.S. 476
(1957), and culminating in the Court's decision today, cannot bring stability to this
area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental [f]irst [a]mendment values ..
Id. at 73.
94. Goldfluss, What is "Community" In Judging Obscenity, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21,
1981, at 2, col. 3.
95. Judge Howard Goldfluss of the Criminal Court of the City of New York
described his hometown of Riverdale as follows:
If you zig-zag through Riverdale, crossing over Henry Hudson Parkway at
236 Street, and then double back, you may find a group of disciples of the
Marquis de Sade who would find social redeeming value in anything and
everything. On the other hand, outside of that perimeter, move toward the
west, and a little to the north, there may be those who see Little Red
Riding Hood as perversion.
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nite number of people, the fact that people live in close proximity to
each other in modern America does not suggest that those individuals
share common moral bonds or values.
Since a mere geographic division lacks any substantive content,
the Miller test's reliance on geographic boundaries to inform the com-
munity standards analysis is improper.98 Not only is the "geography-
only" analysis inadequate, but such an evaluation ignores cultural and
other considerations that determine the parameters of community toler-
ance. Consequently, the geographic-based traditional formulation of
community is misplaced and unworkable. To better understand why a
community is much more than those people living within a contiguous
area, it is helpful to explore the meaning of community.
IV. Community
The concept of community has several different configurations.' 7 It
has been defined as "any collectivity of people,""8 and as "the maximal
group of persons who normally reside together in face-to-face associa-
tion."99 One common formulation is that of a group of people who re-
side in the same geographic locale. 100 Yet, the notion of community has
significant spiritual overtones. A moral community, for example, may
constitute "people who have chosen to live together because they share
a unitary conception of the Good."''1 In essence, in any moral commu-
nity, "the operative aim is always the promotion of a good quality of
life.",'0 2
96. The use of geographical boundaries as the basis for defining community has
been assumed by most judges. Judge Howard Goldfluss, Criminal Court of the City of
New York, has stated, "[t]he problem is that the Supreme Court has never defined
'community.' I can only guess that it meant some sort of geographical subdivision -
smaller than a state; bigger than a bread box; probably a section of a city or town." Id.
97. G. MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 79 (1949); see also Chesler, Imagery of
Community, Ideology of Authority: The Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 457, 458 (1983).
98. Chesler, supra note 97, at 458.
99. G. MURDOCK, supra note 97, at 79 (quoting Murdock, Ford, Hudson, Ken-
nedy, Simmons & Whiting, Outline of Cultural Materials, YALE ANTHROPOLIGICAL
STUD., II 29 (1945)).
100. As one author notes, "the community appears always to be associated with
a definite territory, whose natural resources its members exploit in accordance with the
technological attainment of the culture." G. MURDOCK, supra note 97, at 81.
101. R. Chesler, supra note 97, at 458 (1983).
102. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, 117, 119 (E. Barker, trans. and ed. 1958).
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The community is a universal social group.103 That is, it occurs in
some form in all human societies.' The reasons for humans to band
together in communities are several:
[C]ommunity organization provides individuals with increased op-
portunities for gratification through social intercourse, with more
abundant substance through cooperative food-getting techniques,
and with insurance against temporary incapacity or adversity to
mutual aide and sharing. These advantages may be added protec-
tion through numbers in the economies possible with specialization
and a division of labor. The chances of survival thus seem to be
materially enhanced through community organization and this, to-
gether with the directly perceived gains, doubtless accounts for its
universality.10 5
The concept of community has survived from the time of the An-
cient Greeks. Classical Athens provides perhaps the closest approxima-
tion of the ideal community.10 6 According to Aristotle, the friendship
found in a community informed the polity with a stronger foundation
than even laws or rules, "when people are friends, they have no need of
justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition."' 0 7
This Aristotelian vision of community has required considerable
adaptation in the modern technologically advanced, industrial United
States. As one commentator has noted, "More recently, improved com-
munication and transportation have accelerated the pace at which new
values, ideas, and ways of life penetrate the individual's consciousness.
The moral community, as defined by Aristotle, has almost ceased to
exist." 0 3
Changes in the modern configuration of the community also have
created a shifting morality.109 This shifting morality owes its movement
103. G. MURDOCK, supra note 97, at 79.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 80.
106. Chesler, supra note 97, at 458 n. 3 (in Athens "the idea of the polis as the
only setting in which virtue could develop for true Athenians" created unity among its
members). The idea of community was illustrated by the New England town. Id.
107. ARISTOTLE, NICHONACHENA ETmIcs, 215 (M. Oswald trans. 1980); see also
R. Chesler, supra note 97, at 459 n. 6.
108. R. Chesler, supra note 97, at 459-60.
109. See generally A. MOORE, The Young Adult Generation, at 87 (1969) ("the
first is that a shift in morality is taking place in our society") (emphasis in text). "A
liberalizing trend is clearly discernable, particularly among young adults." Id.
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to both pragmatic and humanistic concerns. 110 The shifting of morality
may be affected by many influences, including a dependency on religion
within the group.""1
A community's values are important to many different legal deter-
minations. In addition to assisting in determining the parameters of ob-
scenity, the community's values provide the moral condemnation of a
criminal defendant in a criminal case, and a representative determina-
tion of facts in any jury matter. As one commentator noted, "contem-
porary theories of community offers a new model of the relationship
between the individual and the constitutional order. Instead of a prob-
lematic relationship of part (citizen) to whole (state), in which either
the part or the whole threatens to subsume the other, the new com-
munitarians understand the relationship of the individual to the politi-
cal order as that of the microcosm to the macrocosm."' 2
The concept of egalitarianism within the community provides le-
gitimacy for the use of a community to inform legal standards' and
rules. This egalitarianism presupposes a common bonding or set of
commonalities that permit the individuals to be treated as a group.113
The construct of unity between individual and community is re-
flected in a statement by Michael Sandel, "[t]he story of my life is
always embedded in the story of those communities in which I derive
my identity . . . [w]e cannot conceive our personhood without refer-
ence to our role as citizens, and as participants in a common life.111 4
Modern communities in the 1990's are shaped and influenced by
their "mode of life" 115 as well as their location. Whether the commu-
nity is migratory or non-migratory, urban or rural, intra-city or subur-
ban, will have a profound influence on the structure of the commu-
110. Id. at 88; see generally F. MERRILL, Society and Culture, (1957).
111. A. MOORE, supra note 109.
112. Kahn, Community and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J.
1, 5 (1989); see also Roots of Rap Run Deep in Black Musical Traditions, Miami
Herald, June 17, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
113. See Kahn, supra note 112, at 5 ("[w]e create and maintain our personal
identity in the very same process by which communal identity is created and main-
tained. Thus, the historically specific discourse, which is at the center of communitar-
ian theory, simultaneously creates the individual.and the community. Individual iden-
tity does not exist apart from the discourse that creates and sustains the community").
114. Id. at 5 n. 15 (quoting M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND ITS CRTICS 5-6
(1984)).
115. G. MuRDocK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, supra note 97, at 80.
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nity.111 Modern communities often witness a shifting ethnic population
that further impacts on the normal configuration of the sub-groups
within it.
The character of the living unit also strongly effects the nature of
the community. For example, community configurations are impacted
by trends toward the nuclear family unit, urbanization, and increasing
evidence of groups of homeless persons.1x Modern planning also has
permitted segregation of uses, including certain areas devoted to com-
mercial development and other areas devoted solely to residential use.
Perhaps the ultimate irony is the relatively recent trend toward re-
turning to mixed-use communities, called "new towns,"118 which con-
gregate shops and residences in close proximity. These small self-con-
tained communities putatively promote a moral bonding in a manner
similar to the small European town.
The significance of the many and subtle variables that influence
the moral fiber of the community-i.e., its standards--is readily dis-
cernable in Skyywalker Records, Inc.
A. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro: An Illustration of the
Inadequacy of Defining a Community Solely by Geographic
Boundaries
Whether a sense of community exists at all in a. transient
county [such as Broward County, Florida], so undefinable in char-
acter is moot. Most of us, I suspect, hardly know our neighbors if
we know them at all.119
The first amendment furor surrounding the rap group 2 Live
Crew120 arose from the distribution and sale of the group's album, "As
116. See generally id.
117. Klinger, Main Street U.S.A., Sun Sentinel, Aug. 28, 1990, at 1E, col. 1.
118. Id.
119. Braucher, Trial Hassle is a Repeat Performance, Miami Herald, Oct. 12,
1990, at 5BR, Col. 4 (Broward County ed.).
120. The rap group was created by its leader, Luther Campbell of Liberty City,
Florida. Campbell started out as a solo act, producing and distributing a dance-song
named "Ghetto Style Jump." The Flipside of a Raw-Talk Rapper, Miami Herald,
June 17, 1990, at 12A, col. 4. It received little notoriety and did not become a commer-
cial success. His second song, "Throw the D," which he sold from his car for $2.20 per
single, was better received. Id. "Throw the D" sold 250,000 copies. From the money he
earned from that song, Campbell started both 2 Live Crew and his own recording corn-
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Nasty As They Wanna Be." The album, which contains sexually ex-
plicit lyrics,'121 has sold more than 1.7 million copies.
The Skyywalker case was triggered when the sheriff of Broward
County, Florida began an obscenity investigation of the "As Nasty As
They Wanna Be" album in February, 122 1990.123 In March, 1990, a
Florida circuit court judge issued an order finding probable cause to
believe that the recording was obscene.' 2 ' Shortly thereafter, 25
Skyywalker Records, Inc. filed suit in federal district court seeking a
declaratory judgment of its legal rights.'26
pany, Luke's Records.
Campbell adopted the stage name of Luke Skyywalker, and proceeded to produce
several albums with 2 Live Crew. Luther Campbell was sued for using the name "Luke
Skyywalker" by movie impresario Steven Spielberg. The basis of the suit was that
Luke Skyywalker was a name used by and associated with Spielberg's "Star War"
movies. See, e.g., "Star Wars" and "The Return of the Jedi." In 1989, the group re-
corded "As Nasty As They Wanna Be." As of the date of this publication, sales have
exceeded 1.7 million copies. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578,
582 (S.D. Fla. 1990). The issue decided by the court was, "whether the first amend-
ment absolutely permits one to yell another 'F word anywhere in the community when
combined by graphic sexual descriptions." Id.
121. The album also was produced in a "clean" version entitled "As Clean As
They Wanna Be." Id. That recording has sold at least 250,000 copies to date. Id. In
1989, attorney Jack Thompson, who works out of his Coral Gables home, sent copies of
the lyrics of "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" to all 67 county sheriffs in the State of
Florida as well as Governor Bob Martinez. Governor Martinez referred the issue to a
state-wide prosecutor, who declined to pursue the matter, saying that it was up to the
individual communities to decide. Washington Post, June 17, 1990, at AlO.
122. Shortly thereafter, on February 28, 1990, a deputy sheriff sought a probable
cause determination that the material was legally obscene.
123. See Stein, Sheriff Nick- Thine is Kingdom, Power, Glory, Sun-Sentinel,
June 10, 1990, at 1B, col. 1; Kalajian, Sheriff. I'm Just Doing My Job, Miami Herald,
June 17, 1990, at 12A, col. 1 (Broward County ed.); Parker, Sheriffs Rap Lyric Drag-
net Puts Florida County on Map, Washington Post, June 17, 1990, at A10; Barry,
Navarro Gets Down and Dirty for the Cameras, Miami Herald, June 14, 1990, at 16,
col. 1 (Broward County ed.).
124. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 578, 583.
125. Id.
126. Soon thereafter, on March 27, 1990, Sheriff Navarro filed an in rem pro-
ceeding in Broward County Circuit Court against the album seeking a judicial determi-
nation that the "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" recording was obscene under state law.
Navarro v. The Recording "As Nasty As They Wanna Be", No. 90-09324 (S.D. Fla.
1990); see also Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 578, 583-84; Miami Herald,
June 12, 1990, at 16A, col. 3. (Broward County ed.); Stein, Nasty Protestors Missing
the Target, Sun-Sentinel, June 20, 1990, at 1B, col. 1; Raunchy Songs: Critics Rejoice
Over Ruling, Miami Herald, June 8, 1990, at 2B, col. 1 (Palm Beach ed.). But see
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In the declaratory judgment action, 27 the plaintiff offered several
witnesses. These witnesses included a well-known media critic from the
newspaper Newsday, John Leland, and Professor Carlton Long, a
Rhodes Scholar who discussed the relevance of rap music to Black cul-
ture, including the history of rap. The defense offered no witnesses, just
a tape recording of the song.128
After hearing all of the evidence, the court issued a written ruling.
The ruling began with the statement, "this is a case between ancient
enemies: anything goes and enough already.1' 29 The court found that
the recording failed the three prongs of the Miller test. It decided that
the frequency and graphic nature of the sexual lyrics appealed to the
prurient interest, and that the graphic detail and the specific nature of
the descriptions were patently offensive. 130 In assessing whether the
record had serious artistic value, the court noted that "the Philistines
are not always wrong, nor are the guardians of the [f]irst [a]mendment
always right."13 1 The court concluded that the recording failed the
third 32 "serious value" test requirement as well, and was therefore
Stein, Rhetoric Takes Stage in Rap-Group Hoopla, Sun-Sentinel, June 8, 1990, at lB,
col. 1 ("But I don't blame the judge as much as I blame grandstanding politicians like
our very own Gov. Silly, who acts as if a record is more dangerous to the public than
assault weapons.").
127. The public response to these law suits and the issues involved were immedi-
ate. The reaction in Broward County was divided, and often depended on previously
held opinions about the flamboyant Sheriff Nick Navarro. Reaction around the country
was also divided. See BILLBOARD MAG., Mar. 10, 1990, at 85. The conviction of an
Alabama retailer, who was convicted by a jury of selling a cassette of 2 Live Crew's
"Move Somethin'" was reversed. Id. In other areas around the country, reactions were
similarly mixed. In that case a municipal court judge found the retailer guilty of selling
obscene materials and fined the retailer $500. Id. Pursuant to Alabama law, the case
was retried by a jury which reversed the Judge's ruling and cleared the retailer.Id.
128. Id.
129. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 578, 582.
130. Id. at 591-93 (regarding prong one and prong two of the Miller test).
131. Id. at 594. The court also concluded that there was insufficient literary,
political, artistic, or scientific content within the recording to survive prong three of the
Miller test.
132. The court noted that the plaintiff's evidence indicating the widespread avail-
ability of other explicit sexual works in the tri-county area was not entitled to great
weight in determining whether 2 Live Crew's work was obscene. Id. at 589. "[T]he
Supreme Court has recognized that this type of evidence does not even have to be
considered even if the comparable works have been found to be non-obsene."Id. The
court stated that most of the other material offered was irrelevant because it was not
equivalent to musical lyrics. Id. The material offered was pictorial depictions, "moving
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obscene.1 33
In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the relevant
community standards by which to evaluate prongs one and two were
derived from the tri-county area of Broward, Dade, and Palm Beach
counties. The court noted that this tri-county area was quite diverse,134
and observed that the counties included both the very young and the
very old as well as individuals of many different religions, socio-eco-
nomic classes, races and gender.13 5 The court believed that this area
was more liberal than on the average."3 6
In the opinion, the court never defined what the tri-county commu-
nity standards actually were. The judge simply stated that since he had
lived in the geographic community and served as a judge for a signifi-
cant length of time, he was able to discern the community's standards.
The judge failed to explain whether the counties differed in morality,
whether he was accounting for changes in population over time or in
particular areas, or whether he was defining moral standards as those
opinions based on a majority vote, a super-majority or something else.
The only inference that could be drawn from the opinion is that
the community's standards were obviously "high enough" to flunk the 2
Live Crew album. The problem with this inference, however, is that it
does nothing to dispel the belief that the judge's conclusion was an ad
hoe one, no more based on reason than Justice Stewart's famous con-
cession to the inadministrability of an obscenity standard: "I know it
when I see it."' 137 In a sense, no evidence at all would have been more
convincing than the court's own idiosyncratic anecdotal experience.
or still." Id.
133. Not all judges, when confronted with obscenity cases, find the material in
question to be obscene. In a federal prosecution in the United States District Court in
Los Angeles, California, District Judge David Kenyon declared that video tapes, in-
cluding one which depicted a gang rape in a mental hospital, were not obscene based
on community standards. The judge stated "I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt
that community standards were violated." U.S. v. Gottesman, No. 88-00295 (C.D. Cal.
1988) (quoting California Lawyer, November 1989, at 21, col. 2).
134. Skyywalker Records Inc., 739 F. Supp. 578, 588.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 589.
137. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 373 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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V. The Preferable Approach: Utilizing the Moral Bonds of
the Cultural Community to Inform Community Standards
A preferable alternative exists to relying on geographically-based
standards to discern community values - that of employing the stan-
dards of the "cultural" community. The premise underlying this alter-
native approach is that moral bonding in today's society is more likely
based on sub-culture identification than on communities described
merely by geographic location. In modern America, the cultural back-
ground of groups is simply a much more powerful creator and inculca-
tor of values than geographic location. Thus, if a community standards
analysis applies, the cultural background in which the work was cre-
ated and distributed is an integral and likely dispositive component.
This section first describes the meaning of culture more fully. It
then suggests how cultural values can and should be considered in any
obscenity evaluation, using Skyywalker Records, Inc. as an illustration.
A. Culture
A group of people often share a culture or sub-culture. 3 8 Culture
has been defined as "the patterned behavior resulting from social inter-
action." 13 9 In its broadest sense, culture can be considered the "com-
plex hall which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, lure, custom
and any other characteristics and habits" 140 of those people within it.141
138. See generally H. SCHWENDINGER & J. SCHWENDINGER, ADOLESCENT SUB-
CULTURES AND DELINQUENCY 79 (1985).
139. F. MERRILL, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 473 (1957). See generally J. DOWNS,
CULTURES IN CRISIS (2d ed. 1975); POPULAR CULTURE IN AMERICA (P. Buhle ed.
1987). The definition of culture depends upon whether it is being defined by an histo-
rian, sociologist, or a member of some other discipline. A. Lawrence Lowell, best
known as a former president of Harvard University, defined culture as "the enjoyment
of the things the world has agreed are beautiful; interest in the knowledge that man-
kind has found valuable . . ." R. BIERSTEDT, THE SOCIAL ORDER 126 (4th ed. 1974)
(citing A. LOWELL, CULTURE, AT WAR WITH ACADEMIC TRADITIONS IN AMERICA 117
(1934)).
140. BIERSTEDT, supra note 139, at 127 (citing 1 E. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE
1 (1872)).
141. There are many more definitions of culture than can b- repeated in this
article. For example, two anthropologists defined culture as "those historically created
selective processes which channel men's reactions both to internal and to external stim-
uli." BIERSTEDT, supra note 139, at 127.(citing C. Kluckholn and W. Kelly, The Con-
cept of Culture, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS 84 (R. Linton ed.
1944)).
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The concept of culture is essential to the growth and development of
any community. In fact, the relationship between the two entities is
symbiotic - the structure of a community nurtures and facilitates the
growth of culture. One way of measuring the success of a culture is by
the achievements reached by those within it. 42 Furthermore, culture
offers the community both instrumental and intrinsic advantages: "Cul-
ture is used; and any analysis of its use immediately brings into view
the arrangements of persons and social groups, for whom cultural
forms confirm, reaffirm, maintain, change or deny particular arrange-
ment of status, power, and identity."' 4 Yet, cultures do not always
support their host communities. 44 In fact, a culture may be out of sync
with a society. It consequently may be labeled deviant or anti-
authoritarian. 45
Although the middle class appears to be the dominant culture in
the United States, there are really many different variants of the domi-
nant or mainstream culture. 4 The dramatic variance within American
culture can be traced to the influx of immigrants into the United States
from around the world primarily in the latter half of the 19th century
and early part of the 20th century. 47 This influx, coupled with a broad
land area, permitted America to grow in numerous cultural directions.
Instead of a culture dominated by particular aesthetic achievements or
artistic traditions, America's considerable natural resources created
what one commentator called a multi-faceted "culture of abun-
dance."1 4 8 As a result, literally "hundreds of sub-cultures"' 149 with their
142. BIERSTEDT, supra note 139, at 127.
143. B. OSTENDORF, BLACK LITERATURE IN WHITE AMERICA 16 (1982) (citing
Mintz, Forward to WHITTEN & SZWED, AFRO-AMERICAN ANTHROPOLGY at 10).
144. Society, with its economic as well as social components, is not synonymous
with culture. As historian E. P. Thompson noted, "We should not assume any auto-
matic, or over-direct correspondence between the dynamics of economic growth and the
dynamics of social or cultural life." OSTENDORF, supra note 143, at 15.
145. OSTENDORF. supra note 143 at 16. See generally H.L. GATES, THE SIGNIFY-
ING MONKEY (1988).
146. D. MAURER, EPILOGUE: SOCIAL DIALECTS AS A KEY TO CULTURAL DYNAM-
ICS, LANGUAGE OF THE UNDERWORLD 381 (1964). See generally MERRILL, supra note
139.
147. In addition, the United States, unlike Europe or the Far East, grew up with
"shallow historic traditions and a vibrant commercial culture." POPULAR CULTURE IN
AMERICA, supra note 139, at XIII. See also R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A.
SWIDLER, AND S. TIPTON, HABITS OF HEART 35 (1985).
148. POPULAR CULTURE IN AMERICA, supra note 139, at XIV.
149. MAURER, supra note 146, at 384.
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own set of overlapping but distinctive cultural values and a strong be-
lief in freedom of speech, have proliferated within the dominant
culture.150
Although there has been great pressure to assimilate in American
culture, there also has been increasing cultural "ethnification." '15
These ethnic cultures revolve around a value infra-structure adapted
from and based on traditions from the country of origin. Yet many
other types of sub-cultures exist. Sub-cultures range from occupation
sub-cultures, such as accountants, to the technological sub-culture of
television,152 to the criminal sub-culture.15 3
Sub-cultures not only generate their own values, but even their
own language:15" A special form of communication often is used to sig-
nify who "belongs" to the culture. 55 The use of slang, for example,
serves as one indicator of the existence of a sub-culture with its own set
of values. 156 An illustration of this phenomenon involves the group of
truckers who use citizen's band (CB) radios to communicate with each
other in a specific, stylized manner."'
A sub-culture's identity is maintained in its language. Specifically,
"[t]he continuity of any sub-culture is dependent on keeping its lan-
guage exclusive, since a sub-culture tends to lose its identity once its
language becomes widely known and used by the outsiders.1 58 When
the words' 5 9 of the sub-culture are assimilated into the dominant cul-
150. Id.
151. OSTENDORF, supra note 143, at 7.
152. "Television, for bad or worse, is the national culture of 20th-century
America. To deny the fact is poor research. To ignore the fact is suicidal politics."
Marc, T.V. Critics' Code, in POPULAR CULTURE IN AMERICA 3 (P. Buhle ed. 1987).
153. MAURER, supra note 146, at 384. See generally SCHWENDINGER, supra
note 138.
154. MAURER supra note 146 at 384; see also C. LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 55-56 (1963).
155. MAURER, supra note 146, at 388. As noted by Anthropologist Claude Levi-
Strauss, "Language is a social phenomenon ... " LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 154, at
56.
156. MAURER, supra note 146, at 388. See generally E. FOB, BLACK VERNACU-
LAR VOCABULARY 3-10 (UCLA Center for Afro-American Studied Monograph 5
(1984)).
157. See generally MAURER, supra note 146, at 384.
158. Id. at 387.
159. Freedom of speech is not only an essential ingredient of an independent sub-
culture, but as a concept is shaped by cultural considerations as well. The impact of
culture on speech may be significant. For example, culture that looks to mythology for
its values may not rely on language and communication in the same way as a culture
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ture, this signifies that the sub-culture is deteriorating and its structure
is merging with the dominant culture.
There is often a cause-and-effect relationship between a culture
and its sub-cultures. A linkage of sub-cultures can dictate a power
structure within a larger culture.160 Conversely, if sub-cultures are
threatened or opposed by other sub-cultures or the dominant culture,
the structure of the sub-culture may change. 6 Consequently, "as a
sub-culture becomes more aware of its functional identity, a self-image
is generated which must be bolstered by word and deed. '16 2
Understanding the values and rituals of a particular sub-culture is
often difficult. This is due to ethnocentrism - judging others by one's
own cultural values and mores. 6 Ethnocentrism is not a new phenom-
enon, and was present even in ancient Greek and Chinese societies.16'
Sub-cultural differences may be exacerbated by the ethnocentric lenses
through which sub-cultures view and evaluate each other. That is,
when sub-cultures view other sub-cultures through their own percep-
tions, there may not be any neutrality. Misperceptions may result, so
that "[t]he standards themselves may be fine, but, when wrongly ap-
plied, they are meaningless. 16 5
1. Music: A Reflection of Culture
Music often has been described as reflecting the existence of a spe-
that relies on reason. MAURER, supra note 146, at 387 ("when large numbers of words
escape from the subculture, this may be an indication of sub-cultural diffusion and
suggests that assimilation is under way with a consequent deterioration of the microsys-
tern. We have good examples of this in the subcultures of the jazz musician and that of
the criminal narcotic addict. Words from both these subcultures are now the basis of
the slang vocabulary millions of young people, and neither subculture is nearly so ex-
clusive as it was some 40 years ago"). See generally POPULAR CULTURE IN AMERICA,
supra note 139; Minow, Book Review: Listening the Right Way, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
946 (1989) (reviewing P. CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH: DIALOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN
LIBERTY (1988).
160. Id. at 386; see also D. CLAERBAUT, BLACK JARGON IN WHITE AMERICA 48-
55 (1972).
161. MAURER, supra note 146, at 386. See generally R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN,
W., SULLIVAN, A., SWINDLER, & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART (1985).
162. MAURER, supra note 146, at 386.
163. See DOWNS, supra note 139, at 29. ("one of the greatest stumbling blocks
to understanding other peoples within or outside of a particular culture is the tendency
to judge other's behavior by our own standards.").
164. Id.
165. Id. at 34.
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cial sub-culture."'6 The integral role music plays in providing and aug-
menting the meaning or content of culture is based in large part on the
premise that a sub-culture's music is inextricably linked to other parts
of the same sub-culture.1 17 Thus, the music cannot be fully understood
or evaluated without its associated cultural context.
Of course, the lyrics of music play a large role in the impression
the music makes on the listener. In addition to the direct and literal
meanings of the words used, the words provide a form of communica-
tion of the sub-culture's ideas and values. As one commentator has
noted, "[iut is language that serves as the catalyst by which groups and
individuals interact and transmit many of their culturally important
ideas and attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, etc . .,168
The sub-culture from which certain kinds of music springs, for ex-
ample, may be characterized as rebellious, or at least anti-authorita-
rian. Music often may be associated with the language of political
change or discontent. Perhaps the most notorious musical sub-culture
in recent years is "rock n' roll" music.' 69 Yet, rock n' roll has not been
the only music form to be viewed as containing counter-culture values.
In 1921 the Reverend A. W. Beaven described jazz as "a combination
of nervousness, lawlessness, primitive and savage animalism, and lasciv-
iousness."' 70 In the 1950's, Peter Porter, the host of the CBS show
"Juke Box Jury," described rhythm and blues records as "dirty and as
bad for kids as dope."' 7' Yet, rock n' roll was particularly singled out
for attack. Garrett Buirne, Massachusetts District Attorney, stated in
the 1950's that, "Rock n' roll is a new monster, a sort of nightmare of
rhythm . . . rock and roll gives young hoodlums an excuse to get to-
166. See generally MAURER, supra note 146, at 385. ("other subcultures are
found in the entertainment world past and present ... ").
The study of music and its cultural content is done by ethnomusicologists. The
premise of such study is that the message of music arguably can best be understood by
the study of the cultural background from which the music was created. See generally
B. NETTL, THEORY AND METHOD IN ETHNOMUSICOLOGY (1981).
167. NETTL, supra note 166, at 271. See generally POPULAR CULTURE IN
AMERICA, supra note 139.
168. MAURER, supra note 146, at 390.
169. See generally Note, Modern-Days Sirens: Rock Lyrics and the First
Amendment, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 777 (1990).
170. Feedenthal, Taking a Rap, Miami Herald, June 11, 1990, at 10A, col. 4;
see also Higham, Crackdown on Risque Artists Growing, Miami Herald, June 11,
1990, at 4A, col. 2.
171. Taking a Rap, supra note 170.
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gether. It inflames teenagers and is obscenely objective." '12
Particular musicians were viewed as the knowing leaders of the
rock n' roll subculture. The New York Daily news critic in 1955 stated
that Elvis Presley "gave an exhibition that was suggestive and vulgar,
tinged with the kind of animalism that should be confined to dives and
bordellos.' ' 3
B. The Black Culture and Rap Music
1. Black Culture
The Black culture has been described as "a quest for literacy, free-
dom, and respect. . . which used any strategy to overcome oppression,
[and] circumvent legal and institutional barriers. . . . ,,M, The devel-
opment of Black culture can be understood by retracing history and
also from tracing symbols of the culture such as its language, litera-
ture, and music. "[D]iscrete cultural artifacts, say, a novel or the blues,
are meaningful as self-contained symbolic systems and may be under-
stood from a variety of cultural perspectives. But they acquire their full
resonance from their form-giving context." ' 5 The 'full resonance' of
Black culture also can be culled from its long and often uncharted oral
history as told by poets and song writers. 17 6
The line separating Black culture from the "dominant" American
culture is sometimes blurred. 77 The dominant culture and other sub-
cultures, such as late adolescents, have borrowed jazz, blues, and other
aspects of the Black culture. 78 As one commentator noted,
the sixties will also be remembered for a musical revolution: White
popular music culture acknowledged the Afro-American style as its
172. Id.; see also, Crackdown, supra note 170.
173. Feedenthal, Taking a Rap, Miami Herald, June 11, 1990, at 10A, col 4;
Higham, Crackdown on Risque Artists Growing, Miami Herald, June 11, 1990 at
10A, col. 1-6.
174. B. OSTENDORF, BLACK LITERATURE IN WHITE AMERICA at 8 (1982).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 118 ("expression of Black reality, the earliest formal poetry by Blacks
is an example of upward cultural mimesis.").
177. Id. at 164 ("after being chevied and chased through a series of prefabri-
cated identities, after trying on a variety of masks from Sambo to the 'angry splib,'
many Blacks of the 60's and 70's are tired of playing roles and wearing masks forced
upon them and designed for them by the dominant culture.").
178. Id. at 164.
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chief inspiration. There had been constant borrowing all along.
Noted Phil Garland Wright, 'Unfortunately, it has been a part of
the American pattern for the originators of Black music to be
shunted into the background once their creations had been adopted
by whites and made lucrative as well as popular.'1
Yet, the fact that some of the demarcations are blurred does not
mean that the Black culture has merged with the dominant culture. It
still can be identified by its own language, music and other norms.180
The Black culture has maintained its "own characteristics, despite be-
ing impeded by unwarranted [assimilation], particularly those that are
identical with the self-image of a dominant group .... "81
The development of Black culture can be observed in its language.
"Black English" has been called in a National Science Foundation
Study "a healthy, living form of language [that] shows the signs of
people developing their own grammar [and] separate development."' 82
That study also suggested that the Black vernacular was becoming
more dissimilar to other linguistic forms over time. 8 3
2. The Origins of Rap Music
The roots of the 2 Live Crew music, and other rap music as well,
can be found in a form of music called "hip hop."' 84 Hip hop music is
a combination of musical influences that has been likened to "pop mu-
sic cubism."'815 As musical expression it is identified foremost with the
179. Id. at 148.
180. See id. at 165 n.2.
181. Id. at 1.
182. H. GATES, JR., THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY at 19 (1988) (quoting W. LABov,
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION STUDY (1985)).
183. See id. See generally D. Toop, The Rap Attack (1984).
184. Vandermere, Introduction to D. T.ooP, THE RAP ATTACK (1984).
185. Dave Marsh, a noted music critic has written:
Like all the great hip-hop hits, 'looking for the perfect beat' is as
much a clustering sound collage as it is a 'song' in the conventional sense.
Music like this couldn't have existed before the early 80's, because 'looking
for the perfect beat' is the pure product of contemporary microchip tech-
nology, built upon rapping voices overlaying electronic noises that sound
like the ones they used on computer games, heavy doses of mixing consul
effects a top a synthetic rhythm bed. The result is a fascinating form of
pop music cubism that never abandons the hope of achieving a mass
audience.
D. MARSH, THE HEART OF ROCK AND SOUL, 139 (1989) (reviewing A. BAMBAATA,
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Black American culture. Hip hop originated in Harlem and the South
Bronx in New York City.18" It was political in both its genesis and
presentation. As one commentator noted, "[t]his cultural expression
was nurtured by a long heritage of slavery and resistance to racial,
economic, political, social, and cultural oppression.181
The message communicated by hip hop was illustrated and en-
hanced by its particular style of language. The hip hop style incorpo-
rated recitations and other speech forms adapted to the streets of New
York.188 In essence, the language of hip hop was forged from "histori-
cal experiences and realities." 18 9 This statement especially means that,
"in hip hop culture, Black English is the language of verbal expression
spoken within the context that reflects the pain and struggles of Black
life in the United States."190
Originally, hip hop music existed almost exclusively within the
Black culture,1 " but, as its popularity increased, it became part of the
mainstream culture.19 2 The increased attention paid to hip hop by the
media and numerous musicians caused it to "cross over" into the main-
stream culture. 9 3
Yet, hip hop was not the only music form influencing the develop-
ment of rap. A different antecedent was African jive. 94 The jive form
consisted of rhyming stories often filled with "violent, scatological" lan-
guage, that had "been used for decades to while away time in situa-
tions of enforced boredom, whether prison, armed services, or street
corner life."'9 5 Within African jive, there were various strains of music.
Even boxer Mohammed Ali's rhymes, narrative poems called
LOOKING FOR THE PERFECT BEAT, by Afrika Bambaataa and "Soul Sonic Force," writ-
ten and produced by Arthur Baker and John Robie, 1982).
186. Vandermere, supra note 184.
187. Id.
188. See generally S. HAGER, HIP-Hop: THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BREAK
DANCING, RAP MUSIC AND GRAFFITI 45-55.
189. Vandermere, supra note 184.
190. Id.
191. "For over two years rap had developed in almost complete isolation from
the rest of the world . . . . Tapes were circulated around New York, in prisons, in
nearby states, and could even be found on army bases overseas." S. HAGER, supra note
188, at 49.
192. See id. at 89.
193. See id. at 87.
194. See generally D. Toop, THE RAP ATTACK (1984).
195. D. Toop, THE RAP ATTACK 29 (1984).
1991]
145
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
"toasts,"' 196 were a form of African jive. Some toasts had hundreds of
different forms.1 97 Most of these toasts glorified the criminal way of
life. 98
The evolution of rap music was gradual, with bits and pieces of
various art forms being used to create its foundation. Part of its evolu-
tion was out of necessity. "Vocal entertainment became necessary to
keep the crowd under control, . .. [w]hen people first came to the
park, they would start dancing. Then everyone would gather around
and watch the DJ. . .you need the vocal entertainment to keep every-
one dancing."'' 9
The genre also developed from "friendly musical competition."
Noted early rapper, Grandmaster Caz, "'The way rap evolved is from
people trying to outdo each other.' ",200 The same commentator noted,
"that was rap, but we didn't know it at the time. Then everybody
started singing nursery rhymes. Then Flash started the whole thing of
having real groups. Then people started coming to parties just to see
the emcees." 0' The emcees thus moved from the background, offering
commentary only to fill in the spaces between the songs, to the fore-
front, where they became the creative artists. The emcees became free
to develop their own techniques including "an inventive use of slang,
the percusive effect of short words, and unexpected internal rhymes
"202
C. The Significance of Cultural Context to Obscenity
Determinations
The issue of whether certain rap music is obscene based on com-
munity standards consequently depends on its cultural context. The
cultural context comes from the different sub-cultures within the com-
munity, including both the ethnic and non-ethnic forms. Skyywalker
Records, Inc. would have had greater legitimacy if the court had con-
sidered culture - whether the culture was Black, youth, socio-economic
196. Id. at 29.
197. See S. HAGER, supra note 188, at 45 ("Probably the oldest and most fa-
mous toast, 'the signifying monkey,' had hundreds of different versions by 1976.").
198. See S. HAGER, supra note 188, at 45.
199. See id. at 47.
200. Id. at 49.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 48.
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status, or other - in its obscenity determination. 03 Instead, the court
completely failed to consider culture to inculcate its tri-county "com-
munity" - which, as the court conceded, 0 4 contained a wide diversity of
people - with values or standards. 05
The omission of culturally-based morality from the court's decision
was particularly important to the striking nature of the 2 Live Crew's
music. That music repetitiously portrays women in a negative light
and, if taken literally, goes so far as to .consistently brutalize them. 20
Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the bru-
talization of women is not a sufficient basis for finding material to be
obscene, 27 the offensiveness of 2 Live Crew's work - and particularly
whether the work appeals to the prurient interest - can best be ascer-
tained by evaluating the roles of men and women within the cultural
community. In light of those roles, the relevant questions are: "Would
such music be taken literally? Would it be valued or would it be ac-
ceptable in certain locations and at certain times?" "Is it a parody?"
The issue, therefore, becomes whether the "boasting" of 2 Live Crew is
an acceptable expression of male street talk within a particular cultural
vernacular - such as when it occurs as a substitute for fighting or as a
means of passing a time of enforced idleness like a jail term.208
203. See, e.g., Mills, The Rap on 2 Live Crew, Wash. Post, June 17, 1990, at
G6, col. 4-5; Le Moyne, Recording Ruled Obscene Brings Arrest, N.Y. Times, June 9,
1990, at A8, col. 4 (nat'l ed.); see also, Phillips, Obscenity Ruling Rocks Industry,
L.A. Times, June 9, 1990, at F8, col. 1.
204. See also Strossen, Book Review, 62N.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1987) (reviewing
V. BURSTYN, WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (1985)).
205. While it is permissible under the fuzzy parameters of the community stan-
dards test drawn by the Supreme Court to apply Miller without evidence of community
standards, Judge Gonzalez did not rely on any evidence that defined the moral frame-
work of those counties other than his own experiences.
206. The irony of finding that lyrics that brutalize women appeal to the prurient
interest was noted by one of 2 Live Crew's attorneys, Alan Jacobi, of Miami's Jacobi
and Jacobi: "2 Live Crew's music can be gross, rude and outrageous . . . But that's
why it's unlikely anyone would find it sexually exciting." S. Soocher, It's Bad, It's Def
- Is it Obscene? Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 28; see also McKinnon, Not a Moral Issue
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984).
207. See American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985).
208. D. Hackett & D. Adrianson, Roots of Rap Run Deep in Black Musical
Traditions, Miami Herald, June 17, 1990, at A12, col. 2; see also Mills, The Rap on 2
Live Crew, Washington Post, June 17, 1990, at G9, col. 3. But see Wynter, NAACP
Raps 2 Live Crew, Reflecting Division among Blacks Over the Music, Wall St. J.,
June 21, 1990, at A16, col. 1-2.
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On the other hand, it also must be asked whether this conceptual-
ization of the music's message is merely an after-the-fact justification
for exploitation, that sells records due to its shock value but otherwise
in no way comports with the values of the average members of the
culture.209 At least one observer has argued that the race of 2 Live
Crew has been used to obfuscate the real issue, which is the sexist na-
ture of the songs.21 0 Another observer, a black woman, has sounded a
parallel claim, urging that 2 Live Crew's music should not be identified
with the Black culture simply because the band members are black,211
and that Black culture does not support "violence or irresponsible sex"
by anyone, Black or White.21 2
Thus, while culture is relevant, it is incorrect to assume that a
culture automatically endorses the value system of all of its mem-
bers.21 Just as the Hispanic culture does not accept the values of all of
its Hispanic members, and the White culture does not accept the values
of all of its white members, the Black culture does not accept the value
of all of its Black members, including Black musicians. A. Black colum-
nist has reiterated this belief: "The cultural differences between the
races don't give ...2 Live Crew the right to traffic in dirt without
being challenged .. .in or out of the ghetto. 21 4
Yet, the use of cultural considerations does not complete the com-
munity standards analysis. It still must be determined whether societal
toleration or intoleration of a particular form of speech is based on
moral principle or no reason at all.215 Without such introspection, it
209. See generally MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
321, 323 (1984). Similarly, other cultural communities may look upon the verbal deni-
gration of women as blasphemous, and as an extraordinary insult. Still others may view
it as sexually based for certain adult segments of society.
210. Hamblin, Conviction of Record Store Owner as a Victory for the Entire
Community, Sun Sentinel, Oct.11, 1990, at 23A, col. 5.
211. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1990, at A16, col. 3-5 (letter to the Editor by Mi-
chele MM. Moody-Adams.)
212. Id.
213. The reconciliation of cultural differences in a multi-cultural society, more-
over, does not automatically render a cultural analysis unworkable. Often, different
cultures share a similar value structure.
214. Hamblin, supra note 210, at 23A.
215. Thus, a feminist critique of pornography as insuring "male power as a sys-
tem" may be relevant to the culture even if not voiced so long as it rests on the existing
moral principles of the average person in the community. If the denigration of women
is merely a curiosity or an attempt to shock without any principled basis, it is more
likely to violate community standards.
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would be difficult to discern the basis for the objection to the material,
and whether the community's tolerance depends on principle or
indifference.216
Thus, perhaps the greatest advantage of a culturally-based ap-
proach to community standards is that it forces the trier of fact to
struggle over defining a community's values. In fact, the process of
struggle may be more important than the end results. Such an attempt
would educate the trier of fact so that it may better understand the
purpose behind protecting the material in the first place. By tracing the
history and context of alleged obscene material, the trier would be
making a more informed and more deliberate decision. That is, a less
pre-judged decision would likely occur. As Harry Kalven, Jr. has noted,
the struggle over defining a free speech test is often more significant to
revealing the purpose underlying the test than to the development of
the test itself217
In this regard, the lack of substance associated with the court's
assessment of community standards in Skyywalker Records, Inc. may
be viewed as symptomatic of a deeper issue: the apparent lack of will-
ingness of courts and juries to struggle with the concept of community
standards. Unless juries and courts are willing to engage in a full-
fledged debate, there will continue to exist the tendency to judicially
void the community standards inquiry, and to substitute personal, idi-
osyncractic viewpoints in its place.
The court's rejection in Skyywalker Records, Inc. of the role of
cultural considerations was evidenced by the way the court treated the
testimony of Professor Long, who testified about the cultural back-
ground of rap music. The judge stated, "[w]hile this court does not
doubt that both 'boasting' and 'doing the dozens' are found in the cul-
ture of Black Americans, these devices are also found in other cultures.
'Doing the dozens' is commonly seen in adolescence, especially boys of
all races. 'Boasting' seems to be part of the universally human condi-
tion."21 The judge did not further add, however, that "doing the 'doz-
ens'" and 'boasting' in rhyme has special significance in the Black cul-
216. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA, 6
(1988); see also Holt, Protecting America's Youth: Can Rock Music Be Constitution-
ally Regulated? 16 J. CoNTEMP. L. 53, 55 (1990).
217. H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA, 149
(1988); see also Bollinger, Harry Kalven, The Proust of the First Amendment, 87
MICH. L. REv. 1576 (1989) (reviewing Kalven's A WORTHY TRADITION).
218. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 578.
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ture. The fact that generic boasting exists in other cultures does not
undermine the special significance of this language form to the Black
community, and should not permit the avoidance of dealing directly
with the music's cultural implications.
Moreover, the comparison drawn by the court between boasting in
the Black culture and other cultures, far from negating the cultural
significance of such a musical technique, illustrates instead the slippery
slope of using comparisons to illustrate community standards. If, for
example, the geographic community enthusiastically supports enter-
tainers such as Eddie Murphy 219 or comedian Andrew Dice Clay, does
this insulate 2 Live Crew's music from being singled out for
prosecution?
In United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandize,
Schedule No. 2102,220 the United States Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a trier of fact can consider the level of availability of
comparable materials to determine the community's tolerance for such
literature. 221 The problems with such a comparative analysis though,
are numerous. The existence of material for sale does not indicate how
the average person in the community views such material, raising the
dilemma previously noted of whether a community's toleration is based
on principle or indifference.222 Furthermore, the determination becomes
not so much about any specific material, but how much material a
community had tolerated previously within its geographical bounda-
ries.223 The superficial advantage of permitting such an analysis is that
it allows the trier of fact once again to avoid defining community stan-
dards and examining what people in the "community" actually think.
Instead, the comparative analysis facilitates a decision based on limited
219. See Eddie Murphy Raw,(Paramount 1988) (which is replete with numerous.
epitaphs and other "vulgarity").
220. 678 F.2d 433 (2nd Cir. 1982) (per curium).
221. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No.
2102, 709 F.2d 132, 137 (2nd Cir. 1983); see also Note, Constitutional Law- Appel-
late Procedure - Obscenity- In Determining Whether Marerials are Obscene, the Trier
of Fact May Rely upon the Widespread Availability of Comparable Materials to Indi-
cate that the Materials are Accepted by the Community and Hence Not Obscene
under the Miller Test- United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise,
Schedule No. 2112, 709 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983), 52 CINCINNATI L. REv. 1131, 1132
(1983).
222. H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION 6 (1988).
223. The irony of this quantitative measure is that crusaders against pornogra-
phy have a much more difficult task of getting any material declared obscene because
of the quantity already permitted within geographic community boundaries.
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information or even abstract conjecture.224 Most significantly, to use
comparisons with other cultures avoids having to evaluate the role of
such music within any one particular culture. Thus, a strictly personal
idiosyncratic approach fails to confront the true basis of moral bonding
within the modern community.225
Perhaps the comment that most aptly summarizes the importance
of considering culture in attempting to ascertain community standards
was made by Professor Henry Louis Gates of Duke University, an ex-
pert on African-American culture. He stated, "I don't see how people
can jump into somebody else's culture with completely no knowledge of
that culture, and then decide what's obscene and what's not. 228
VI. The Cultural Community and
Relativism: The Persistent
Deficiency in Community Standards
Even if the cultural context is considered in determining commu-
nity standards, the analysis may still be subject to attack. Sometimes,
no matter how searching the inquiry into cultural concerns may be, a
stable set of community values still may be difficult to ascertain. Essen-
tially, in some instances, reliance on cultural values may not create suf-
ficient substance to the community standards test to significantly im-
prove on a bald geographic-based inquiry.
The deficiency in relying on the cultural community inheres in one
of its major premises. The cultural community is predicated on the
moral bonding that occurs between its members. The community is
forged from the putative consent of its members, reflecting the will of
those within it. 2 27 Yet, a culture's moral bonds simply may not bridge
224. Note, supra note 221, at 1141.
225. In Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 678 F.2d
433, the trial court judge had to consider various materials including the movie "Deep
Throat." The trial court judge concluded that that movie was not patently offensive to
the New York community. He further found that the other articles for consideration
(which were listed in Schedule 2102), were no more offensive than "Deep Throat" and
thus survived the Miller test. It was this type of comparative reasoning that was
skewed by Judge Gonzalez.
226. Mills, The Rap on 2 Live Crew, Washington Post, June 17, 1990, at G9,
col. 3.
227. Yet the exercise of volitional choice is not always clear, and certainly does
not define our legal order alone. See Kahn, Community and Contemporary Constitu-
tional Theory, 99 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (1989):
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the differences in the morality of its individual members who are influ-
enced by sources such as other cultures, technology, and an urban lifes-
tyle.228 Indeed, cultural values may mask the fundamental differences
in the members of a culture who come from different generations,
socio-economic statuses, and other such factors which strain the con-
cept of a singular community value system.
The evolution and overall dynamic nature of culture adds to the
destabilization of the concept. The media is a particularly powerful
destablizer creating its own popular culture.22 9 One commentator
noted, "[t]his is not the age of enlightment, but of mass media. Few
believe that the synthesis of reason and will can be accomplished
through a national debate in which will is persuaded by reason ...
[c]ommunity functions not as a geographical place, but as a conceptual
model of order that combines elements of reason and will. 23 0
The difficulty of locating an accurate measuring device for a
shared community morality compounds the inherent instability of this
standard. Unlike a jury verdict, where a consensus is actually obtained
after a full and - hopefully - fair discussion, there is no probability of
an equivalent exchange of ideas among community members. The town
meeting, or Hyde Park political stump, for example, are forms of ex-
change not commonly used in modern America. The American media,
while permitting the expression of opposing views, still does not provide
for exchanges that would permit an adequate measure of a commu-
nity's morality. While religous groups likely foster such a sharing, mea-
suring this segment of a community would not in itself derive the over-
all cultural community's standards.
A theory of constitutional order based on will overcomes the gaps between
individual and the state by relying on the concept of consent. On this view,
in confronting the constitutional order, the individual confronts that to
which she has already consented to be bound. The bonding character of
law derives from an affirmative act of the individual; that act alone over-
comes the divide between citizen and state. The state may not be our bet-
ter self, but nevertheless we still confront only an objective occasion of
ourselves.
Id.
See also Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political
Philosophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389, 399-400 (1987); Brest,
The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1063 (1981).
228. See generally Kahn, supra note 227, at 7.
229. P. BUHLE, POPULAR CULTURE IN AMERICA (1987).
230. Kahn, supra note 227, at 3.
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The problem of reaching a consensus about the cultural commu-
nity's moral standards is thus the achilles heel in the culturally-based
community standards analysis. 3 ' Even the most widely recognized
method of consensus, the public opinion poll, would be inadequate. In
addition to a lack of debate and a failure to screen for the existence of
outside biases on the same level of jury deliberations, a poll does not
reach everyone in the community, fails to measure the strength of any
one individual's convictions, and may be manipulated by the nature
and number of the questions asked. Attempts to divine the commu-
nity's moral essence without an opinion poll are even more precarious
and less precise. Thus, within any given cultural community, there not
only may be a lack of common moral bonding, but also an inability to
identify the morals of the community.3 2 One commentator noted that,
"[c]ulture in the United States is often viewed as one all-encompassing
entity - a majority approach which conveniently buries the identity of
Black and other disenfranchised peoples." 233 The cultural community
test thus may itself become vague to the point that it becomes com-
pletely malleable, and lacking in consistency. 234
In Justice Douglas' dissent in Roth v. United States, he spoke of
231. While a jury may provide its own representative consensus, even jury delib-
erations need not reach a consensus in all cases, since a less than unanimous verdict is
acceptable in some jurisdictions. Moreover, a jury is not simply an adequate substitute
for a clear and precise constitutional standard. As one commentator has noted, "the use
of juries ...however, . . . should not be used in place of an articulate definition."
MacDougall, The Community Standards Test of Obscenity, 42 U. TORONTO FAC. L.
REv. 79 (1984).
232. The theoretical use of community also fails because the notion of commu-
nity illustrates a concept of consent or approval. This is contradictory to, or at least
inconsistent with, the concept of reason, which also informs the law of boundaries.
Using community standards to define obscenity law may provide a definition of what
material the community consents to seeing, but does not pertain at all to the reasoning
for any such determination. As one commentator has noted,"more importantly, only
through discourse are common values revealed and maintained. This discursive element
of community replicates much of the function of reasoning classical, political theories."
Kahn, supra note 227, at 3.
233. T. VANDERMERE & D. Toop, The Rap Attack (1984).
234. While flexibility is essential to legal rules and principles, too much of it may
undermine those same rules and principles. As one commentator has noted, "while
traditional legal theorists acknowledge the inevitability and desirability of some inde-
terminacy, traditional legal theory requires a relatively large amount of determinacy as
a fundamental premise of the rule of law. Our legal system, however, has never satis-
fied this goal." Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L. J. 1, 13 (1984).
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the "battle between the literati and the Philistines. 235 In Judge Gonza-
lez's decision in Skyywalker Records, he wrote that "the Philistines are
not always wrong. '"236 The relativity of cultural values qualifies these
assertions, suggesting that, while a battle may be occurring, the values
of the warriors may be changing all the time. To try to identify suffi-
ciently clear standards from such a dynamic situation may be difficult,
and on some occasions, impossible.
Yet this critique of cultural variability does not undermine the
continued use of cultural considerations in the analysis. The culturally-
based community still provides the best opportunity for an accurate as-
sessment of community values from any of the alternatives. Further-
more, its inclusion would force judges and jurors to engage in a more
thorough and searching process, regardless of the final outcome.
VII. Conclusion
As evidenced by Skyywalker Records, Inc., a geographic-based
community standards analysis is unworkable. The geographic-based
community standards test fails primarily because in the 1990's, those
people living within a geographic area generally lack common moral
bonding. Instead to inform the community standards test with substan-
tive content, it is necessary to consider cultural bonding as well. Cul-
tural and sub-cultural relationships provide a more common form of
moral bonding in modern America.
The inclusion of cultural considerations to infuse the community
standards analysis with substance has several advantages. In addition
to providing more realism to the test, the utilization of culture at least
forces the trier of fact to undertake a thorough and more objective
evaluation of the community's moral structure in a manner somewhat
removed from the trier's own biases and predilections.
Yet, even if cultural ties are considered as a part of the analysis,
the indeterminacy of cultural bonding may still undermine the legiti-
macy of the test. Under some circumstances, the common values within
cultural groups are extremely difficult if not impossible to articulate
precisely. The use of cultural considerations to discern a tolerably
vague common morality from numerous dynamic sub-cultures may in
those instances be futile, and the community standards test conse-
quently may not pass constitutional muster.
235. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
236. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 578.
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Until the community standards analysis of Miller v. California is
abandoned, however, the preferable approach is to include cultural con-
siderations in the analysis whenever feasible.
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"WARNING: EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CONTAINED."'
"We should have a great many fewer disputes in the world if words
were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only, and not for
the things themselves." 2
"Whatever narrows the boundaries of the material fit to be used in art
hems in also the artistic sincerity of the individual artist. It does not
give fair play and outlet to his vital interest. It forces his perceptions to
channels previously worn into ruts and clips the wings of his
imagination."3
I. Introduction
For many years, courts all over the United States have told us
what kind of movies we can watch,4 what kind of books we can read,5
1. Be forewarned: This article contains quotations from 2 Live Crew's As Nasty
As They Wanna Be (1989), as well as other sexually explicit lyrics from popular songs.
This precise warning was used on the cover of the 2 Live Crew recording. Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Interestingly
enough, by using these words in the context of an "intellectual" exposition of the is-
sues, these words would not be deemed obscene. Although lawyers may use this lan-
guage in discussing what is obscene without suffering any negative effects, the general
public may not be exposed to these recordings. Thus, it just goes to show that George
Orwell was correct in Animal Farm when he explained: "All pigs are equal, but some
pigs are more equal than others."
2. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1960), cited in,
E. OBOLER, THE FEAR OF THE WORD: CENSORSHIP AND SEX 20 (1974). Arguably, the
only difference between the ideas expressed in 2 Live Crew's recording and other pro-
vocative popular music is their word choices. See infra text accompanying notes 219-
254. Furthermore, pornography and obscenity represent ideas and information about
sexual activity. See infra text accompanying notes 339-47.
3. J. DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE (1934), cited in, E. OBOLER, supra note 2, at
102. This article proposes that pornographic art has been a significant force in liberat-
ing society's attitudes toward sexuality. See infra text accompanying notes 204-218.
4. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Regulation of
obscenity is censorship of speech about sexuality that the censors, whether they are
courts, legislators, prosecutors, or editors of artistic works, have deemed inappropriate
for society. All censors have the following characteristics:
1. They know better than the prospective reader what is "right" for him
[or her] to read.
2. They themselves may read the censorable matter without being delete-
[Vol. 15
158
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/14
Campbell
riously affected.
3. They know conclusively what bad effects reading "bad" stuff will
have.
4. They can see no possibility of good results from reading the fit-to-be-
censored items.
E. OBOLER, supra note 2, at 4.
Censorship has occurred throughout all ages. However, it is not good policy.
Oboler stated:
1. The widespread dissemination of all possible knowledge is a good thing
for mankind.
2. Censorship is clearly an attempt to narrow down, if not eliminate,
man's self-knowledge, as well as his [or her] knowledge of extra-human
activity.
3. Therefore, censorship, no matter for What reason, is bad for humanity.
Id. at 5-6.
Oboler described the personified Censor:
There he stands - the Eternal Censor, the true believer in the
Everlasting Nay. He is proud of his calling and willing, fanatically, to give
up a great deal. . . to keep the Bad from affecting the Good. He knows
intuitively what is evil, and he needs no legalistic definitions to clarify his
thinking. Only he, the Censor, among all men, unerringly can tell the ob-
scene and the pornographic and the scatological and the blasphemous and
the subversive from what is good, without more than a moments considera-
tion. His mind has a built-in dowsing rod for all the words of sin, and his
divination of where the dirtiest of dirt can be found is never less than
accurate.
Through his eyes the work comes in just two shapes - the lingam
and the yoni - and the artistic creators always seem to manage to mold
whatever they are creating into these two forms. There is no use trying to
fool the Censor; he can always tell what those rascally creatures, the imag-
inative artists, are really doing. What others might accept as reality, he
recognizes as exaggeration. What most might consider artistic exaggera-
tion, he can readily identify as obscene and pornographic. Whatever is ob-
scene and pornographic by his standards must at least be expurgated, bet-
ter barred, at best obliterated for all time.
The Censor is not to be gulled by the literary fustian which the critics
and authors have draped around their presumably "artistic" goals. The
Censor knows that there is almost a direct correlation between practically
anything called "literature" and just plain filth - particularly today.
Nowadays, says the Censor. . . , only a very few [artists] are [producing
works] about anything that doesn't come down, if properly understood, to
just raw sex. And the idea of sex promulgated by these [artists] has noth-
ing to do with the right way to think. . . about it; they dare to [describe]
sex as if it were - can you believe it? - pleasurable and joyous, fun and
games.
One cardinal tenet of the Censor is that, of all bad things, sex is the
worst. And the Censor is on intimate terms with the truth about sex - the
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and what kind of photographs we can view.6 Now, one court in Florida
has told its citizenry that there are certain kinds of music that should
not be heard.7 Even in the wake of informal agreements by the music
ultimate truth that is too truthful for the mass of men....
The Censor alone is entitled to lower himself into that cloacal abyss
which is writing about sex; somehow the fifth which would enmire and
besmirch the average man never affects him. He is thrice armed by his
preordained and appropriate roles of combined judge, jury, and appeals
agency, a position which places him far above the average run of impres-
sionable men. It is from that lofty pinnacle that he asserts his own purity
and the innate impropriety of all other men. His strength is both a result
and a cause of the weakness and impressionability of others.
The sock of comedy and the buskin of tragedy, to the Censor, are
both equally guilty accomplices in helping make appealing and palatable
to the masses the iniquitous, the perverse, the base. Indeed, it is not really
the morally unfit book or magazine or play [or musical work] which ap-
palls the Censor, so much as the very idea that sex exists.
Id. at 222-23 (emphasis in original). See Roberts, infra note 330, at 1, for another
commentator's remarks on the humor of having the Supreme Court Justices retire to
the privacy of the screening room to view these types of movies. Id. Can't you just
imagine them sitting there, saying: "Hey, we do that at our house. That's acceptable,"
or better yet, acting like Siskel and Ebert giving it a thumbs up. For more information
on censorship and obscenity, see M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP: THE
SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE (1964); M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, To THE PURE... A
STUDY OF OBSCENITY AND THE CENSOR (1928).
5. Print censorship can be traced back as far as Plato and his attempts to restrict
poetical expression. E. DE GRAZIA, CENSORSHIP LANDMARKS 287 (1969); see also A.
CRAIG, THE BANNED BOOKS OF ENGLAND (1937); A. CRAIG, SUPPRESSED BOOKS: A
HISTORY OF THE CONCEPTION OF LITERARY OBSCENITY (1963);-A. HAIGHT, BANNED
BOOKS (3d ed. 1970) (books since Homer's The Odyssey have been banned); J. JEF-
FRIES, LEGAL CENSORSHIP OF OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS: SEARCH FOR A CENSORING
STANDARD (1968); D. LOTH, THE EROTIC IN LITERATURE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF
PORNOGRAPHY AS DELIGHTFUL As IT IS INDISCREET (1961). One of the earliest cases
of book banning in the United States was United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses
by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). In One Book Entitled Ulysses, a customs
collector attempted to restrict James Joyce's Ulysses from being imported because it
allegedly contained obscene passages. Id. The court compared Ulysses to works of sci-
ence and held that where a book is not intended to be sexually arousing in its dominant
part, that book is deserving of first amendment protection. Id. at 707. The court stated
that the work must be considered as a whole, and objectionable passages cannot be
isolated and examined out of context. Id. at 707 Despite its offensive nature to some
people, the court permitted Ulysses to be imported. Id. at 708-09.
6. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (child pornographic
photographs).
7. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990). The
present controversy surrounding music has not been instigated solely by 2 Live Crew's
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industry to regulate itself through labeling,8 one court has declared a
recording As Nasty As They Wanna Be. Recently a suit was brought against Judas
Priest in Nevada. The plaintiffs sued Judas Priest, claiming that the subliminal lyrics
found on a recording encouraged two young men to enter a suicide pact. One of the
young men died as a result of their suicide attempt. See Vance v. Judas Priest, 16 Med.
L. Rptr. (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1988) (preliminary ruling that subliminal messages are not
protected by the first amendment); Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844, 86-3939 (Nev.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990) (defendant rock singers won lawsuit). See also Keen, Heavy
Metal on Trial: Nevada Judge Will Decide Landmark Suit, U.S.A. Today, July 16,
1990, at IA; 2 Families Sue Heavy-Metal Band As Having Driven Sons to Suicide,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1990, at C13, col. 1. A similar case was brought against rock
singer Ozzy Ozbourne. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 187 (1988) (court held that the facts did not meet the incitement test of Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
8. There have been attempts at lyric regulation. See Comment, First Amend-
ment Implications of Rock Lyric Censorship, 14 PIEPPERDINE L. REv. 421 (1987).
Currently, there is an agreement to which companies can subscribe that would in some
ways regulate the explicit content of recordings. Among these include placing a warn-
ing on albums: "Explicit Lyrics-Parental Advisory." Id. at 424 n.9. Although this
agreement at present is voluntary, one commentator believes this type of censorship is
in direct contravention of first amendment principles, stating that at the very least,
artists could "lose their outlets for self-expression and be forced into self-censorship."
Note, Song Lyric Advisories: The Sound of Censorship, 5 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.
J. 225 (1986). This commentator noted that the market for explicit music is likely to
continue: "There exists a perpetual need for non-conformist outlets of expression in
every democratic society." Id. at 238 n.78. Certainly, companies that choose not to
comply with the voluntary agreement are free to generate recordings with lyrics that
could be objectionable.
Some artists whose recent or forthcoming records carry the warning label are:
Rap: King T, CPO, Boogie Down Productions, Intelligent Hoodlum, Too Short, Master
Ace, and Smooth Ice; Rock: Mojo Nixon, Too Much Joy, and Mother Love Bone;
Hard Rock/Heavy Metal: Suicidal Tendencies and Meliah Rage. Landis, Albums
Start Getting 'Explicit' Label, U.S.A. Today, July 24, 1990 (Life) (labels will hurt
lesser-known artists). One of the most vocal groups in the campaign for record labeling
has been the Parents' Music Resource Center. See The PMRC's Record-Stickering
Campaign" A Five-Year History, BILLBOARD, April 14, 1990, at 87-88. Although the
labels that are currently placed on some recordings are voluntarily included, legislation
requiring labeling continues to be an issue in a number of states. See Newcomb, Anti-
Stickering Rally Draws Thousands in St. Louis, BILLBOARD, April 28, 1990, at 8
(Missouri, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Delaware have considered bills in 1990); Hol-
land, 13 State Lawmakers Back Off Sticker Bills, BILLBOARD, April 14, 1990, at 1, 87
(states where bills were withdrawn included Alaska, Minnesota, Kansas, Iowa, Illinois,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, and New York); Holland, Support for Stickering Bills
Seems to Erode, BILLBOARD, April 7, 1990, at 1, 93 (Arizona, Tennessee, Maryland,
West Virginia, and Oklahoma have considered bills in 1990); Louisiana Governor Ve-
toes Bill Requiring Record Labeling, Dow Jones Highlights, Westlaw, July 25, 1990.
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rap' album by 2 Live Crew legally obscene.' 0 For this U.S. district
court in Florida, 2 Live Crew's recording, As Nasty As They Wanna
Be, [hereinafter Nasty] proved to be too "nasty" in Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro [hereinafter 2 Live Crew]."
See also Goldberg, The Great Lyrics Debate Will Not Go Away: How to Answer
Warning Label Advocates, BILLBOARD, April 28, 1990, at 9.
9. See infra text and accompanying notes 83-86 for a discussion of rap music. In
this article, examples from hard rock, heavy metal, pop, soul, and rap are used. This
article does not specifically target examples solely from rap due to the tremendous
crossover of songs that exist on the Billboard charts, today. In particular, rap songs
often appear on both the soul music and pop music charts, as do ballads by heavy
metal and hard rock artists.
10. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 596. This was a civil suit in Flor-
ida. However, since the judge's determination that the recording i; legally obscene,
there have been several arrests in Florida, as well as Texas, for selling the recording.
See Browne, The Rap on Obscenity: The 2 Live Crew's Album is Ruled More Than
Just 'Nasty' In Florida Court, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, June 29, 1990, at 48-49
(local record store owner in Florida arrested); Record Store Owner Pleads Not Guilty
to Obscenity Charge, Reuters, July 24, 1990 (Lexis, Nexis Library, Current File) (San
Antonio record store owner arrested for violating state obscenity statutes for selling the
recording) [hereinafter Record Store Owner].
An Indiana judge recently ruled that the recording is obscene, and prosecutors
have filed charges against two store chains for selling the recording. See 2 Live Crew
Album Ruled Obscene in Indiana, Lincoln Journal-Star, July 29, 1990.
In Tennessee, the district attorney general for Williamson County declared both
Nasty and Niggers with Attitude's Straight Outta Compton obscene under Tennessee
law. Morris & Haring, 2 Live Crew, N.W.A. Called Obscene by Tenn. Judge, BILL-
BOARD, April 7, 1990, at 4, 93.
There have also been arrests for the live performance of Nasty songs. See Band
Arrested for Performing 2 Live Crew Song, Lincoln Journal-Star, Aug. 12, 1990, at
2A (New York band arrested after playing songs from Nasty); Browne, supra, at 48
(all members of 2 Live Crew - except the drummer who did not sing - arrested after
they performed songs from Nasty). There has been controversy in many cities about
whether the band should be allowed to perform the songs from As Nasty As They
Wanna Be. See, e.g., Morning Report: Pop/Rock, L.A. Times, July 16, 1990, at F2,
col. 1 (Anchorage, Alaska officials planning to bar band from appearing live); Resi-
dents Ask Council to Ban 2 Live Crew Show in Anaheim, L.A. Times, July 19, 1990,
at F3, col. 4 (Mayor of Anaheim, California said, "the city would make no effort to
halt" the live performance; district attorney in Sacramento said, "[the] album would
not violate California's" obscenity laws).
11. 739 F. Supp. 578, 596 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Following this ruling, the State pro-
ceeded with criminal prosecutions of Charles Freeman, a local record store owner, and
the members of the band, for their live performance of these songs. Mr. Freeman was
convicted of violating Florida's obscenity statute. State v. Freeman, No. 90-17446-
MM-10 A (Broward County Ct., Oct. 3, 1990) (appeal pending). The members of 2
Live Crew were acquitted by a different jury, assessing the very same lyrics. State v.
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There has been a great deal of outrage about the 2 Live Crew
decision by liberals,1 2 by individual recording artists,13 and by the mu-
sic industry in general. 4 Many people, in fact, have claimed that this
Campbell, Nos. 90-17616-MM-10 A, B, C (Broward County Ct., Oct. 20, 1990). Sex-
ually explicit lyrics can be found on many other albums besides 2 Live Crew. For
example, Prince recorded "Darling Nikki" on Purple Rain (1984): "Met a girl named
Nikki. Guess you could say she was a sex fiend. I met her in a hotel lobby mastur-
bating with a magazine." Similarly, Motley Crew's "Bastard" on Shout at the Devil
(1983) says: "Out go the lights/In goes my knife/Pull out his life/ Consider that Bas-
tard dead/Get on you knees/Please beg me, please/You're the King of the Sleaze/
Don't you try to rape me." See also infra notes 89-92, 246, and text accompanying
notes 234, 239, 244, for additional sexually explicit lyrics.
12. People concerned with their right of freedom of speech have been very verbal
in the 2 Live Crew controversy. Such individuals have spoken out on Donahue (July,
1990) and Geraldo (July 1990).
13. A number of well-known musicians including Frank Zappa and Axl Rose,
have spoken out on behalf of 2 Live Crew. In fact, Bret Michaels of Poison stated that
the entire campaign against 2 Live Crew is political. Anderson, Pop Notes, Newsday,
July 22, 1990, at Part II, page 10.
14. See Haring & Newman, 'Nasty' Ruling, Arrests Galvanize Industry, BILL-
BOARD, June 23, 1990, at 1, 5; Philips, Obscenity Ruling Rocks Industry, L.A. Times,
June 9, 1990, at Fl, col. 4 (concern regarding the impact the Florida court's decision
will have); Soocher, 2 Live Crew: Taking the Rap, ROLLING STONE, August 19, 1990,
at 19 (music industry experts disagree whether case signals start of "obscenity witch
hunt" aimed at music industry). See also Philips, Virgin Records to Strike Back with
Free-Speech Stickers: The Chief of the Album Label Urges an Industry Wide Cam-
paign Against a National 'Witch Hunt, L.A. Times, July 19, 1990, at F1, col. 1 (the
recording industry is "getting blamed for everything that's going wrong in the coun-
try;" Jeff Ayeroff of Virgin Records stated, "it's time for the record industry to strike
back against what [appears] to be a national 'witch hunt' against pop music"). In fact,
Virgin Records is using a red, white and blue label which reads: "The First Amend-
ment gives you the right to choose what you hear, what you say and what you think.
CENSORSHIP IS UNAMERICAN. Don't let anyone take away that right. Raise
your political voice. Register to vote." Id. (emphasis in original).
Luther Campbell has come out with a solo single entitled "Banned in the U.S.A."
Bruce Springsteen allowed Campbell to use the chorus of "Born in the U.S.A." on the
recording because he was concerned about the principles involved. In addition, Doug
Morris, President of Atlantic Records, has agreed to distribute the recording. This
alignment with a major label is important because it gives Campbell, whose recordings
had been released by an independent and less powerful label, more "corporate muscle."
This added backing may be helpful in influencing stores to carry the Nasty recording,
as well. Hilburn, Pop Album Review: Macho and Mean Rap From Luther Campbell,
L.A. Times, July 23, 1990, at Fl, col. 4. See also Dwyer, 2 Live Crew Principle: How
to Make Money, Newsday, July 20, 1990 (News) at 2 ("[2 Live Crew] can't sing [or]
dance, have practically no rhythm or beat, no stage presence, no lyrics or rhyme. And
the only jokes appear to be about their penises. . . .But talent was no obstacle. The
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decision is a direct attempt to suppress development in culture - to be
specific, black culture."' One commentator stated that the reason this
music is being suppressed is because the
'lower orders' are particularly susceptible to obscenity's baleful ef-
fects . . Black youth are seen as dry kindling, ready to burst
into fire with any stray spark . . [White America has] the po-
tent image of a mass of unthinking, animal-like black youth wait-
ing to erupt into a frenzy of wilding or rioting, depending on the
provocation.16
Atlantic Records music company issued a statement about its courage and devotion to
Free Speech and signed a contract with Campbell.").
15. Rap is an "urban, do-it-yourself music which upsets conservatives and is usu-
ally independently produced." Philips, supra note 14. Rappers interpret the arrest of 2
Live Crew, as well as labeling attempts, "as part of a plot by middle-class whites to
stop their children from empathizing with black Americans." Turner, Right-On Rebels,
N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990 (Features) (quoting Ice T., a popular rapper). "Rap is the
most powerful joining music. That's why they want to shut it down. . . ." Id. See also
Philips, supra note 14 (Florida court's decision "could be perceived by some as an
attempt to restrict culture.").
While it is true that 2 Live Crew's music appeals to some segment of the black
American population, the music does not appeal to all blacks. Many black people
would argue that 2 Live Crew does not represent their culture. However, this should
not negate the import of the music to some segment of the black culture. Similar state-
ments may be made about Jewish culture being portrayed in film, in particular. For
example, the recent Academy Award winning film Driving Miss Daisy portrayed Re-
form Jews in the South. For the "stereotypical, Woody Allen-type Jew from New York
City," this portrayal certainly does not represent all Jews.
Nevertheless, it has finally become clear to much of the entertainment industry
that there is a distinct "Black Culture." For example, Spike Lee's Do The Right Thing
portrays the lives of inner city blacks in New York City. Similarly, In Living Color, a
new television series on the FOX network, deals almost exclusively with different seg-
ments of the black population. The show confronts racial stereotypes. For example, a
regular character is a homeless black man who panders on the subway and has tried to
build a home out of a cardboard box. Similarly, there are two black men who operate
the "Home Boys' Shopping Network," in which they offer stolen merchandise for sale.
Besides stereotypes, this show also deals with cultural differences even within the black
population. One segment portrays a West Indian family in "Hey Mon," which focuses
on their strong work ethic. See also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S.Ct. 2997
(1990) (in upholding FCC policies allowing minorities' advantages in certain broad-
casting ownership programs, the Court recognized that minorities treat issues differ-
ently, including news programming that focuses on racial issues).
16. Gales, The Case of 2 Live Crew Tells Much About the American Psyche,
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1990, § 4 at 18, col. 4 (letter to editor by an English professor at
Duke University). This same image brought about concern for the effects of Spike
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Allegations that this record was singled out from many sexually ex-
plicit recordings11 has some intuitive appeal and some truthfulness.
Nevertheless, outrage about the Nasty recording cannot be ana-
lyzed in a vacuum. Social and political changes have occurred within
American society that have both led to the creation of the album and
the outrage which it has engendered."' Amid the confusion about the
National Endowment of the Arts funding decisions for potentially inde-
cent or obscene art,19 there seems to be an Inquisition in society with
respect to sexual matters.20 The political climate in our society has rip-
Lee's Do the Right Thing. Id. The term "wilding," in fact, became widely known after
the gang rape of the female jogger in Central Park in 1989. See generally Kunen,
Madness in the Heart of the City, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, May 22, 1989, at 106 (cover
story: "The Central Park Outrage: Night of the 'Wilding' "); Stone, What Really Hap-
pened in Central Park: The Night of the Jogger - And the Crisis of New York NEW
YORK MAGAZINE, August 14, 1989, at 30 (incident has had major impact on New
York City's pre-existing racial tensions).
This paternalistic attitude toward black youth is not isolated. In general, all por-
nography regulation is designed to protect what the majority perceives to be a "deviant
few" who will be adversely affected by the pornographic material. See infra note 363.
17. Cf. Andrew Dice Clay's recent release The Day the Laughter Died (1989)
(also contains explicit language). However, the 2 Live Crew court noted that there had
been no complaints about Clay's recording. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at
583. This should at least hint of the potential for selective prosecutions in the obscenity
area.
18. See Ellis, Sensing the Shift in Political Winds, Bush Drops the Conservative
Agenda, L.A. Times, July 22, 1990, at M4, col. 1 (mentioning recent controversy over
Andrew Dice Clay's appearance on NBC's Saturday Night Live, the photography of
Robert Mapplethorpe, and the general proliferation of cultural conservatism in the en-
tertainment industry as a political issue).
19. See, e.g., Bernstein, Subsidies for Artists: Is Denying a Grant Really Cen-
sorship?, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at Cl1, col. 4 (" 'They're trying to starve organi-
zations and artists that have unwanted ideas ... .' ")(quoting Martha Wilson, director
of Franklin Furnace); Commack, Who Can Define What Is Obscene, Newsday, July
19, 1990, at 65 (discussing generally the problem of the National Endowment of the
Arts defining obscenity); Performance: Front and Center, Washington Post, July 16,
1990, at D7 (four artists appealing decision by NEA to deny their grants). One com-
mentator stated: "'What we're seeing here is people trying to control society by con-
trolling the arts.'" Keen, supra note 7, at IA (quoting Trish Heimers of the Recording
Industry Association of America).
20. With the advent of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), society
has been concerned with safe-sex practices, in particular, for both heterosexuals and
homosexuals. See The Escape Club, "Wild, Wild West," Wild Wild West (1988) (re-
flecting society's concern about the transmission of disease, they sing, "Give me, give
me 'safe sex' ") (transcribed from tape). Furthermore, although the Supreme Court did
not directly address the AIDS issue in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the
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ened the obscenity issue for reconsideration.21 While one can agree or
disagree whether a particular book, movie, photograph, or recording is
obscene when applying the legal standards advanced in Miller v. Cali-
fornia,22 doing so merely begs the question: Should we be regulating
this type of material at all?23
This paper examines the 2 Live Crew case as a starting point in
the debate on obscenity. Even if the case were to be reversed on appeal,
the fact that any court can declare a piece of music obscene should be
objectionable to a free thinking society.
In Part II of this paper, the Supreme Court's most important ob-
scenity opinions are discussed.24 The current obscenity test from Miller
v. California is presented in preparation for an analysis of the 2 Live
Crew case.25
In Part III, the facts of the 2 Live Crew case are presented, 26 and
the court's application of the Miller test is explained." Additionally,
the court's application of the Miller test will be criticized at all levels:
Court stated that homosexual sodomy was not constitutionally proteted, a result that
directly opposes the "sexual revolution" that continues to take place in America.
One commentator recently said that this Inquisition of the arts has occurred be-
cause America does not really have any other significant political problems. Dionne,
Who's Winning the Culture Wars? Censorship: Redrawing the Lines of Tolerance,
Washington Post, July 15, 1990, at 61. He sees the "obscenity issue as 'filling a void
for a lack of social issues.'" Id. (quoting Michael Cromartie, a research associate at
the Ethics and Public Policy Center).
21. As early as 1977, one member of the Court pointed out the need to reexam-
ine the obscenity issue. In Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Justice Stevens pointed out "the need for a principled re-examination of
the premises" on which Miller rests.
22. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
23. See, e.g., Allan, A Right to Pornography?, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 376
(1983); Chemerinsky, Outlawing Pornography: What we Gain, What we Lose, 12
HuM. RTs. 24 (1985); Kamp, Obscenity and the Supreme Court: .4 Communication
Approach to a Persistent Judicial Problem, 2 COMM. & L. 1 (1980); Katz, Regulating
Obscenity, 5 WHITTIER L. REv. 1 (1983); Stone, Obscenity Law Reform: Some Practi-
cal Problems, 130 NEw L.J. 872 (1980); Young, News from the Front - The War on
Obscenity and the Death of Doctrinal Purity, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 305 (1987).
For information about exactly what type of pornography is sold in "adult book-
stores," see Dietz & Sears, Pornography and Obscenity Sold in "Adult Bookstores" A
Survey of 5132 Books, Magazines, and Films in Four American Cities, 21 U. MIcH.
J.L. REF. 1 (1987-88).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 50-76.
25. The Miller test was used in the 2 Live Crew case.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 80-104.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 106-70.
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1) whether appropriate community standards were applied;2 8 2)
whether Nasty appealed to a "prurient interest" in sex; 3) whether
Nasty was patently offensive;29 and 4) whether Nasty had any serious
value.30 In this section, the weaknesses of the Miller test itself are re-
vealed. For a number of reasons, including the fact that this music was
designed to appeal to a subpopulation, namely black Americans, the
community standards approach is not desirable.3 1 Furthermore, notions
of what appeals to the "prurient interest" and what is "patently offen-
sive" have changed over time. 2 The lyrics used in Nasty are similar to
other types of lyrics widely available today, with the exception that
they use laymen's terminology for genitalia and sexual acts. It will be
argued that penalizing the group for its word choices in expressing the
same ideas is an inappropriate suppression of free expression. 3 Finally,
the appropriateness of the court's determination of artistic value is
questioned.3 4
In Part IV, the bases upon which the Supreme Court has seen fit
to regulate speech dealing with sexual matters is explored.35 One ra-
tionale that has been offered for such regulation has been that obscen-
ity appeals to the emotional rather than the intellectual aspects of
humans.36 Besides obscenity, many have argued that this same ration-
ale applies to music itself.37 This is an inappropriate rationale on which
to deny protection to either music or speech dealing with sexual mat-
ters. If all speech is mediated by cognition, then emotional effects can
occur with any type of speech, including the most protected form of
speech - political speech.38
An additional rationale for the regulation of obscenity has been to
28. See infra text accompanying notes 172-93.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 195-257.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 258-83.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 178-80.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 197-218.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 219-54.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 260-61, 275-83.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 284-388. It is important to recognize what
pornography and obscenity is. It is speech dealing with sexual issues. By labeling it as
obscenity, the courts have been able to turn their backs on the fact that there is speech
involved. See Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography in its Place,
17 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 359 (1987) (also recognizing what the content of the
speech is, i.e., dealing with sexual matters).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 328-48.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 292-327.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 326-27.
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deter the allegedly harmful affects of obscene materials.3 9 However, it
will be argued that the social science evidence cannot answer this ques-
tion for the courts. Conflicting studies exist that in no instance account
for a 100% causal relationship.40 Thus, values must be determinative.
Given that values have always played a role in the regulation of
speech dealing with sexual matters, what is probably the real basis for
regulation of this speech - morality - must be explored. It will be
argued that the majoritarian morality has sought to prevent change by
suppressing speech about sexuality.4" However, this justification is in-
appropriate in a free society where change is an inevitable result from
all types of free speech, including political speech, which is very rarely
suppressed.42
In Part V, the author proposes that the most defensible position in
the arena of obscenity regulation is the absolutist position of Justice
Black; all speech should be protected.43 "Obscenity" and "pornogra-
phy" are merely labels for speech dealing with sexuality.44 Because this
is speech, it should be protected under the first amendment.
In Part VI, it will be concluded that society has traditionally de-
valued sexual speech based on its moral conventions.45 However, with
other types of speech, society does not attempt to impress its moral
views by suppressing the speech. A society that believes wholeheartedly
in democracy does not suppress speech about communism. Why should
sexual speech be singled out for suppression?4"
One of the reasons the government has sought to regulate speech
regarding sexual activities is because of the power and mystery of sex. 47
However, sex is a great deal less mysterious than it used to be because
of more open debate about sexuality. Part of that debate has included
"obscenity".48 Thus, this type of sexual speech should be protected, for
if it is not, as Justice Black questioned, how long will it be before other
types of speech that we value are suppressed? 49
39. See infra text accompanying notes 350-70.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 363-67.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 371-88.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 384-86.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 389-404.
44. See infra text accompanying note 70.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 405-29.
46. See infra text accompanying note 408.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 415-16.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 417-18.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 425-27.
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II. Obscenity and the First Amendment
The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.50 Free speech is one
of the most critical rights citizens have in fostering self-government,
self-realization, and truth-seeking. Typically, governmental action
designed to curb free speech will pass judicial review only when it is
shown that governmental action is necessary to further a "compelling
governmental interest" by narrowly drawn means to achieve that
purpose.51
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has never hesi-
tated to point out that the first amendment's guarantees of free speech
are not absolute. In fact, there are various types of speech that are not
protected under the first amendment. In Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire,52 the Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words - those which by their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any ex-
position of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.53
Although the Chaplinsky Court made this statement in dicta in
1942, in 1957, the Court directly confronted the issue of whether ob-
50. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. The first amendment is applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
51. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-71 (1981).
52. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
53. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted). In addition to obscenity, other types of
speech are outside the scope of first amendment protection. These include commercial
speech that is false, misleading or advocates a crime, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); defamation, see, e.g., New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials); fighting words, see Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); and child pornography, see Osborne v. Ohio, 110
S.Ct. 1691 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See generally J.
Snowden, "The Circle of First Amendment Protection," Mass Communications Law
Lecture, July 1990, U. of Neb. C. L., Lincoln, Neb.
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scenity was protected speech. In Roth v. United States,54 the Court
sustained a conviction under a federal statute punishing the mailing of
"obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy . . ." materials.55 The Court held
that obscenity was outside the protection available under the Constitu-
tion. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the [consti-
tution's] guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as ut-
terly without redeeming social importance . . . . We hold that ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press.58
THE CIRCLE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Outside: Obscenity
Fighting Words
Defamation
Child Pornography
54. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
55. Id. at 479 n.1.
56. Id. at 484-85 (footnotes omitted). It is unclear from Roth whether obscene
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In Roth, a majority of the Court decided that obscene materials
could be identified by asking "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest.15 7 Materials ap-
pealing to a "prurient interest" were those that had "a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts,"58 or those that appealed to "a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and [that go] substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters. 59
Not long after Roth, however, the Court began to have difficulty
separating protected from unprotected speech, specifically separating
obscene and non-obscene pornography.60 In Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts,"1 the Court articulated a new test of obscenity, expanding on the
Roth standard:
[T]hree elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a pru-
rient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
speech is even considered to contain ideas, or whether the ideas it contains are not
acceptable. In any event, one commentator has argued that historically there was no
such recognition of obscenity as being without importance or considered to be "non-
ideas." Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act
and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1566 n.3 (1988), states that even Benjamin Franklin
wrote what for the time would probably have been viewed as "obscene" stories. Frank-
lin invented the tale of Polly Baker, the story of a woman prosecuted five times for
bearing illegitimate children. At her fifth trial, the woman defended herself on the
basis that the court should not "turn natural and useful Actions into Crimes." Frank-
lin, The Speech of Miss Polly Baker, General Advertiser (London), April 15, 1747,
reprinted in, M. HALL, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN & POLLY BAKER app. 165 (1960), cited
by, Gey, supra.
57. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (1957).
58. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged, 2d
ed. 1949) which defines prurient, in pertinent part, as follows: "Itching; longing; uneasy
with desire or longing; or persons, having itching, morbid or lascivious longings; or
desire, curiosity, or propensity; lewd . . ").
59. Id. (citing the MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)).
60. In fact, the Court spent a great deal of time reversing convictions for obscen-
ity without hearing oral argument or writing opinions whenever at least five members
of the Court, using their own tests, concluded that the material in the case was not
obscene. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York 386 U.S. 767 (1967). See generally Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 n.3 (1973) (Court decided 31 cases in this manner). For
the distinction between obscenity and pornography used in this paper, see infra note 70.
61. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the mate-
rial is utterly without redeeming social value.62
Memoirs which moved beyond Roth, required proof that the mate-
rial was "utterly without redeeming social value."6" Nevertheless, the
Court ultimately found this third prong of the test to be problematic
for it made it very difficult for the states to prove that materials were
obscene.64 Apparently, the Court believed there were types of materials
that should be prohibited and made it easier for states to prohibit these
materials with the use of yet another revised test in Miller v.
California."5
Miller is currently the state of the law for obscenity produced by
adults and directed to adults.66 In Miller, the appellant conducted a
mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of adult books. He was
62. Id. at 418.
63. Id.
64. Although the Court was concerned with the state having to prove a negative,
i.e., that the work was utterly without redeeming value, oddly enough, every time a
person attempts to prove that a statute is unconstitutional, he or she has to prove a
negative.
65. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
66. There is a different standard for materials directed to minors. Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See Weller, See No Evil: The Divisive Issue of Mi-
nors' Access Laws, 18 CuMB. L. REv. 141 (1987-88). Furthermore, there is a different
standard for materials that contain child pornography. See Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct.
1691 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See also Kent & Truesdell,
Spare the Child: The Constitutionality of Criminalizing Possession of Child Pornog-
raphy, 68 OR. L. REv. 363 (1989); Loken, The Federal Battle Against Child Sexual
Exploitation: Proposals for Reform, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 105 (1986); Potuto, Stan-
ley Ferber = The Constitutional Crime of At-Home Child Pornography Possession,
76 Ky. L.J. 15 (1987-88); Note, Child Pornography: Ban the Speech and Spare the
Child? - New York v. Ferber, 32 DE PAUL L. REv. 685 (1983); Note, Child Pornog-
raphy, the First Amendment, and the Media: The Constitutionality of Super-Obscen-
ity Laws, 4 COMM. ENT. L.J. 115 (1981); Note, Child Pornography: Greater State
Power to Protect the Interest of the Child, 7 J. Juv. L. 227 (1983); Note, Constitu-
tional Law - First Amendment - New York Statute Proscribing Distribution of
Nonobscene Materials Depicting Minors Engaged in Sexual Conduct Does Not Vio-
late the First Amendment Because the Materials Are Outside First Amendment Pro-
tection and the Statute Is Not Substantially Overbroad. New York v. Ferber, 28 VILL.
L. REV. 416 (1983); Note, Constitutional Law - Obscenity-Child Pornography Laws
Need Not Comply with the Legal Definition of Obscenity. New York v. Ferber, 61 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 154 (1983); Note, New York v. Ferber: Compelling Extension of First
Amendment Infringement, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 475 (1983); Note, No First
Amendment Protection for the Sexploitation of Children, 29 Loy. L. REv. 227 (1983).
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convicted under a California law which prohibited the knowing distri-
bution of obscene matter.6 7 He distributed unsolicited brochures for his
adult materials that contained pictures and drawings "very explicitly
depicting men and women in groups of two or more engaged in a vari-
ety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed. 6 8
The Court noted that the recipients of these brochures were "unwilling
recipients,"6 and thus, the state had a strong interest in protecting
them.
The Court articulated a new test to clarify the standard for deter-
mining "what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to
regulation under the states' police power."'7 0 The Court held:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
67. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311.2(a) and 311, cited in, Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 n.1 (1973).
68. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 22. The Court distinguished between "obscene material" and "porno-
graphic material." Id. at 18-19 n.2. "Obscene material" was "la: disgusting to the
senses ... b: grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is appropriate
• ..2: offensive or revolting as countering or violating some ideal or principle," or
"offensive to the senses, or to taste or refinement; disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul,
abominable, loathsome." Id (citing first WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY (Unabridged 2d ed. 1949), and then, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY "(1933
ed.)). In contrast, it was "pornographic" material that hadto do with sexual activity:
"1: a description of prostitutes or prostitution; 2: a depiction (as in writing or painting)
of licentiousness or lewdness: a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual
excitement." Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 n.2 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY, supra). According to the Court, "[p]ornographic material which
is obscene forms a sub-group of all 'obscene' expression, but not the whole, at least as
the word 'obscene' is now used in our language. [ThusJ 'obscene material' [has] a
specific judicial meaning which derives from the Roth case, i.e., obscene material
'which deals with sex.'" Id.
In this article, generally, the word "obscenity" will be specifically used when refer-
ring to materials that have been declared legally obscene using the Miller test. How-
ever, both pornographic materials and obscene materials deal with sexuality. Because I
believe that there is no principled way to distinguish between obscenity and "plain 'ole"
pornography, I will use these two terms both simultaneously and interchangeably when
speaking of materials dealing with sexual activity.
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literary, artistic, political or scientific value.71
Although the Court was not willing to give concrete examples of
what would be considered obscene under this newly articulated test, it
was willing to offer some general guidance. Works that contained "pa-
tently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated"' 2 would be obscene, as well
as "patently offensive representations of descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.""3
Using this test, a number of books,7 4 magazines, 75 and motion pic-
tures"8 have been challenged as being legally obscene. 77 It is precisely
this test that was applied recently in the 2 Live Crew case to declare a
musical recording obscene. 78
71. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 25.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 16-18. Miller itself was a challenge based on books.
75. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
76. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
77. This, it is clear from the cases that obscene speech has no protection under
the first amendment. See also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct.
2829, 2835 (1989). For more general information on pornography and obscenity, see
M. COAKLEY, RATED X: THE MORAL CASE AGAINST TV (1977) (discussing obscenity
on television); G. HAWKINS & F. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988);
R. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES? PORNOGRAPHY IN AND OUT OF COURT (1967); D. Mo-
RETTI, OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE LAW UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1984); PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP (D. Copp & S. Wendell eds. 1983); PORNOG-
RAPHY, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (A. Sobel ed. 1979); R. RANDALL, FREEDOM &
TABOO: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF A SELF-DIVIDED (1989). See also G. BY-
ERLY & R. RUBIN, PORNOGRAPHY, THE CONFLICT OVER SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERI-
ALS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1980); J. NORDQUIST,
PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP (1987) (bibliography); W. TABB, SOURCES OF INFOR-
MATION ON THE PORNOGRAPHY ISSUE (1973) (bibliography).
78. "The rationale is simple: the message conveyed by obscene speech is of such
slight social value that it is always outweighed by the compelling interests of society, as
manifested in the laws enacted by its elected representatives." Skyywalker Records,
Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 584. Florida in particular had a comprehensive set of laws that
would criminalize the distribution, sale or production or any obscene materials includ-
ing a recording. See FLA. STAT. § 847.001(1)(a) (1986). However, most states have
some statutory prohibition on the sale and distribution of obscene materials. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-130 to 198 (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-3501 to 3512 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 311 to 312.5 (West 1988);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2001 to 2014 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-2101 to 26-2104
(1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 531.010 to 531.370 (Baldwin 1984); LA. REV. STAT.
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III. The Case of 2 Live Crew7 9
A. Facts
The plaintiff, Skyywalker Records, Inc., ° is a Florida corporation
headquartered in Miami, Florida. The plaintiffs, Luther Campbell,
Mark Ross, David Hobbs, and Chris Wongwon, better known as 2 Live
Crew, released a recording entitled As Nasty As They Wanna Be.
Nasty was released to the public in 1989. As of the date of the district
court case, the public had purchased approximately 1.7 million copies
of the recording."' 2 Live Crew also released a "clean" version of this
same recording entitled As Clean As They Wanna Be [hereinafter
Clean]. This recording contains the same instrumental background mu-
sic but not the explicit sexual lyrics. Clean had sold approximately
250,000 copies as of the date the case was decided. 2
Especially noteworthy was the fact that the allegedly obscene ma-
terial was music, in particular, "rap" music." Music from the rapgenre is noted for an emphasis on the lyrics accentuated by strong mu-
ANN. § 14:106 (West 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-190.1 to 14-190.8 (1989); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21 to 43.26 (Vernon 1989). But cf. State v. Henry, 302 Or.
510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987) (obscene materials could not be suppressed because the Oregon
constitution prohibited any law from being "passed restraining the expression of
[speech] freely on any subject whatsoever").
79. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
80. The company is now known as Luke Records. The company had to change
its name as a result of a trademark suit by the makers of Star Wars in which their
trademark - Luke Skywalker - was being confused with Skyywalker Records. See
Lucasfilm Sues Luther Campbell Over Use of 'Skywalker' Name, BILLBOARD, April 7,
1990, at 85, col. 6.
81. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 582.
82. Id.
83. Rap music emerged in the late 1970's from New York's streetwise "hip-hop"
culture. This same culture provided the world with graffiti art and break-dancing. Rap
has "fostered separatism, creating a new language of black codes and street lingo
designed to exclude outsiders." MacDonald, Rap Music is Shaking Things Up, Seattle
Times, July 15, 1990, at J1. Rap music "cannot be denied. It's the most significant,
most exciting music happening at the moment. It's a window into a world many people
know little about - the black ghetto - and it has revitalized dancing, the lifeblood of
pop music." Id. Rap is reflective of the "high level of anger" many African Americans
feel due to unemployment and poverty. Id. "This frustration has exploded in rap music,
sometimes with frightening intensity. But it is a healthy way of expressing what is
being said, thought and felt in the black community. Rap is often a bulletin from the
streets . . . ." Id.
1991]
175
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
sical beats. 4 Rap music originated in Black American culture some ten
years ago.85 While rap music does not always contain lyrics regarding
sexual activity,86 the plaintiffs chose to create a recording that on the
whole concerned sexual matters.87 Many of the titles of the songs even
reveal the subject matter to be discussed in the music, including "Me
So Horny,"8 8 "Dick Almighty,"8 9 "Dirty Nursery Rhymes,""0 "The
84. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 595.
85. See supra note 83. Although rap music has been around in the black commu-
nity for some time, it is now becoming popular with the white culture via the pop
charts. Some of these songs include Young MC, "Bust A Move"; MC Hammer, "Can't
Touch This," and "Please Hammer Don't Hurt 'Em"; Technotronic, "Pump Up the
Jam"; "Get Up On It"; Bell Biv DeVoe, "Poison" (on video, self-proclaimed appeal to
pop music lovers because of combination of hip-hop, rap, and pop styles). In fact, NBC
is planning a new sit-coin about rap music: The Fresh Prince of Bel Air. Marin, It's
Rap, Yo: Fresh Show Hops at NBC, Washington Times, July 19, 1990, at El.
86. In fact, much of rap music has been used to address political issues, includ-
ing police brutality. For example, Snap's "The Power" argues for a response to contin-
ued harassment: "It's getting kind of hectic .... I've got the power .... Equality I
possess ... The microphone that I am holdin' . . . can't be stolen. If they are 'Snap!'..
. No 'nigger' police will try to save them.... Stay off my back or I will attack, and you
don't want that." Rap has "exhumed the word 'nigger' using it with impunity in rap
songs and even in the names of groups (one of the top rap groups is NWA, or Niggers
With Attitude)." MacDonald, supra note 83. Furthermore, some rappers are expres-
sing the current frustrations of Black Americans with Jews. Public Enemy, whose al-
bum It Takes A Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back, was chosen as 1988 album of
the year by the Village Voice, has been criticized for its "anti-Semitic rhetoric of Min-
ister Louis Farrakhan." MacDonald, supra note 83.
87. In addition, the cover of the recording features four women's rear ends
clothed in only t-back bathing suits with the members of 2 Live Crew lying on the
sand, their faces visible through the standing females' legs. Compare City of Los Ange-
les v. Boucher (L.A. Mun. Ct. No. 31364354), cited in, Bishop, Porn in the USA, 6
CAL. LAW. 60, 64 (December 1986) (poster insert in Dead Kennedy's recording,
Frankenchrist, of H.R. Giger's Penis Landscape depicting ten sets of male and female
genitals engaged in sex acts).
88. See infra text accompanying note 234 for the lyrics in their entirety. Note, it
does a great disservice to this music to only focus upon the lyrics. This music is a
combination of words and rhythm with instruments and drums often accentuating the
message. The music should be considered "as a whole." Cf. Skyywalker Records, Inc.,
739 F. Supp. at 595-96 (court examined the lyrics and found the background music to
be comparatively insignificant).
89. Part of the lyrics are:
What the fuck is your name, motherfucker?
Long rod, thick frank, stiff peter ....
And my greatest thrill is to bust my nuts in a bitch's mouth.
That dick almighty, that dick almighty ....
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It'll fuck all the bitches, all shapes and size.
She'll climb a mountain, even run the block
Just to kiss the head of this big black cock.
He'll tear the pussy open, 'cause it's satisfaction.
The bitch won't leave, it's fatal attraction.
2 Live Crew, "Dick Almighty," As Nasty As They Wanna Be (1989) (transcribed
from tape). Lyrics from "Dick Almighty" by Luther Campbell, David Hobbs, Mark
Ross, Chris Wongwon. D 1989 by PAC JAM Publishing. Administered in the U.S. and
Canada by Longitude Music Co. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of Wind-
swept Pacific Entertainment Co. DIB/A Longitude Music Co. (BMI). These lyrics are
also cited in Plaintiff's Exhibit A, "Affidavit for Order of Determination of Probable
Cause of Obscenity [filed by the Sheriff of Broward County]," Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 23, 1990.
90. Part of the lyrics are:
Jack and Jill went up the hill to have a little fun,
Jack got mad, hit Jill in the ass,
'Cause she couldn't make him come.
Momma Bear and Papa Bear were walking through the forest,
Momma Bear and Papa Bear could he eat her porridge.
Papa Bear said, "Shit, bitch. You must think I'm sick.
Just get down here on your knees, and suck this bear ass dick."
Abraham Lincoln was a good old man,
He hopped out the window with his dick in his hand,
He said, "Excuse me, ladies, I'm doing my duty.
So pull down your pants and give me some booty."
There's an old lady who lives in a shoe,
Got a house full of kids, don't know what to do.
She sucked and fucked all the niggers around.
When it was time to pay the rent, could none be found.
Little Miss Muffet sat on a tuffet,
With her legs gapped open wide.
Up came a spider, looked up inside her,
And said: "That pussy's wide!"
Little Jack Homer sat in the corner
Fucking this cutie pie,
Sucking his thumb, made the bitch come,
Said: "Hell of a nigger am I!"
2 Live Crew, "Dirty Nursery Rhymes," As Nasty As They Wanna Be (1989) (tran-
scribed from tape). Lyrics from "Dirty Nursery Rhymes" by Luther Campbell, David
Hobbs, Mark Ross, Chris Wongwon. © 1989 by PAC JAM Publishing, Administered
in the U.S. and Canada by Longitude Music Co. All rights reserved. Reprinted by
permission of Windswept Pacific Entertainment Co. D/B/A Longitude Music Co.
(BMI). These lyrics are also cited in Plaintiff's Exhibit A, "Affidavit for Order of De-
termination of Probable Cause of Obscenity [filed by the Sheriff of Broward County],"
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 23, 1990.
Andrew Dice Clay is well-known for his "dirty" versions of popular nursery
rhymes. See Andrew Dice Clay, "Rhyme Renditions," The Day the Laughter Died
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Fuck Shop," ' and "If You Believe in Having Sex."92 2 Live Crew also
(1990) ("Eeny meeny miney moe, suck my dick and swallow slow.... Hickery dickery
dock, your wife was suckin' my cock. The clock struck two; I dropped my gue; I kicked
the bitch down the fuckin' block.") (transcribed from tape).
91. The lyrics for this song are in part:
I know a place just down there two streets.
Baby, they don't ask no questions, and give you clean sheets...
Welcome to the fuck shop.
There's only one place where we can go.
Where the price is right, just a buck a blow.
It's always popular with the girls and the guys,
'Cause for all my money, it's the best buy.
Ten dollars, two hours ....
It's more than enough time to play.
Each room has a bed and also a sink,
So you can wash your dick after fucking ....
But be careful of the things that you use
'Cause you can get arrested for sex abuse.
So as you hit the door, and the panties drop
Whole lot of suckin' and fuckin'
At the fuck shop.
2 Live Crew, "The Fuck Shop," As Nasty As They Wanna Be (1989) (transcribed
from tape). Lyrics from "The Fuck Shop" by Luther Campbell, David Hobbs, Mark
Ross, Chris Wongwon. © 1989 by PAC JAM Publishing, Administered in the U.S. and
Canada by Longitude Music Co. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of Wind-
swept Pacific Entertainment Co. D/B/A Longitude Music Co. (BMI).
92. This song uses a "call and response" mode with the audience. Part of the
lyrics are as follows:
"If you believe in having sex, say 'Hell yeah!'"
"Hell yeah!"
"If you believe in having sex, say 'Hell, fuck yeah!'"
"Hell, fuck yeah!"
"When I say 'S,' you say 'E.' When I say 'X,' you say 'Sex'...
"All hoars"
"Suck dick"
"All niggers"
"Eat pussy"
"All hoars"
"Drink dick"
"All niggers"
"Eat pussy" ....
"Suck my cock and I'll eat your pussy ... "
"Suck my cock and I'll eat your pussy ... "
"Now I wanna know why everybody likes havin' sex, more than they like
doin' anything else in the whole world. Okay, fellas, I wanna know what
ya'll like about having sex. Is it less filling?"
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includes a statement on the cover of the recording: "WARNING: EX-
PLICIT LANGUAGE CONTAINED. ' 3
In mid-February of 1990, the Broward County Sheriff's office be-
gan an investigation of the Nasty recording in response to complaints
by South Florida residents.94 A deputy purchased a cassette tape of
Nasty from a display rack marked "Rap Music."95 This deputy had six
of the eighteen songs on the album transcribed, prepared an affidavit
detailing the facts of his purchase, attached a copy of the cassette to
the affidavit, and requested that the Broward County Circuit Court
find probable cause that the Nasty recording was legally obscene.986 On
March 9, 1990, the duty judge97 of the Broward County Circuit Court
issued an order finding probable cause to believe the recording was ob-
scene under Florida law.98
The Broward County Sheriff's office distributed the judge's order
to county wide retail establishments that might be selling the Nasty
recording as a "courtesy" warning to stores instead of making arrests. 99
Even those stores that did not receive personal visits from deputies
"No, it tastes great ... 
"Now, ladies, I wanna know what all ya'll fine ass ladies like about having
sex .... Does it taste great?"
"No, it's less filling."
2 Live Crew, "If You Believe in Having Sex," As Nasty As They Wanna Be (1989)
(transcribed from tape). Lyrics from "If you Believe in Having Sex" by Luther Camp-
bell, David Hobbs, Mark Ross, Chris Wongwon. © 1989 by PAC JAM Publishing,
Administered in the U.S. and Canada by Longitude Music Co. All rights reserved.
Reprinted by permission of Windswept Pacific Entertainment Co. D/B/A Longitude
Music Co. (BMI).
93. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 583.
94. Id.
95. The deputy noted that the purchase could have been made by anyone of any
age. Id. at 583. The fact that the products could be available to minors may have had
some role in the judge's decision in this case. However, the case really turns on access
to adults. Many stores, in fact, had a policy of not selling this specially marked record-
ing to any minors. Id. The issue of minor's access rights and or protecting minors is
beyond the scope of this article. For more information, see supra note 66.
96. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 583. This affidavit contains all of
the "obscene" words without any hyphens or dashes to mask the content. See Plaintiff's
Exhibit A, "Affidavit for Order of Determination of Probable Cause of Obscenity [filed
by the Sheriff of Broward County]," Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief, March 23, 1990.
97. The Honorable Mel Grossman issued the order.
98. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 583.
99. Id.
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ceased selling the record after hearing about the deputies' visits from
television and radio reports. 100 Within days, all retail stores in Broward
County ceased selling the Nasty recording."'
On March 16, 1990, the 2 Live Crew plaintiffs filed suit in federal
district court for a determination that the recording was not obscene
under state law and that the actions by the Broward County Sheriff's
office were improper prior restraints.10 2 A non-jury trial was held
before the court on these issues.103 Although the court ruled that the
actions by the Sheriffs office were improper prior restraints because of
the lack of procedural protection, 04 the court did find that the Nasty
recording was legally obscene under Florida law, which opened the
door for the State to prosecute distributors and performers of those
songs under the Florida obscenity laws. This article will explore the
obscenity determination by the federal district court.'05
B. Applying the Miller Test
The 2 Live Crew court applied the Miller test of obscenity.'0 6 The
court's application of each prong of the Miller test will be discussed
below.
1. Prong 1 of the Miller Test
The first prong of the Miller test requires that the trier of fact
determine whether "'the average person, applying contemporary com-
100. Id.
101. Some stores continued to sell the Clean version. Id.
102. Plaintiffs brought suit seeking a declaration of their legal rights under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1989) and injunctive relief
under § 2202(b) (1989).
103. There is no constitutional right to a trial by a jury in obscenity cases. See
Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973). At some level this presents some difficulty
because of the community standards approach to be discussed infra at text and accom-
panying notes 171-192.
104. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 600. Undoubtedly, the obscenity
decision will be used in later prosecutions against 2 Live Crew for their live perform-
ance of this material, as well as the record store owner's prosecution for selling this
recording. See supra note 10.
105. This paper will argue that the Miller test produces an unsatisfactory result
in this case. The court's application of the test will be criticized, as will the test itself.
See infra text and accompanying notes 172-283.
106. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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munity standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest."'11 7 This test requires that the relevant commu-
nity be identified, as well as that community's standards. Once the
standards are identified, it can be determined whether the particular
work in issue appeals to the prurient interest.
a. The Relevant Community and Its Standards
The first time the "community standards" approach was used by
the Supreme Court was in Roth, 08 although it was merely a restate-
ment of the test used in many lower court opinions prior to Roth. 09
These lower courts placed considerable emphasis on local prevailing no-
tions of morality, and recognized that what is obscene at one time and
place may not be at another. 10
Issues regarding the size of the appropriate community, its compo-
sition, and the view of the average person in the community become
questions of fact for the trier of fact."' As this was a non-jury trial," 2
107. Id. at 24. This test requires that the work be considered as a whole. Virtu-
ally all songs on the Nasty recording deal with sexual activity. However, I would like to
at least pose the question of whether this is a proper test for a music recording. Gener-
ally, individual songs from a recording become popular and become "hits." Radio sta-
tions do not play entire albums, but rather select the single releases to be played on the
radio. Furthermore, even if a person buys the recording, he or she is unlikely to always
play the entire recording at once. Perhaps this part of the test is inappropriate for
musical works.
108. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
109. See United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 11.9, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Learned
Hand may have been the first to enunciate this concept). See also F. SCHAUER, THE
LAW OF OBSCENITY 116-17 (1976).
110. F. SCHAUER, supra note 109, at 117. For more information about the com-
munity standards approach, see Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity
Regulation: A Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and
Judgement Preclusion, 7 SETON HALL 543 (1976); Gliedman, Obscenity Law: Defini-
tions and Contemporary Standards, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 913; Mott & Kellett,
Obscenity, Community Standards, and the Burger Court: From Deference to Disarray,
13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 14 (1973); Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community
Standards": The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1978); Waples, Choice of Community Standards in Federal Obscenity
Proceedings: The Role of the Constitution and Common Law, 64 VA. L. REv. 399
(1978); Note, "Contemporary Community Standards" in Obscenity Prosecutions -
Smith v. United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (1978).
111. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 587. See F. SCHAUER, supra
note 109, at 69-95, 116-135.
112. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 587.
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the judge determined that the relevant community in the case was not
only Broward County, Florida, where the records were being restricted,
but also included the area of Palm Beach and Dade counties. He did so
because: they are close geographically; they are linked via common
transportation (air, water, and highway); they share the same tourists;
the three counties generally share access to the same radio and televi-
sion stations and newspapers; people of different ethnic backgrounds
attend some of the same cultural events; trade is not restricted to
county lines, and; there is overlap of political and judicial federal dis-
trict areas.113
Despite the fact that the 2 Live Crew court found that "the rele-
vant community standard reflects a more tolerant view of obscene
speech than would other communities within the state,"114 the judge
still found that the music would appeal to the prurient interest and was
patently offensive."15
Several types of evidence were presented by the plaintiffs in favor
of a finding that the community would be tolerant of their work. The
plaintiffs pointed to the fact that the Sheriff's office had not received
many "written complaints." The court did not give 'this fact great
weight. The court stated that there might be many reasons "why con-
cerned citizens" did not complain. The court stated that the fact that
the recording was not released until 1989 was important because "it
takes time for even a popular musical release to reach the public con-
sciousness.""'  Furthermore, the court stated that the sheriff had a duty
113. Id. at 588. In determining who the "average person" is to apply the commu-
nity standards, the court considers all adults in the area. The court noted that even the
most sensitive should be considered in reaching an aggregate "average person." See
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-302 (1978). But see Smith v. United States
431 U.S. 291, 304-05 (1977) (courts should not focus solely on the "most prudish or
the most tolerant").
It is important to note, however, that the standard for minors is different. See
supra note 66. In the present case, the court did not consider minors because "there
was not sufficient evidence adduced at trial that the music was targeted at such persons
or that it actually reached children." Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 589.
114. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 589.
115. Id. at 591-92.
116. Id. at 589 (emphasis added). The judge does not seem to have a grasp of
how the music industry operates. When music is released, it is promoted at that time.
Under ordinary circumstances, songs either become "hits" right away, or they die un-
noticed. Luther Campbell, in "Banned in the U.S.A.," see supra note 14, which even
notes that Nasty was a year old, and that the case has brought a new interest to music,
and with it a completely different audience than the 1.7 million people who originally
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to enforce obscenity law "regardless of community protest" 111 despite
the fact that the Sheriffs office had conceded that the reason other
recordings were not being investigated was because of lack of com-
plaints.118 The court placed a great deal of weight on the fact that the
state legislature had enacted laws prohibiting obscenity.119
Despite the fact that there were "other sexually explicit works"
made available for the court's review, the judge did not believe this
evidence was entitled to great weight in determining community stan-
dards.120 The 2 Live Crew court noted that the Supreme Court has
recognized that this type of evidence does not have to be considered
even when the comparable works have been declared non-obscene.1 21
The court found that much of the evidence presented was irrelevant
because "[e]vidence of depictions of sexual conduct in pictures, moving
or still, is not substantially equivalent to musical lyrics. 1 22 The court
found that the most comparable works were writings or audio tapes
including Raw by Eddie Murphy1 23 and The Day the Laughter Died by
Andrew Dice Clay.1 24 In contrast to pictorial depictions, these works
focus on a "verbal message.12 5 Nevertheless, the court noted that
these works might also be legally obscene, and thus, did not give them
bought it.
117. Id. at 589.
118. Id. The court stated that the explanation of why this "particular" album
was singled out could be reasonably linked to significant community discontent,
whether communicated by telephone calls, anonymous messages, or letters to the po-
lice. Furthermore, the vast majority of complaints in the file, although not exclusively
from Broward County, were from residents of the relevant community." Id.
119. Id. at 587.
120. Id. at 589.
121. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126-27 (1974). See infra notes 247-
51.
122. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 589.
123. Id. Eddie Murphy's stand-up comic routine in the video Raw is filled with
all of the four letter words that society deems inappropriate. However, Eddie Murphy
is a Black comedian who is revered by both Blacks and Caucasians. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that the White majority would find his material legally obscene.
124. Andrew Dice Clay's The Day the Laughter Died is replete with descriptions
of vulgar sex practices, including incest. See Andrew Dice Clay, "Turn-On Words,"
The Day the Laughter Died (Warner Bros. 1990) (Clay accuses a man in the audience
of wanting to have sex with his daughter when he saw her at age 14 in her first bikini
bathing suit). However, Dice, as a White, Jewish male, is still within the mainstream
of American society. Unlike 2 Live Crew's vulgarities, Clay's are heard by mostly
white audiences.
125. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 589. (emphasis added)
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great weight.The plaintiffs argued that the court would be unable to determine
the community standards regarding prurient interest, in part, because
the defendants failed to introduce expert testimony. s12  Furthermore,
they alleged that this court's opinion would "only reflect the personal
opinion of the undersigned judge, not the relevant community. ' '12 7 The
court refused to empanel a jury, and noted that "[e]ven if the court
had used an advisory jury, the verdict of six other citizens on the issue
of community standards would have been of doubtful value. The indi-
viduals would have only been Broward County residents. ' 28 Further-
more, the judge said, "even if [I] would not find As Nasty As They
Wanna Be obscene, [I] would be compelled to do so if the community's
standards so required."' 29 With the relevant community identified and
with some notions of what the community standards would be regard-
ing the Nasty recording, the judge evaluated whether the material ap-
pealed to the prurient interest.'
b. Appealing to the "Prurient Interest"
The Supreme Court has defined "prurient" as "material having a
tendency to excite lustful thoughts."' 3' The material must exhibit a
"shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.' 3 2 Materials
which appeal only to "normal, healthy sexual desires" are not
126. Id. at 590. Expert testimony, however, is not required in obscenity cases.
See Comment, Emasculating the Defense in Obscenity Cases: The Exclusion of Ex-
pert Testimony and Survey Evidence on Community Standards, 10 Loy. ENT. L. J.
619, 634-40 (1990); Note, Is Expert Testimony Necessary to Obscenity Litigation?
The Arizona Supreme Court Answers - NO! -in the Consolidated Cases of State v.
Superior Court and State v. Coulter, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 821 (1987).
127. The plaintiffs were probably, correct in thinking that the judge could not
separate his views of what is obscene from those of the "community." See Scott, Eitle,
& Skovron, Obscenity and the Law: Is it Possible for a Jury to Apply Contemporary
Community Standards in Determining Obscenity? 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 139, 147
(1990) (results of study showed that "a judge's instruction that jurors apply not their
own standards but rather those of the average member of the community has little
meaning because jurors' perceptions of the community standard are likely to be deter-
mined primarily by their own personal standards").
128. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 590.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
132. Id. at 487. See also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S 491, 498
(1985).
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obscene.133
The recording was found to appeal to the prurient interest for sev-
eral reasons. 3 First, the lyrics and titles of the songs were replete with
references to genitalia, excretion, oral-anal contact, fellatio, group sex,
specific sexual positions, sado-masochism, the turgid state of a penis,
masturbation, cunnilingus, sexual intercourse, and "the sounds of
moaning," all of which had been defined by the Florida legislature as
"sexual conduct" which includes "actual or simulated sexual inter-
course, deviate sexual intercourse,... masturbation,... sadomasochis-
tic abuse, [and] actual lewd exhibition of the genitals."13 5 The court
stated that the "frequency and graphic description of the sexual lyrics
evinces a clear intention to lure hearers into this activity."13
Despite the fact that the court was unwilling to place much weight
on the prevalence of pictorial and movie representations of the same
activities as evidence that this particular recording was not obscene, the
court held, "depictions of ultimate sexual acts are so vivid that they are
hard to distinguish from seeing the *same conduct described in the
words of a book, or in the pictures in periodicals or films. 1 37
Second, the court placed special emphasis on the fact that the ma-
terial was music. However, the court had no difficulty finding this mu-
sical work obscene. 138 Although generally the meaning of music "is
133. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 498.
134. The court also considered the plaintiffs commercial motive. Skyywalker
Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 592. This factor, however, should not be dispositive in
any speech case because virtually all artists must consider what will sell if they expect
to make a living by selling their work. Even William Shakespeare had a sense of what
would appeal to the masses, i.e., lots of sexual innuendo in Shakespeare's The Taming
of the Shrew and violent battle scenes in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar.
135. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 591 (citing FLA. STAT. §
847.001(11), 847.001(2) and 847.001(8) (1989)).
136. This case, however, was not one of incitement in which'a speaker is seen as
urging his or her listeners to act. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). I
have spoken of the application of the incitement test with respect to television violence
in Campbell, Television Violence: Social Science vs. The Law, 10 Loy. ENT. L.J. 413
(1990).
137. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 596.
138. One expert testified that material is art if it causes a reaction in the audi-
ence perceiving it. Id. However, the court was able to dodge that supposition by finding
that even if that were so, if the reaction met all three prongs of the Miller test, then
"the law does not call that art - it calls it obscenity.. . ." Id. For information about
the role of sex in the arts, see H. KATCHADOURIAN & D. LUNDE, FUNDAMENTS OF
HUMAN SEXUALITY 321-420 (1972) (the use of eroticism in art beginning with the
ancient cultures of India, Greece, and Rome; literature; and film - complete with
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subjective and subject only to the limits of the listener's imagina-
tion," 139 the emphasis on this recording's lyrics distinguished it from
other types of music. The central characteristic of "rap ' " music is the
emphasis on the verbal message. Rhythm is stressed over melody, but is
used to accentuate the lyrics. Despite the consideration of the music
and the lyrics jointly, the court found that the work taken as a whole
was obscene.""
Third, the court found the plaintiffs' apparent intent was to appeal
to the prurient interest. 42 Probably most damaging to the plaintiffs
was the fact that they had produced two versions of the recording; the
second recording used the same background music but excluded the
Nasty lyrics.' 43 The court emphasized the fact that the plaintiffs' ex-
pert testified that the Nasty recording without the "salacious lyrics"
would not have been expected to sell more than 500,000 copies nation-
wide.' 44 The fact that the Nasty version sold over 1.7 million copies
illustrations); M. PECKHAM, ART AND PORNOGRAPHY: AN EXPERIMENT IN EXPLANA-
TION 124 (1969) ("pornographic art in its formal function is indistinguishable from
[other types of] art"); SEX IN THE ARTS: A SYMPOSIUM (J. McDermott & K. Taft ed.
1932) (sex has been used in every artistic medium including poetry, fiction, drama,
dancing, movies, music, advertising, painting, and sculpture).
139. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 595 (citing ACLU Amicus Brief
at 3).
140. The court noted that the "rap" style itself was not on trial. Id. at 594.
Furthermore, the court stated: "Obscenity is not a required element for socially valua-
ble 'rap' or 'hip-hop' music. 2 Live Crew itself proved this point by the creation of its
Clean recording." Id. at 596.
141. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 596. Nasty includes "riffs" from
other artists. The court did not find that these "riffs" raised the music to the level of
serious artistic work. In fact, Luther Campbell's new solo recording "Banned in the
USA" contains "riffs" from Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the USA." See supra note
14. However, the 2 Live Crew court stated: "Once the riffs are removed, all that re-
mains is the rhythm and the explicit sexual lyrics which are utterly without any re-
deeming social value." Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 596. However, in the
music world today remakes, see, e.g., Sweet Sensation, "Love Child" (remake of Diana
Ross and the Supremes original hit); remixes, see, e.g., Paula Abdul, Shut Up and
Dance (remixes of her hits from Forever Your Girl); and the addition of "riffs" into
original recordings, see, e.g., M.C. Hammer's "Can't touch this" (contains "riffs" from
Rick James's "Superfreak") often creates a new artistic expression.
142. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 592. See Pinkus v. United
States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
143. See supra text and accompanying note 81 for information about the Clean
recording.
144. See L. GROSSMAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF RoCK MUSIC 11 (1976) ("In a
pop song the subject matter may be incidental to the commercial motive and so second-
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while the Clean version had sold only 250,000 copies was important. 14
"The difference between the actual sales of the two recordings can rea-
sonably be found to have been motivated by the 'leer of the sensual-
ist.' "148 The court stated that the plaintiffs could not claim that they
"needed the vulgar lyrics to promote their message since the plaintiffs'
own experts testified that music from neither the 'rap' nor 'hip-hop'
genre does not require the use of such language.
''41
Finally, even though the plaintiffs presented both lay and expert
testimony that "the Nasty recording did not actually physically excite
anyone who heard it and indeed, caused boredom after repeated play,"
the court stated that "based on the graphic deluge of sexual lyrics
about nudity and sexual conduct," the recording appealed to a "shame-
ful and morbid interest in sex.' 1 48
2. Prong 2 of the Miller Test
The second prong of the Miller test requires the trier of fact to
determine whether the work depicts or describes sexual conduct in a
"patently offensive way." 141 Although not all speech dealing with sex is
obscene, 50 some works are believed to go beyond what is considered
normal candor on the subject of sex. 15' While subtleties and innuendo
may be protected, graphic details may often put a work that would
otherwise be protected speech outside the circle of first amendment
protection. 52
ary to the mode of presentation or the manner of marketing. This emphasis on the
commerciality of the pop song is ... to point out that in the pop world commercial
considerations loom large.").
145. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 592.
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Miller, 413 U.S. 24.
150. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (the film, Carnal Knowl-
edge, contained scenes of a woman with a bare midriff and several lovemaking scenes
which were not graphic).
151. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
152. In Jenkins, 418 U.S. 153, the Court stated:
While the subject matter of the picture is, in a broader sense, sex, and
there are scenes in which sexual conduct including "ultimate sexual acts"
is to be understood to be taking place, the camera does not focus on the
bodies of the actors at such times. There is no exhibition whatever of the
actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise, during these scenes. There are occa-
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The most significant factor in the court's determination that the
recording was patently offensive was the use of "what are commonly
known as 'dirty words.' "153 The court found that although the use of
profanity when not rising to the level of fighting words, was constitu-
tionally protected,154 the combination of these so-called "dirty words"
with "explicit sexual descriptions" was a different matter.15 5 Even in
the face of testimony that the Nasty recording was made to be "lis-
tened and danced to," the court found that the "goal of this particular
recording is to reproduce the sexual act through musical lyrics. It is an
appeal directed to 'dirty' thoughts and the loins, not to the intellect and
the mind.' 5 6 Thus, the recording was deemed "patently offensive."
3. Prong 3 of the Miller Test
The third prong of the Miller test requires the court to determine
whether the work lacks "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. '157 In Miller, the Supreme Court concluded that the first
amendment protected works with
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, regardless of
whether the government or a majority of the people approve of the
ideas these works represent. The protection given speech and press
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
sional scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not enough to make material
legally obscene under the Miller standards.
Id. at 161.
153. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 593. Another factor was the
depictions of female abuse and violence. Id. (citing American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, the court considered the poten-
tial for a "captive audience." The court found that music could be more intrusive to the
unwilling listener. Id. There were, however, no claims that others were hearing the
music besides those purchasing the recordings themselves. Thus, this problem seems
tangential to the obscenity issue in this case and will not be discussed further. For more
information on the "captive audience" problem, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). In addition,
the 2 Live Crew court again considered the commercial exploitation of sex to promote
sales. See supra note 134 for a discussion of the role of a commercial motive.
154. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Jersey v. Rosenfeld, 623 N.J.
594, 303 A.2d 889 (1973).
155. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 593.
156. Id. at 591. (emphasis added)
157. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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ple. But the public portrayal of hard core sexual conduct for its
own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different
matter.158
This third prong of the Miller test is not to be measured by com-
munity standards. 159 Rather, courts must ask whether a "reasonable
person" would find serious social value in the material.160 This standard
is intended to be an objective one.161
In applying this test, the 2 Live Crew court stated that it did not
view its role as a censor or critic of art and music. The court held: "If
the Nasty recording has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value, it is irrelevant that the work is not stylish, tasteful, or even
popular."16' 2
In proving their case, the plaintiffs called several experts to testify
to the value of the work. One expert testified that there was cultural
content that rose to the level of serious "sociological value. '163 Accord-
ing to the expert, "white Americans 'hear' the Nasty recording in a
different way than black Americans because of their different frames of
158. Id. at 34-35.
159. See generally Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity:
Serious Literary, Artistic, Political or Scientific Value, 11 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1159 (1987);
Wright, Defining Obscenity: The Criterion of Value, 22 NE]w ENG. L. REV. 315 (1987-
88); Comment, An Assessment of the Value Inquiry of the Obscenity Test, 76 ILL. B.J.
512 (1988).
160. See Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1921 (1987); see generally Note, Ob-
scenity and the Reasonable Person: Will He "Know It When He Sees It?", 30 B.C.L.
REV. 823 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Obscenity and the Reasonable Person]; Note, Pope
v. Illinois: A Reasonable Person Approach to Finding Value, 20 TOL. L. REV. 230
(1988).
161. See Note, First Amendment - The Objective Standard for Social Value in,
Obscenity Cases: Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 78 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735
(1988).
162. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 737 F. Supp, at 594.
163. Id. The expert testified that there was a political message in the Nasty re-
cording when viewed from a Black American's perspective. Id.
Furthermore, the expert attempted to give the recording credence as a literary
work. Id. at 36. The music uses rhyme and allusion, as in a song entitled "Dick Al-
mighty," in which "personification" is used. See supra note 89 for the lyrics. However,
the court did not find this feature to be redeeming in light of the explicit sexual nature
of the work. The district court noted that in Miller, the Supreme Court had stated: "A
quotation from Voltaire in the fly leaf of a book... will not constitutionally redeem an
otherwise obscene publication." Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 n.7 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin,
408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972)).
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reference.116 4 The expert identified three cultural devices in the work:
"call and response, "165 "doing the dozens,""66 and "boasting. ' 167 How-
ever, the court found none of these arguments persuasive. Although
these devices were found in the culture of black Americans, the court
stated that "these devices are also found in other cultures. 'Doing the
dozens' is commonly seen in adolescents, especially boys of all races.
'Boasting' seems to be a part of the universal human condition." '
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the recording had serious
value as comedy and satire. Again, the court found this argument un-
persuasive. Despite the fact that people "can and do laugh at obscen-
ity,"'6 0 there could be many reasons why an audience would laugh at
the recording, including being embarrassed by the words. The court
found that this laughter did not reflect any satirical value.17
C. What's Wrong With the Result? Everything
The court's application of the Miller standard reveals the inade-
quacies of the Miller test for obscenity in a society filled with diver-
sity. 71 Criticisms of the district court's findings on the facts of this
case will be given, as well as criticisms of the Miller test itself.
1. Community Standards
In Miller, the Supreme Court rejected a national standard for de-
164. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 594.
165. In "If You Believe in Having Sex," males and females yell in repetitive
verse "Tastes Great - Less Filling." See supra note 92 for the lylics.
166. "Doing the dozens" is a word game composed of a series of insults escalat-
ing in their satirical content. "Doing the dozens" can also be found in the critically
acclaimed Spike Lee film, Do the Right Thing, which deals with the relationship be-
tween Blacks and Italians in New York City. There is one scene in this film where
various characters give a rendition of insults directed at various ethnic groups, e.g.,
Italians, Blacks, Koreans, and Jews.
167. "Boasting" is a way for people to overstate their virtues, including their
sexual prowess. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 594.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 595.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Mills, The Judge vs. 2 Live Crew: Is the Issue Obscenity or
Young, Black Males?, Washington Post National Weekly Edition, June 25-July 1,
1990, at 9 (Nasty's artistic value is as comedy and satire; judge's decision "demon-
strates the danger of a cultural outsider passing judgment on something he doesn't
understand;" Nasty has "real cultural underpinnings").
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termining when a work is obscene.1"2 Despite the fact that we have a
"national Constitution," the Court isolated obscenity as being subject
to review under "community standards."173 The Court believed that
people in different states varied in their "tastes and attitudes, and this
diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity."17 4
Diversity is the key to the problem of imposing obscenity restric-
tions even within what may well be a "community."1 5 Even within a
particular geographical region, there are different cultures, different
ideologies, different opinions about the function of government, and dif-
ferent ideas about what is obscene. Even in making a case for the iden-
tification of a "community," the 2 Live Crew court noted that although
people of different cultural backgrounds would attend public events to-
gether, each county has a "distinct mix of ethnic peoples."'' 7  More re-
markably, in deciding the composition of the citizens of the area, the
judge, based on his own personal knowledge of the area, stated:
In a word, this area is remarkable for its diversity. The three coun-
ties are a mecca for both the very young and the very old. Because
of the beaches and the moderate year round climate, this area in-
cludes young persons establishing homes and older residents retir-
ing to enjoy life under the sun. There are both families and single
individuals residing in the communities. Generally, the counties are
heterogeneous in terms of religion, class, race, and gender.17
The 2 Live Crew case presents a particularly unique problem in
172. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-32 (no error in instructing jury to apply the "con-
temporary community standards of the State of California;" requiring a state to "struc-
ture obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national 'community standard' would
be an exercise in futility;" constitution does not require that "people of Maine or Mis-
sissippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York
City") (emphasis in original).
173. Id; see also F. SCHAUER, supra note 109, at 120-24.
174. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. Interestingly enough, this same analysis would not
be applied to Northern attitudes that were eventually imposed upon reluctant Southern
communities in order to bring about desegregation. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
175. I will concede the fact that there may be some areas of the country that are
so homogeneous that a community standards approach may be effective. However, al-
most all places have some population of minorities, for example, and this makes them
diverse at least in terms of racial composition, and presumably cultural experiences.
176. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 588.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
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terms of determining the relevant community because many experts
and commentators have argued that this particular music is reflective
of a particular culture and is directed at that culture, namely a certain
segment of the Black American population. a78 The "community" iden-
tified in Florida has a Black population, as well as an Hispanic popula-
tion.179 Yet, the community identified in the case was neither black nor
white, but was an "average" of all the people living there. Is this "aver-
age" a proper community reference point? Arguably, it is a majority of
objectors to Nasty that have the right to preserve its standards for ac-
ceptable sexual speech at the expense of a minority of acceptors of
Nasty.80 In this case, the primary group of intended receivers of this
information is, in fact, a legally recognized minority - Black
Americans.
This analysis can be taken one step further. While the vast major-
ity of a given population may object to the materials being distributed
even in the absence of racial undertones, the minority who are purchas-
ing them are being subjected to discrimination in terms of receiving
these materials. In such cases, the relevant community should be the
community to whom these materials are targeted - namely the pur-
chasers of pornography.
The community standards approach does not make much sense in
a free market economy.81 The fact that records were selling in Florida
indicates that at least some segment of the population was interested in
receiving this material.8 2 This type of material does not become im-
pressed upon an unwilling populace. 8 3 For example, an ice cream store
may move into a community at the North Pole, but most likely will not
profit there because the consumers will not want to purchase ice cream
178. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 171 (black scholars and intellectuals should be
able to place 2 Live Crew's recording in its cultural context).
179. Florida has a large population of Hispanics partly because of the influx of
Cuban refugees.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 371-88 for a discussion of the impos:"ion
of the majority's morality on the rest of the country.
181. In Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977) (Stevens, J. dissent-
ing), Justice Stevens concluded: "In the end, I believe we must rely on the capacity of
the free marketplace of ideas to distinguish that which is useful or beautiful from that
which is ugly or worthless." Id.
182. In fact, the headquarters for Skyywalker Records is Miami, Florida.
183. See J. WEATHERFORD, PORN Row: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE SEx-FOR SALE
DISTRICT OF A MAJOR AMERICAN CITY (1986). Cf. W. STANMEYJIR, THE SEDUCTION
OF SOCIETY, PORNOGRAPHY AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN LIFE (1984).
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in that cold climate. In contrast, a hot chocolate and coffee shop might
fare very well there, not because it was able to impress itself upon an
unwilling community, but because it was able to meet a commercial
demand. By analogy, an X-rated movie theater might avoid opening up
in a town where regular "church-going" people who listen weekly to
the sins of pornography at Sunday services live. If these people are
following the tenants of their faith, the movie theater would not be able
to find any customers who would be interested in seeing movies there.
However, if the people of another community are interested in having
this type of entertainment available, the movie theater will probably
open up and do business with this group of people.
In the Florida community, no one was forcing anyone to buy
Nasty. Nasty was made available as part of a nationwide distribution
system, as are almost every type of mass media product today.1' 4 If the
record stores did not believe they could sell the recording, they would
probably not have ordered it. The fact that they ordered Nasty and
consequently sold the recordings is evidence that at least some portion
of a "willing" population was interested in this type of material.
Obviously, this type of argument could be carried to an extreme.
A similar argument could be made that in a free market economy there
might be a market for murder. If one could pay a "hit man," he or she
could kill. The market theory would allow this activity for willing sup-
pliers and consumers.
However, this type of free market theory is appropriate for the
"marketplace of ideas."' 5 For the moment, assume that obscene
materials contain ideas.:" 6 Given there were 1.7 million people in the
United States who purchased the recording at the time it was declared
obscene, and another million or so who have purchased it since the dec-
184. While the Supreme Court in adopting the Miller standard wanted to distin-
guish between materials that might be viewed in New York versus some tiny commu-
nity that wanted to be sheltered from the rest of the country, this type of analysis does
not make sense in modern society. With the advent of cable television, modern media
links the entire country. There may be a segment of the population who never heard of
2 Live Crew, namely the white population. However, with time, more people would be
exposed to this and other recordings. Furthermore, why should even one person willing
to receive information be penalized because he or she happens to reside in Broward
County, Florida, instead of New York City? Should he or she have to relocate in order
to receive the sexual messages of 2 Live Crew?
185. See infra note 387.
186. See infra Part IVA, arguing that obscene materials' physical effects, if any,
are cognitively mediated.
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laration,18 7 there is obviously some market for these ideas about sexual
activity. In fact, although no exact numbers were given for how many
Florida residents had purchased the recording, the fact that the com-
pany is located in Florida would indicate that some number of purchas-
ers were from Florida. Thus, at least some members of a community
were willing to listen to this music, while those that were not did not
purchase it."'8
Presumably, because the material was directed at Black adults,
Black adults probably made up the bulk of the purchasers.18 9 This sub-
population or subculture had an interest in receiving this information,
and the market provided it. 90 For other groups, the market provides
other sources of information about sexual activity. The members of 2
Live Crew express themselves by directing their music to a specific
populace. The fact that it reached a larger segment of the population is
notable because it further emphasizes the fact that this Florida com-
munity is not homogeneous, but is "heterogenous in terms of religion,
class, race, and gender." 91
In light of this hete*rogenous community, of which could be said
for every community in America, how can one "average" the commu-
nity without giving deference to the white, conservative culture which
predominates? Obviously, that is the point pertaining to any form of
187. See infra note 277.
188. To my knowledge, this recording has not been aired on the radio. Thus, this
case does not present the captive audience problem presented in FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See supra note 153 (discussing the captive audience prob-
lem). However, the video of "Me So Horny" has been shown on cable's MTV. Prior to
Pacifica, the FCC had requested broadcaster self-censorship of obscene programming.
In Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the
court held that a radio call-in show's broadcast of "explicit discussions of ultimate
sexual acts in a titillating context" could be constitutionally regulated. Such regulation
did not constitutionally infringe upon the public's right to listening alternatives when it
determines that the broadcast is obscene.
189. To my knowledge, there are no published statistics on the exact
demographics of the purchasers. However, even if the bulk of consumers were Cauca-
sian, these individuals would also be considered willing consumers.
190. The notion that there are "subcommunities" or "subcultures" living within
a particular community seems particularly relevant. Even in New York City, there are
sections of the city that are primarily Black, Asian, Italian, Jewish, and Hispanic. It is
this large mix of ethnic people that makes it more likely that a New York City "com-
munity" would be more tolerant of Nasty.
191. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 579. (emphasis added) See Post,
Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment,
76 CAL. L. REv. 297 (1988).
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pornography. The majority of people in a community wish to suppress
information, prohibiting access by a minority of individuals, namely
those individuals who in fact buy pornographic or obscene materials.
192
This type of "intentional infliction" of morality upon a subpopulation
of society is precisely the type of activity the first amendment forbids
when it comes to speech.1"3 This concept of moral paternalism will be
explored further in Part IVC, 194 but for now it should suffice to point
out the weakness of using the elusive and oppressive community stan-
dard including identifying what that community standard is in light of
cultural and ideological diversity.
2. Prurient Interest and Patent Offensiveness
What is a prurient interest really? What types of materials are
patently offensive?' 9 5 The Supreme Court's definition of prurient is not
particularly helpful, as ideas about what is prurient change over time.
Similarly, the notion of what is patently offensive does not remain
unchanged."'6
The Supreme Court illustrated this point in an important obscen-
ity case, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.1 97 In Brockett, several
192. There is some question of whether the buyers of pornography are a "minor-
ity" any longer, as annual sales reach approximately $8 billion. See, e.g., W.
STANMEYER, supra note 183, at 1 (in 1981 the industry was making at least $4 billion).
193. Actions such as murder, rape, and child sexual abuse can be distinguished
from speech. Interestingly enough, the court stated that the sheriff had a duty to en-
force the obscenity law "regardless of community protest." This would seem to contra-
dict the notion of community standards and reinforce the notion of paternalism. Also,
the state legislators enacted laws that, while they may be representative of an entire
state, may not be representative of any particular community to which the issue of
whether Nasty is obscene is posed. Paradoxically, if the entire state of Florida were
considered, the recording would arguably not be obscene because of the inclusion of
extremely diverse cities such as Miami, Tampa, Orlando, and Fort Lauderdale.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 371-88.
195. The original definition of what is obscene included that which is repulsive or
disgusting. However, the Court singled out sexual issues, as opposed to violence, for
example. See supra note 70.
196. Many ideas have changed in: the entertainment industry besides sex. For
example, violence in films has escalated since A Clockwork Orange (1971) was fea-
tured with all of its brutality that by today's standards seems relatively benign. See
Appelo, Ultra-violence: Why Has This Been the Bloodiest Summer in Movie History?
Entertainment Weekly, August 3, 1990, at 51-55 (features a chronological exploration
of the escalation of violence in movies).
197. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
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adult book and movie vendors challenged the constitutionality of a
Washington statute that penalized persons dealing with "obscene mat-
ter" that appealed to the "prurient interest." 198 "Prurient interest" was
defined as that which encouraged "lasciviousness or lust." 199 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad.20 0 The court objected to the inclusion of "lust" in the defini-
tion of what appeals to the "prurient interest. 20 1 Noting that the law
must take into account the changing meaning of words, the court deter-
mined that the meaning of "lust" had changed since its use in Roth.
No longer were "lustful" thoughts objectionable, because lust was
found to be "healthy" and "wholesome," as well as "common to mil-
lions of well-adjusted persons. 202
The United States Supreme Court deferred to the lower court's
finding that the statute was overbroad. However, instead of striking the
entire statute, the Court maintained that if the statute were invalidated
"only insofar as the word 'lust' is taken to include normal interest in
sex," the statute could still serve to prohibit obscene materials.20 3 Thus,
the statute could be cured by merely deleting the word "lust".
The notion that the concepts of lust can change over time is an
important one.204 In the early 1900's, women were still wearing long
skirts, and the thought of women showing their ankles in public made
the moralists shudder.205 Since then, clothing styles have permitted the
halter top and the miniskirt to exist, styles that would never have been
permissible had it not been for a loosening of the screws of the Puritan-
ism that proliferated.0 6 Similarly, bathing suit styles have changed
198. WASH. LAWS, ch. 184 47th Legis. (effective April 1, 1982).
199. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 491.
200. J-R Distributers, Inc. v. Eikenberry 725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd in
part sub nom. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 491.
201. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 499.
202. J-R Distributors, Inc., 725 F.2d at 490.
203. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504-505.
204. Without changes in sexual mores, society would never advance. Since our
society overcame the Puritan oppression of the early days of our country, every genera-
tion has been bolder than the previous one. From the 1920's with the flappers, to the
sexual revolution of the 1960's and 1970's, books, movies and music have played a role
in the liberation of our attitudes toward sex. With the liberation of our attitudes toward
sex has come the recognition of equal rights for women and an openness about sexual
relationships and roles.
205. See, e.g., SEX IN THE ART: A SYMPOSIUM, supra note 138, at 279-313 (role
of clothing).
206. See generally P. SOROKIN, THE AMERICAN SEX REVOLUTION (1956).
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both for men and women.2 °7 From the bathing suit that covered "every-
thing," society has allowed the Speedo and the "thong" to be worn. °s
Notions of nude bathing still trouble many people, but on some public
beaches, even nude sun bathing is permissible. 09
The relaxing of society's values about clothing styles is a reflection
of the changes in attitudes toward sexuality.21 0 These changes have also
been reflected in books and movies. Today, the daily soap opera and
movies such as Fatal Attraction all but display the genitals openly.211
Some "main stream, .... artsy" movies, fearing an X-rating which would
mean certain death at the box office, refuse to receive a rating from the
Motion Picture Association of America; without a rating, they will be
207. All one has to do is to take a look at the Sports Illustrated swim suit issues
from the past two decades to see the difference in styles.
208. Even now in Florida, there is much public controversy over whether the "t-
back" bathing suit should be worn on public beaches. See Naked Truth: Florida City
Really Hates Adam & Eve Mural, Chicago Tribune, July 15, 1990 (discussing the
"moral outrage" Florida has been experiencing over a variety of issues including Nasty,
the t-back bathing suit, and a new mural that shows Adam and Eve from a rear view
sitting on the beach nude).
209. Nude sunbathing is popular in Europe, particularly in France. In fact,
Europeans overall have a much more liberal view of obscenity than Americans. Fur-
thermore, Amsterdam's "red light district" is famous all around the world for its live
sex shows, "porn shops," and legalized prostitution. See NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES: LONDON, AGAINST CENSORSHIP (1972) (Great Britain); A REPORT
ON DENMARK'S LEGALIZED PORNOGRAPHY (G. Schindler ed. 1969); SEXUAL UNDER-
WORLDS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (G. Rousseau & R. Porter eds. 1988). Cf. McFar-
lane, Indecency and Obscenity: The View from Europe, 140 NEW L.J. 50 (1990) (dis-
cussing recent cases in the United Kingdom preventing the importing of obscene
materials); Reiman, Prurient Interest and Human Dignity: Pornography Regulation in
West Germany and the United States, 21 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 301 (1987-88) (West
Germany uses a standard based on the concept of "human dignity" to regulate
pornography).
210. There have clearly been changes in society's views of sexuality, although
some of the conservatives clearly oppose such changes. See TAKING SIDES: CLASHING
VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN HUMAN SEXUALITY (R. Francoeur ed. 1987).
211. Some films have been able to avoid "obscenity" labels by merely hinting at
what is occurring. For example, in Fatal Attraction, in the "elevator" sex scene, at no
time does the audience see either Glenn Close's or Michael Douglas's genitals. How-
ever, the way the scene is shot, it is very erotic, and does everything but show the
genitals. For more information about erotica, see M. DAVIS, SMUT: EROTIC REALITY,
OBSCENE IDEOLOGY (1983); G. GORDON, EROTIC COMMUNICATIONS: STUDIES IN SEX,
SIN & CENSORSHIP (1980); E. KRONHAUSEN & P. KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND
THE LAW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EROTIC REALISM (2d ed. 1964); A. LORDE, USES OF
THE EROTIC: THE EROTIC AS POWER (1978); Comment, Regulation of Pornography: Is
Erotica Self-Expression Deserving of Protection? 33 LoY. L. REV. 445 (1987).
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able to exhibit their movie in conventional theaters rather than the fa-
miliar "XXX Cinemas."2"2 In addition, buckling under the conserva-
tive pressure that dominates many parts of the country, objectionable
portions are often removed from films in order to receive an R-
rating.2 13
Some of the types of entertainment that today seem commonplace
and would be labeled as exciting a "normal, healthy desire in sex"
would have been labeled obscene ten years ago. Obviously, what excites
a "normal" interest in sex has changed over time.2 14 In fact, the dia-
logue for discussion about sexual behavior has been facilitated by the
changing mores in society. Now, talk shows like Donahue,2 5 books,216
movies217 and music218 have begun to talk more openly about sexual
212. For example, The Cook, the Thief His Wife, and Her Lover, a movie origi-
nally shown in Europe, would have had no movie left if the nudity (including the rare,
male-frontal nudity) and the sex scenes were removed. Thus, the makers of this very
well done "artsy" movie took no rating.
213. For example, when Wild Orchid, originally released in Europe, came to
America, the movie makers had to remove "objectionable scenes" in order to receive an
R-rating. Similarly, David Lynch's Wild at Heart, winner of the 1990 Cannes Film
Festival, will be cut in order to receive an R-rating. Recently, MPAA instituted NC-17
(No Children under 17) to replace the X rating. Movies like Henry and June were
shown in their uncut version. (CBS News, September 26, 1990).
214. Distinguishing a prurient interest in sex from a "wholesome" or "healthy"
interest in it is not a simple task. Researchers of sexual behavior are still trying to
understand what degree of interest is, in fact, healthy. Gliedman, supra note 110, at
920. See generally H. KATCHADOURIAN & D. LUNDE, supra note 138, at 171-72 (stud-
ies on different cultures in particular reveal different attitudes toward sexuality as well
as different behaviors).
215. Almost weekly on Donahue, some sort of sexual issue is the topic for the
show. For example, a show about how wearing the appropriate lingerie could improve
people's sex lives was televised. Donahue (CBS television broadcast, August 1990).
216. Almost every bestseller today has some graphic sexual descriptions. For ex-
ample, Scott Turrow's bestseller Presumed Innocent contains the following passage
describing the main character's feelings about having sex with the then dead victim of
a brutal murder. S. TURROW, PRESUMED INNOCENT 106-107 (Warner Books ed. 1987)
("On my knees, straining and blind, driving my face inside her. . . . [I]n time I would
be called upon to slam myself inside her").
217. Some movies have taken it upon themselves to discuss sexual issues, includ-
ing Casual Sex? and Sex, Lies, and Videotape.
218. Recording artists like Madonna are fascinated with sexual issues. Her songs
"Like a Virgin," discussing a woman's experience with a man who makes her feel as if
she has never had sex with other men, and "Papa Don't Preach," about a woman who
finds herself pregnant and wants advice about what to do about the pregnancy, deal
with sexual issues of our time.
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behavior. The specific music contained in Nasty is a natural progres-
sion in the dialogue about sexuality. The fact that it contains words like
"fuck," "dick," and other "street language" is indicative of the fact
that people have become more open about discussing sex. Although 2
Live Crew may not use what white society deems as correct language,
e.g., intercourse and penis, the layman with less sophistication uses this
type of street language.
The 2 Live Crew court was concerned with the fact that the plain-
tiffs had chosen these "salacious lyrics" in order to sell their record-
ing.218 By comparing the sales of the Nasty version with the Clean ver-
sion of the recording, the court found that there was a clear difference
due to the "leer of the sensualist. '22 ' The court stated that 2 Live Crew
did not need these lyrics to promote their message because rap music
does not require that type of language.221
This analysis by the Florida court misses the mark. Recognizing
that the plaintiffs, in fact, had a message, the court misidentified it.
The message was not the music22 2 but rather the open discussion of
sexual activity. The fact that the plaintiffs chose to create a Clean ver-
sion should not have been dispositive. In fact, the Clean version has a
different message. The important poinit is that the plaintiffs chose to
create a recording about sex.2
This case seems to be one in which 2 Live Crew was penalized for
their word choices. The district court was quick to point out that the
"dirty words" coupled with descriptions of sexual behavior were what
pushed this recording over the edge of acceptable dialogue.2
Although the content of the speech was sexual, if the group had
been more careful to use sophisticated allusion and metaphor as much
219. Judge Gonzalez stated: "Today, this court decides whether the First
Amendment absolutely permits one to yell [the] "F" word in the community when
combined with graphic sexual descriptions." Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at
592.
220. Id. at 595.
221. Id.
222. See M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
(1966) (arguing that the medium is the message).
223. Similar problems have arisen with respect to lyrics that deal with the use of
drugs. For example, Peter Townsend's, "Acid Queen" in Tommy (1969), a rock opera,
says "I'm the gypsy, the Acid Queen/ pay before we start/ I'm the gypsy, the Acid
Queen/ I'll tear your soul apart/ My work is done now, look at him/ his head shakes,
his fingers clutch, watch his body writhe/ I'm guaranteed to break your little heart."
224. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 593.
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music does today, would Nasty have passed muster? Even the Supreme
Court in Cohen v. California,225 in which the defendant had been ar-
rested while wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft," noted
that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.1 226 The Court did not see
the language used by Cohen as "obscene," but instead analyzed it as
"fighting words." However, that same word "fuck" is used repeatedly
on 2 Live Crew's album. A word is a word, is a word, or at least one
would think. This is true, absent content regulation. However, content
regulation is what is occurring.22
While it is permissible for a person to say "Fuck the Draft" be-
cause of its political content, it is impermissible for someone to say, "I
225: 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
226. Id. at 25. In contrast to 2 Live Crew's use of sexual language, the Cohen
Court stated that the case did not involve obscenity. Although the word used was
"fuck," the "vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System would [not possibly] con-
jure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen's crudely
defaced jacket." Id. at 20.
While the 2 Live Crew case and Cohen are not identical, there was important dicta
in Cohen relevant to the present analysis. The Court stated that Cohen's conviction was
based entirely upon the "offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message
to the public. The only 'conduct' which the State sought to punish [was] the fact of
communication. Thus, we deal here with a conviction resting solely upon 'speech' .....
Id. at 18 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded:
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of par-
ticular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopu-
lar views. We have been able, as noted above, to discern little social benefit
that might result from running the risk of opening the door to such grave
results.
Id. at 26. Cf. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (permissible to ban from broadcasts the seven "words you couldn't say on the
public .. . airwaves". They were, "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and
tits").
227. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that content regulation is imper-
missible. Presumably courts would not eliminate songs that have "positive messages,"
even rap songs such as Partners In Kryme, "Turtle Power" (advocating use of positive
actions) from the movie Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. However, there are other
types of popular music that express views that many people would disagree with, but
which are not obscene. For example, Calloway, "I Wanna Be Rich," (transcribed from
radio broadcast) expresses the ultimate materialism: "I want money. Lots and lots of
money. I want the pie in the sky. . . . I wanna be rich. . . . I want my cake, wanna
eat it too. I want the stars and the silver moon. I spend my money on lottery. My
favorite numbers are 1, 2, 3 .... " Would the courts be willing to eliminate this type
of speech? Presumably, not.
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Wanna Fuck," because that contains a sexual reference. The fact that
the topic was sexuality seems to be pure content regulation, as does all
obscenity law. While content regulation is generally thought to be for-
bidden, there are a surprising number of examples in which the Court
permits it, including defamation and child pornography, to list but a
few. 228
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a problem with the plaintiffs'
particular choice of words, that choice of verbiage pushing them over
the edge from material that is pornographic to material that is ob-
scene. 29 However, how are such distinctions to be made? 230 Perhaps a
comparison of lyrics that have not met with any challenge in any court
of law is warranted.3 1
The song that has received the most publicity on the Nasty record-
ing is "Me So Horny." 23 2 The song begins with dialogue between a
prostitute and band members. It continues with a man singing the
verses and a woman singing the chorus.233 The lyrics are as follows:
'What do we get for $10?' 'Everything you want .... Me so
228. See supra text accompanying note 53.
229. Arsenio Hall, a popular late-night talk show host on the FOX network,
commented that words should be used in satire so that the forbidden words' power can
be taken away. He stated: "If we don't joke and laugh, we're gonna kill each other."
Interview with Arsenio Hall on Donahue (CBS television broadcast, July, 1990).
230. One commentator stated,
the ambiguous nature of lyrics in music may render some words more diffi-
cult to rate, as opposed to striking visual imagery in films which present
unmediated concepts. Whereas [the motion picture raters] can immedi-
ately ascertain what constitutes excessive nudity requiring an "R" or an
"X" rating, for example, determining what combination of words consti-
tutes sexually explicit lyrics would arguably be subject to ongoing debate.
And, since music is subject to a plethora of varying interpretations, it
would be virtually impossible to render absolute determinations of what
can be categorized as sexually explicit, violent, or profane lyrics.
Note, supra note 8, at 22 (Westlaw citation). However, with Nasty, there can be no
doubt the recording was intended to describe sexual activity. Thus, the question of
whether (as opposed to how) songs should be censored because of their sexual content
must be asked.
231. Courts are not constitutionally required to consider such evidence. See
supra note 121, and see infra text and accompanying notes 247-52.
232. This song has probably received the most publicity because it is the first
song on the recording.
233. I have used ellipses to indicate omissions in the original, and I have used
quotation marks to indicate the two parties "rapping," i.e., the prostitute and the mem-
bers of the group.
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horny . . . Sock it to me . . . Love you long time . . . Me so
horny ..
Sitting at home with my 'dick all hard,' I got the black book
for a freak to call. Pick up the telephone, and dial the seven digits,
said 'Yo, . . . baby, are you down with it?'
I arrived at her house, knocked on the door, Not having no
idea of what the night had in store. I'm like a dog in heat, a freak
without warning; I have an appetite for sex, 'cause me so horny.
'Me so horny . . . . Love you long time . .. .'
Girls always ask me why I fuck so much, I say, 'What's wrong
... with the crew cut?' It's all in fun, and she shouldn't be mad. I
won't tell your Mama, if you don't tell your Dad.
I know you'll be disgusted, when you see your pussy busted.
Won't your Mama be so mad, if she knew I got your ass? I'm like
a dog in heat, a freak without warning; I have an appetite for sex,
'cause me so horny.
'Me so horny . . . . Love you long time ... '
You can say I'm desperate, you can call me perverted, But
you'll say I'm a dog when I leave you fuckin' deserted. I'll play
with your heart, just like it's a game. I'll be blowin' your mind,
while you're blowin' my brain.
I'm just like that man they call Georgie Puddin' Pie, I fuck all
the girls, and I make 'em. cry. I'm like a dog in heat, a freak with-
out warning; I have an appetite for sex, 'cause me so horny.
'Me so horny . . . . Love you long time . . . . Sock it to me
It's true you were a virgin until you met me. I was the first to
make you hot and wetty-wetty. You tell your parents that we're
going out, never to the movies, just straight to my house.
You said it yourself, you like it like I do. Put your lips on my
dick and suck my asshole too. I'm like a dog in heat, a freak with-
out warning; I have an appetite for sex, 'cause me so horny.234
The music is also interspersed with moans from the woman who is sing-
234. 2 Live Crew, "Me So Horny," As Nasty As They Wanna Be (1989) (tran-
scribed from tape). Lyrics from "Me So Horny" by Luther Campbell, David Hobbs,
Mark Ross, Chris Wongwon. © 1989 by PAC JAM Publishing. Administered in the
U.S. and Canada by Longitude Music Co. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission
of Windswept Pacific Entertainment Co. D/B/A Longitude Music Co. (BMI). These
lyrics are also cited in Plaintiffs Exhibit A, "Affidavit for Order of Determination of
Probable Cause of Obscenity [filed by the Sheriff of Broward County]," Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 23, 1990.
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ing the chorus.23 5 The song discusses a woman who is sexually excited
- horny, as slang - who is about to have sexual intercourse with the
singer. He describes various sexual acts, including oral sex. While the
language used is "graphic," it is simplisticly so. The listener is able to
understand in common, lay terms what the meaning of the song is.
Similar music has been produced,2 6 but with more restraint on lan-
guage uses. 217 Allusion and metaphor without the explicitness of the
colorful slang is used in the songs that follow.
One popular song by the Pointer Sisters, discusses a woman being
sexually excited in "I'm So Excited. '238 She wants to have sex with the
man who excites her, and asks him to "move real slow," so she can
have an orgasm:
Tonight's the night we're gonna make it happen. Tonight we'll
put all other things aside. Get in this time and show me some affec-
tion. We're going for those pleasures in the night.
I want to love you, feel you, wrap myself around you. I want
to squeeze you, please you. I just can't get enough, and if you move
real slow, I'll let it go.
I'm so excited, and I just can't hide it. I'm about to lose con-
trol and I think I like it. I'm so excited and I just can't hide it, and
I know.. .I want you.
We shouldn't even think about tomorrow. Sweet memories will
last a long, long time. We'll have a good time, baby; don't you
worry. And if we're still playing around, boy that's just fine.
235. More than a few years ago, Donna Summer released "Love to Love You,"
that contained the sounds of a woman moaning, presumably in pleasure. There was no
legal action taken with respect to this recording. See also Samantha .Fox "Touch Me",
infra note 246.
236. Music about sexual behavior is "everywhere." See infra note 246 for other
examples.
237. In order for music to get "air time" on radio stations, it has to meet with
broadcast regulations. Indecency on broadcast media is strictly controlled by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See Feldman, The FCC and Regulation of Broadcast
Indecency: Is There A National Broadcast Standard in the Audience? 41 FED. COMM.
L.J. 369 (1989); Hsiung, Indecent Broadcast: An Assessment of Pacifica's Impact, 9
COMM. & L. 41 (1987); Comment, The FCC's Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: A
Broadened Approach for Removing Immorality from the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 871 (1989); Comment, Indecency and the First Amendment: Special Problems of
the Broadcast Industry, 13 LINCOLN L. REV. 101 (1982).
238. This song continues to be played on radio stations nationwide. In fact, I
transcribed this song from KFRX's (Lincoln, Nebraska) telecast (August, 1990).
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Let's get excited. We just can't hide it. I'm about to lose con-
trol, and I think I like it. I'm so excited and I just can't hide it, and
I know . . . I want you . . . . I want to love you, feel you, wrap
myself around you. I want to squeeze you, please you. I just can't
get enough, and if you move real slow, I'll let it go.
I'm so excited ...
Look what you do to me. You've got me burning up...
I'm so excited ....
How did you get to me? I've got to give it up ....
I'm so excited .... 289
Although this song does not use the words that 2 Live Crew used to
describe sexual acts, it refers to some of the same acts. Is the Pointer
Sister's song any less sexually suggestive than 2 Live Crew's song? Yet,
the Pointer Sisters are revered by pop music devotees, which includes a
large white audience.24 This particular song has been around for sev-
eral years, and continues to be played without objection on the pop
radio stations around the country.241 Certainly, this mu.ic could be ob-
jectionable, but the fact that no objection has been made is certainly
relevant in determining what appeals to the prurient interest or is pa-
tently offensive.242
239. "I'm So Excited" by Trevor Lawrence, June Pointer, Ruth Pointer and
Anita Pointer. © 1983 EMI Blackwood Music Inc./Till Dawn Music/Anita Pointer
Publishing/Ruth Pointer Publishing/Leggs Four Publishing Rights for Till Dawn Mu-
sic Controlled and Administered by EMI Blackwood Music Inc. Rights for Anita
Pointer Publishing, Ruth Pointer Publishing Controlled and Administered by Braintree
Music. All rights reserved. International Copyright secured. Used by Permission.
240. The Pointer Sisters are Black Americans, but unlike 2 Live Crew who are
also Black, their music is appreciated by a considerable number of Caucasians.
241. See supra note 238.
242. I believe that the plaintiffs made the mistake of introducing a variety of
pornographic materials none of which was music. Besides Nasty itself, the plaintiff
introduced the following evidence: PLAYBOY (June 1990); HUSTLER (June 1990); PENT-
HOUSE (June 1990); TIGHT PUSSIES (magazine); Ass PARADE (magazine); DEEP
THROAT GIRLS (magazine); TURN-ONS (magazine); CLUB (magazine); CALIFORNIA
CREAMIN (book); READY MADE BRIDE (book); MORE FUN FOR THE WIFE (book);
Teasers Number I (videocassette); The Day the Laughter Died (dual cassette); Raw
(videocassette); 303 BONDAGE PHOTOS (magazine); NAKED STRANGER (magazine).
Order Sealing Evidence, Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 579 (June
7, 1990) (Case No. 90-6220-Civ-Jag) (evidence available to adults upon request).
I believe the plaintiffs should have introduced other music such as that presented
in this article that show the use of sexuality in popular music today. Even Eddie Mur-
phy's RaWy and Andrew Dice Clay's The Day the Laughter Died are not music, but
rather comedy routines filled with "dirty" jokes.
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The Pointer Sister's rendition of sexual pleasure is not the only one
on the pop scene. George Michael's "I Want Your Sex," while banned
in many clubs when it was first released, enjoys quite a bit of air time
on radio stations across the country:
243
There's things that you guess/ And things that you know/
There's boys you can trust/ And girls that you don't/ There's little
things you hide/ And little things that you show/ Sometimes you
think you're gonna get it/ But you don't and that's just the way it
goes/
I swear I won't tease you/ Won't tell you no lies/ I don't need
no bible/ Just look in my eyes/ I've waited so long baby/ Now that
we're friends/ Every man's got his patience/ And here's where
mine ends/
I want your sex/ I want you/ I want your ... sex/
It's playin on my mind/ It's dancing on my soul/ It's taken so
much time/ So why don't you just let me go/ I'd really like to try/
Oh I'd really love to know/ When you tell me you're gonna regret
it/ Then I tell you that I love you but you still say NO!!
I swear I won't tease you/ Won't tell you no lies/ I don't need
no bible/ Just look in my eyes/ I've waited so long baby/ Out in
the cold/ I can't take much more girl/ I'm losing control/
I want your sex/ I want your love/ I want your.., sex
It's natural/ It's chemical (let's do it)/ It's logical/ Habitual
(can we do it?)/ It's sensual/ But most of all .... / Sex is some-
thing we should do/ Sex is something for me and you/
Sex is natural - sex is good/ Not everybody does it/ But
everybody should/ Sex is natural - sex is fun/ Sex is best when
it's ... one on one one on one/
I'm not your father / I'm not your brother/ Talk to your sis-
ter/ I am your lover/
C-c-c-c-come on/
What's your definition of dirty baby/ What do you consider
pornography/ Don't you know I love you till it hurts me baby/
Don't you think it's time you had sex with me/ Sex with me/ Sex
with me/ Have sex with me
Oh so much love/ That you've never seen/ Let's make love/
Put your trust in me/
Don't you listen to what they told you/ Because I love you/
243. I transcribed these lyrics from the lyric sheet available with the recording.
Here the ellipses are in the original. I have not deleted anything from this section. I use
the "/" sign in order to indicate the end of a line from the original "poetry" type-
setting.
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Let me hold you/ Oh/
I'm not your brother/ I'm not your father/ Oh will you ever
change your mind/ I'm a gentle lover with a heart of gold/ But
baby you've been so unkind, oh/
Come on/ I want your sex/ Come on, I want your sex/ That's
right, all night/ Oh, I want your sex/ I want your ... sex/
Sexy baby's/ Sexy body/ Keeps me guessing/ With a prom-
ise/ I know we can come together/ But the question is/ Will we
ever?/
Sexy baby's /Sexy body/ Keeps me guessing/ With a prom-
ise/ I know we can come together/ But the question is/ Will we
ever?/
Together - you and me.2 44
George Michael's recording of "I Want Your Sex," is in fact a good
example of the merit of sexual speech. It takes a stand about the utility
of sex: "Sex is natural - sex is good." 24 It is truly sexual speech. 46
George Michael uses the generic term "sex" for sexual intercourse, but
clearly "invites" the woman whom he addresses to have "sex with me."
244. George Michael, "I Want Your Sex," Faith (CBS Records 1987). "I Want
Your Sex" (George Michael) © 1987 Morrison-Leahy Music LTD. (PRS) All rights
for United States administered by Chappell & Co. All rights reserved. Used with
permission.
245. Id.
246. Other references to sexuality abound in popular music today. See Samantha
Fox, "Touch Me" ("I wanna feel your body, your heart beat next to mine;" "I could
not decide between pleasure and pain;" "Like a tramp in the night, I was beggin' you
to treat my body like you wanted to;" "I want your body, all the time") (also has quite
a bit of moaning) (transcribed from radio broadcast); Frankie Goes to Hollywood,
"Relax," Welcome to the Pleasuredome (1984) ("Relax go to it ... when you wanna
come .... ") (referring to sexual climax) (transcribed from tape); Frankie Goes to
Hollywood, "Two Tribes (for the victims of ravishment)," Welcome to the
Pleasuredome (1984) ("Orgasm has become a most mystified state of feeling. Um, no
one can be quite sure if they've had it or not. Um, is it just ejaculation, or is it orgasm?
Is it just involuntary pelvic contractions, or is one having orgasm?"); Julio Iglesias &
Willie Nelson, "To All The Girls We've Loved Before" (Julio sings: "To all the girls..
. who filled my nights with ecstasy") (transcribed from radio broadcast); Madonna,
"Hanky Panky" I'm Breathless (1990) ("I don't want you to thank me, you can just
spank me;" "Tie my hands behind my back, and ooh, I'm in ecstasy;" "Like Hanky
Panky, nothing like a good spanky") (implying sado-masochistic behavior) (transcribed
from tape); John Cougar Mellencamp, "Jack and Diane" ("Let's run off behind the
shady trees, dribble off those Bobbie Brooks pants and do what I please") ("paints" a
clear visual image of the two teens having sex in the grass) (transcribed from radio
station broadcast).
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If he had used the term "fuck" instead of "sex," would that have
placed this song in the same category as Nasty?
While these lyrics have not been challenged as being obscene, that,
of course, does not mean that they would not be declared "obscene."
The district court was quick to point out that the Constitution does not
compel comparable materials be considered in determining what would
be acceptable to a community. 47 These types of comparable materials
may be pervasively listened to in the community by choice248 or may
exist in the community because of indifference by the majority but lis-
tened to only by a minority of individuals .249 Nevertheless, the accepta-
bility of comparable materials in the community should be considered
as directly relevant in determining whether the community would ob-
ject to this particular recording.25 ° If comparable evidence is not con-
sidered, the judgment of the recording can be based on no more than
the views of the jury or judge.251
Other comparable material would reveal that Nasty is no more or
less sexually provocative than other recordings with the exception of
word choices.252 One cannot draw a line between these types of lyrics
unless one bases it on mere word choice because all of these lyrics deal
with sexuality. Some lyrics are more sophisticated, as they only allude
to the sexual act itself. The Pointer Sister's "I'm So Excited" might be
subject to other interpretations, but it cannot be disputed that the sing-
ers are talking about the sex act when they say "I want to squeeze you,
247. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 589.
248. Lentz, Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials, 15 J. L. REFORM 45, 66
(1981).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Scott, Eitle, & Skovron, supra note 127.
252. Courts are not constitutionally required to consider comparable evidence.
See Lentz, supra note 248; Note, Constitutional Law - Appellate Procedure -Ob-
scenity - In Determining Whether Materials are Obscene, The Trier of Fact May
Rely Upon the Widespread Availability of Comparable Materials to Indicate that the
Materials Are Accepted by the Community and Hence Not Obscene Under the Miller
Test - United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No.
2102, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983), 52 CINN. L. REv. 1131 (1983). The introduction of
the Nasty recording into evidence was sufficient. The judge stated "As noted by the
Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I [413 U.S. at 56 & N.6.], when the material
in question is not directed to a bizarre, deviant group not within the experience of the
average person, the best evidence is the material, which 'can and does speak for it-
self.'" Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 590.
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please you, wrap myself around you. ''253 "God forbid" they should say,
"I want to fuck you;" even though they may mean the same thing, they
cannot say that.25 4
Professor Schauer, a leading scholar in obscenity jurisprudence,
has argued that the types of distinctions the courts want to make about
what are permissible references to sexual activity can be made on the
basis of classifying that which is obscene as causing a physical rather
than an intellectual response in the perceiver. 255 Even if one accepts
that as a valid identifier of the obscene,2 56 there still appears to be no
way to distinguish between that which merely excites a normal healthy
interest in sex and that which excites a morbid interest. If both types of
sexual materials stimulate the perceiver, which arguably the lyrics by
the Pointer Sisters and George Michael do, why should only the 2 Live
Crew recording be prohibited? Schauer's argument does riot adequately
answer that question, perhaps because it is no better than Justice Stew-
art's method of identification: "I know it when I see it.1257
253. Pointer Sisters, "I'm So Excited," supra note 239.
254. There are many other examples of less explicit matter, but are nevertheless
frowned upon when used. For example, the term "illegitimate child" is a euphemism
for "bastard."
Similar word choice discussions were raised at the trial court that was ruling on
whether James Joyce's Ulysses was obscene:
COUNSEL: Judge, as to the word "fuck," one etymological diction-
ary gives its derivation as from facere - to make - the farmer fucked
the seed into the soil. This, your honor, has more integrity than a euphe-
mism used every day in every modern novel to describe precisely the same
event.
JUDGE WOOLSEY: For example...
COUNSEL: Oh - "They slept together." It means the same thing.
JUDGE WOOLSEY (smiling): But, Counselor, that isn't usually the
truth!
United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), cited in, A. GERBER, SEX, PORNOGRAPHY, AND JUSTICE 99-
100 (1965). Judge Woolsey decided that the book was not obscene.
255. Interestingly enough, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the recording did
not physically excite anyone, and, in fact, caused boredom after repeated play. If the
purpose of identifying a work as obscene is so that it will not be viewed by people who
might get sexually excited, it would seem that this type of evidence would be important
in finding that the material was not obscene. However, the 2 Live Crew court still
found that the recording appealed to a "shameful and morbid interest in sex." This
finding seems ludicrous if the concern is preventing physical excitation.
256. In Part IVA2 infra, it will be argued that this is not a valid basis upon
which to distinguish it. See infra text and accompanying notes 328-49.
257. See infra note 336.
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3. Serious Value
The serious value prong of the test presents the most difficulties.258
While the test is the objective, based on the "reasonable person,"2 59 the
test requires that the court become an art critic.260 This is a task, like
many other court-appointed tasks, that is inappropriate.261
Despite expert testimony," 2 the 2 Live Crew court was unable to
find that the Nasty recording had any serious sociological value.263 The
expert testified that the work reflected specific aspects of Black cul-
ture.264 In particular, the expert testified about the concept of "boast-
ing." Boasting is a way in which a person overvalues their sexuality.26 5
The court was unable to find serious value in this despite the fact that
"'[b]oasting' seems to be a part of the universal human condition." 266
Judge Gonzalez recognized that not only is this recording specifi-
cally reflective of a particular subculture within American society, but
"seems to be a part of the universal human condition," 217 thereby, un-
intentionally, making a strong case for regarding this work with serious
artistic value. The act of sex itself is part of the universal human condi-
tion, and discussing it in common, layman's terms is also part of the
universal human condition. That realization alone is enough to give the
work credence in the art world.268 Nevertheless, the court was unwill-
258. See Main, supra note 159; Wright, supra note 159.
259, See Note, supra note 160.
260. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)
(Justice Holmes wrote: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
[in] the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [art] .... At the one
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their [artist] spoke.").
261. See also Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 1359 (1990) (arguing that the entire post-modern art movement uses sexuality in a
way that could be deemed "obscene;" the art form seeks to defy traditional values).
262. Expert testimony is not required in obscenity cases. See supra note 126.
263. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 594. Cf. MacDonald, supra note
83; Mills, supra note 171.
264. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 594.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Art is generally understood to be a reflection of the human condition. See P.
MICHELSON, THE AEsTHEICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1971), cited in, E. OBOLER, supra
note 2, at 236:"
Pornography exists, not because unscrupulous fiends print and sell it, but
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ing to accept this realization.
In addition, the court did not acknowledge the comedic or satirical
value of the recording. 2 9 Finding the fact that people laughed at the
recording to be irrelevant, the court stated:
In a society, where obscenity is forbidden, it is human nature to
want [to] taste forbidden fruit. It is quite another thing to say that
this aspect of humanity forms the basis for finding that Nasty has
serious artistic value. Furthermore, laughter can express much
more than enjoyment and entertainment. It is also a means of hid-
ing embarrassment, concealing shame, and releasing tension. The
fact that laughter was only heard at the time that the first song of
the tape was played is probative on what the audience's outbursts
really meant. It cannot be reasonably argued that the violence, per-
version, abuse of women, -graphic depictions of all forms of sexual
conduct, and microscopic descriptions of human genitalia contained
on this recording are comedic art.270
Anyone who has listened to the recording would probably laugh
for a variety of reasons. Some would genuinely find the recording
amusing, while others might be embarrassed. However, this latter
group would have the option to turn the recording off if the message
was too much for them.27 1 Why should this first group be penalized
because this latter group is unable to genuinely laugh at the message?
Even for the group that would find the recording funny, repeated
play would tend to detract from its comedic impact. In fact, the plain-
tiffs conceded that repeated play caused boredom and not sexual ex-
citement.272 Isn't this the effect of any comedic experience that is re-
peated? After all, how many times can a person see a comedy and still
because it is part of our nature. There is, therefore, no question of whether
we will have pornography. We will have it, as we have it now, and as we
have always had it. The question is quite simply whether we can stand our
own humanity.
269. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 595. Cf. Pareles, Raunchy Rap
From the 2 Live Crew, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at C3 ("hard to imagine the per-
formance as anything more than lowbrow comedy, hardly a serious threat to the moral
tone of the republic") (emphasis added).
270. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 595. Again, the judge "hit the
nail on the head" but refused to see the real import of what he was saying. If it is
human nature to want to taste forbidden fruit, the fact that.this recording appeals to
human nature should render it as having serious value.
271. Again, this is not a captive audience problem. See supra note 153.
272. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 592.
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laugh at the same jokes? Furthermore, satire, in particular, does not
necessarily evoke laughter. An important and controversial comedian,
Andrew Dice Clay noted, "[My] show is not about laughter. It's about
comedy. You don't have to laugh to enjoy it."'273
Furthermore, because each individual song deals with some of the
same subject matter, the jokes become less and less laughable. How-
ever, given that most music is made to be "listened and danced to," 274
as the court acknowledged, if there is any comedic effect, it is merely
an added plus. The music has value already because of its rhythm, its
discussion of sexual activity, and then, if necessary to find any value in
it, its comedic effect.
Courts are least qualified to determine what is art. In fact, if the
marketplace theory is allowed to work, it should work at this stage.27 5
Not only have experts in the field recognized the value of the plaintiffs'
work,27 '6 but almost three million people to date across the country2 77
273. Andrew Dice Clay, "Laughter vs. Comedy," The Day the Laughter Died
(1990) (transcribed from tape). Interestingly enough, Clay's recording also contains a
warning about the explicit language: "WARNING: This Comedy Album Contains
Filthy Language and No Jokes!!! Over 100 Minutes of New DICE!!!" Clay is very
controversial because of his graphic language and explicit sexual comments. Many peo-
ple perceive his comedy to be negative toward women in particular. See Oates, The
Diceman Numbeth, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, July 27, 1990, at 44-47.
274. Skyywalker v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 181-191.
276. Not all commentators agree that the work is valuable even as "art," but
most would agree that there is no more reason to declare this piece of music obscene
than any other. One music critic stated:
Despite the greater comic invention and the more sophisticated musical
grooves this time, [2 Live Crew's] basic approach continues to offer a
dour, ultimately ugly view of sex. It's all relentless, macho posturing with
men giving the orders and women simply following .... After the Miami
rap group's ... album.., became ... the first pop recording ever declared
obscene by a U.S. District Court, more than a million people have bought
the album, probably to see what the fuss was all about. What they discov-
ered was a collection of mostly boring, X-rated stag-party tunes by a
largely undistinguished rap group.
However shallow and stupid the music, it was also clear that there
was no more reason to declare "Nasty" obscene than the thousands of
similarly sexually explicit books and videos that are available in every city
in the land.
Hilburn, supra note 14. See also Milward, Wrapping Nasty in the Flag, Newsday,
July 20, 1990, at Part 2, page 2 (although bad art, "anybody with a belief in the Bill of
Rights [would defend] 2 Live Crew's right-to be stupid jerks").
277. See Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 578 (1.7 million copies sold
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have recognized the value of the plaintiffs' work.""
The serious value standard does not require that the value be iden-
tified only by community standards. In effect, some commentators have
argued that this creates a national standard.2 7 9 If this is the case, cer-
tainly three million people should qualify as giving credence to the
work. 80 Even in the absence of that many consumers, the art might
still be found to have value.2 8' Many works that today are revered mas-
terpieces were not recognized at the time they were created. 8 2
While the courts are called upon to answer many questions for
which they are not qualified, this is a particularly dangerous area for
them. If the courts are allowed to make decisions about what has seri-
ous artistic value, a conservative morality forced on the nation will sti-
fle creativity.2 83 Stifling a society as diverse as ours, for no legitimate
reason, is particularly troublesome. Despite claims that the recordings
induce criminal behavior, the fact remains that the serious value judg-
ment is a judgment based on what is good for society - in other words
before the court decision); see also Hilburn, supra note 14 (1 million copies sold after
ruling).
278. In fact, some have argued that the value of the Nasty recording has turned
out to be its role in the discussion on what the first amendment should protect. "First
Amendment Rights," Oprah Winfrey (CBS, July 1990) (flag burning controversy and
2 Live Crew).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
280. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Historically, 1 to 10% of the
population has always been homosexual, but this did not affect the Court's decision
regarding homosexual sodomy.
281. Even Adolf Hitler allowed works which he deemed obscene and politically
incorrect to be displayed both in a parade and a museum built for the purpose of
displaying such works.
282. Many artists have not been recognized until after their deaths. Edgar Allen
Poe, who had what many would call a morbid or obscene interest in death, for example,
died a pauper, and this is why people who visit his grave in Baltimore, Maryland, place
pennies there.
Camille Claudel, the sculptor, was not particularly recognized for her work, as she
was competing with her former teacher, Rodin. Today, her work is remembered for its
strength, as well as for its sexual provocativeness.
The Supreme Court noted: "What is good literature .... what is good art, varies
with individuals as it does from one generation to another." Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946). See also H. GARDNER, ART THROUGH THE AGES 690-93
(6th ed. 1975) (French salon denied access to painters such as Manet), cited in Note,
supra note 261, at 1377 n.124.
283. Art was designed to challenge society, to challenge the status quo. See
Note, supra note 261, at 1378 (Post-Modernism is a "rebellious movement").
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a moral judgment.
IV. The Basis for Regulation of Speech Dealing with
Sexuality
It is apparent that there are several problems with the Miller ap-
proach. While government may want to stamp out certain types of
speech that it regards as harmful, it is prohibited from doing so with
some exceptions.' People in a democratic society, for example, may
disapprove of those who espouse communism as a way of life. However,
absent a "clear and present danger" to the nation, such individuals'
speech cannot be suppressed.2 85 Their speech deals with bringing about
political change, and the appeal of communism at any given time is a
valuable barometer for politicians and sociologists. Similarly, the Ku
Klux Klan is allowed to march, despite the violence that can be incited
by such marches. 86
Following this logic, the state should not be able to exclude discus-
sions of sexual matters from public debate, even if we fear the further
denigration of women or increased sexual promiscuity. Sexuality is a
topic that is certainly relevant, if not critical, to "social change."
Changing mores in society about the role of women, styles of clothing,
and sexual behavior itself come about through open debate on
sexuality.
There seem to be several bases upon which regulating speech deal-
ing with sexual matters has been deemed acceptable. Three of those
will be dealt with here. First, some claim that this type of speech ap-
peals to the emotions rather than the intellect, and thus, constitution-
ally permissible to regulate it.287 Second, many claim that certain types
284. See supra note 53.
285. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (pamphlet interfering
with recruiting by urging men to violate the draft law); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) (pamphlet calling for strike of munitions workers); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (prosecution under New York statute prohibiting the advo-
cation of an overthrow of government by violence); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927) (prosecution under California Criminal Syndicalism Act for joining and
assisting in organization of Communist Labor Party); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951) (prosecution of Communist Party members for conspiring to advocate
forcible overthrow of the government). Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(Klu Klux Klan members prosecuted for advocating racial and religious bigotry; for-
mulating incitement test).
286. Political speech is at the heart of the first amendment. See supra note 53.
287. See infra text accompanying notes 328-49.
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of pornography should be regulated because they induce sexual crime
or are otherwise harmful (particularly to women), z28 Finally, some
have expressed the real reason for regulating pornography; the regula-
tion of society's morals.2 s9 While those supporting these theories believe
them to be legitimate bases for regulation of speech dealing with sexu-
ality, it will be demonstrated that none are appropriate reasons for such
regulation.
A. The Falsity of Music and Obscenity as Purely Emotive
Speech
Until now, this article has proceeded on the assumption that music
is protected speech. Yet, this assumption may not be warranted.9 ' As
will be discussed in this section, music and pornography are purported
by some to be outside the scope of protection of the first amendment
because they appeal to humans' emotions rather than humans' intellect.
Because the 2 Live Crew case dealt with music, as well as obscenity, it
might be helpful to demonstrate why both music and obscenity do ap-
peal to the intellect, and thus, should be given constitutional
protection.29'
1. Music
While a song's lyrics utilize words and are thus, "'speech," some
commentators have argued that the combination of lyrics and back-
ground music constitute something entirely different.292 Nevertheless,
music serves an important social function, as well as an important ar-
tistic one.293
288. See infra text accompanying notes 350-70.
289. See infra text and accompanying notes 371-88.
290. For example, there are those who claim that political speech was the only
type of expression to be protected under the first amendment. Query whether Luther
Campbell's new solo recording, "Banned In The U.S.A.," see supra note 14, would be
protected, as it deals with the first amendment right of free speech and the aftermath
of the 2 Live Crew case. In addition, Billy Joel's "We Didn't Start the Fire" catalogues
a variety of social and political events throughout this century including the dropping
of the atomic bomb and censorship of such books as The Catcher in the Rye.
291. Even if music and obscenity merely catered to the emotions, I would still
consider it to be protected expression.
292. Comment, Musical Expression and First Amendment Considerations, 24
DE PAUL L. REv. 143, 159 (1974).
293. Id.
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As a traditional art form, music29 4 provides social order, providing
a context for the confrontation of ideas: "Conflict engenders dialogue;
dialogue results in communication; communication leads to understand-
ing. 295 However, even with its important social function, is music de-
serving of first amendment protection?.
First amendment protection has been extended to a number of so-
cially important activities, including speeches,296 solicitation, 297 broad-
218 299ancasting, 93 movies, parades and demonstrations,300 and symbolic pro-
tests.301 In each of these cases, there are elements of communication or
"speech."302
One commentator recognized that speech, like all forms of com-
munication, transfers messages.303 Messages were defined as "any pat-
terned output no matter how primitive the patterning, from simple ex-
clamatory directions to highly complex ideational structures."30 4 In this
vein, writing, filming, and performing music would all be types of
speech. Writing30 5 and films 06 have been recognized as generally pro-
tected by the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court has never.
been confronted with a case such as the present one where the content
of the music is at issue. 07
294. Here and throughout this paper, music will be considered to be both the
lyrics and the instrumental background sounds.
295. Comment, supra note 292, at 159. At least one commentator has argued
that "since music serves a considerable social function and at the same time represents
an important mode of artistic expression," it should be protected. Comment, Drug
Songs and the Federal Communications Commissions, 5 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 334,
343 (1972).
296. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
297. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
298. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
299. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
300. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
301. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1965) (arm
bands).
302. Comment, supra note 292, at 160.
303. Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45
N.Y.U.L. REv. 761, 763-64 (1970).
304. Id.
305. See United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), afid, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) (books).
306. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (movies).
307. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989), the Supreme
Court was confronted with a mere time, place, and manner regulation, in which a band
was required to use sound equipment provided by the city in order to prevent excess
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While verbal expression has the acknowledged capacity to commu-
nicate ideas, pure music, i.e., music without lyrics, arguably does not
have that capability. 0 Yet, one commentator has stated that this fea-
ture of pure music
is not insurmountable. A work of pure music can express and...
convey feeling and emotion. Beginning with the conception in the
mind of the composer, the idea can be expressed as rhythm, mel-
noise from disturbing nearby residents. Providing that music is protected by the first
amendment, the Court stated:
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato's dis-
course in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers
have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and the emotions, and
have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state. The
Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order. Music, as
a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First
Amendment.
Id. at 2753 (emphasis added; citations omitted). However, the Court was quick to point
out that it was not faced with a content regulation case. The Court stated: "We need
not discuss whether a municipality which owns a band stand or stage facility may
exercise, in some circumstances, a proprietary right to select performances and control
their quality." Id. See also Carew-Reid v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.
1990) (upholding ban on use of amplifiers by musicians on New York City subway,
platforms as reasonable time, place, or manner restriction); Calash v. City of
Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80 (1986) (denial of access to municipal stadium used for non-
profit activities to profit-making rock concerts was permissible; not pretext for hostility
to rock music); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d. 560 (9th Cir. 1984)
(music is protected by first amendment; could not exclude "hard rock" music from
municipally owned amphitheater); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th
Cir. 1983) (municipality could not forbid playing rock music even if music had no
political message).
One court discussing the protection of music stated:
Important First Amendment rights are at stake when music formats are
regulated. Music and other forms of cultural expression are traditionally
protected under the First Amendment. In addition to its artistic value, mu-
sic, both classical and popular, can be an important mode of political and
moral expression. There is even the possibility of repression when, for ex-
ample, the lyrics of popular songs communicate controversial ideas.
Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. Federal Communications Commission, 506 F.2d
246, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
308. Scientists are still trying to determine how humans perceive and understand
music. See DeAngelis, How Music is Heard is Focus of New Field: Study at APA-
Sponsored Meeting Suggests Music Sense in Infants, 21 A.P.A. Monitor 8-9 (August
1990); DeAngelis, Musical Paradox Study Scales the Cutting Edge, 21 A.P.A. Moni-
tor 8, 10 (August 1990).
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ody, harmony and all of the other intricate devices of musical ex-
pression. Indeed, it has been suggested that just as words serve as
symbols for concepts music also serves to convey meaning and con-
cepts that cannot be borne by words.309
In contrast to "pure music," analysis of songs suggests a bifur-
cated approach.310 Words and music could exist separately giving pro-
tection for one, the other, or both as a unit.311 If words and music are
taken as a unit, the words would take on a secondary importance and
would be "obscured by the tones of the music." 312 However, if words
and music do not blend, the words as words can no more be suppressed
than a poem or short story when they deal with speech that is
protected.313
However, one of the primary problems with traditional first
amendment analysis has been that certain types of speech are labeled
as emotive rather than intellectual.3 14 As the commentator above
pointed out, music can convey feeling and emotion. Yet, in order to
convey such feelings and emotions, something must happen within the
perceiver's mind.315 He or she must receive information, process it, un-
309. Comment, supra note 292, at 161 (emphasis in original & footnotes
omitted).
310. Id. at 161.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Of course, the problem is that these words are not protected because they
have been deemed "obscene."
314. One commentator uses similar terminology when he refers to some works
including "obscenity" as being "non-cognitive." Non-cognitive works provide a contrast
to works that appeal to the intellect. See Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amend-
ment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589 (1986). See also Finnis, "Reason and Passion". The Con-
stitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222 (1967)
(citing sources from Plato, Aristotle, and Freud in support of the reason/passion di-
chotomy). For an indepth criticism of Sunstein's approach, see Chevigny, Pornography
and Cognition. A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J. 420. Cf. Sunstein, The First
Amendment and Cognition: A Response, 1989 DUKE L.J. 433.
315. Psychologists study what happens within the brain that allows us to compre-
hend sense-data. These psychologists study human perception. See generally R. Boor-
ZIN, G. BOWER, R. ZAJONc & E. HALL, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION 138-
41 (6th ed. 1986) (discussing mentally imposed organizing principles for incoming
sense-data); R. MORGAN, PSYCHOLOGY 7.2 (3d ed. 1977) ("Between sensing and know-
ing is perceiving. Even though all knowledge comes to you through your senses, sensa-
tion might still be only.. . 'one great blooming, buzzing confusion' if there were not an
internal organizing process [Le., perception]") (quoting William James).
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derstand it, and translate it into something that has an emotional ef-
fect.316 The sounds that are perceived are mere sounds, but when they
are ordered into meaningful, recognizable arrangements by the per-
ceiver, i.e., the sounds become discernable as language or music, these
sounds can convey information.31 Just as a person listens to Vivaldi's
Four Seasons and hears the changes in the music corresponding to
changes in the seasons themselves and visualizes the seasons changing,
when one listens to Nasty, he or she hears a series of rhythmic beats
that emphasize lyrics on the recording and visualizes the images that
are being portrayed. 31 8 The music itself is not merely an emotional me-
dium. Rather, it conveys images and ideas that, when combined with a
receiver's imagination,"' 9 may lead to emotional arousal.3 20 However,
without the cognitive capability, the music would be merely a series of
meaningless sounds that conveyed nothing.3 2'
The concern over songs "promoting" drug use, 21 sexual activ-
316. See A. REYNOLDS & P. FLAGG, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 102 (2d ed.
1983):
When you listen to . . . the radio the words usually seem distinct; there
seems to be a well-defined separation between words. But this is not really
the case, because the perceived distinctions between words do not exist in
the physical sound signal. Rather they are the result of the pattern
precognition process. They are inserted by . . . the listener, during the
course of analysis.
See also Meichenbaum & Butler, Cognitive Ethology: Assessing the Streams of Cog-
nition and Emotion, in ASSESSMENT AND MODIFICATION OF EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR:
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION AND AFFECT 139-63 (K. Blankstein, P.
Pliner & J. Polivy eds. 1980) (discussing the relationship between cognition and
emotion).
317. Psychologists now recognize that the "cognitive capacity" is not unitary.
Cognitive capacities includes the senses as well as linguistic ways of understanding.
Thinking about any subject draws on a diversity of cognitive capacities. Chevigny,
supra note 314, at 423.
318. This is precisely the problem because the images being described are
deemed "obscene."
319. Curiously, simply imagining (without any supplementary aids) can lead to
emotional arousal. Chevigny, supra note 314, at 429. One can also remember some-
thing sad from the past, and this can make him or her feel sad in the present. Simi-
larly, sexual fantasies can be brought to bear by the imagination alone. See N. FRIDAY.
MEN IN LOVE - MEN'S SEXUAL FANTASIES: THE TRIUMPH OF LOVE OVER RAGE
(1980) (collection of men's sexual fantasies).
320. Chevigny, supra note 314, at 429.
321. See supra note 315.
322. See Comment, supra note 295; Note, Drug Lyrics, the FCC and the First
Amendment, 5 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 329, 329 n.4 (1972).
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ity,323 or suicide324 cannot be merely based upon the emotional impact
of the medium. While music clearly can illicit some emotional re-
sponse, all other forms of protected speech can do so as well. The co-
median can make the audience laugh because they become happy lis-
tening to the comic message; the actor playing Hamlet in
Shakespeare's tragedy of Hamlet can make the audience cry because
they feel sad when he contemplates suicide.3 25 In addition, the nonver-
bal speech of wearing armbands can make people feel angry when it is
done in protest to war,3 26 or sad when it is done to remember dead
heroes, and the nonverbal speech of burning the flag can enrage peo-
ple.3 27 Yet, these types of speech are not viewed as "emotive," but
rather as appealing to the intellect of the perceiver. Thus, music should
be protected expression because it conveys a message perceived by the
hearer's mind. It should not be denied protection because of any of the
message's emotive by-products.
323., Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 578. See Roldan, Radio-Active
Fallout and An Uneasy Truce - The Aftermath of the Porn Rock Wars, 7 Loy. ENT.
L.J. 217 (1987) (discussing the testimony before a Senate committee considering possi-
ble record labeling for music containing explicit lyrics).
The combination of music and pornography is especially troublesome. Professor
Bloom, commenting on contemporary popular music, stated that "rock music has one
appeal only, a barbaric appeal, to sexual desire - not love, not eros, but sexual desire
undeveloped and untutored." A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 73-75
(1987). Bloom stated:
Rock music presents the listener with kinesthetic stimuli that suggest sex-
ual activity through analogous rhythmic patterns and by actual imitative
sounds. At the same time, the lyrics both urge and represent sexual activ-
ity. The music thus only incidentally brings the pulse of music; more fun-
damentally it arouses the listener through kinesthetic senses. Rock music
does not express erotic or sexual longing; it does not "express" anything,
but merely arouses.
Id. Furthermore, the terms "rock and roll" as in "Rock and Roll Music," used to be a
reference to sexual activity. T. GORE, RAISING PG KIDS IN AN X-RATED SOCIETY 81
(1987).
324. See supra note 70 (Ozzy Ozbourfe and Judas Priest have been sued for
bringing about teens' suicides).
325. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET.
326. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1965).
327. The Supreme Court recently ruled that flag burning is protected by the first
amendment. Many people upset with this result have attempted to propose a constitu-
tional amendment that would prohibit flag burning. See United States v. Eichman, 110
S.Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 57 U.S.L.W. 4770 (June 20, 1989).
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2. Obscenity
Music is not in the "emotional boat" alone. For many years, com-
mentators have urged that pornography is merely a conduit for eliciting
an emotional or physical response in the receiver, rather than a
thoughtful or intellectual response.3 28 The chief proponent of this view
is Professor Schauer.329 Schauer believes that obscene material does not
communicate ideas of any sort, and is thus not speech.330 Since obscene
materials are not speech, no first amendment problem is presented.
Schauer defines speech as requiring two elements: 1) it must be
communicative; and 2) the subject matter must be in the public inter-
est.331 Communicative speech includes language, signs, and symbols
that denote particular words, phrases, easily understood messages that
could be readily expressed in words, and pictures and photographs
where there is an intent to communicate ideas and information.3 3 2
For Schauer, hard core pornography is merely designed to produce
a physical effect, i.e., sexual stimulation.333 When a court protects ma-
terial that is arousing, it protects its intellectual aspects.3 4 In contrast,
hard core pornography is excluded because it only has a physical
effect.33 5
The distinction between pornography as important speech versus a
sexual stimulant was evident in the early Supreme Court decisions
dealing with obscenity.38 The reason that obscenity was determined to
328. See, e.g., F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1982).
329. Id. See also Sunstein, supra note 314.
330. Roberts, The Obscenity Exception: Abusing the First Amendment, 10 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 677, 708 (1989).
331. Id. at 709 (citing F. SCHAUER, supra note 328, at 900, 905-07).
332. Roberts, supra note 330, at 709 (citing F. SCHAUER, supra note 328, at 96-
97).
333. Roberts, supra note 330, at 709. Schauer labeled hardcore pornography as
a "sexual surrogate," indistinguishable from hiring prostitutes to perform sexual acts
for one's voyeristic satisfaction. Id. at 709 (citing F. SCHAUER, supra note 328 at 922-
23).
334. Id. at 710.
335. Id. (citing F. SCHAUER, supra note 328, at 924-25).
336. For example, Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), thought that only so-called "hardcore pornography" could
be constitutionally prohibited. He stated: "I shall not today attempt further to define
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it."
Id. at 197 (emphasis added). Many commentators currently agree with this position.
See, e.g., Taylor, Hard-Core Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH.
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lack social value was "precisely because it pertains, not to the realm of
ideas, reason, intellectual content and truth-seeking, but to the realm of
passion, desires, cravings and titillation. 33 7
As with music, pornography may arouse certain emotional re-
sponses. However, such arousal is not unmediated by cognitive func-
tions. In order to support such a view, the individual would have to be
seen as a passive observer in the world.338 However, modern psycholo-
gists have shown that merely looking at black marks on a printed page
is unlikely to produce the relevant effect.339 In that regard, an obscene
novel would be no different from one of the classics.340 The physical
stimulation requires that one be able to read and understand the words
that are represented by the markings on a page, and that one be "able
and willing to convert what is understood into a sexual stimulus. '341
The process involves communication - the sending of a message and
the receiving of a message. The physical effects should not negate the
intellectual process involved. 342 One commentator -remarked:
The mere thought of pornography involving bestiality or sadism
makes me feel somewhat nauseous, but this response is not merely
a physical effect. What is repellent is not a particular arrangement
of patches of color [or sounds in music] but the realization of just
what it is that is depicted ....
[We have these reactions] because our responses to the world
about us - indeed, our conception of it - are a function of the
system of values, epistemological and moral, in which we partici-
pate. It is thus not surprising that what appear to be merely physi-
cal responses are frequently much more than that. Obscenity dis-
gusts people because they are applying their values to what they
J.L. REFORM 255, 272 (1988) (proposing a "simple" statute defining hard-core pornog-
raphy as "any material or performance that explicitly depicts ultimate sexual acts, in-
cluding vaginal or anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, anilingus, and masturbation,
where penetration, manipulation, or ejaculation of the genitals is clearly visible").
337. Finnis, supra note 314. Cf. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscen-
ity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 10 (not agreeing that the levels of protection conformed to
the intellectual and passionate aspects of speech but were rather the Court's subjective
judgments of social value).
338. See supra text and accompanying notes 315-16 that demonstrates the role
of the perceiver in interpreting what he or she sees or hears.
339. Roberts, supra note 330, at 711.
340. Id. at 710-11. Similarly, with pictorial obscenity, before it can be effective,
one must realize who is doing what to whom, how and why. Id. at 711.
341. Id.
342. Id.
19911
221
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
see, not because certain patterns of sense data cause such re-
sponses. Indeed in terms of interpreted sense data, there is little, if
any, difference between ... a collection of obscene songs and Schu-
bert's Winterreise. Perceptions of the differences between these cat-
egories and our responses to them are part of an intellectual pro-
cess in which thought plays the central role.... Whether obscenity
stimulates, whether one is revolted by it, and whether one wishes to
partake of it or to have it banned, are questions whose answers
depend on the interpretive and evaluative schemes of the individual
and cannot be explained exclusively in terms of urges or mechani-
cal causation.34 3
Pornographic or obscene ideas may be arousing, but the resulting
physical effect depends on the receiver's imagination, values, beliefs,
and most importantly, thoughts.34 4 The message about sexual activity
is conveyed to the receiver, and the receiver takes the information,
processes it, and has a response. That response may be repulsion, for
others, it may elicit a sexual reaction, 3" and still for others, it may be a
point of dialogue to discuss sexual matters openly and honestly.346
If the goal of regulation is to eliminate those types of speech which
elicit a sexual reaction, presumably adult erotica, 47 which is not ob-
343. Id.
344. See Chevigny, supra note 314, at 430.
345. Some researchers attempt to measure this response by examining penile re-
sponses. See e.g., Zuckerman, Physiological Measures of Sexual Arousal in the
Human, 25 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 297 (1971) (penile erection most satisfactory indi-
cator of sexual arousal in human males); R. LANGEVIN, SEXUAL STRANDS: UNDER-
STANDING AND TREATING SEXUAL ANOMALIES IN MEN (1983) (technology extended to
evaluate preferences of various deviant and nondeviant populations); Abel, Barlow,
Blanchard & Guild, The Components of Rapists' Sexual Arousal, 34 ARCHIVES OF
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 895 (1977) (rapists); Abel, Blanchard, Becker, & Djenderedjian,
Differential Sexual Aggressiveness With Penile Measures, 5 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
315 (1978) (rapists); Freund, Heasman & Roper, Results of the Main Studies on
Sexual Offenses Against Children and Pubescents, 24 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 387
(1982) (child molesters).
346. For example, married couples may use pornographic materials to explore
their sexuality. See THE JoY OF SEX: A GOURMET GUIDE TO LOVEMAKING 208 (A.
Comfort ed. 1972) (book generally contains explicit illustrations of sexual activity and
argues that pornography can be a "real help" to couples); A. PENNEY, HOW TO MAKE
LOVE TO A MAN 131-40 (1981) (utility of "sex shops").
347. See supra note 211. For those materials that do elicit a sexual reaction in
the receiver of that information, what makes those materials different from other types
of works that elicit depression or rage - types of emotion that are beyond the realm of
"normal" sadness or anger?
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scene, would have to be prohibited. As the current jurisprudence recog-
nizes, such a prohibition would be overbroad because many works of
art contain simple nudity, and nudity alone is not enough to make a
work obscene. 48
However, if the goal of regulation is only to eliminate that which
appeals to the "prurient interest," is "patently offensive," and lacks
"serious value," one is hard pressed to determine what works fall into
what category. Professor Schauer would base that distinction on the
work's inability to appeal to anything other than a physical response,
but as has been demonstrated above, such an analysis does not logically
distinguish between protected erotica and unprotected obscenity.
Perhaps the Court would distinguish between works dealing with
sexuality on the basis of the harm which so-called "hard core pornogra-
phy" is alleged to cause." 9 A discussion of this rationale as the basis
for regulating materials dealing with sexual activity is discussed below.
B. Harm
Those individuals who would seek to prohibit the distribution of
obscene materials often do so to protect society from "harm. 350 While
they purport to recognize that some types of sexual expression should
be protected, i.e., nudity, 351 they are willing to draw lines, generally at
"hard core" pornography.3 52
348. See Jenkins, 417 U.S. 153.
349. Even though proof of such harm is scanty, the Court has stated that it is
permissible for this material to be regulated on the assumption that it causes harm.
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) ("From the beginning of
civilized society, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions.
... Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching... a conclusion [that
obscenity is harmful] and acting on it simply because there is no conclusive evidence or
empirical data.").
350. In this context, harm is considered to be the alleged negative effects on the
receivers of pornography rather than the effects on the participants. Linda Lovelace,
for example, claimed to have been coerced into filming Deep Throat. See L. LOVELACE,
ORDEAL (1980). However, unlike child participants, adults should be presumed to be
consensual actors, even if some individual participants are "coerced" because of finan-
cial reasons or career steps to stardom. See Gey, supra note 56, at 1599-1600 (arguing
for criminal or traditional tort actions to cover these situations).
351. The Supreme Court protects nude dancing. See Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
352. This follows the view that hard core pornography can be separated from
other types of pornography. This view comports with that of Justice Stewart. See supra
note 336. See also Designing Women (CBS, 1989) (commenting that the only people
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Typically, the "hard core" pornography censors argue that these
materials are harmful to individuals.3 53 In particular, the feminists
claim that much pornography is degrading to women, leads to their
negative treatment, and perpetuates the "rape" mentality of both men
and women in society. 5 4 MacKinnon and Dworkin, two leading com-
who don't know what hard core pornography is are the judges). However, this "I know
it when I see it mentality" is very difficult to reconcile with such things as notice and
other procedural necessities involved in the judicial process. However, an individual is
not required to know that the material he or she possesses is obscene, but merely have
an intent to possess the material.
Two commentators attempted to separate hard core pornography from other sexu-
ally explicit materials. They divided the subject into two areas: "hard core obscenity"
and "erotic realism:"
In [hard core obscenity] the main purpose is to stimulate erotic response
in the reader. And that is all. In erotic realism, truthful description of the
basic-realities of life, as the individual experiences it, is of the essence,
even if such portrayals (whether by reason of humor, or revulsion, or any
other cause) have a decidely anti-erotic effect. But by the same token, if
while writing realistically on the subject of sex, the author succeeds in
moving his reader, this too, is erotic realism, and it is axiomatic that the
reader should respond erotically to such writing, just as the sensitive
reader will respond, perhaps by actually crying, to a sad scene, or by
laughing when laughter is evoked.
P. KRONHAUSEN & E. KRONHAUSEN. PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW (1959), cited in A.
GERBER, supra note 254, at 190. This position reduces the problem to one of "what was
the author's purpose in writing." A. GERBER, supra note 254, at 190. If the author
intended to stimulate an erotic response, then it would be hard-core pornography, but if
the writer only intended to "write realistically on the subject of sex and incidentally
caused a response in the reader then it would constitute erotic realism." Id. While this
view may have some appeal, it would be very difficult to determine what purpose the
author intended, particularly when the author is not the one before the court in a given
case.
353. Why isn't nudity or "soft porn" harmful? Nudity is protected. See Jenkins
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (nudity in film Carnal Knowledge was not
enough to make material legally obscene under Miller test).
354. See FEMINISM AND CENSORSHIP: THE CURRENT DEBAT;3 (G. Chester & J.
Dickey eds. 1988); A. SOBLE, PORNOGRAPHY: MARXISM, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE
OF SEXUALITY (1986); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORN (L. Lederer ed.
1980); Ayim, Pornography and Sexism: A Thread in the Web, 23 U.W. ONT. L. REV.
189 (1985); Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution The Anti-
pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1987); Bryden, Be-
tween Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 147
(1985); Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Por-
nography, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1984); Mahoney, Obscenity, Morality, and the
Law: A Feminist Critique, 17 OTTAWA L. REV. 33 (1985); Spaulding, Anti-Pornogra-
phy Laws as a Claim for Equal Respect: Feminism, Liberalism & Community, 4
[Vol. 15
224
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/14
Campbell
mentators in the feminist movement against pornography, have sug-
gested that there is a large portion of pornographic materials that de-
pict people, usually women, as existing solely for the sexual satisfaction
of others and portrays them in sexually subordinate roles.3 55
All of the would-be censors believe they can distinguish between
harmful and benign types of pornography. However, let us assume for
argument's sake that they can do something that courts find extremely
difficult to do. These individuals point to relevant social science re-
search that attempts to demonstrate the effects of hard core
pornography.
It is not the purpose of this article to describe this body of re-
search in great detail. However, as with most social science research,
there are some studies that seem to demonstrate negative effects, 58
while others show no negative effects at all.357 In general, the most
harmful pornography appears to be that which incorporates both sex
and violence.358 It is this type of pornography that the feminists are
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 128 (1988); Comment, Sexual Display of Women's Bodies
- A Violation of Privacy, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1211 (1980); Comment, Sex
Discrimination and the First Amendment: Pornography and Free Speech, 17 TEx.
TECH. L. REV. 1577 (1986); Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 497 (1985); see also B. SELLEN, FEMINISTS, PORNOGRAPHY & THE LAW: AN
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT 1970-1986 (1987).
355. See e.g., MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321;
Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. 1-29 (1985).
356. For studies that demonstrate increases in aggressive behavior following ex-
posure to sexual stimuli, see Donnerstein, Pornography: Its Effect on Violence Against
Women, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 53 (N. Malamuth & E. Donner-
stein eds. 1984); Sapolsky, Arousal, Affect, and the Aggression-Moderating Effect of
Erotica, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION, supra, at 85; Zillmann & Bry-
ant, Effects of Massive Exposure to Pornography, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AG-
GRESSION, supra, at 115.
357. Some researchers have argued that pornographic materials may act as a
means of "catharsis." See Kelley, Dawson, & Musialowski, Three Faces of Sexual
Explicitness: The Good, the Bad, and the Useful, in PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH AD-
VANCES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 57, 77 (D. Zillman & J. Bryant eds. 1989).
358. See E. DONNERSTEIN, D. LINZ, & S. PENROD, THE QUESTION OF PORNOG-
RAPHY: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1987) (discussing research
particularly on violent pornography); Donnerstein, Champion, Sunstein, MacKinnon,
Pornography: Social Science, Legal and Clinical Perspectives, 4 LAW & INEQUALITY
17 (1986); FOR ADULT USERS ONLY: THE DILEMMA OF VIOLENT PORNOGRAPHY (S.
Gubar & J. Hoff eds. 1989); C. WILSON, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1981); D'Amato, A New Political Truth: Exposure to Sexually Vio-
lent Materials Causes Sexual Violence, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 575 (1990); Pollard,
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most opposed to.359 However, this type of pornography has not tradi-
tionally been the only type sought to be regulated.36 0 Nevertheless, even
in the face of the research findings, there have been disagreements as
to interpretation among both social scientists36' and among policy
makers.36 2
Regulating Violent Pornography, 43 VAND. L. REV. 125 (1990); Spahn, On Sex and
Violence, 20 NEW. ENG. L. REV 629 (1984-85); Symposium, Violent Pornography:
Degradation of Women Versus Right of Free Speech - A Colloquium, 8 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 181 (1978-79).
359. See Pollard, supra note 358.
360. Cf. American Book Sellers Association v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985), affid without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (banning such material in order to
protect women).
361. See Brannigan, Pornography and Behavior: Alternative Explanations, 37 J.
COMM. 185 (1987) (attack on research); Byrne & Kelley, Basis Legislative Action on
Research Data: Prejudice, Prudence, and Empirical Limitations, in PORNOGRAPHY:
RESEARCH ADVANCES & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 314 (D. Zillman & J. Bryant eds.
1986) (systematic criticism of research methods used in many studies that showed neg-
ative effects); Zillman, Pornography Research and Public Policy, in PORNOGRAPHY:
RESEARCH ADVANCES & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 314 (D. Zillman & J. Bryant eds.
1986) (discussing policy implications and proposing superior methodology).
362. For example, between the 1970 and 1986 Attorney General reports on por-
.nography there are remarkable differences. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OB-
SCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970) [hereinafter 1970 REPORT] recommended that ob-
scenity laws be repealed. The committee reasoned that the statutes inhibited freedom
of expression and were unduly vague. The committee also recognized the subjectivity in
defining what is obscene. See id. at 359-61. This Commission found no significant evi-
dence of causation between access to pornography and sexual crime. Id. at 242-43.
However, the 1986 Commission reached a different conclusion. The 1986 Commission
examined the research and used it as well as "common sense" to support the allegation
that pornography is harmful to society. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON POR-
NOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 323-29 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 REPORT]. Furthermore,
although this 1986 Commission found that nudity alone was not harmful, the Commis-
sion also found that violent pornography was harmful. Id. at 347, 323-29. However, the
Commission could not decide whether nonviolent materials portraying ultimate sexual
acts was harmful although some members thought that these portrayals could lead to
increased promiscuity. Id. at 338-40. This Commission called for more suppression of
pornography. See id. at 433-58.
Although there had been more scientific research done since the 1970 REPORT, the
research still had to be interpreted. Thus, subjective views about pornography, as well
as common sense understandings of the harm possible, still played a role. See ACLU,
POLLUTING THE CENSORSHIP DEBATE: A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF THE FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 73-74 (1986). For
a detailed comparison of the two commissions' findings, see Comment, supra note 211,
at 460-62. For a critical analysis of the 1986 REPORT see, Symposium on the Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 641.
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Social science cannot answer the question.3 63 As long as there is
The view that common sense ideas of harm are important has, at different points,
found some support with the Supreme Court. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 63 (1973). See also Justice Department's Brief in Roth v. United States, cited
in A. GERBER, supra note 254, at 212 (defending its power to refuse to permit the use
of the mails to disseminate magazines and literature that might be regarded as ob-
scene, the United States Government argued that "[t]he distribution of obscenity
causes a substantial risk of inducing immoral sexual conduct over a period of time by
breaking down the concept of morality as well as moral standards").
363. Realistically, the battle to suppress pornography is not about sex, but about
deviance. Gey, supra note 56, at 1613. Many state courts have discussed the definition
of prurient by referring to notions of normality and healthiness. See, e.g., Richards v.
State, 461 N.E.2d 744, 748 (Ind. App. 1984) ("an interest in sex is normal"). The
courts seem to be worried about the sex offenders who "like" pornographic materials,
although no one is quite sure what the effect of the materials is. Compare 1970 RE-
PORT, supra note 362, at 239 (sexual offenders are not as aroused as non-offenders)
with Abel, Blanchard, Becker & Djenderedjian, Supra note 345 (nonrapists less
aroused by rape scenes) with Baxter, Barbaree & Marshall, Sexual Responses to Con-
senting and Forced Sex in a Large Sample of Rapists and Nonrapists, 24 BEHAV.
RESEARCH & THERAPY 513 (1986) (using a large sample, differences between groups
disappeared). See also M. GOLDSTEIN & H. KANT, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL DEVI-
ANCE: A REPORT OF THE LEGAL AND BEHAVIOR INSTITUTE, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFOR-
MA (1973).
Interestingly enough, it is not just the "back alley common folks" that use pornog-
raphy; many white middle class people also use some types of pornography, and they do
not appear to be adversely affected, i.e., not committing crimes, sexual or otherwise.
See Bryant & Brown, Uses of Pornography, supra note 357, at 25 (discussing patterns
of usage). Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly distinguished between the uppercrust
of society, i.e., judges and scientists, and the rest of the population when it allows the
same materials to be examined by these individuals, discounting any negative effects.
In Roth v. United States, Chief Justice Warren stated:
The line dividing the salacious or pornographic from literature or science is
not straight and unwavering. . . . [T]he same object may have a different
impact, varying according to the part of the community reached. But there
is more to these cases. It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person. The
conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an attribute
of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus placed in context
from which they draw color and character. A wholly different result might
be reached in a different setting.
354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (concurring opinion), See Gates, supra note 16 (at the trial
for a determination of obscenity of Lady Chatterly's Lover in Britain, counsel for the
government asked "'Is this the sort of book you would wish your maidservants to
read?").
One commentator notes that rarely is any effort made to censor plays because a
play caters primarily to responsible and mature adults (arguably those from the upper
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not a 100% causal relationship,8 4 it is still a value judgment. Some
research after Brown v. Board of Education3 65 indicated that desegre-
gation might have particularly negative effects on Black children's self-
esteem.366 However, even if it was conclusively proven that desegrega-
tion of schools has resulted in detrimental effects upon Black youth, it
is not likely that the courts would determine that segregation would be
permissible again. Our society values equality, and this overreaching
value would lead to desegregation even in the face of contrary empiri-
cal evidence. Similarly, first amendment values should be decisive in
the obscenity debate.367
Even if the feminists are right and pornography cannot only lead
to more dangerous illegal acts against women, but also to negative atti-
tudes toward women,3 68 deciding to prohibit this type of material is
socioeconomic strata of society), and the high costs of admission tends to limit the
audiences to the sophisticated and educated. A. GERBER, supra note 254, at 194. Why
aren't they affected?
Perhaps we should discontinue debate on any topic that might lead some individu-
als to act on what that speech discusses. Perhaps we should prevent people from speak-
ing out in favor of pro-choice abortion legislation because people might vote in favor of
it, and then babies would be killed.
364. Social science research is never able to account for every source of variance.
Even in carefully controlled studies, there is error variance. See Campbell, supra note
136, for a discussion of the types of social science research (laboratory studies, field
experiments, and correlational studies); Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing
the Value of Social Science to the Law As Science and Social Policy, 38 EMORY L.J.
1005 (1989). In Roth, Justice Douglas stated:
If we were certain that impurity of sexual thoughts impelled to action, we
would be on less dangerous ground in punishing the distributors of this sex
literature. But it is by no means clear that obscene literature, as so defined,
is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from the com-
munity standards.
354 U.S. at 510.
365. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
366. See Stephan, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in
Brown v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 217 (1978) (concluded that
there is little evidence indicating desegregation reduces prejudice; desegregation rarely
increases self-esteem of Black youth and in fact often decreases it).
367. Some of the values protected by free speech include promoting individual
self-fulfillment, a means for advancing knowledge and discovering truth, a means for
providing participation in decision making by all members of society, and a means of
achieving a more "adaptable and hence a more stable community, of maintaining the
precarious balance between health cleavage and necessary consensus." T. EMERSON,
TmIE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 354-55.
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clearly a value judgment. If this material is regulated, then all speech
dealing with traditional homemakers, for instance, should be regulated.
June Cleaver from Leave It To Beaver may be a poor role model for
women of the 1990's should then be excised from television. Accord-
ingly, depicting women as "barefoot and pregnant," and taking their
place "in the kitchen" should also be excised. Followed to its logical
extreme, this type of regulation would lead to massive censorship.
There are a number of types of speech that reinforce traditional
views of Blacks' roles in society. For example, depicting Black women
in a maid's position,369 or a Black man cast as a thief?370 Presumably,
the feminists would not seek to prohibit this type of programming, but
is it not as harmful to Blacks as they believe some types of pornogra-
phy to be to women?
Values clearly play an important role in the obscenity debate, such
as values about freedom of speech and the devaluing of certain types of
speech. Although this country has historically placed a strong value
upon freedom of expression, there has been a competing value that has
led to the debate over suppression of certain speech dealing with sexual
matters. Thus, the true underlying values in regulating obscenity must
be considered. Those values are values about morality and will be dis-
cussed below.
C. Morality
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,371 the Supreme Court explic-
itly rejected the notion that scientific data was needed to justify prohib-
iting obscenity.37 2 Instead, the Court's focus was on morality. Making
clear what had been implied in earlier cases, 37 3 the Court stated that
the states' interest in preserving morality was compelling. The states
had the power to regulate the "public exhibition of obscene material, or
commerce in such material, [that] has a tendency to injure the commu-
nity as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize in Mr.
Chief Justice Warren's words, the States' 'right ... to maintain a de-
369. For example, Maime on The Young and the Restless (CBS) is a maid, and
one of her nieces is a repeated petty thief.
370. See supra note 15 for a discussion of the "Home Boys Shopping Network"
on In Living Color.
371. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
372. Id. at 60.
373. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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cent society.' ,,374
Many commentators have recognized that the Court's central
function in identifying material that is obscene has been to maintain
the moral status quo. 75 Rather than being concerned with the preven-
tion of criminal acts, the Court has been concerned with protecting a
court-approved system of values. One commentator explained the
Court's position:
The great danger is that obscenity will not merely cause specific
effects that are bad according to our current moral standards, but
will change our moral values for the worse. Because values define
our whole society, the fear is "that pornography has an eroding
effect on society, on public morality, on respect for human worth,
on attitudes toward family love, on culture. 376
While this argument stems from the notion that all law is based on
morality,37 7 this particular argument should fail in the context of ob-
scenity. While it can be said that we have laws that prohibit the indis-
criminate killing of other human beings,37 8 these laws exist because of
a consensus regarding the morality of such action.37 9 In contrast, the
374. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
at 199 (1964) (dissenting opinion)).
375. See H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIB-
ERAL SOCIETY (1969); J. DAILY, THE ANATOMY OF CENSORSHIP (1973); P. MACMIL-
LAN, CENSORSHIP AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1983) (Great Britain); E. OBOLER, supra
note 2; R. RiST, THE PORNOGRAPHY CONTROVERSY: CHANGING MORAL STANDARDS IN
AMERICAN LIFE (1975); Connor, Obscenity: Its Moral Meaning and Scope, 27 CATH.
LAW. 70 (1981); Morality Pornography and the Law, 4 COMM. & L. 43 (1982); Com-
ment, Pornography, Law and Moral Theory, 17 OTTAWA L. REV. 1 (1985). Cf. Mac-
Kinnon, supra note 355.
376. Roberts, supra note 330, at 695 (quoting 1970 REPORT, supra note 362, at
458).
377. The state has broad police powers to enforce morality. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 475 U.S. 186 (1986) (because the majority of the population found homo-
sexual sodomy immoral, it could be prohibited). However, as one commentator ex-
plained: "The question is not whether the enforcement of morals is legitimate, but
whether it is permissible for the state to enforce moral beliefs in a manner that is
inconsistent with the Constitution." Roberts, supra note 330, at 701. Where the first
amendment is concerned, protecting a society from ideas about sex that it does not like
is a far cry from protecting society from sexual acts that it does not want to tolerate.
378. While we, as a society, frown upon first or second degree murder, man-
slaughter, and even negligent homicide, we do allow justifications and excuses such as
self-defense and insanity. Furthermore, even intentional killing is permitted during war.
379. For a discussion on the lack of consensus about musical taste much less
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fact that pornography has become an $8,000,000,000 per year38° indus-
try suggests that more than an insignificant few are not bothered by the
moral aspects of its existence. In fact, in the face of the pervasiveness
of pornography, 381 the values justices are attempting to protect are not
as homogenous as they would like to think.3 18 The Court's protection of
the moral majority's values amounts to a sanctioning of these morals as
correct. In fact, such a position sanctions the dominant morality's
"right not only to impose its values on dissidents, but also to prevent its
replacement by alternative moral systems, a claim that is hardly conso-
nant with the marketplace theory of the first amendment."38 3
The dominant morality can no more be objectively "true" than
views about the equality of all men and women under the law. 384 We
allow groups such as the Ku Klux Klan to speak out about the need for
white supremacy to dominate and suppress the Blacks, Jews, and other
minorities of America. 85 Certainly, their speech is contrary to our
moral values about the equality of all humans.3 88
obscenity see, Music and Message, Seattle Times, July 22, 1990, at K4 (quotations
from a variety of citizens regarding censorship of music).
380. See supra note 192.
381. See id.
382. Roberts, supra note 330, at 687 (only common morality we have are certain
basic principles, such as tolerance which allows diverse moral beliefs to coexist).
383. Id. at 298.
384. "Changes in moral values can only be regarded as bad from the perspective
of those who hold moral views contrary to the changes." Id. at 297-98.
385. See D. HAMLIN, THE NAZI/SKOKIE CONFLICT: A CIVIL LIBERTIES BATTLE
(1980). In Smith v. United States, Justice Stevens, stated in dissent that it was
ridiculous to assume that no regulation of the display of sexually oriented
material is permissible unless the same regulation could be applied to po-
litical comment. On the other hand, I am not prepared to rely on either the
average citizen's understanding of an amorphous community standard or
on my fellow judges' appraisal of what has serious artistic merit as a basis
for deciding what one citizen may communicate to another by appropriate
means.
431 U.S. 291, 318-19 (1977) (dissenting opinion).
386. While everyone would agree that the message of the Ku Klux Klan is politi-
cal, many commentators have argued about whether obscenity could qualify as political
speech. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 330, at 703. Certainly, obscenity can serve to
educate and can serve as a resource that people can use to explore sexual experience.
Id. at 718 (citing Richards, Pornography Commission and the First Amendment: On
Constitutional Values and Constitutional Facts, 39 MAINE L. REV. 275, 296-97
(1987)).
However, the debate on sexual activity is more than educational; it is "intensely
political." Roberts, supra note 330, at 718. See also D. DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF
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The dominant morality may be uncomfortable with ideas about
sexual freedom, but should such ideas be suppressed in order to main-
tain that morality? Social change would never come about without
challenges to existing dogma. Furthermore, reinforcement of the
"proper" morality can only come about with an open and honest dis-
cussion of what is immoral.3817
If obscene material is to be suppressed, there needs to be a greater
justification than the Court in essence saying: "We don't agree with
these ideas." Such a justification is contrary to everything the first
amendment was designed to protect.388
PORNOGRAPHY (1989); R. RUSHDOONY, THE POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1974). Por-
nography plays a role by commenting on sexual roles, issues of monogamy, and the
subordination and/or liberation of women. Id. at 718-719. Pornography makes society
think. It is precisely this type of thought which has engendered the feminist debate
about the effects of pornography. See supra text accompanying notes 354, 355, 368
and 369.
Even if obscenity is not considered political speech, it is at least as important as
commercial speech which receives some protection. In Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976), Justice
Blackmun recognized that commercial speech may even be more important than politi-
cal speech, at least on a daily basis. He wrote: "As to the particular consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information [about the prices of drugs], that interest
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
387. In discussing the marketplace, John Stuart Mill stated:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is
robbing the human race: posterity as well as the existing generation; those
who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error
for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 20 (S. Collini ed. 1989).
388.
As a general proposition, it would seem anomalous to our democratic sys-
tem to censor [works] containing offensive content which could affront the
moral sensitivities of some readers. The offensive content of literary works
arguably fails to represent a clear and present danger to society's moral
structure. No danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and pre-
sent, unless the incident of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion .... [T]he remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can
justify repression.
Quade, Book Censorship, 70 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1974, at 32, col. 1. Even Tipper Gore, a
leader in the movement to educate parents about what types of movies and music their
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V. Prohibiting Certain Speech Dealing with Sexuality: An
Untenable Position
As has been discussed above, the bases for prohibiting speech deal-
ing with sexuality are ill founded. Neither concerns over the harm that
obscenity causes, 89 nor the need to uphold the majority's morality are
appropriate reasons to regulate speech.39 0 Furthermore, the idea that
obscenity is somehow nonspeech is simply not true.391 Given that there
has been no sufficiently articulated reason upon which to base regula-
tion, it would follow that there should be no regulation of speech deal-
ing with sexuality.
Justice Black's original absolutist position seems most useful in a
free society.39 2 He thinks that, absent some legitimate reason to regu-
late speech, i.e., a clear and present danger to the country, 393 or incit-
ing violence,3 94 no regulation is necessary. In an early obscenity case in
which the Court determined that there had to be some level of intent to
possess obscene materials before a prosecution would be consistent with
the constitution, Black stated:
Certainly the First Amendment's language leaves no room for in-
ference that abridgments of speech and press can be made just be-
cause they are slight. That Amendment provides, in simple words,
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." I read "no law abridging" to mean "No
law abridging." The First Amendment, which is the supreme law
of the land, has thus fixed its own value on freedom of speech and
press by putting these freedoms wholly "beyond the reach of Fed-
eral power to abridge." No other provision of the Constitution pur-
ports to dilute the scope of these unequivocal commands of the
First Amendment. Consequently, I do not believe that any federal
children are exposed to, agrees that censorship is not the answer. She advocates the use
of additional speech to counteract the effects of pornography rather than its suppres-
sion. T. GORE, supra note 323, at 27.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 350-70.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 371-88.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 328-49.
392. Justice Black is historically known as purporting an absolutist position.
However, even those who supported an absolutist view weie able to find loopholes. Jus-
tice Black was able to distinguish between conduct and speech. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 396-398. However, I would not allow that distinction when it comes to
expressive activities.
393. See supra text accompanying note 285.
394. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and supra note 136.
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agencies, including Congress and this Court, have the power or au-
thority to subordinate speech and press to what they think are
"'more important interests."
If, as it seems, we are on the way to national censorship, I...
suggest that.there are grave doubts in my mind as to the desirabil-
ity or constitutionality of this Court's becoming a Supreme Board
of Censors - reading books and viewing television performances to
determine whether, if permitted, they might adversely affect the
morals of the people throughout the many diversified local commu-
nities in this vast country. It is true that the ordinance here is on its
face only applicable to "obscene or indecent writing." It is also true
that this particular kind of censorship is considered by many to be
"the obnoxious thing in it mildest and least repositive form. .. ."
But "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first foot-
ing in that way. . . . It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon." While it is "obscenity and indecency"
before us today, the experience of mankind - both ancient and
modern - shows that this type of elastic phrase can, and most
likely will be synonymous with the political, and maybe with the
religious unorthodoxy of tomorrow. Censorship is the deadly enemy
of freedom . . . . The plain language of the Constitution forbids it.
I protest against the judiciary giving it a foothold here.395
This is the most defensible position regarding the first amendment.
However, even Justice Black made distinctions between conduct and
speech that would exclude a great many expressive activities. 98 The
courts should use the absolutist position without the qualifications for
expressive conduct. This position, however, would not protect illegal ac-
tivities used in creating pornographic material, such as having sex with
children in creating child pornography, or killing an individual in the
so-called "snuff" films.
Yet, this position could still be used to restrict protected expres-
sion. For example, some prosecutors have been creative and have prose-
cuted producers and directors for solicitation and prosecuted actors for
prostitution.3 97 These types of prosecutions, absent evidence that the
adults participating in the production were not consenting adults,
395. Smith v. People, 80 S. Ct. 215, 221-222 (1960).
396. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (Cohen's jacket was "mainly
conduct and little speech") (Black, J. dissenting). See generally H. BLACK, A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL FAITH 53 (1969).
397. See Bishop, Porn in the U.S.A., 6 CAL. LAW. 60, 64 (Dec. 1964).
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should not be allowed."' 8
The reasons offered to support regulation of obscenity are not ac-
ceptable. While other laws rest on moral consensus,3 9  there are a great
many people who purchase pornographic materials. 00 Pornography is
an $8 billion dollar industry.401 Given the lack of a consensus on this
issue, and the risk of suppressing a significant number of individuals'
expressive activity,402 as well as people's right to receive that informa-
tion,4 °3 any speech dealing with sexuality should not be regulated. 40 4
VI. Conclusion
In this article, the 2 Live Crew case acted as a starting point in the
debate on obscenity. While it is an important case because of its poten-
tial impact on the entertainment industry,40 5 and because it is the first
decision to ever declare a work of music obscene, it is a poor starting
point because it brought a poor result. As has been discussed in this
article, the Miller test of obscenity produces an anomalous result for
Nasty. The community standards approach does not account for the
music being targeted to a subculture, namely the Black community,40 6
and it suppresses artistic expression.40 7 The prurient interest and patent
offensiveness standards are illusory. There is no justifiable basis upon
398. See supra note 350.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 379-382.
400. See supra note 192.
401. See id.
402. Many singers today use lyrics that are sexually provocative. See supra note
246 text and accompanying notes 239, 244.
403. Often the Court has focused on the public's right to receive information.
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (unless overrid-
ing state interest, criminal trials are to be open to the public).
404. I think the most defensible type of regulation would be for violent pornogra-
phy. However, much of main stream entertainment, see, e.g., The Accused (Jodie Fos-
ter won the Academy Award for Best Leading Actress for her role in which she was
gang raped in a bar; while there was no explicit focus on the genitals, there was indeed
more than a hint of sexual activity as Jodie Foster lay on top of a pin ball machine and
several men were shown having intercourse with her), could be lumped under this cate-
gory. While these materials would not be labeled obscene even under the current
Miller test, the feminists' proposals would prohibit their distribution because of their
portrayals of women in subordinate roles. See Gey, supra note 56, at 1606 (speaking of
the prohibition of many of the "classics").
405. See supra text accompanying note 14.
406. See supra text and accompanying notes 15-16.
407. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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which to distinguish the "bad stuff" - obscenity - from the "tolera-
ble stuff" - pornography. 0 Finally, the social value standard places
the courts in the tenuous position of being art critics."°9
The reasons for regulation of obscenity are no more acceptable
than the particular application of the Miller test to the 2 Live Crew
case. The view that obscenity merely appeals to a physical or emotional
interest rather than an intellectual interest is simply untenable. All in-
coming sense data, i.e., musical sounds or verbal sounds, are mediated
by cognition.410 Just as Hamlet's soliloquy can bring one to tears, or a
comedian's routine can bring the audience to laughter, pornography or
obscenity can repulse people or sexually excite them. Nevertheless, the
particular reaction is triggered because people cognitively understand
the material.41
Justifications based on harm to society in the form of increased
criminal activity, or as some feminists suggest, increases in negative
attitudes toward women, reinforcement of traditional ideas of female
subordination, and possibly encouragement of abuse of women, attempt
to be supported by empirical evidence of the effects of pornography.4 "
However, social science cannot answer the question; there is never
100% causation accounted for by this type of evidence. Thus, society
must make a value judgement about speech on sexual activity.4 3
Traditionally, society has devalued sexual' speech. This has been
based on morality.41 4 However, with other types of speech, society does
not attempt to impress its moral views by suppressing i:he speech. Our
society that believes whole-heartedly in democracy does not suppress
speech about communism. Therefore, sexual speech should not be sin-
gled out for suppression.
One of the reasons the government seeks to regulate speech re-
garding sexual activities is because of the power of sex.415 In Roth, the
Court stated that sex was a "great and mysterious motive force in
408. See supra text accompanying notes 328-48, 350-55.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 258-261, 275-83.
410. See supra notes 315-16.
411. See id. See also supra note 307 (in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the
Court recognizes that music appeals to both the intellect and the emotions).
412. See supra text accompanying notes 350-55.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 363-70.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 371-88.
415. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 584. Besides speech on sexual
activities, states have banned sexual conduct including prostitution, incest, and rape.
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human life, [and] has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest
to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human
interest and public concern."416 However, sex is a great deal less myste-
rious than it used to be because of more open debate about sexuality.417
Part of that debate has included pornography and obscenity.418
Not only is sex powerful, but words themselves are powerful.41 9
Counted among those words are musical lyrics.420 Words about sex are
so powerful that society has sought to eliminate certain types of speech
by labeling them "obscenity."' 421 However, words are merely represen-
tations of ideas;422 yet, it is clear that the Court has decided that cer-
tain ideas are not worthy of first amendment protection.423
It is unfortunate that the first amendment has never been abso-
lute.424 Justice Black's view is a view that should have dominated first
amendment jurisprudence - an absolutist view.425 Black questioned
how long it would be before we started down the road to prohibiting
other types of speech that we value because, once started down the
416. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). Society in general will
never be "safe" from pornography until it comes to grips with human sexuality. See S.
FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (1912-13) (discussing the evolution of society as a function
of taboos about sexuality); S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITs DisCONTENrs 64 (J.
Strachey trans. 1961) (" 'hunger and love are what moves the world.' ") (quoting the
poet-philosopher Schiller). See also SEX AND SOCIETY (J. Edwards ed. 1972).
417. See supra text accompanying notes 204-18.
418. See id.
419. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 585.
420. Id. There has been sexual music throughout history. Even the culturally
valued opera uses sexual speech. Sung in other languages, however, these operas if
translated into the street language that Nasty used would be deemed "obscene." See
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (1990) (Orif's Carmina Burana, if it
were not sung in Latin, could not be broadcast).
421. This outrage over Nasty is nothing new. In the 1950's Elvis Presley and his
swinging "pelvis" were not televised on television. Elvis was filmed from the waist-up
for fear of his "sexual power."
422. See supra text accompanying note 2. One should keep in mind that when a
person uses profanity, the precise words embody the emotions. I know several people, as
I am sure everyone does, that refuse to use profanity. Yet, they make up other words
for "damn," "fuck," or "shit." Instead, these people might say, "Flibbity jibbet,"
"darnit," "heck," or even use "regular words" like "sunflower." They think that they
are doing something that is different from the curser. However, I would argue that
these are the same. It is the anger, the emotion, that is "hateful," not the words used.
423. See supra note 53.
424. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Shouting fire in
crowded theatre and causing a panic).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 392-95.
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"road of censorship, '426 we can never go back.42 7 The Court has long
been on the "road of censorship," allowing no protection for other "cat-
egories" of speech such as defamation.428
More than fifteen years ago, Justice Stevens noted that the obscen-
ity issue was overdue for reconsideration.429 It is now more than over-
due. Perhaps in this decade, the Court will reconsider the issue, realize
that there is no way to principally distinguish between pornography
and obscenity, and decide in favor of protecting all speech about
sexuality.
426. Since Black's comment, more than a few types of speech have been deemed
unprotectable. See supra note 53.
427. Since the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the fact that flag burning is
protected by the first amendment, some have called for a constitutional amendment to
make this conduct impermissible. One cartoonist captured the danger of this type of
censorship:
© Don Wright; reprinted by permission of Don Wright and the Palm Beach Post.
428. See supra note 53.
429. See supra note 21.
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Essay: Too Live a Crew
Bruce Rogow*
I am sure that scores of serious articles will be written about the 2
Live Crew litigation which began in February, 1990. They will assess
and re-assess Miller v. California,' debate "community standards," de-
fine "prurient interest," and opine on the first amendment issues which
have been raised by the legal proceedings spawned by the recording, As
Nasty As They Wanna Be.2 Because I have had the pleasure of being
among those in the center of the dispute, I thought it might be helpful
to share some of the things I learned, and perhaps encourage others to
write about specific matters which I think are important.
A. The Role of the Press
Since the 2 Live Crew cases involved "high" law, "low" language,
race, and show business, they tapped an enormous well of publicity. I
was not surprised at the intensity or duration of the publicity, and I
think the media coverage may be one of the most overlooked first
amendment lessons of the cases.
The first amendment is a restraint on governmental power. Gov-
ernmental power is exercised by politicians. Politicians live and die in
the media: newspapers, television, radio, magazines. Nothing inhibits
government misconduct more than criticism from a free press. I have
not scientifically surveyed the press response to Broward County Sheriff
Nick Navarro's 2 Live Crew crusade, but the clippings, cartoons, edito-
rials and my conversations with reporters around the country lead me
* Professor of Law, Nova University; trial and appellate counsel for 2 Live Crew
and for Charles Freeman, convicted record seller. The author wishes to acknowledge
Beverly Pohl, Research Assistant, for participating in the preparation of this essay, and
for invaluable assistance throughout the 2 Live Crew litigation.
1. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2. The three major 2 Live Crew/As Nasty As They Wanna Be cases are
Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990), appeal dock-
eted sub nom Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, No. 90-5508 (11th Cir., June 6, 1990)
(federal judge declared record obscene); State v. Freeman, No. 90-17446-MM-10 A
(Broward County Ct., Oct. 3, 1990) (appeal pending) (record seller convicted); State v.
Campbell, Nos. 90-17616-MM-10 A, B, C (Broward County Ct., Oct. 20, 1990) (all
three defendants acquitted of obscene live performance).
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to conclude that the vast majority of words used on the 2 Live Crew
cases supported freedom of speech and condemned or poked fun at the
Sheriff's actions.
Prosecutors, officers and politicians are all sensitive to public opin-
ion. Even Sheriff Navarro, after the acquittal of three performing 2
Live Crew members, seemed to want an end to the controversy. But the
interesting news is not Nick Navarro's reaction throughout these cases,
but the fact that out of the tens of thousands of prosecutors, police and
public officials, only a handful warred with As Nasty As They Wanna
Be, which when the controversy began, had been bought by 1.2 million
people.
So, I am more sanguine than many about the health of the first
amendment. The fact that throughout the country only a score of cases
were brought against those who sold the recording, and even fewer at-
tempts were made to censor 2 Live Crew's performances, attests to the
good judgment and constitutional loyalty of the overwhelmingly vast
majority of the law enforcement and political constabulary. 3 Two ex-
planations exist for the self-restraint exhibited by these officials: (1) a
clear understanding of the first amendment, and the difficult task of
overcoming the protections accorded presumptively protected speech,
music and art; and (2) a fear of critical press coverage which could
coalesce public opinion against the officials' actions. Representing 2
Live Crew gave me the opportunity to talk to many of the people con-
templating action against As Nasty As They Wanna Be or the group.
Of the two inhibiting factors, the threat of critical press coverage was
more telling than the threat of Miller v. California's first amendment
mandate.
3. As far as I have been able to determine, the few prosecutor-players were those
with a track record of over-zealousness. The State Attorney in one mid-Florida Circuit
has crusaded against what he perceives as pornography while delighting in publicly
describing in ancient Anglo-Saxon terms the sexual practice he decries. Dallas and
Cincinnati are other known anti-first amendment venues, and Westerly, Rhode Island,
which unsuccessfully sought to stop a performance (Atlantic Beach Casino v.
Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38 (D.R.I. 1990)), seemingly shares a puritanical heritage
with Dedham, Massachusetts, which precluded Henry and June, the first NC-17
movie, from its city's theaters. Coakey, Dedham Film Cancellation Draws Battle
Lines, The Boston Globe, Oct. 6, 1990, Metro Region, at 17.
[Vol. 15
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B. The Role of Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan4
The most threatening first amendment governmental misconduct is
a prior restraint. Since speech is presumptively protected, its suppres-
sion usually cannot precede judicial review. The 2 Live Crew brouhaha
began as a response to a blatant prior restraint.
A deputy sheriff purchased a copy of the As Nasty As They
Wanna Be cassette from a large Fort Lauderdale record store. His mis-
sion was prompted by a sour grapes letter to Sheriff Navarro from a
Miami golf-pro-turned-lawyer who had recently run against the incum-
bent Dade County (Miami) State Attorney with a spectacularly unsuc-
cessful campaign, in which Luther Campbell, 2 Live Crew's leader, had
supported the incumbent with a rap advertisement broadcast on black
radio stations. I think Sheriff Navarro paid little heed to the letter,
shipping it down his chain of command where, at some point, William
Kelly, a long retired J. Edgar Hoover pornography apparatchik who
was the Sheriff's "special consultant" on pornography, triggered the or-
der to buy the record. Kelly had close ties to certain "conservative fam-
ily oriented" fundamentalist organizations. The Miami lawyer was sim-
ilarly "connected."
Sergeant Mark Wichner was the officer assigned the task of buy-
ing the $8.99 cassette. He took it to his office, listened to it, and made
an attempt to transcribe many of the songs. Armed with the cassette,
his transcription, and an affidavit setting forth the details of his
purchase, he went to Broward County Circuit Court for a "probable
cause" determination. Although Florida law is silent on this process,
and United States District Judge Jose Gonzalez later viewed the proce-
dure as "bizarre," '5 the concept is not so legally farfetched. Rather than
having an officer determine whether something is "obscene" and then
arresting the purveyor, a de facto practice has existed of purchasing
books, magazines, or videotapes and presenting them to a judge for his
or her scrutiny. The Broward County Circuit Court Clerk's office main-
tained a "Probable Cause of Obscenity" file which contained 150 simi-
lar orders obtained over the past few years by police officers from vari-
ous municipal jurisdictions throughout the county.
Historically the practice has been to obtain the probable cause
finding and then return to the book or video store, repurchase the item,
and arrest the seller. That process then permitted the seller a full crim-
4. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
5. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 598.
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inal trial on the issue of whether or not the item was obscene under the
applicable Florida statutes and Miller v. California.6
In this case, Officer Wichner went to Circuit Judge Mel Gross-
man, who was the duty judge on the day of Wichner's courthouse trip.
Judge Grossman kept the cassette for several days before ultimately
issuing a probable cause order which, because it was the starting point
for all that ensued, is printed in its entirety below.'
Armed with the probable cause order, and its improbable reliance
on the Miami Herald's editorial decision-making, Wichner, at the di-
rection of his supervisors, began the prior restraint which triggered the
2 Live Crew litigation. A memorandum was prepared by Wichner for
6. Florida Statutes, section 847.001(7), provides the applicable definition of ob-
scenity, mirroring Miller:
"Obscene" means the status of material which:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) Depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
as specifically defined herein; and
(c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.
7. ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE OF
OBSCENITY
Upon application of Detective Mark Wichner of the Broward County
Sheriff's office, and prior to the filing of any criminal charges with the
office of the Broward State Attorney, the Court, in its Magistrate capacity,
on March 2, 1990, did review in its entirety the following material, to-wit,
a recording: "AS NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE", by the 2 Live Crew
as released by Skyy Walker [sic] Records, 3050 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite
307, Miami, Florida.
THE COURT being fully aware of the contents of the aforesaid ma-
terial and in conformity with this Court's duty to satisfy the requirements
for a speedy judicial determination as to the issue of obscenity, finds prob-
able cause to believe that the aforesaid material is obscene within the pur-
view of Florida Statute Section 847.011 and the applicable case law.
THE COURT also notes that this application of contemporary com-
munity standards is shared by as avid a First Amendment proponent as
the Miami Herald. That newspaper stated in an article appearing in its
edition of February 28, 1990, that "Many of 2 Live Crew's lyrics are so
filled with hard-core sexual, sadistic and masochistic material that they
could not be printed here, even in censored form."
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward
County, Florida, this 9th day of March, 1990.
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE MEL GROSSMAN
[Vol. 15
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distribution to deputies around the county. They were instructed to,
and did, inform all record store owners in the county that selling As
Nasty As They Wanna Be subjected them to possible arrest for violat-
ing section 847.011, Florida Statutes.
Thus the Sheriff, through the actions of his deputies, effectively
removed all copies of As Nasty As They Wanna Be from vendors' rec-
ord racks. No arrests were made because no vendor was willing to risk
a criminal prosecution over an $8.99 recording. No civil action was ini-
tiated by the Sheriff to determine whether As Nasty As They Wanna
Be was actually obscene. The probable cause order, and the Sheriff's
"friendly advices" were the end of Broward County sales, although
subsequent events prompted a second million copies to be sold around
the country.
While similar probable cause findings had been made in a handful
of places, including at least two by grand juries under the direction of a
Volusia County, Florida, State Attorney, 2 Live Crew made the deci-
sion to litigate in Broward County because it was convenient, close to 2
Live Crew's Miami base, and because South Florida was viewed as less
hostile to the first amendment than were other Florida venues.
The original federal complaint brought by the record company and
the four members of 2 Live Crew (Luther Campbell, Mark Ross, Chris
Wongwon and David Hobbs) sought a declaratory judgment that the
recording was not obscene. The complaint was quickly amended to in-
clude a count challenging the Sheriff's actions as a prior restraint.
Lost amidst the wave of publicity caused by Judge Gonzalez' June
6, 1990 decision that the record was obscene, was the half of his opin-
ion which condemned the Sheriff's procedures as "Nasty Suppression:"
[T]he Sheriff's actions in this case constituted a seizure of pre-
sumptively protected speech within the scope of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.
The First Amendment, rights of 2 Live Crew and the music
store owners to publish the recording and the public's right as an
audience were all infringed.
Indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate just how dramati-
cally informal censorship can impair the First Amendment. With
relative ease, every copy of Nasty in Broward County was sup-
pressed . . . . 8
8. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 598, 602.
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Judge Gonzalez then enjoined the Sheriff from engaging in future prior
restraint9 and ordered him to pay substantial attorneys' fees to 2 Live
Crew for prevailing on its prior restraint claims. 10
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan," the precedent for Judge Gonza-
lez' ruling, involved a Rhode Island pornography commission's review
of various publications, and letters to publishers warning them that
their books and magazines were objectionable and could be the subject
of state prosecutions. Justice Brennan wrote:
People do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats
to institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not come
around . . . The Commission's notices, phrased virtually as orders,
reasonably understood to be such by the distributor, invariably fol-
lowed up by police visitations, in fact stopped the circulation of the
listed publications . . . It would be naive to credit the State's as-
sertion that these blacklists are in the nature of mere legal advice,
when they plainly serve as instruments of regulation independent of
the laws against obscenity.12
Judge Gonzalez concluded that the Sheriff's approach was incon-
sistent with Freedman v. Maryland," Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad'4 and Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc.,'5 which de-
manded adherence to three rules in order to avoid an unconstitutional
prior restraint:
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving
that the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second,
any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a
specified brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the
status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be
assured.'
Officer Wichner took no action designed to secure any of these
9. Id. at 603.
10. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
11. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
12. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
13. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
14. 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975).
15. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
16. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 601 (citing Southeastern Promo-
tions, 420 U.S. at 560 (emphasis in original)).
[Vol. 15246
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mandates. No judicial action other than the probable cause order was
ever contemplated by the Sheriff's office. The restraint was for an ex-
tended period, and there never would have been a judicial determina-
tion were it not for the 2 Live Crew federal lawsuit. Indeed, it was as if
As Nasty As They Wanna Be had been imprisoned for life, without a
trial. Therefore the federal suit was like a habeas corpus action,
designed to secure the freedom of the recording.
C. The Obscenity Trials
Having been forced to file an action to liberate their music, the
plaintiffs sought to place the burden of proof on the Sheriff to prove the
record was obscene, just as the State would have had that burden had a
criminal prosecution, or a civil proceeding, been instituted by the State.
The plaintiffs also sought to require proof of obscenity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
Those arguments were made despite the fact that the plaintiffs
were seeking the declaratory judgment and would ordinarily have had
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were
entitled to relief (i.e., that As Nasty As They Wanna Be was not
obscene).
The argument went this way: Although in the vast majority of de-
claratory judgment actions the plaintiff has the burden of proof, that is
not always the case. In assigning the burden, the court must first ex-
amine the underlying issues. 17 Especially when the suit is one to deter-
mine non-liability, the burden may shift to the defendant, This suit
was in that peculiar posture - the plaintiffs were forced to bring a
civil action to declare the record non-obscene - because the Sheriff
failed to provide a full, fair, and prompt adversary proceeding. The
burden of proving obscenity must fall on the censor' 9 precisely because
the Constitution is a restraint on governmental power. The government
must prove its basis for not observing the limits imposed upon it by the
first amendment. 20
17. Reasor v. City of Norfolk, 606 F. Supp. 788, 793 (E.D. Va. 1984).
18. BARCHORD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 404-405 (2d ed. 1941).
19. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 560.
20. Compare Aero Spacelines, Inc. v. United States, in which the plaintiff chal-
lenged a government board's conclusion of excessive profits:
•. the burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the
existence of the fact or facts upon which the rights and liabilities of the
parties depend is upon him who has the affirmative of the issue which
19911
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The appropriate standard of proof for a federal declaratory judg-
ment action involving the issue of obscenity has never been addressed
by the Supreme Court. There is abundant precedent, however, for us-
ing a "clear and convincing" standard in certain civil cases."1 The rea-
sonable doubt standard has rarely been applied in civil litigation. 22 Be-
cause this federal action was one to protect the most important of
federal rights, and to avoid subsequent criminal actions against retail-
ers, the plaintiffs requested a reasonable doubt standard - to be the
defendant's burden - or at least a clear and convincing standard. De-
forms the basis of the controversy, without regard to whether lie is plaintiff
or defendant in the suit.
530 F.2d 324, 331 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citations and footnotes omitted).
21. Standard of proof was addressed at length in California v. Mitchell Broth-
ers'. Santa Ana Theater:
The purpose of a standard of proof is "to instruct the factfinder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correct-
ness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Three stan-
dards of proof are generally recognized, ranging from the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard employed in most civil cases, to the "clear and
convincing" standard reserved to protect particularly important interests in
a limited number of civil cases, to the requirement that guilt be proved
"beyond a reasonable doubt" in a criminal prosecution. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-424 (1979). This Court has, on several occa-
sions, held that the "clear and convincing" standard or one of its variants
is the appropriate standard of proof in a particular civil case. See Adding-
ton, 441 U.S. at 431 (civil commitment); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (libel); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)
(deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denatu-
ralization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 159 (1943) (de-
naturalization). However, the Court has never required the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard to be applied in a civil case. "This unique
standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the Constitution, is regarded
as a critical part of the 'moral force of the criminal law,' In re Winship,
397 U.S., at 364, and we should hesitate to apply it too broadly or casually
in noncriminal cases." Addington, 431 U.S. at 428.
454 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1981) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 97 n. 5 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing to cases referred to in 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, nn. 2-12 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981)). Justice Stevens
points out that the Court has used the reasonable doubt standard in several civil con-
texts, and cites to: Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc.,
293 U.S. 1, 7-8 (invalidity of patent); Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 502, 522
(1922) (constitutional invalidity of state statute); Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122,
134 (1889) (invalidity of title); cf. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308,
317 (1902).
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spite the Supreme Court's past flexibility on this, issue,2" Judge Gonza-
lez would not bend.
The Sheriff's counsel accepted the burden of proof, but the Court
refused to require a standard of proof beyond a preponderance of the
evidence. One important issue which may be resolved by the pending
appeal of the federal order is the proper standard of proof to be used in
cases where a plaintiff is forced by an unconstitutional prior restraint to
litigate as a civil plaintiff the right to first amendment protection for
his or her work. It certainly is an issue demanding critical analysis.
The unique posture of the federal litigation brought against Sheriff
Navarro led to an ironic conclusion: the presumptively protected record
was freed from the prior restraint, but then reincarcerated as obscene
in a civil proceeding using only a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. Strong doctrine supports the argument that where critical factual
findings are to be made on important constitutional issues, at least
"clear and convincing," if not "beyond a reasonable doubt" must be
the standard to insure the integrity of such important fact finding."2 4
Whatever the standard of proof, a district court's findings of fact
ordinarily are subject to appellate review under the difficult "clearly
23. Compare Santosky v. Kramer:
Moreover, the degree of proof required in a particular type of pro-
ceeding "is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the
judiciary to resolve." Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284. "In cases involving indi-
vidual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a mini-
mum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.'" Addington,
441 U.S. at 425, (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (CA
4, 1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dism'd
sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof - "clear
and convincing evidence" - when the individual interests at stake in a
state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more substantial
than mere loss of money." Addington, 441 U.S. at 424. Notwithstanding
"the states' 'civil labels and good intentions,'" id., at 427,(quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-366), the Court has deemed this level of cer-
tainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of govern-
ment-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with "a
significant deprivation of liberty" or "stigma." 441 U.S. at 425, 426.
455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
24. See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 454
U.S. 90 (1981) (the choice of standard of proof in a civil nuisance abatement case
involving obscenity, is a matter of state law, but the first and fourteenth amendments
do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
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erroneous" standard. 25 In a first amendment case, however, the appel-
late court "has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of
the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.' "28 Al-
though Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union involved libelous speech
and not obscenity, the Court analogized the need for independent ap-
pellate review of facts impacting on first amendment rights. Citing Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion in Roth v. United States:2 7
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility
by saying that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled
the questioned matter as 'obscene,' for, if 'obscenity' is to be sup-
pressed, the question whether a particular work is of that character
involves not really an issue of fact but a question of constitutional
judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.2
Thus, while the Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard insulates
most lower court findings of fact from adverse appellate review, Judge
Gonzalez' finding that As Nasty As They Wanna Be is obscene is not
similarly insulated. The trial record of the plaintiffs' case offers much
in the area of artistic and literary value that Judge Gonzalez ignored.
So even though Sheriff Navarro had the advantage of a civil burden of
proof, his victory may not withstand appellate review.
No matter what the ultimate outcome, it was a direct result of the
civil finding of obscenity in federal court which prompted the two crim-
inal proceedings in state court. This lead to the confusing scenario of a
record seller being found guilty of the criminal obscenity charge of sell-
ing the record declared civilly obscene by Judge Gonzalez, while three
2 Live Crew members were acquitted of obscenely performing the same
songs before a paying audience.29
Charles Freeman
Judge Gonzalez' Order was released on June 6, 1990, to a packed
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
26. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U*.S. 485, 499
(1984) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284-286).
27. 354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957).
28. Id. at 507 n. 25 (emphasis in original).
29. State v. Campbell, Nos. 90-17616-MM-10 A, B, C (Broward County Ct.,
Oct. 20, 1990).
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federal courtroom. The first amendment precedent he set condemning
prior restraints was swallowed up by his declaration that As Nasty As
They Wanna Be appealed to the prurient interest of the average person
in Broward County, described sexual conduct defined by the State in
patently offensive ways, and that the recording lacked serious literary,
artistic, scientific or political value.
The fact that a record had never before been declared obscene,
added to the racial issues generated by the record's ghetto patois, com-
bined with the press' natural protectiveness of first amendment rights,
made the order big news. So big that one record merchant, Charles
Freeman, the owner of E. C. Records in a Fort Lauderdale African-
American community, decided to protest the ruling and capitalize on
the publicity.
Freeman, a savvy, charming, militant entrepreneur, was stunned to
learn that the recording was now federal contraband. A quick study, he
decided to continue carrying the record and challenged the Sheriff to
arrest him. The press, delighted with this solo example of civil disobedi-
ence, flocked to E. C. Records, and was present when Eugene
McCloud, a black detective in the Sheriff's Organized Crime Tactical
Unit, appeared to make an undercover purchase of As Nasty As They
Wanna Be on Friday, June 8, 1990. McCloud asked for a copy and
Freeman obligingly asked McCloud if he wanted to hear a few cuts
from the album before buying it. McCloud said "yes" and Freeman
placed an album on a turntable, sending the sounds of "The Fuck
Shop" to the television cameras, and then McCloud, happy with what
he heard, bought a record and a cassette for $18. Then he arrested
Freeman, to the delight of the press and of the Sheriff, who had Free-
man held outside his shop for forty minutes until the Sheriff himself
could arrive to make the misdemeanor collar of Freeman official, and
escort him to jail.
After that, Good Morning America's satellite television truck and
a host of other media made their way to E. C. Records, making it a
kind of cult stop for first amendment groupies.
Club Futura
At the same time, the press was building the confrontation be-
tween Luther Campbell and Sheriff Navarro. Campbell, a 29 year-old
record entrepreneur, had built a multi-million dollar a year business in
five years, starting by selling his records from the trunk of his car, and
had catapulted to fame (or infamy) with a series of explicitly sexual
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rap records. He was scheduled to lead 2 Live Crew's performance at a
Hollywood, Florida night club called Club Futura. The date had long
preceded Judge Gonzalez' order.
The Sheriff, whose political career was based upon his breaking
Florida law by switching parties (Democrat to Republican) too close to
official qualifying time,30 and who had been, as Sheriff, threatened with
contempt by both federal3" and state judges (for jail overcrowding and
lack of courthouse security, respectively),- now was faced with a per-
formance which the press led him to perceive was in violation of Judge
Gonzalez' order.
Detective McCloud again got the call. As the press carried
messages back and forth between Campbell and Navarro, McCloud
was designated the point man in a fourteen person mixed-gender task
force culled from the Organized Crime and Public Corruption units of
the Sheriffs Department. Their job was to go to Club Futura as under-
cover couples to hear, in McCloud's words, whether any song from As
Nasty As They Wanna Be was sung.
Four couples, eight deputies, in their sportiest clothes, armed with
mini-microcassette recorders, and provided with $60 per couple to
purchase tickets and drinks, staked out the 2 Live Crew show at Club
Futura shortly after midnight on June 10, 1990. Another six detectives
formed the backup team to effectuate the arrests which were pre-or-
dained because the sounds of "C'mon Babe," "Me So Horny," "If You
Believe In Havin' Sex," and "The Fuck Shop" were an essential ele-
ment of 2 Live Crew's show.
Rather than risk the ire of the crowd, the deputies apprehended
Campbell and Chris Wongwon after the show, as they were being
driven home by Campbell's driver. Mark Ross, the lead rapper, went
home separately and the fourteen officers, apparently unable to follow
two cars, did not arrest him that night. He was given a misdemeanor
summons at my house two weeks later, in an effort to avoid another a
media event. Campbell and Wongwon were transported to the County
Jail and booked on the misdemeanor charge of participating in an ob-
scene performance "before live people." David Hobbs, the fourth Crew
member who mixed the records at Club Futura, making the instru-
mentals for this unique form of hip hop music which formed the back-
drop for the four-letter words, was not arrested. The deputies did not
30. Polly v. Navarro, 457 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
31. See Carruthers v. Navarro, No. 76-6086 Civ-WMH (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 1989)
(contempt hearing).
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see him singing; he only hummed.
The Trial Issues
The defenses of Freeman, and of Campbell, Ross and Wongwon
were rife with small issues which were essential to a complete defense.
Although the burden of proof was clear - proof beyond a reason-
able doubt - many evidentiary issues had to be addressed. The State
wanted to introduce Judge Gonzalez' civil judgment of obscenity. De-
fense in limine motions in both cases successfully precluded introduc-
tion or mention of the Gonzalez order.3 2
The State also wanted to introduce a State prepared transcript of
the recording, As Nasty As They Wanna Be, in Freeman, and a tran-
script of the taped "Club Futura" performance in the Campbell case.
Defense in limine motions were successful in both cases, under section
90.403 of the Florida Evidence Code.3 Excluding the transcript in the
Freeman case was a clear victory, but throughout the trial the prosecu-
tors unsuccessfully sought to use the transcripts (which took officers
over five working days to prepare) as memory recollection aids so the
officers could interpret their sometimes unintelligible recordings. Their
unsuccessful recollection struggles with the Crew's common language
descriptions of fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation (but not pederasty -
why do these words sound so nasty?)3 4 made the trial amusing.35
32. The basis of exclusion was that civil judgments, even if final (and this one
was not), are not admissible in criminal cases because the higher burden of proof in a
criminal case makes the civil judgment irrelevant, and because the only value, if there
were any relevancy, would be to prejudice the defendant. See Forrest v. State, 513 So.
2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Dubose, 11 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1943).
33. That section provides in pertinent part: "Relevant evidence is inadmissible if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
34. See Hair: The American Tribal Love Rock Musical, "Sodomy" (RCA
Victor original Broadway Cast recording May 6, 1968) (show opened April 29, 1968,
Biltmore Theater, New York, N.Y.).
35. The press' problems in reporting the trial were captured by Mike Clary's
New Times review of the trial:
The trial of the 2 Live Crew on obscenity charges was billed as a First
Amendment case, so all of the serious newspapers and network television
stations sent reporters, each one dispatched by an editor who saw not only
a chance to use words such as "sex," "horny," and "nasty" in daily cover-
age, but also the phrase "chilling effect." Nothing sends more chills of
righteousness up the tingling spines of serious editors than the threat of
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Entertainment aside, the important legal issues raised by a first
amendment criminal trial really turn on the beginning and end of the
case: jury selection and jury instructions.
Jury Selection
No other crime uses "community standards" as an essential ele-
ment of the offense. Burglary, auto theft, drug dealing, robbery, rape
and murder prosecutions do not require a jury to determine "whether
the average person, applying contemporary community standards,"
would find that the act appeals to or offends any community view or
interest. All other crimes provide real notice to the alleged wrongdoer,
and require only that the jury determine the facts relevant to the ele-
ments or the defenses.
Only criminal "obscenity" turns on an after the fact determination
by a jury as to the mores of the average person vis a vis the prosecuted
conduct. If we are to continue using this strange test conjured by
Miller v. California,"6 one that imposes a burden upon six or twelve
people to assess the values, experience, religious, cultural, generational,
racial, ethnic, sexual preference, political, economic, psychologic, and
educational profiles of thousands or millions of people in a community,
then to determine whether their "prurient interest" has been appealed
to,37 or if they would be patently offended, then the jury selection pro-
cess must provide a reliable vehicle for finding these omniscient people.
Just stating the problem reveals the farcical nature of the attempt,
but given the present status of the law, defense counsel's job is to play
an effective role in this serious judicial soap opera of sex.
Florida utilizes voter registration lists as its only source of poten-
censorship.
Of course none of the mainstream media represented wa; actually to
print or air any of the words at issue in the trial. The irony of this was not
lost on the reporters, many of whom spent ergs of creative energy trying to
come up with inventive euphemisms to reflect the Crew's lyrics. Many
newspapers, including the Miami Herald and the St. Petersburg Times,
went for dashes, as in "f-." The New York Times' Sara Rimer spoke of
the "power of the penis," and did use the rappers' favorite form of female
address, "bitch." Other papers, including the Los Angeles Times, wouldn't
even go that far.
Clary, The Circus Came To Town, New Times, Vol. 5, No. 28, Oct. 31, 1990, at 18.
36. 413 U.S. 15.
37. In Florida, "prurient interest" is defined as a "morbid or shameful interest in
sex." FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION § 847.
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tial jurors. The data in Broward County revealed that black citizens,
who comprise 13.5 % of the population, are only 8.5 % of the registered
voters.3 8 Persons under 25 years of age are 23.5 % of the population, 9
but are registered voters at an even lower percentage.4 0
The jury pools in Freeman and Campbell starkly attested to these
disparities. In Freeman, only one of 35 persons in the venire was black.
There appeared to be no persons under 25, and of the twelve put in the
box for initial consideration, none was under 25 and all were white.
An objection was made in Freeman, but the trial judge, correctly
citing Florida law, 4 ruled that since the voter registration lists were
non-discriminatory, the random and natural consequences of their use
was not a basis for challenging the venire.
The first twelve in the box, nine upper-middle-class white women
and three men, were as far as we got in Freeman. The trial judge,
Judge Paul Backman, did not believe in a free associational voir dire.
(He told me, as the later Campbell case went into the fourth of its six
days of jury selection, that he would have had a jury on the first day.)
But even had he granted more latitude, the twelve offered no valid
challenges for cause, and with the three peremptories per side4' we
never got beyond those twelve. The State struck a young man who
worked in a newspaper press room; the defense struck a man who
seemed antagonistic. The jury was comprised of five well educated
white professional women and an hispanic man. After the conviction of
Freeman, the press profiled the jury members (who were unwilling to
even talk to the media), revealing that one of them lived in the fourth
most expensive assessed value house in Broward County - $3.6 million
- probably more than the assessed value of all of Sistrunk Boulevard,
the main African American business street in Fort Lauderdale. There
is no legal relevance to this fact, but it underscores the distance be-
tween Miami's Liberty City, home of the 2 Live Crew music and the
38. Miami Herald, Oct. 2, 1990 (BR), at 1.
39. Broward Economic Development Board, 1989 data (personal communication,
Lou Sandora).
40. The Broward County Voter Registration Office data as of October 8, 1990
showed that registered voters age 18-20 comprise only 2.9% of the total registration.
Ages 21-35 represent 22.9% of the total.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1989); Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 800 (Fla.
1985). The constitutionality of the use of voter registration lists was recently upheld in
California. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (Cal.
1990).
42. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350.
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site of recent race riots, and the jury's white upper-middle-class com-
munity. The jury was obviously drawn from lists which under-
represented the Crew's and Freeman's peer groups.
The fact that the Campbell jury was more representative does not
detract from the serious defects in the jury selection process. The sys-
tem is a lottery, with luck playing the major role in deciding which
persons will first appear in the box for initial voir dire. Obviously every
jury trial involves the same "luck of the draw," but where the offense
itself turns on the ability to divine the socio-sexual views of the commu-
nity, the lottery well should contain numbers which refiect the commu-
nity, not just those who register to vote.43
The media attention on the Freeman jury problem may have
helped to open the selection process in the 2 Live Crew performance
case which commenced three days after Freeman's conviction. Freeman
left the courtroom angrily shouting "[t]hey don't know nothing about
the ghetto." The press, faithful reporters of race and class divisions in
our society, pursued the obvious point of Freeman's remarks, research-
44ing and writing about Broward County's juries.
In contrast to Judge Backman in the Freeman trial, Judge June
LaRan Johnson provided wide latitude in voir dire for the 2 Live Crew
trial. The fifty-one people who were all ultimately put in the box were
slightly more diverse than the Freeman venire. Six black potential ju-
rors were included, although only three potential jurors were under
twenty-five. The ultimate jury was the product of six and one-half days
of wide-ranging voir dire, the successful use of jury sequestration as a
defense tactic to scare away the least acceptable jurors,45 the luck of
drawing a varied lot (some of whom educated the whole potential panel
by their responses to prosecution questions46), and the prosecutors' fail-
ure to keep track of the agreed-upon process of passing and striking,
allowing the defense to accept the panel and foreclose the three prose-
43. A frequently recommended supplemental source of names is licensed drivers.
See ALA. CODE § 12.16.57 (1975); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE. § 197 (West 1990). The
trial judge in Campbell declined our invitation to break that new ground.
44. See Miami Herald, supra note 37.
45. The least acceptable jurors were presumed to be middle- class white women
with six-to-sixteen year-old children, who would find sequestration difficult.
46. One person declared himself a "fan" of 2 Live Crew. Another likened the
prosecution to "Nazi Germany." A third described instances of police brutality in the
black community. One prospective juror kept asking the prosecutors about topless and
bottomless dancing in her efforts to understand the State's attempt to define "commu-
nity standards."
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cution back strikes which they should have exercised earlier.
This jury had a 65 year-old Jewish mother of a condominium cir-
cuit entertainer, a 76 year-old former sociology professor, a
fortysomething principal of an integrated middle school whose sister
(unknown to the State) was a criminal defense lawyer, and a 26 year-
old diesel mechanic who knew of Jim Morrison's (The Doors) arrest for
indecent exposure in Miami twenty years ago. The prosecutors were too
young to appreciate that anyone knowing the Morrison case would
know it only out of sympathy.
A black woman juror lived six blocks from the county's two largest
adult bookstores, which are just across the street from the Sheriff's of-
fice substation. The sociology professor taught at Howard University
during the 1960's, a fact never learned by the prosecutors, and never
pursued by the defense, having heard enough of the State's voir dire to
want her. The Jewish mother knew of Redd Foxx's bawdy songs from
the 30's, while the prosecutors only remembered him from television's
Sanford & Son. She became the post-trial jury media star, appearing
on The Donahue Show and asking what was the big deal, "Even Dr.
Ruth says, 'love your penis.'"
In fact, these jurors conducted a long post-acquittal press confer-
ence; the retired sociology professor was hired to write an opinion piece
for the local newspaper, 47 and the foreman, who was gay, "came out of
the closet" in an interview with a South Florida news and arts
weekly.48
Thus, jury selection in the Campbell case liberated more than the
defendants.
Jury Instructions
The critical jury instruction in an obscenity case is the "serious
literary, artistic, political and scientific value" prong of Miller v. Cali-
fornia.49 As explained by Pope v. Illinois,50 the "value" issue is not a
community standard, it is a national inquiry:
Just as the ideas a work represents need not obtain majority ap-
47. Bailey, 2 Live Crew Juror Says Trial Reminiscent of Blacklist, Sun-Senti-
nel, Oct. 28, 1990, at 1H.
48. Mullin, Jack Thompson and the Truly Obscene, New Times, Oct. 31-Nov. 6,
1990, at 12 (Miami's News and Arts Weekly).
49. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
50. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
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proval to merit protection, neither, insofar as the First Amendment
is concerned, does the value of the work vary from community to
community based on the degree of local acceptance it has won. The
proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given
community would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable
person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole.
Of course, as noted above, the mere fact that only a minority
of a population may believe a work has serious value does not mean
the "reasonable person" standard would not be met.5
In both the Freeman and Campbell trials the prosecution sought
to turn Pope and Miller inside out and convince the trial judge that
material was obscene if any reasonable person would find that the ma-
terial lacks serious artistic, etc. value. In the Freeman case the trial
judge initially took the State seriously, but overnight re-read the cases
provided to him and came back in the morning with this instruction:
The value of the material: In order for you to find that this mate-
rial is obscene you must also find that taken as a whole it lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. If any reasona-
ble person would find that the material has such value it is not
obscene even if it appeals to the prurient interest in sex, and even if
it depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way.
If it has serious literary or artistic effort, or if it attempts to
convey scientific information or political points of view, it cannot be
obscene.52
The Campbell trial judge gave the same instruction, although she
too was confused by the State's argument, and when actually reading
the instruction to the jury, slipped and said it the State's way. A mid-
instruction objection and bench conference cured the error, and actu-
ally permitted reinforcement of the value prong of Miller. The jury in
this case rested upon the value test, finding the performance to have
had serious political, literary and artistic value.53
51. Id. at 500, 501.
52. Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal, State v. Freeman, No. 90-17446-MM-10 A (Broward County Ct., Oct. 3,
1990) (setting forth the given instruction).
53. The Mapplethorpe jury in Cincinnati also used Miller's value test to acquit
Dennis Barrie, the Cincinnati Art Museum Director charged with obscenity. Walsh,
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Why did the Freeman jury come to a different conclusion? One
explanation may be the trial judge's supplemental instruction requested
by the jury which was obviously struggling with the Miller test. It had
asked to be reinstructed shortly after retiring and had been told to rely
upon their collective recollections. Within an hour, the jury asked to
hear "the three prongs of the Miller test," and the judge said he would
re-instruct them on the substantive law of the case. However, the judge
went beyond that in his supplemental instruction, telling the jury it
could determine obscenity without the aid of any expert testimony.
Since the defense's entire case was expert testimony, giving that sup-
plemental instruction which was not responsive to the jury's pointed
Miller question may be the error upon which Freeman's conviction is
ultimately reversed.
The United States Supreme Court has said: "Particularly in a
criminal trial the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word."5 4
This is especially so with regard to supplemental instructions "since the
jury will rely more heavily on such instructions than on any other sin-
gle portion of the original charge. '55
In Freeman's case, the supplemental instructions "last words"
were to a jury twice seeking guidance on Miller v. California. Instead
the jury received final, supplemental instructions which went beyond its
inquiry and told the jury it had the right to disregard the defense testi-
mony. The proper course is to limit a reinstruction "to direct response
to the jury's specific request. Indeed, to do otherwise might not only
create confusion in the minds of the jurors but might give the appear-
ance of placing the trial judge in the role of an interested advocate
rather than an impartial arbiter."56 Thus, like all cases, big and small,
Advice Offered to 2 Live Crew Jurors, Sun Sentinel, Oct. 14, 1990, at lB.
The 2 Live Crew jury was moved to find political value by the rhythmic chants of
"F- Navarro and F- Martinez," the Broward Sheriff and the Florida Governor.
The artistic and literary evidence came from John Leland, Newsday's music critic, and
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., a Duke University English Professor.
54. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946).
55. Henry v. State, 359 So. 2d 864-868 n.3 (Fla. 1978) (citing, United States v.
Carter, 491 F.2d 625, 633 (5th Cir. 1974)) ("a trial judge must be acutely sensitive to
the probability that the jurors will listen to his additional instructions with particular
interest. . . . Thus the court must exercise special care to see that, . . inaccuracy or
imbalance in supplemental instructions do not poison an otherwise healthy trial.").
56. Id. at 867 (1978) (citing East v. State, 339 So. 2d 1104, 1106 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1976)) ("When a jury calls for additional instruction and clearly delineates the
area of its request, it is usually better for the trial court to remain within such area.").
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the jury instructions are a critical matter, and error in them may be the
key to making Freeman's outcome symmetrical with 2 Live Crew's
result.
Conclusion
The 2 Live Crew saga will continue through federal and Florida
courts for some time. Charles Freeman's initial appeal to the Florida
Circuit Court is on the horizon. 58 The federal appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit will probably not be argued until the Spring of 1991.
Whatever may be the outcome of those cases, the acquittal of 2
Live Crew in the Club Futura performance case seems to have left the
most lasting mark. Their acquittal of obscenity for singing in public
what they sang on a recording designed for private consumption, un-
derscored the absurdity of using the law to determine the value of art.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Pope v. Illinois calls for re-exami-
nation of the Miller v. California standard:
I think we should be better advised to adopt as a legal maxim what
has long been the wisdom of mankind: De gustibus non est dispu-
tandum. Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no use
litigating about it. For the law courts to decide "what is beauty" is
a novelty even by today's standards. 9
The prosecutions of As Nasty As They Wanna Be, in all their per-
mutations, attest to the wisdom of Justice Scalia's vievi. While it has
been great fun for me, and a source of serious intellectual stimulation,
the energies spent by all the participants could have worked toward
solutions of more serious problems than what to do with some dirty
57. The Freeman case presents other appellate issues, among them the failure to
instruct the jury that the "average person" meant adult average persons; and the fail-
ure of the trial court to admit other records by The Ghetto Boys and Ice Cube, which
contained comparable lyrics. In addition, the trial court refused to admit a host of
salacious materials purchased throughout Broward County which the defense argued
was relevant to "prurient interest," for these materials were designed to demonstrate
that term in action.
58. On November 16, 1990, the trial judge denied a motion for new trial. Free-
man was later sentenced to pay the maximum fine, $1,000, to a local school for the
performing arts and to pay court costs of $87. The notice of appeal was filed December
12, 1990. Under Florida law, the Circuit Court will hear the appeal, then discretionary
review may lie in the District Court of Appeal.
59. Pope, 481 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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words. Even those who took the words literally, like one of the co-con-
tributors to this volume, have misused their energies. Unpleasant words
will never be erased from our society. Unpleasant deeds may be, but
not by trying to censor the descriptions of unpleasantness. It is better to
hear the words and address the thoughts they convey than to suppress
the words so the thoughts may fester without the public airing which
can lead to progress.
To know the 2 Live Crew story is to know a recurring phenomenon
created by those who fail to understand history. Censorship cannot sur-
vive the human desire to know and judge things for one's self. No law
judge or jury will ever eradicate that irrepressible instinct. We could
have a thousand obscenity trials, but words and thoughts about sex will
never be limited to a missionary view. "Prurient interest, patently of-
fensive descriptions of sexual conduct and serious artistic, literary, po-
litical or scientific value" should be discussed someplace - anyplace -
other than the courts.
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The Search for a Section 1983 Right Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause
Since its inception in 1871, and characterization in the Supreme
Court case of Monroe v. Pape, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has caused turmoil
among commentators concerned with this statute's application in the
area of constitutional rights.' The focus of this comment is to describe
1. As stated by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171
(1961), section 1983 is derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §
1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873) [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. § 1983]. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, priv-
ileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Con-
gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
The commentators concerned with section 1983 focus primarily on its protection of
"any rights" secured by the Constitution and laws of the federal government. See, e.g.,
Note, Section 1983 Remedies for the Violation of Supremacy Clause Rights, 97 YALE
L.J. 1827 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Section 1983 Remedies]; Note, Dormant Com-
merce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Protecting the Right To Be Free of
Protectionist State Action, 86 MICH. L. REv. 157 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Dormant
Commerce Clause Claims]; Spurrier, Federal Constitutional Rights: Priceless or
Worthless? Awards of Money Damages Under Section 1983, 20 TULSA L.J. 1 (1984);
Comment, The Commerce Clause: Allocating Provision or Individual Right? Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 126 (1984)., 7 U. ARK. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 757 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, The
Commerce Clause].
Other commentators have noted the problem section 1983 created by opening the
proverbial "floodgates of litigation." See, e.g., Matasar, Personal Immunities Under
Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741,
742 n.8 (1987) (quoting Justice Rehnquist's complaint in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
91 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), about the "'staggering effect of [section] 1983
claims upon the workload of the federal courts . . .'" ); Note, Is the Section 1983
Civil Rights Statute Overworked? Expanded Use of Magistrates-An Alternative to
Exhaustion, 17 .U. MICH. J.L. REF. 361 (1984) (generally discussing the problems with
overuse of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But see Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra, at 1845-
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the nature of the constitutional rights which are covered by section
1983 for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988.2 The obvious choices are those individual or personal rights
which fall within the purview of the Bill of Rights and the Civil War
amendments, and these will be addressed in the sections which follow. 3
However, the more controversial issue is whether the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution embodies personal rights which are implicated in
the statutory language of section 1983 and section 1988 to allow the
courts to award attorney's fees to plaintiffs who have been granted re-
lief from burdensome state statutes.4
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari several times to cases
involving the Commerce Clause issue,5 but has now granted certiorari
2. Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980). Courts have also stated that a party who prevails on a
ground other than section 1983 is entitled to attorney's fees under section 1988 if sec-
tion 1983 would have been an appropriate basis of relief. See J & J Anderson, Inc. v.
Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985). Thus, it is not mandatory that a
section 1983 claim of relief be brought in the plaintiff's original complaint in order to
get attorney's fees later.
3. These rights were expressly considered by the Forty-second Congress in the
debates prior to passage of the then Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 because the act was
passed in the wake of the fourteenth amendment. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
180 (1960).
4. This comment is concerned with state regulation under the dormant commerce
clause doctrine where a state may regulate or infringe upon, within certain limits, in-
terstate commerce when Congress has not legislated pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). This situation
is to be distinguished from that where the state passes statutes in conflict with extant
congressional statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause and which, therefore,
causes the Supremacy Clause to be invoked to defeat the conflicting state regulation of
interstate commerce. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 8.1 (3d ed. 1986); Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at
158 n.11.
5. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Secretary of State,
503 A.2d 214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986). Justices White, Brennan, and
O'Connor dissented from the denial of certiorari in Private Truck Council. 476 U.S. at
1129. The dissenting Justices recognized a conflict of authority b-.tween the Eighth
Circuit in Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139, and the Third Circuit in
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Russell
to Dennis v. State, in which the Nebraska Supreme Court denied plain-
tiff's motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.6 In Dennis, the
Nebraska court based its reasoning on that of several federal courts
which have also determined that the Commerce Clause does not confer
individual rights within the meaning of section 1983 which would allow
an award of fees under section 1988.7 However, the courts that have
considered the Commerce Clause issue failed to define what a right was
before considering whether a right existed under the Commerce
Clause.8
The goal of this comment is to derive the meaning of rights, and
then to see if these rights are included as part of the Commerce Clause
structure. Section one discusses the reasoning of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court's decision in Dennis in order to gain some bearing on this
analysis. Section two's analysis results in a definition of "rights" which
fits into the scheme of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This definition is derived from
a consideration of the plain meaning and the legislative history of sec-
tion 1983, as well as from the history of the Commerce Clause, and the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. Section three considers the
nature of the Commerce Clause as a mechanism which allocates power
between the state and federal governments. This section shows that the
Commerce Clause serves only to provide "benefits" for individuals that
are not encompassed by section 1983's meaning of "rights." Section
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980), and would have granted cer-
tiorari on this basis. Private Truck Council, 476 U.S. at 1129. This opinion shows that
there are members of the Court who recognize that an issue exists concerning whether
the Commerce Clause secures individual rights within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
6. Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676, cert. granted sub nom. Den-
nis v. Higgins, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). The question that the Court granted certiorari
based upon was, "[i]s the claim that state tax discriminates against interstate com-
merce in violation of Commerce Clause and that seeks injunction against enforcement
of tax cognizable under 42 USC § 1983?" 58 U.S.L.W. 3749 (U.S. May 29, 1990)
(No. 89-1555). It was not Kansas' statutory scheme which was at issue, as stated in 58
U.S.L.W. 3749, but rather Nebraska's taxation of out-of-state motor carriers.
7. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139; Private Truck
Council, 503 A.2d 214. These and other cases denying the existence of Commerce
Clause rights to plaintiffs seeking attorney's fees based on section 1983 and section
1988 will be considered in more detail in section four of this comment.
8. See Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1; Note, Dormant Commerce
Clause Claims, supra note 1. Several commentators also fail to define what a right is
before questioning whether one exists under the Commerce Clause. See Note, Dormant
Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1; Comment, The Commerce Clause, supra note
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four uses these considerations to examine the Nebraska Supreme
Court's decision in Dennis and concludes that it was correct in holding
that the Commerce Clause is not a source of rights cognizable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore, that section 1988 attorney's fees were
precluded.
I. The Decision In Dennis v. State
Dennis v. State is a typical case involving yet another state's at-
tempt to tax out-of-state people for use of the state's highways.' How-
ever, the case is one of the relatively few involving a plaintiff attempt-
ing to secure a claim of relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an
impingement of a Commerce Clause "right" in order to get attorney's
fees under section 1988.10 In Dennis, the plaintiff, Mark E. Dennis,
claimed that Nebraska had exacted taxes pursuant to two statutes11
9. See, e.g., State v. Private Truck Council, 258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988);
Private Truck Council v. State, 128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d 1150 (1986).
10. See Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139; Private Truck Council,
258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378; Private Truck Council, 128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d 1150;
Private Truck Council, 503 A.2d 214.
11. The first statute read: "
Trucks, truck-tractors, semitrailers, trailers, or buses, from states
other than Nebraska, entering Nebraska shall be required to comply with
all the laws and regulations of any nature imposed on Nebraska trucks
. . . and to comply with all the requirements as to payment of all license
fees, permit fees, and fees of whatever character which owners of trucks
.. . owned and operated in Nebraska, are required to pay when operating
in such foreign state, unless the state or states, in which such trucks...
are domiciled, grant reciprocity comparable to that extended by the laws
of Nebraska.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 443, 451 N.W.2d at 685-86 (emphasis in original) (quoting NEB.
REv. STAT. § 60-305.02 (1984)). The second statute provided:
(1) In case a foreign state . . . is not reciprocal as to license fees on
commercial trucks . . . the owners of such nonresident vehicles from those
states or territories will be required to pay the same license fees as are
charged residents of this state in such foreign state or territory. In case no
fees are charged in Nebraska on trucks . . . other than license fees, and
the reciprocity law of any other foreign state . . . does not act to exempt
Nebraska trucks . . . operating in that state from payment of all fees
whatsoever, the owners of such foreign trucks. . . shall be required to pay
a fee in an amount equal to the fee of whatever character, other than
license fee, is charged by such other state to foreign trucks . . ..
(7) Properly registered shall mean a vehicle licensed or registered in
one of the following: . . . (b) the jurisdiction in which a commercial vehi-
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which violated the Commerce Clause 2 and the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause' 3 of the United States Constitution, and which also gave
rise to a claim of relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving him of
constitutional rights. 4
The plaintiff in Dennis owned and operated a trucking company
with its principal place of business in Ohio."5 As part of this business,
plaintiff owned one tractor and two trailers, all registered in Ohio.'"
Due to the Ohio registration, plaintiff was subject to a one to two cent
tax per mile while driving in Nebraska, because Ohio exacted the same
tax of Nebraska-registered vehicles operating in Ohio. 17
The trial court held that the statutes constituted an undue burden
on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and en-
joined their enforcement.' 8 However, the trial court dismissed the
counts under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for failure to allege facts sufficient to support the action. 19 Rather
than award attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the trial
cle is registered, where the operation in which such vehicle is used has a
principal place of business therein, and from or in which the vehicle is
most frequently dispatched, garaged, serviced, maintained, operated, or
otherwise controlled, and the vehicle is assigned to such principal place of
business ....
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 443-44, 451 N.W.2d at 686 (emphasis in original) (quoting NEB.
REV. STAT. § 60-305.03(1), (7) (1984)). Both statutes were amended after the trial
court's decision, thus making the Commerce Clause issue moot in respect to Nebraska.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678 (referencing NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 60-
305.02 to .03 (1988)).
12. "The Congress shall have the Power [tjo ... regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, ci. 2.
13. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I.
14. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 677-78. The plaintiff also sought to
enjoin enforcement of the statutes "as a grant by the Legislature of special and exclu-
sive privileges, immunities, and franchises in violation of [the Nebraska Constitution]
.... " Id. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 677. The trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to
prove this violation and dismissed the action. Id. at 428-29, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
Though the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that this was an issue below, it made no
further mention of the action in its opinion.
15. Id. at 442, 451 N.W.2d at 685.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
19. Id. at 428-29, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
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court stated that the "plaintiff and his attorneys are entitled under the
[e]quitable [f]und [d]octrine to payment of their expenses and reasona-
ble fees."' 20 Based on the trial court's opinion, the pertinent issue raised
on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court was whether the statutes'
impermissible burden on interstate commerce created a claim cogniza-
ble under section 1983 so as to allow attorney's fees under section
1988.21
20. The equitable fund doctrine provides that,
when one by active litigation creates, or increases a fund in which others
are entitled to share, those others should bear a portion of the litigation
expenses, and that they can be made to do so by charging the fund with
the reasonable expenses of the litigant who preserves or augments it.
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.8, at 200 (1973). The plaintiff claimed that the fund consisted
of the total amount of taxes collected by Nebraska that would be subject to refund.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678. The trial court did not agree with this
contention and left to another day the determination of what fund, if any, was available
for payment of the fees. Id.
21. This is the same issue upon which the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Dennis v. Higgins, 58 U.S.L.W. 3749 (U.S. May 29, 1990) (No. 89-1555).
Two other issues were raised to the Nebraska Supreme Court: first, whether enforce-
ment of the statutes violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and also, whether
the trial court erred in awarding fees under the equitable fund doctrine. Dennis, 234
Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678. On the first issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not violated by the taxation of the out-
of-state trucks. Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 686. The court first noted that the Supreme
Court decision in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948), precluded only "'clas-
sifications based on the fact of non-citizenship unless there is something to indicate that
non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.''"
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 443, 451 N.W.2d at 685. The Nebraska Supreme Court then
observed that Nebraska's statutory scheme did not impose taxation based on the "resi-
dent or nonresident status of the motor carrier, but [was] based upon the state where
the particular vehicle [was] registered." Id. at 444, 451 N.W.2d at 686. Under this
statute then, even residents of Nebraska would be taxed if they drove vehicles which
were covered by the statute and registered in a state other than Nebraska. Id. The
court concluded that since plaintiff was taxed simply because his tractor was registered
in Ohio, and because Nebraska residents would also be taxed under the same circum-
stances, the statute was not one which discriminated against out-of-state citizens in
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 444-45, 451 N.W.2d at 686.
In an alternative holding on the Privileges and Immunities Clause issue, the court
first reasoned that only out-of-state citizens had standing to challenge violations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 686. See also Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). The court concluded that because plaintiff did
not even allege that he was a citizen of another state in his complaint, he did not have
standing to bring the Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge against the statutes.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 686.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause did
not secure rights cognizable under section 1983 which would allow an
attorney's fee award under section 1988.22 Therefore, the court af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of this claim.23 In its decision, the
court first noted that there was a conflict of authority on the Commerce
Clause issue and decided, after considering the main cases in the area,
that the "better reasoned cases hold that there is no cause of action
under section 1983 for violations of the [C]ommerce [C]lause."24 The
court relied primarily on the Eighth Circuit decision in Consolidated
Freightways Corp. v. Kassel,25 and other cases which make reference
to it,26 for the proposition that the Commerce Clause is a constitutional
The next issue was raised by the defendant, the State of Nebraska, and questioned
whether the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff his fees and costs pursuant to the
equitable fund doctrine. The court stated that the doctrine "presupposes the existence
of a fund . . .and requires the prevailing party to have brought suit to preserve or
protect [the] fund . . . ." Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 687. Moreover, the fund must be
an "immediate fund" which the court must have control over from the beginning of the
trial, and from which the court can award attorney's fees and costs at trial. Id. at 446,
451 N.W.2d at 687. In Dennis however, the court stated that "[t]here is no fund in this
case, much less a fund within the jurisdiction of the trial court." Id. On this note, the
court held that it was error for the trial court to award fees based on the equitable fund
doctrine. Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 688. The court also noted that Nebraska "has not
waived its sovereign immunity as to attorney fees under the circumstances such as this
case." Id. at 448, 451 N.W.2d at 688. Thus, in a second alternative holding, the court
reversed the trial court's decision to award fees under the doctrine.
Finally, the Commerce Clause violation was not appealed by Nebraska because
the state revised the two tax statutes that were in issue. See supra note 11.
22. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 430, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
23. Id. at 448, 451 N.W.2d at 688.
24. Id. at 430, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
25. 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
26. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 430-32, 451 N.W.2d at 678-80 (citing Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139). The Dennis court also relied on several federal and
state cases which had cited Consolidated Freightways Corp. in support of their deci-
sions. See Kraft v. Jacka, 872 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1989); J & J Anderson v. Town of
Erie, 767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985); Pesticide Pub. Policy Found. v. Village of
Wauconda, 622 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1985), af'd, 826 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987);
State v. Private Truck Council, Inc., 258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988); Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. State, 221 N.J. Super. 89, 534 A.2d 13 (1987), aff'd, 111 N.J.
214, 544 A.2d 33 (1988); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 503 A.2d
214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. State,
128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d 1150 (1986). In all of these cases, the court distinguished
sections of the Constitution which confer individual rights from those which serve only
to allocate power between the levels of government. These cases, and their distinction,
will be considered in more detail in section four of this comment. Note at this point,
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provision which allocates power between the state and the federal gov-
ernments. Further, the court recognized, in reliance upon the Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. decision, that the most individuals can expect
of the dormant commerce clause limit on the states is an indirect bene-
fit from its enforcement, a benefit which is "not the same thing as a
'right' secured by the Constitution Within the meaning of section
1983."s7
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected other cases which stated
that individuals had a right to engage in interstate commerce. For in-
stance, the court adopted the reasoning of Consolidated Freightways
Corp., which discredited "'two earlier federal cases stating terse hold-
ings going the other way . ..neither of [which] . . . analyzed the
merits of extending section 1983 to encompass violations of the Com-
merce Clause, but rather merely relied on generalized statements in
Supreme Court cases that did not involve the Commerce Clause is-
sue.' ",28 The court also dismissed several United States Supreme Court
references to a right to engage in interstate commerce based on the
Eighth Circuit's dismissal of the same in Consolidated Freightways
Corp. .29 Thus concluding that the Commerce Clause did not secure
however, that these cases all beg the question of what a right is. Rather than define the
term, the authorities rely on the happenstance of the Forty-second Congress' limited
use of the term "rights" well over 100 years ago, as well as the Supreme Court's usage
in contexts unrelated to the present question of Commerce Clause rights. Beginning in
section two, this comment draws on these sources in arriving at a general definition of
rights which can be applied to a modern question never considered in the past debates
and cases.
27. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 432, 451 N.W.2d at 680.
28. Id. at 438-39, 451 N.W.2d at 683. The two cases cited in this reference are
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980), and Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1975), aff'd on other grounds,
425 U.S. 463 (1976). These are discussed in section four of this comment.
29. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 432, 451 N.W.2d at 679-80. These cases were: Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216
U.S. 1 (1910); and Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891). The Garrity reference
to a right to engage in interstate commerce was considered "mere dictum." Dennis, 234
Neb. at 432, 451 N.W.2d at 679. The references in Western Union and Crutcher were
viewed by the Nebraska Supreme Court as focusing on the separation of powers be-
tween the federal and state legislatures which, therefore, excluded the Commerce
Clause as a right securing provision. These cases are further considered in note 148,
along with three other cases that were not mentioned in Dennis, but which do refer to a
"right" to engage in interstate commerce: namely, Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 3:5 (1868), and Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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section 1983 rights, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the action. The following sections of this comment
consider the underlying forces of the rights/benefits distinction, which
is made by the Nebraska court in Dennis, to support the conclusion
that the Commerce Clause does not afford rights to individuals which
can be vindicated by a section 1983 action.
II. The Definition of a Section 1983 Right
The failing in cases like Dennis is that the courts do not define
section 1983 rights before considering the Commerce Clause issue, and
whether the plaintiff can get attorney's fees under section 1988. The
problem the courts face in this respect is that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 uses
the term "rights" without providing a definition which would aid in
determining what these rights are, and whether such rights exist under
the Commerce Clause. In order to discover the meaning of "rights"
then, the courts must resort to statutory interpretation tools. Of impor-
tance here is the plain meaning rule which provides that "where the
[statutory] language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning
the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion."30 However, where the statute's
language is vague or ambiguous, the courts will then look to the legisla-
tive history of the statute to surmise congressional intent on how the
ambiguous term should be applied."' The first inquiry, then, looks to
the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to determine the scope and meaning
of the term "rights."
A. The Plain Meaning of Section 1983
Under the plain meaning doctrine, two questions exist with respect
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first of these considers the scope of "rights,"
as the word is used in section 1983, because "rights" is modified by the
term "any" in the statute. The second question asks what is a "right"
30. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citing Hamilton v.
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)). The import of the Court's statement is that the
Court will first look to determine if terms used in the statute are vague or ambiguous.
If the terms are neither vague nor ambiguous, the Court will then base its decision on
the plain meaning of the statute.
31. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U.L. REV.
277, 285 (1990).
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within the meaning of section 1983.
Section 1983 uses the words "any rights. . . secured by the Con-
stitution and laws ... *"32 Use of the term "any," without other words
to modify it, would seem to suggest that any right which exists under
the Constitution and federal statutes would be within the ambit of sec-
tion 1983. However, early Supreme Court cases declined to give such a
broad reading to this statute.33 For instance, the Court in Holt v. Indi-
ana Manufacturing Co. 34 refused to extend section 1983 coverage be-
yond "civil rights," while in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organ-
ization35 it drew a tenuous distinction between "personal" and
"property" rights, the former included as section 1983 rights while the
latter was not. These cases restricting the scope of section 1983 have
since been overruled by the modern Supreme Court which is eager to
confirm the existence of constitutionally and statutorily created rights
in order to meet the broad language of "any rights" used by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.6 Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "the Supreme Court
has never placed a constitutional provision outside section 1983 .' 37 Sev-
eral cases support this proposition including Maine v. Thiboutot,38
32. See supra note 1 for the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
33. See generally Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1, at 1834-35.
34. 176 U.S. 68, 73 (1900).
35. 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939). The plurality in Hague was actually interpreting
the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which gives the district courts original jurisdiction in section 1983 suits. The language
used in section 1343 is practically the same as that used in section 1983:
Civil rights and elective franchise
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the ju-
risdiction of the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982).
36. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (overruling the
personal/property rights distinction established by Hague, 307 U.S. 496, and limiting
the Holt, 176 U.S. 68, "civil rights" restriction of section 1983 to its facts). But see
Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885) (Contracts Clause does not secure rights
within the meaning of section 1983); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Fla.
1978) (same).
37. Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1, at 1835.
38. 448 U.S. 1 (1979) (stating generally, section 1983 encompasses violations of
both constitutional and federal statutory rights).
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,3 9 Lane v. Wil-
son,4" Brown v. Board of Education," and Lynch v. Household Fi-
nance Corp..42 Due to the Court's broad interpretation of section 1983,
if an individual right exists under the Commerce Clause, this right
would likely be included within the meaning of rights protected by sec-
tion 1983.
Unlike its usefulness in determining the scope of "rights" which
section 1983 invokes, the plain meaning doctrine provides no guidance
in defining what a right is under section 1983. Indeed, it has been rec-
ognized that "'plain meaning' is too simplistic a guide to the construc-
tion of section 1983.""' This is especially so because the Court has not
provided a clear test which could be used to determine what a right is
under section 1983.44 Without a statutory or Court-formulated test for
determining what a right is, the plain meaning rule is of no avail be-
cause it would leave the Court to answer the question on intuition
alone. Where the plain meaning rule provides no guidance in determin-
ing how a statute's terms are to be applied or interpreted, the Court
should next resort to the legislative history of the statute and other
"extra-statutory materials pertaining to what happened before and dur-
ing the passage of the law to explain language that is ambiguous
. . ," The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is, therefore, in-
valuable, because the plain meaning rule cannot be usefully applied
due to the ambiguous nature of the term "rights."" Considering this
history, as well as other notions of the meaning of the term "rights"
will lead to a definition which can be used in determining if the Com-
merce Clause embraces individual rights.
39. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the first
amendment are part of section 1983 rights).
40. 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (incorporating fifteenth amendment voting rights under
section 1983).
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (allowing a section 1983 remedy for the violation of
equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment).
42. 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (including property rights as rights cognizable under
section 1983).
43. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
44. D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.3, at 363 (3d ed. 1989).
45. Wald, supra note 31, at 282.
46. Justice Powell has also stated that section 1983's history should guide the
Court's interpretation of this statute. See Matasar, Personal Immunities, supra note 1,
at 752 (relying on the Court's opinion in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421
(1976) for this proposition).
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B. The Legislative History of Section 1983
In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, Justice
Stevens, speaking for a majority of the Court, stated that "in all cases
of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these
statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve. ' 47 The first
Supreme Court case to imbue section 1983 with a substantively broad
scope based on an examination of the statute's legislative history and
purposes was Monroe v. Pape.48 In that case, the Court considered
whether 13 police officers, who had broken into the petitioner's home
without a search warrant and arrested him without an arrest warrant,
had acted under color of state law in order to allow the petitioner's
claim of relief under section 1983 against both the officers and the City
of Chicago.49 In deciding that the action against the officers alone was
permissible while the action against the City was not, the Court noted
that section 1983 was enacted in response to the Ku Klux Klan's activi-
ties against the freedmen and other minorities in the South:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union ren-
dering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and
the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a con-
dition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate.
That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State
authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the
United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient
for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recom-
mend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectu-
ally secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law
in all parts of the United States .. ..
As revealed by this statement, the proposed legislation sought to elimi-
47. 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) (considering whether the plaintiffs complaint
stated a claim under the Supremacy Clause which was cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and which would provide the lower court with subject matter jurisdiction).
48. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also Spurrier, supra note 1, at 3 (citing cases
which had, prior to Monroe, limited the scope of section 1983 as a remedy for depriva-
tion of rights, privileges, or immunities).
.49. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.
50. Id. at 172-73 (quoting President Grant's message to Congress reported in
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871)). See also Spurrier, .;upra note 1, at 2
(stating that section 1983 was "enacted to protect the newly-freed blacks from the
lawless activities of whites in southern states ...").
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nate state inactivity concerning Klan operations which resulted in de-
nial of equal protection and due process rights to the recently freed
slaves of the South.51
The Monroe Court went on to point out three purposes of section
1983 in alleviating this denial of fourteenth amendment rights. First,
the legislation served as a tool to invalidate any "invidious legislation
by States against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United
States." 52 Second, the Court stated that section 1983 provided a rem-
edy where state law is inadequate, and quoted Senator Sherman for
support of this conclusion:
[I]t is said the reason is that any offense may be committed upon a
negro by a white man, and a negro cannot testify in any case
against a white man, so that the only way by which any conviction
can be had in Kentucky in those cases is in the United States
courts, because the United States courts enforce the United States
laws by which-negroes may testify.53
51. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Since this amendment was ratified in 1868, only three years before President Grant's
statement, supra at the text accompanying note 50, it is safe to draw the conclusion
that the President's use of the language "effectually secure life, liberty, and property"
was significantly influenced by the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause lan-
guage that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . .," because the language in his statement and that in the Clause is so
similar. Also, the President's use of "enforcement of the laws in all parts of the United
States" implicates the fourteenth amendment's equal protection language, "nor deny
any person . . . the equal protection of the laws," for the same reason.
52. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173 (quoting Congressman Sloss, CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871)).
53. Id. at 173-74 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 345 (1871)). This
statement provides an example of equal protection denial to blacks at the time. En-
forcement of state laws here would have allowed only racist whites to testify as wit-
nesses in trials of black citizens. An almost irrebuttable presumption of guilt thus arose
which state law would have no effect in curing. Section 1983 presumably offered a
remedy for this denial of equal protection by providing a neutral tribunal which elimi-
nated the racist discrimination between black and white witnesses.
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Finally, section 1983 provided "a federal remedy where the state rem-
edy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. ' 54 This is
the remedy which would cut to the heart of de facto discrimination
against blacks in the South.5 With these purposes derived from the
legislative history of section 1983 in mind, the Monroe Court ulti-
mately stated that,
one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right
in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immu-
nities guaranteed by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment might be de-
nied by the state agencies.56
With this statement, and the preceding look at the legislative debates,
it is easy to surmise, as the Court in Monroe did, that the Forty-second
Congress used the term "rights" in the context of fourteenth amend-
ment rights due to the frequent references to the terms and policies
underlying this amendment.57
Based on the intuitive sense of the word, "rights" under the four-
teenth amendment means individual rights aimed at the protection of
people who are denied due process and equal protection of the laws by
state governments. This focus on rights within the context of the four-
teenth amendment has been followed by later Supreme Court decisions.
For instance, the Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. recog-
nized that section 1983 "was passed for the express purpose of 'en-
forc[ing] the [p]rovisions of the fourteenth amendment.' ,,51 The Court
went on to state, "the rights that Congress sought to protect in [section
54. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
55. Defacto discrimination is the situation where the state's statutes are not dis-
criminatory on their face, but are applied, enforced, or not enforced in such a manner
which effectively discriminates against blacks, and other minorities. The Monroe Court
recognized this in its quotation of Senator Burchard. 365 U.S. at 176-77 (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871)). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973) (considering the differences between de facto and de jure
discrimination).
56. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180.
57. This conclusion is also supported by the title given to section 1983 when it
was passed by the Forty-second Congress: "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment and for other purposes." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
app. 335 (1871).
58. 405 U.S. at 545.
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1983] were described by the chairman of the House Select committee
that drafted the legislation as 'the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety.' "9 Later, in Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization, the Court noted that "it is . . . clear
that the prime focus of [C]ongress in all of the relevant legislation was
ensuring a right of action to enforce the protections of the fourteenth
amendment and the federal laws enacted pursuant thereto." 60 If it was
doubted before, this language unequivocally shows that Congress used
the word "rights" with the intent to protect fourteenth amendment per-
sonal or individual rights. These are individual rights because neither
the state nor the federal government has the power to infringe upon
these rights; this is a concept which irresistibly leads to the definition of
section 1983 "rights."'"
C. The Definition of a Right
The major characteristic which separates a right from other con-
stitutional entitlements is that rights cannot be stripped from the indi-
vidual by the government, whether it be state or federal.6 2 This notion
59. Id. at 545 (quoting Representative Shellabarger, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. 69 (1871)).
60. 441 U.S. at 611. See also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934
(1982) ("The history of [section 1983] is replete with statements indicating that Con-
gress thought it was creating a remedy as broad as the protection that the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment affords the individual.").
61. The state or federal government may infringe on these rights in those situa-
tions where the state is permissibly acting pursuant to its police power, or where the
federal government is acting according to its constitutional prerogatives. See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to 16-59 (2d ed. 1988). However,
in either of these instances, the governing entity must still pass the Court formulated
strict scrutiny test for statutes and other regulations which infringe on the due process
and equal protection rights of the individual. The reasoning behind such a stringent test
is that neither the states nor the federal government are empowered to regulate these
rights under the Constitution. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 4,
§ 11.4, at 357, § 11.7, at 367. This reasoning will be elaborated upon in the following
sections of this comment.
62. 'See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 195-205 (1980). Prior articles attempt to establish the existence of Commerce
Clause "rights" by relying on precedential use of the term by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1. The point of the follow-
ing historical discussion in the text is to avoid any misapplication of these usages,
which were derived from specific sets of facts before the Court, by establishing a com-
1991]
274
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/14
Nova Law Review
of individual rights, if it must be attributed to some point of origin in
United States history, evolved from the "natural law" concept which
flourished in the 18th and 19th centuries.63 During this time, all
branches of the federal and state governments were considered to have
a limited "sphere of authority defined by the nature and function of
that level or branch and by the inherent rights of citizens."64 These
"inherent rights" included the rights to personal security and liberty,
and the right to keep private property. They were rights that in no way
could be limited by the government, simply because its authority and
jurisdiction did not include such a power.6 5 The natural law concept
was a guide to the Court even after ratification of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868, when it would seem that the Court would no
longer need the concept.6"
As discussed above, the fourteenth amendment was passed with
the intent to provide federal authorities with the means to protect due
process and equal protection rights of people who were plagued in the
South by the Ku Klux Klan. These are the same rights which the Su-
preme Court previously included in the natural law category. However,
the Court construed the fourteenth amendment's protection quite nar-
rowly when presented with the Slaughter-House Case.?.17 The reason
for this restricted reading was the Court's fear that the fourteenth
amendment's scope would expand so much that the Court would find
itself adjudicating cases which were properly within the states' jurisdic-
tion.68 However, the amalgamation of the natural law concept and the
mon definition of rights that can be applied to the Commerce Clause analysis.
63. L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-1, at 560, § 15-3, at 1309-10.
64. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 565.
67. Id. at 562. The Slaughter-House Cases (Butchers' Benevolent Association v.
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co.) decision was that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth amendment guaranteed only those
rights of national citizenship including, as the Court stated in dicta, the right,
to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon
that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its
protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He
has the right of free access to its seaports, through which all operations of
foreign commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices, and
courts of justice in the several States.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,
44 (1867)).
68. L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-1, at 565. Recall that this was a period in his-
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language of the fourteenth amendment would alleviate this fear and
allow the Court to embark upon its now infamous journey into the
Lochner era.69 The crux of the line of cases during this period was the
Court's move toward review of government regulations with an eye to
substantive economic due process based on the fourteenth amendment
and natural law concepts.
The Court used the well established limits of natural law to limit
the reach of the fourteenth amendment, and thus protect the states'
existing field of sovereign rights. As Professor Tribe states, "D]ust as
inherent limitations on government guided natural law scrutiny of leg-
islative action, so could they guide federal judicial review under the
fourteenth amendment."1 0 The important development of this time was
the individual right to freedom of contract which arose from the natu-
ral law aspect of the Court's review under the fourteenth amendment.7 1
The freedom of contract theory's evolution began with Allgeyer v. Lou-
isiana,'7 2 continued with Lochner v. New York, 73 and ended with West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish.74 For purposes of this comment, it is sufficient
to note that freedom of contract was an individual right derived from
the now discredited field of substantive economic due process review.
However, the natural law concept underlying the Court's review in this
area is useful in forming a definition of the rights implicated by 42
U.S.C. § 1983.Y
tory when the Court was much less willing to grant power to the federal government at
the cost of diminishing the states' sovereign rights.
69. Id. at 565-66.
70. Id. at 565.
71. Specifically, freedom of contract arose from the natural law concept of the
individual's right to personal liberty. Professor Tribe states that the Court in Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), "warned that the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause pro-
tected the freedom to contract and prevented arbitrary deprivations of common-law
liberty--deprivations which by definition could not amount to exercises of the police
power, whose mission was the protection of common-law rights." L. TRIBE, supra note
61, § 8-1, at 566 (emphasis in original). Freedom of contract was derived of the natural
law because the government could not interfere with the individual's exercise of this
right. Interference with this right was not part of the nature and function of the gov-
ernment entity. Thus, freedom of contract was seen as a limit on the scope of the
individual rights created by the fourteenth amendment, because the Court was already
well versed in the limits of the individual's right to personal liberty.
72. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
73. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-2, at 567.
75. As the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland stated:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this
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Merging the plain meaning and legislative history of section 1983
with the theory underlying the natural law notion results in a definition
of "rights." The plain meaning reveals only that any rights which may
exist under the Constitution and federal laws will be included in section
1983's coverage.76 The legislative history of section 1983 reveals that
the Forty-second Congress intended the statute to reach those depriva-
tions of due process and equal protection rights which the people of the
South suffered during the reconstruction period after the Civil War. 7
What makes these fourteenth amendment guarantees "rights" lies in
the natural law concept which was commonly accepted when both sec-
tion 1983 and the fourteenth amendment were created. As Professor
Tribe states, natural law considered that governing entities were lim-
ited by both the "nature and function" of the entity and by the "inher-
ent rights" of the citizens governed by the entity. 8 Stated another way,
the government was powerless to infringe upon the inherent rights of
the people, due to the concept of natural law, because it was not part of
the nature and function of this entity to do so. It follows then that the
rights held by people under the fourteenth amendment, the rights
which were in the express contemplation of Congress while enacting
section 1983, are immune from government interference because the
purpose of this amendment was to take away the states' power to ram-
pantly continue their interference.79
The definition of "rights" can now be placed on this framework of
section 1983's plain meaning and legislative history, and the natural
Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection
to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the Lochner era demon-
strates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial in-
tervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court [footnote omitted]. That history counsels caution
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment ....
431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). Implicit in this language is the fact that the Court will
continue to draw on concepts of the past, such as natural law concepts, in order to
define certain rights which may be implicated in the future.
76. See supra part A of this section.
77. Id.
78. See L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-1, at 560, § 15-3, at 1:309-10.
79. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-52 n.10 (1966). This con-
struction of fourteenth amendment rights is as applicable today as it was at the turn of
the century. Though fourteenth amendment rights are not impervious to government
burdens, the governing body must demonstrate some compelling interest for the bur-
den; otherwise, the encroachment is constitutionally invalid. See supra note 61.
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law. Rights are all things which inure to the person upon which that
person can claim to be free of governmental action. 0 The term "all" is
derived from the plain meaning of the word "any" used in section
1983, because by this language, Congress intended that the statute
cover all rights which may exist under the Constitution and federal
laws.
Several courts and commentators have argued about the scope of
section 1983 rights being a factor in determining whether a particular
phrase in the Constitution confers rights within the meaning of this
statute. 1 Questioning the scope of section 1983 rights is inconsequen-
tial to a determination of what the rights are, because defining the
scope of section 1983 rights merely begs the question. As discussed in
part A of this section, the language employed in section 1983, "any
rights," clearly shows that if a right exists, it is within the ambit of
section 1983 rights. Basing the definition of rights upon fourteenth
amendment considerations in no way subtracts from this scope. Rather,
the focus of the fourteenth amendment argument is on this amend-
ment's underlying rights existing as a subset of those rights which are
characteristically immune from governmental interference. This defini-
tion does not attempt to limit section 1983 rights to those included in
the fourteenth amendment, or any other constitutional provision. In-
deed, it is illogical to say that fourteenth amendment rights are in-
80. Professor Choper is in accord with this definition. See generally Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review,
86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). In his discussion of individual rights versus states' rights,
Choper observes that "[tihe essence of the individual rights claim is that no organ of
government, national or state, may undertake the challenged activity." Id. at 1555. The
very reason this is a right is because the right is immune from government interference
in the same way as the above definition of rights is described. In contrast to individual
rights violations, Choper states that there is the scenario "[w]hen the contention is
made that the national government has engaged in activity beyond its delegated au-
thority, or when it is alleged that an attempted state regulation intrudes into an area of
exclusively national concern . . . ." Id. In this circumstance, it is conceded that either
the state or the federal government has the power to act, "the issue is simply whether
the particular level that has acted is the constitutionally proper one," not whether some
individual right has been violated. Id. As will be discussed in section three of this arti-
cle, this distinction is crucial in determining whether the Commerce Clause confers
individual rights, because a right cannot exist in an area where one of the governmental
actors has the power to act at the exclusion of the others.
81. See, e.g., Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900); Thompson v. New
York, 487 F. Supp 212 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D.
Fla. 1978); Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at 184; Comment,
The Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 764.
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cluded in section 1983, but that other rights under the Constitution and
laws are not, in the face of the absolute use of the term "any" to mod-
ify "rights."
Section 1983's legislative history reveals that the rights Congress
intended to protect were those that "inured" to the individual, for ex-
ample, under the fourteenth amendment. Finally, the natural law con-
cept, upon which the fourteenth amendment and section 1983 were
based, dictates that these "things" are rights because they define the
limits of government power. The next section considers whether a right
exists under the Commerce Clause in light of this definition of the term
"rights."
III. The Relationship Between Rights and the Commerce
Clause
Section one of this comment noted that in its Consolidated
Freightways Corp. v. Kassel decision, the Eighth Circuit avoided defin-
ing a right before concluding that the Commerce Clause does not se-
cure any rights. s2 The court reasoned that the Commerce Clause served
only to alter the power structure between the state and federal govern-
ments, not to secure section 1983 rights.8" Though the court cited in
detail many authorities to support its proposition, it failed to explain
why the Commerce Clause served only to allocate power.8 4 In fact, the
allocation hypothesis is based on the idea that commerce is subject to
regulation by both the state and federal governments. The Supreme
Court has recognized this principle since the time of Gibbons v.
Ogden 5 and Cooley v. Board of Wardens.8 6 The Commerce Clause
82. 730 F.2d at 1144.
83. Id.
84. The same issue has been discussed in the context of the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, which has also been deemed a power allocation provision. See Note,
Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1060 (1987)); cf. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444,
449 (1989) (stating, "the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, does not create rights
enforceable under [section] 1983 . . .").
85. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196 (Congress' power to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause, "like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, rqay be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the [C]onstitution.").
86. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Cooley established the dormant commerce
clause doctrine which relies on the principle that "if the item [to be regulated] is such
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acts to shift the power of commercial regulation between the state and
federal governments. Where Congress has passed regulatory legislation
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, the states are precluded from
occupying the field with their own statutes.8 7 Where Congress has not
acted to regulate commerce in a particular area, the states may be al-
lowed to do so under the dormant commerce clause doctrine.88 The
Commerce Clause thus serves to allocate power between Congress and
the States because in any given context, commerce between the states
is subject to regulatory power, and the Commerce Clause determines
which entity may exercise this power. The final question is whether a
right cognizable under section 1983 exists within this structure of the
Commerce Clause. This inquiry reveals that the bifurcated nature of a
right, that which inures to the individual and must be free from gov-
ernment interference for its existence, precludes the existence of a right
under the Commerce Clause.
A. Does the Commerce Clause Inure to the Individual?
The first step in determining whether the Commerce Clause
secures an individual right for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purposes is to discover
whether the Commerce Clause provides for something which inures to
the individual. This inquiry reveals a possible problem with the alloca-
tion of power hypothesis. At least one commentator has asserted that if
the Commerce Clause serves only to allocate power with disregard to
the individual who is affected, then this individual should not have
standing to bring an action seeking invalidation of a state statute which
violates the Commerce Clause,8 when in actuality he does.90 The argu-
ment continues that because individuals do have standing to bring
that national uniformity is necessitated, then [c]ongressional power is exclusive[, but
if] the item is representative of a peculiarly local concern (even though within the
reach of the [c]ongressional [C]ommerce [C]lause power ... ) warranting a diversity
of treatment, then concurrent state regulation is authorized in the absence of congres-
sional preemption." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 8.4, at 266.
87. This was the issue presented in Gibbons where New York's licensing law was
in direct conflict with that enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Because the statute was within Congress' Commerce
Clause power, the Supremacy Clause acted to invalidate the conflicting state statute. L.
TRIBE, supra note 61, § 5-4, at 306.
88. L. TRIBE, supra note 61, §5-4, at 306.
89. Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at 167-69.
90. See J. CHOPER, supra note 62, at 209.
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Commerce Clause challenges, an implied right exists under this Clause,
which is within the meaning of section 1983 rights. The Commerce
Clause is thus seen to "inure or work for" the use of the individual,
and, therefore, to confer an individual right. However, this conclusion
is not required by the standing doctrine. Further analysis reveals that
even though the Commerce Clause inures to the individual in some re-
spects, it does not provide for individual rights due to its power allocat-
ing nature.
Though the Commerce Clause serves to allocate power between
the state and federal governments, this is not to say that individuals are
not affected by the Commerce Clause. The individual can, and usually
does, have standing in federal courts to challenge a statute that bur-
dens interstate commerce.9" The reason lies in the elements of standing
which the Supreme Court has developed based on Article III of the
Constitution: namely, personal stake, injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability.92 Based only on the Commerce Clause as an allocation
provision between the state and federal governments, these elements
are easily satisfied using Dennis v. State"3 as an example.
The Nebraska tax statutes applied to tractor-trailer rigs registered
in states other than Nebraska.94 On this basis, the statutes were de-
clared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.95 Dennis' tractor
was within this class affected by the unconstitutional statutes,96 there-
fore, he had a personal stake in the outcome of the case. Enforcement
of the unconstitutional tax statutes directly caused Dennis to be de-
prived of his money. 91 This satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.
Dennis' injury is individuated in that the statutes impacted directly on
the tractor he owned, as well as those similarly situated.98 Finally, the
judicial remedy, in this case an injunction barring enforcement of the
statutes, served to alleviate the harm caused by the statutes.99
Since the elements of the standing doctrine are satisfied, Dennis
91. Id.
92. The Article III "case or controversy" requirement derives from U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 3-14, at 108.
93. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676 (1990).
94. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutes that
were in issue.
95. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
96. Id. at 442, 451 N.W.2d at 685.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
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would have standing to bring the case into federal court. But at no
point in this analysis is it necessary, or even helpful, to say that an
individual right must exist under the Commerce Clause in order for the
individual to have standing in the federal courts. However, it is appar- -
ent that Dennis is somehow affected by the Clause's operation in this
case, and that this operation inures to him as an individual, because
applying the Clause to invalidate the Nebraska statutes is a direct ben-
efit to Dennis who no longer has to pay the taxes while driving in the
state. Thus, it is possible to satisfy the "inures to the individual" part
of the definition of "rights" related in section two.
A Commerce Clause plaintiff must also satisfy the Court's pruden-
tial standing requirements.100 As the Supreme Court stated, "a plaintiff
may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the
judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where
no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the fed-
eral courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." 101
Use of the term "individual rights" would seem to imply that if the
Court recognizes the plaintiff's standing to sue, it must also, impliedly,
recognize that the plaintiff is vindicating a right. Further, because the
Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to sue based on state violations of
the Commerce Clause, this arguably implies that the plaintiffs are vin-
dicating an individual right under this Clause. However, this conclusion
does not follow from a consideration of the Court's prudential standing
elements.
Three "prudential principles" exist which can bar a litigant from
suing in federal court.' 0 2 The Commerce Clause litigant easily meets
all three of these requirements without the hypothesized implication of
100. See Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at 168-69.
101. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (em-
phasis added). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (distinguishing between,
and describing, the Article III case or controversy and prudential standing
requirements).
102. These principles are: "plaintiff's interest must come within the 'zone of in-
terests' arguably protected or regulated by the law in question, [Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);] ...the courts will
not hear 'generalized grievances' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens, [United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974);] . . .[and] plain-
tiff must assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties, [Tileston v.
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943)]." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at
70-71 (4th ed. 1983). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 3-14, at 108 (discussing the
Court's prudential standing requirements).
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an individual right under the Commerce Clause. This is evident by
again using Dennis v. State0 3 as an example.
First, Dennis was in the "zone of interests" regulated by the Ne-
braska tax statutes, because he was within the class of people who had
to pay road-use taxes pursuant to the statutory scheme.o4 The second
tier of the prudential standing limitations is satisfied, because Dennis'
complaint is more than a generalized grievance shared by citizens at
large. Rather, Dennis sustained injury-in-fact by having to pay one to
two cents per mile of highway driven in Nebraska due to this state's
error in enacting the tax statutes. 0 5 Finally, though Dennis can be seen
to have asserted Congress' interests under the Commerce Clause in
protecting interstate commerce from burdensome state statutes by
seeking to enjoin their enforcement, Dennis was also asserting his own
interests in alleviating the injury caused him by the unconstitutional
Nebraska tax statutes. Thus, even though assertion of Congress'
"rights" helped Dennis in his case against Nebraska, the point of Den-
nis' complaint was not vindication of Congress' interests, but vindica-
tion of his own injury, lost money, caused by the Nebraska statutes.
With this, Dennis' complaint satisfies the Court's prudential standing
elements without invoking an individual right under the Commerce
Clause.
As this example demonstrates, satisfaction of the Supreme Court's
prudential standing requirements is not predicated on the plaintiff's as-
sertion of an individual right under the Commerce Clause. The simple
fact that the plaintiff had to, for instance, pay money when he was not
legally obliged to do so is sufficient to satisfy these standing require-
ments. The prudential standing limitations do not necessitate the plain-
tiff's assertion of his own rights. Rather, the plaintiff need only show
sustained injury in order to overcome the prudential standing hurdle.
Commerce Clause plaintiffs meet this requirement due to the economic
injury, as in the Dennis case, caused to them by enforcement of state
statutes which violate the Commerce Clause. 0 6 However, it is apparent
103. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676 (1990).
104. Id. at 442, 451 N.W.2d at 685.
105. Id. See also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
6.3, at 327 (1985) (stating that this element requires a showing of injury-in-fact).
106. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), is also a case where the prudential
standing limitations were met based on economic injury. The Court allowed the plain-
tiff doctor to assert the constitutional rights of his patients where enforcement of the
state statute against the patients would have caused the doctor injury in the form of
lost medical fees. Also, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
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here, as with the Article III standing analysis above, that the Com-
merce Clause does provide some protection which inures to the individ-
ual. For the Clause to confer an individual right, though, it must also
protect the individual from government action at both the state and
federal levels.
B. Does the Commerce Clause Enable the Individual to be Free
from Government Interference?
The Commerce Clause falls short as a provision for rights due to
its failure to provide something that could be called a right upon which
a person could claim to be free of government interference. The district
court opinion in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel explicitly
recognized this principle by quoting Professor Choper's work in the
field of federalism. 107 The court relied on Choper's statement that
"'[t]he essence of a claim . ..which falls into the individual rights
category of constitutional issues .. .is that no organ of government,
national or state, may undertake the challenged activity'" to distin-
guish rights from benefits under the Commerce Clause.10 8 The court
quoted further from Choper: "'In contrast, when a person alleges that
one of the federalism provisions of the Constitution has been violated,
he implicitly concedes that one of the two levels of' govern-
ment-national or state-has power to engage in the questioned con-
duct,'" and stated that "[t]he dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause doctrine is
clearly a 'federalism' provision within Prof[essor] Choper's framework,
because a dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause action does not deny govern-
ment power altogether . . . ,,.o8
The district court's reasoning in Consolidated Freightways Corp.
relied on the notion that the Commerce Clause is a power allocating
provision of the Constitution, as evidenced by the court's recognition
that commerce is subject to regulation, and that it is just a matter of
which "level" of government can regulate within the Commerce Clause
1124 (1977), the Court found standing with a dealer of 3.2% beer who asserted the
equal protection rights of males under an Oklahoma drinking age statute which injured
the dealer due to the lost profits of sales to the restricted males.
107. 556 F. Supp. 740, 746 (1983), affid, 730 F.2d 1139 (1984). In affirming the
district court's reasoning, the court of appeals noted that the district court opinion was
"well reasoned." Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d at 1143.
108. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 556 F. Supp. at 746 (quoting J. CHOPER,
supra note 62, at 175).
109. Id.
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limitations. As this comment's definition of rights states, in order for a
right to exist, the individual who claims its existence must also be able
to claim that the right is free from government interference or revoca-
tion. As the court concludes in Consolidated Freightways Corp., based
in part on Choper's reasoning, because the Commerce Clause always
admits to at least one government entity with power over commerce,
the concomitant presence of a right is precluded due to the nature of
that right's existence, requiring freedom from government power at all
levels."'
However, the question arises that if the Commerce Clause does
not secure rights, then how is the individual affected by the operation
of this clause? The answer was succinctly given by the Eighth Circuit
in Consolidated Freightways Corp.: "[I]ndividuals are oftentimes
benefitted through the indirect protection resulting from the limitations
placed on the states through the dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause doctrine
... ,,11 The court's statement is true in the sense that what individu-
als derive from the Commerce Clause can be taken away at an instant.
This is the nature of a benefit as the word is used by the above court.
No matter what it is called, the effect of the Commerce Clause on the
individual is not a right, because the effect, whether beneficial or not,
can be legislated away by the state or federal government at any time.
The distinction, therefore, between a right and a benefit is that a right
exists of its own force and is not subject to government action abridg-
ing its exercise by the individual. A benefit, on the other hand, exists
according to some governmental provision which can be taken away at
any time. This distinction is clear in Champion v. Ames" 2 where the
Court upheld federal legislation, enacted pursuant to Congress' Com-
merce Clause power, which forbade the interstate transport of lottery
tickets. If there is an individual right to engage in the interstate com-
merce of lottery tickets, or to be free of state statutes which forbid such
commerce, how is it that Congress can eradicate this right? By nature,
a right is something that cannot be taken away by government, such as
the right to free speech under the first amendment, or the right to be
free of warrantless searches and seizures under the fourth amend-
ment. 1 3 Therefore, Congress, as well as the states, should not be able
to take away the "right" to engage in interstate transport of lottery
110. Id. at 748.
111. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d at 1145.
112. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
113. See supra section two of this comment.
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tickets, or to be free of state statutes which do this, under the Com-
merce Clause if it confers a right. The answer to the question lies in
the fact that it is based on an improper premise that a right exists
under the Commerce Clause.
Before the congressional legislation banning transport of lottery
tickets, the individual could claim the benefit, under the Commerce
Clause's allocation of power to Congress, of being free to transport lot-
tery tickets in interstate commerce. This is not a right though, because
Congress could act at any time, as" it did, to forbid the transport."14 The
individual also does not have the right to be free of state statutes which
forbid this commerce because either Congress could act to allow the
states to do this, or the Court may determine that the state was pursu-
ing a permissible governmental interest in forbidding the transport.1 5
Either way, the freedom to engage in interstate commerce is subject to
termination by a government entity, termination which is not compati-
ble with the existence of a right but which is compatible with the exis-
tence of a benefit. This distinction made between rights and benefits
under the Commerce Clause by the court in Consolidated Freightways
Corp. is viable, and is supported by the Nebraska Supreme Court's
decision in Dennis v. State and the cases cited therein. 16
IV. Cases in Support of the Commerce Clause as an
Allocation Provision
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Dennis v. State, relied on the
majority of cases speaking to the "rights" issue which held that the
Commerce Clause, as a power allocation provision of the Constitution,
did not include individual rights as the term is used in 42 U.S.C. §
1983.117 The foremost authority in this area is the court of appeals
opinion in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, based on the
number of courts which have adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in
this case. These courts concluded, as the Nebraska Supreme Court and
the Eighth Circuit did, that the nature of the Commerce Clause as a
114. Champion, 188 U.S. at 325.
115. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
116. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676.
117. Id at 427, 451 N.W.2d at 676. It was stated in Private Truck Council of
America v. Quinn, that "the weight of authority" supports the prior decisions that
violation of the Commerce Clause "is not cognizable in an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983." 476 U.S. 1129 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and O'Connor
joined in this dissent.).
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power allocation provision of the Constitution precludes the existence
of an individual right for the purposes of a section 1983 claim of relief.
One of the cases which adopted the Consolidated Freightways
Corp. reasoning was Kraft v. Jackax" 8 which involved "a section 1983
action against members of the Nevada Gaming Control Board after the
board refused to extend further licensing to the plaintiffs when their 1-
year limited gaming licenses expired." 119 The plaintiffs argued that
their Commerce Clause "rights" had been violated when the Gaming
Board issued a stop order on the sale of out-of-state securities in which
plaintiffs had an interest.120 Relying in part on the Consolidated
Freightways Corp. decision, the Ninth Circuit stated, "assuming that
the Board's actions in any way implicated the Commerce Clause, the
plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action under [section] 1983 for viola-
tion of the Clause" because the Clause was an allocation of power pro-
vision which the section 1983 remedy was not intended to cover.12 x
Thus, the court relied on the allocation of power concept to deny the
existence of a right under the Commerce Clause.
Another case which relied on the Consolidated Freightways Corp.
allocation of power concept was Pesticide Public Policy Foundation v.
Village of Wauconda,22 involving a Village ordinance which regulated
the use of pesticides within its jurisdiction. Among other claims, the
Foundation asserted that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause,
and sought attorney's fees for its members pursuant to a section 1983
claim.'2 In dictum, after the court decided that the Foundation did not
have standing to sue on behalf of its members for fees, the court stated
that the "Commerce Clause relates not to individual rights, but rather
to the distribution of power between the state and federal govern-
118. 872 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1989).
119. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 433, 451 N.W.2d at 680.
120. Kraft, 872 F.2d at 869.
121. Id. The court also relied on its own decision in White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987).
That case involved an Arizona taxing scheme which the plaintiff Tribe alleged con-
flicted with federal regulations, and was, therefore, in violation of the Supremacy
Clause. Id. at 846. The plaintiff succeeded in overcoming the state statute but failed in
its attempt to secure attorney's fees under section 1988 for a violation of Supremacy
Clause rights. Id. at 850. The Ninth Circuit viewed the Supremacy Clause as a provi-
sion, like the Commerce Clause, which allocates power between the state and federal
governments. Id. at 849. See also Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1.
122. 622 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1985), afid, 826 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 426.
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ments" and on this basis, concluded that section 1983 does not support
violations of the Commerce Clause.12 4 With this, the court accepted the
allocation of powers concept and held that attorney's fees could not be
awarded for a Commerce Clause violation.
The Tenth Circuit, in J & J Anderson v. Town of Erie,125 also
denied section 1988 attorney's fees for Commerce Clause violations
based on the allocation of power concept. The Town of Erie passed an
ordinance which prohibited certain airplanes from landing within its
borders. 12 The ordinance was later repealed, but the plaintiff sought
attorney's fees for the violation of, among other things, his rights under
the Commerce Clause. 27 The court concluded that "[t]he Commerce
Clause . . ., although limiting the power of the states to interfere in
areas of national concern, [does] not secure rights cognizable under
[section] 1983," and denied the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees
under section 1988.128 With this, the Tenth Circuit also fell in line with
those cases stating that the Commerce Clause, as a constitutional pro-
vision which serves to allocate power between the levels of government,
does not confer section 1983 rights. 29
Several federal courts would expressly allow the Commerce Clause
124. Id. at 435-36. The Pesticide court also relied on the Seventh Circuit holding
in Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 750
F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1984), which in turn relied on the Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
730 F.2d 1139, allocation of power analysis, that the Supremacy Clause does not se-
cure rights within the meaning of section 1983. Pesticide Pub. Policy Found., 622 F.
Supp. at 435.
125. 767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 1471.
127. Id. at 1472.
128. Id. at 1476.
129. Several state cases also denied section 1988 attorney's fees for Commerce
Clause violations, based on the allocation of powers reasoning in Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139. See, e.g., State v. Private Truck Council, Inc., 258 Ga.
531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988) (Georgia highway-user tax statutes violating the Com-
merce Clause did not implicate section 1983 rights); Private Truck Council, Inc. v.
State, 221 N.J. Super. 89, 534 A.2d 13 (1987), af'd, 111 N.J. 214, 544 A.2d 33
(1988) (retaliatory New Jersey tax on out-of-state truckers violating the Commerce
Clause does not violate any section 1983 rights); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Secre-
tary of State, 503 A.2d 214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986) (reciprocal
Maine taxes on out-of-state truckers which violated the Commerce Clause did not im-
plicate rights under section 1983); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. State, 128 N.H. 466,
517 A.2d 1150 (1986) (relying on Private Truck Council, Inc., 503 A.2d 214, to state
that section 1983 rights are not involved with state statutes that burden interstate com-
merce by taxing trucks registered in other states).
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cause of action under section 1983 in opposition to the authorities
above. One of these is Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v.
Moe.130 In an action seeking to enjoin enforcement of a Montana tax of
cigarette sales by the plaintiff tribes, an issue was raised by the defend-
ant that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1341 which prohibits, among other things, enjoining state tax-
ation where an efficient remedy can be had in the state's courts.' 3' In
the court's conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 granted subject matter
jurisdiction over the tribes' claims, the court also stated that it had
jurisdiction over the individual plaintiffs' claims under the jurisdictional
counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), because these
plaintiffs had alleged violations of the Commerce Clause which secured
rights cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.132 The basis for the court's
conclusion was a prior statement made by the Supreme Court in Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp. that the section 1983 phrase "'rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws includes
not only [f]ourteenth [a]mendment .rights, but '[all of] the Constitu-
tion [and] laws of the United States.' "133 The district court's reliance
on Lynch was improper, and did not serve to prove that section 1983
rights exist under the Commerce Clause.
The Lynch Court's dictum was not stated pursuant to a determina-
tion under the Commerce Clause. Instead, the case dealt with whether
there was a viable distinction between personal and property rights for
purposes of a section 1983 claim of relief under the fourteenth amend-
ment.' Also, and perhaps more importantly, the Court's statement
only revealed the intent to apply section 1983 to rights which existed
beyond the fourteenth amendment context and did so without defining
these rights.135 Thus, the Kootenai conclusion, based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Lynch does not support a conclusion that individual
rights exist under the Commerce Clause.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in affirming the decision in Koo-
tenai, made statements which also discredit the district court's decision
130. 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1974), affid on other grounds, 425 U.S. 463
(1976).
131. Id. at 1301-02.
132. Id. at 1304.
133. Id. at 1305 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 n.16 (1972)).
134. Lynch, 405 U.S. at 542.
135. Id. at 556.
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that the Commerce Clause conferred section 1983 rights." 6 First, the
Court decided the case based only on the tribes' claims.13 The Court
went on to say in a footnote that "if only the individual Indians have
standing to sue for refunds, their claims must be properly grounded
jurisdictionally."1 38 This statement called into question the district
court's belief that the individual plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claims
implicated rights which provided jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although not dispositive, the Court's
dictum suggests that the district court acted improperly in predicating
jurisdiction on an alleged Commerce Clause rights violation. 39
The court in Kennecott Corp. v. Smith would also allow the sec-
tion 1983 claim of relief under the Commerce Clause.14 The court
considered whether to invalidate a New Jersey statute which the plain-
tiff alleged was in conflict with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1"1
In determining whether the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2283, barred plaintiff's request for an injunction, the court stated that
"actions brought under [section] 1983, such as this case, are explicit
exceptions to the anti-injunction act."'' 4  In a footnote, the court sup-
ported this statement by saying that "[t]he present action is properly
brought under section 1983 because it seeks redress for deprivations of
constitutional rights secured by the Commerce Clause and of federal
statutory rights protected by the [Securities Exchange Act,]' 43 and
cited Maine v. Thiboutot as authority.14 4
Two problems exist with relying on Thiboutot for the proposition
that the Commerce Clause secures section 1983 rights. The first is that
136. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1975).
137. Id. at 474-75, 475 n.14.
138. Id. at 468 n.7.
139. Id; see also Connor v. Rivers, 25 F. Supp. 937, 938 (N.D. Ga. 1938) (stat-
ing that a Georgia statute violating the Commerce Clause did not affect any rights for
jurisdictional purposes under § 1343(3) (then codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(14)), aff'd
mem., 305 U.S. 576 (1939).
140. 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 183.
142. Id. at 186.
143. Id. at 186 n.5. See also Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d
558 (6th Cir. 1982) (relying solely on Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, to allow a section 1983
action under the Commerce Clause); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 608 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (similarly relying on Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, and, in turn, Kennecott Corp., 637 F.2d 181, to allow the section 1983 action
under the Commerce Clause).
144. 448 U.S. 1 (1980)
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the Kennecott Corp. court provided absolutely no reasoning for its con-
clusion, which is relegated to a footnote. 145 Second, the Thiboutot case
relied upon by the court does not stand for the propcsition that the
Commerce Clause confers individual rights. Rather, the Thiboutot
Court held that section 1983 provided a remedy for all violations of
federal statutes which create individual rights. 46 The court in Kenne-
cott relied on the Supreme Court's statement that "the section 1983
remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as
constitutional law."'x47 Either way, the reliance on Thiboutot was mis-
placed, because that case did not address whether rights existed under
the Commerce Clause. 48
145. Kennecott, 637 F.2d at 186 n.5.
146. 448 U.S. at 4.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d at 1143. Several Supreme Court
cases also seem to contradict the conclusion that the Commerce Clause supports no
individual rights due to language asserting that individuals have a right to engage in
interstate commerce. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Oklahoma
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 260 (1911); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 21 (1910); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891); Cran-
dall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). All except one of these decisions, Garrity v. New Jersey, were
handed down during the time that the freedom of contract concept was still in exis-
tence, and even Garrity expressly relied on Western Union for its decision. Garrity, 385
U.S. at 500. As stated in section two of this comment, the Lochner era relied on the
natural law inherent rights of citizens to limit government action. The Court's state-
ments that an individual right to engage in interstate commerce existed would seem to
further the natural law's application to limit state infringement on commerce between
the states. In any case, the Court's recognition of this right is strictly limited to the
theories of that time period which have since been abrogated by the Court. See also L.
TRIBE, supra note 61, §§ 8-5 to 8-6 (generally describing the reasons for the downfall
of Lochnerism). Abandonment of these theories "restricted the ability of the Justices to
rely upon a natural law or openly subjective basis for defining liberty and individual
constitutional rights." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 11.7, at
367. Since the Court's abrogation of the theories which supported the Lochner era
cases, the Court was no longer in a position to declare that a right to engage in inter-
state commerce existed, because the foundation for such a statement had been wiped
away. This is evident because the Court has never since mentioned a right to engage in
interstate commerce. This lack of authority is what provided the impetus for the de
novo determination of whether a right existed under the Commerce Clause in cases
such as Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139, and Dennis v. State, 234
Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676, and law review articles like Note, Dormant Commerce
Clause Claims, supra note 1. It is also evident due to the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari to Dennis in order to finally resolve the issue of Commerce Clause rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dennis v. Higgins, 110 S. Ct 2559 (1990).
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In light of the predominant body of case law, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court understandably denied the plaintiff's claim under section
1983 for violation of alleged Commerce Clause rights.1 49 The majority
of courts which have considered this issue relied on the power allocat-
ing nature of the Commerce Clause to conclude that the Clause does
not provide for individual rights, which would allow a claim for attor-
ney's fees under section 1988 based on a section 1983 right. The only
problem with the reasoning of these authorities is their failure to ade-
quately consider why the Commerce Clause serves only to allocate
power between the different levels of government, and to define the
term "rights" before concluding that the power allocating nature of the
Commerce Clause precludes the existence of rights under this
Clause. 150 However, by carefully defining 42 U.S.C. § 1983's use of
rights,1 51 and closely examining the relationship of the Commerce
Clause with the federal and state governments, and within history,1 52
the above discussion shows that the reasoning employed by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in Dennis v. State, as well as those cases which
serve to support Dennis, was well founded.153
Conclusion
As evidenced by the grant of certiorari in the Nebraska case of
Dennis v. State, the Supreme Court is concerned with the issue of
whether the Commerce Clause protects individual rights cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which can be used to base an award of attor-
ney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. By examining the plain meaning
and legislative history of section 1983, it is possible to develop a con-
crete definition of a right, a definition which reveals that its existence
requires freedom from government action. When this definition is inter-
twined with a consideration of the purposes which give life to the Com-
merce Clause, the result is that the power allocating nature of this con-
stitutional clause, necessary for the commercial security of a country
149. Dennis, 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676.
150. See supra note 8 and accompanying text, which references other articles
that have recognized this flaw.
151. See supra section two of this article, stating that a right is anything which
inures to the person upon which that person can claim to be free of government action.
152. See supra section three of this article, describing the nature of,the Com-
merce Clause as a constitutional provision which serves to allocate power between the
state and federal governments.
153. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676.
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comprised of fifty sovereign states, precludes the concurrent existence
of an individual right. Thus, the majority of courts which have consid-
ered the Commerce Clause issue and which have concluded that the
Commerce Clause does not secure rights within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to allow an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 are correct in their decisions.
Holiday Hunt Russell
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The Availability of Excess Damages in First-Party
Bad Faith Cases: A Distinction Without a Difference*
I. Introduction
Selling uninsured motorist 1 insurance coverage is big business in
the State of Florida. In 1989, insurers earned $451,151,260 as a result
of the sale of uninsured motorist policies.' This represents nearly five
percent of the over $10 billion in premiums earned from all types of
coverage.3
When an insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage or any
other type of insurance,4 the insured reasonably expects to have any
* The author expresses his gratitude to the firm of Preddy, Kutner, Hardy,
Rubinoff, Brown & Thompson; David S. Nelson and Love Phipps, Esqs.; and James
Seymour, editor of THE FLORIDA UNDERWRITER for their briefs, opinions and
statistics, and to Eric Tilton, Esq. for providing insight into the legislative intent of the
1982 and 1990 versions of the bad faith statute.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.727(1),(3) (1989) state:
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurance policy which provides bodily
injury liability coverage shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this
state with respect to any specifically insured or identified motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this state unless uninsured motorist
coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom ....
(3) For the purposes of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor ve-
hicle" shall, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be
deemed to include an insured motor vehicle when the liability insurer
thereof:
(a) Is unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its
insured within the limits specified therein because of insolvency; or
(b) Has provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which are
less than the total damages sustained by the person legally entitled to re-
cover damages.
2. 1989 Property & Casualty Statistical Report, 7 FLORIDA UNDERWRITER 36,
44-45 (July 1990). (Although references within the survey refer to "Priv. Pass. Auto."
the editor has informed this Author that the totals listed refer solely to uninsured mo-
torist coverage.).
3. Id. at 37, 44-45.
4. See United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644
F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (mortgage guaranty insurance contract); Reliance Ins.
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legitimate claim promptly paid. Unfortunately, the insured may be dis-
appointed to find that his5 friendly insurer who holds him in its "good
hands"' is applying the squeeze by refusing to pay a legitimate unin-
sured motorist claim. Until recently, the insurer, who claimed to be
"like a good neighbor," could collect uninsured motorist premiums, de-
lay or refuse to pay a valid claim for the limits of the policy, and if
faced with a judgment in excess of the policy limits, pay only the policy
limits without liability for the excess.
In 1989, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida decided Jones v. Continental Insurance Co.,7 which permit-
ted insureds to recover damages in excess of the stated policy limits, as
a matter of law, in a first party bad faith8 action. Another federal dis-
trict court has refused to apply Jones insofar as it permits recovery of
excess damages as a matter of law, holding instead that these damages
are recoverable, if proven to have been causally related to the bad
Co. v. Barile Excavating & Pipeline Co., 685 F. Supp. 839 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (insur-
ance company acting as surety on a performance bond); Forston v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (malpractice insurer-claim dismissed
as premature); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 555 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1990)
(personal injury protection benefits pursuant to section 627.736 (1983)); Kujawa v.
Manhattan Nat. Life Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1989) (life insurance); Schimmel
v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 506 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (property
damage insurance covering household goods).
5. The author does not suggest that any connotation be placed on the use of the
male pronoun in gender neutral situations. "The use of he as pronoun for nouns em-
bracing both genders is a simple, practical convention rooted in the beginnings of the
English language. He has lost all suggestion of maleness in these circumstances." W.
STRUNK & E. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (3d ed. 1979).
6. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. 331, 342, 396
A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Spaeth, J. dissenting). "The insurer's promise to
the insured to... put him in 'good hands' ... or to be 'on his side' hardly suggests that
the insurer will abandon the insured in his time of need."; See also Weese v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 115, 117 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[W]hen an insured purchases a
contract of insurance, he buys insurance-not a lot of vexatious, time-consuming, ex-
pensive litigation with his insurer.")(quoting Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Ins. Co., 352 S.E.2d 73 (W.Va. 1986)).
7. 716 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
8. Bad faith is:
The opposite of "good faith," generally implying or involving actual or
constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect
or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted
by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or
sinister motive.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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faith.9
Likewise, in the Florida state courts, decisions are in conflict. In
Wahl v. Insurance Co. of North America10 the court permitted the re-
covery of excess damages as a matter of law,"' and in McLeod v. Conti-
nental Insurance Co.,'2 the court refused to direct a verdict that excess
damages are, as a matter of law, recoverable, and further refused to
instruct the jury similarly.'- The questions whether excess damages are
recoverable and if so, whether they are recoverable as a matter of law
are currently awaiting appellate resolution.' 4
A cause of action for bad faith is not new in Florida. Indeed, it has
existed in the third party context for over fifty years.15 Florida courts
have defined a third party bad faith action as
one brought by an insured against his insurer because of its failure
to settle a third party tort claim for a reasonable sum ... where a
reasonably prudent person would do so, and the wrongful refusal to
settle exposes the insured to liability in an amount in excess of the
policy limits .... 6
The injured third party, after becoming a judgment creditor, may then
institute suit against the tortfeasor's liability insurer for the portion of
the judgment which exceeds the insured's available coverage based
upon a violation of Florida Statute section 624.155(1)(b)(1). This third
party is, in effect, a third party beneficiary of the insurance contract
9. Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 89-613-Civ-ORL-19 at 10 (M.D. Fla. 1989)
(Order dated June 26, 1990).
10. No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
11. No. 87-1187-CA(17), Excerpt of Proceedings at 20 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct.
1987).
12. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785 (1990).
13. Brief of Appellant at 20, McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 Fla. L. Weekly
(1990).
14. McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15FIa. L. Weekly 2785 (1990)(The Second
District Court of Appeal certified the following question to the Supreme Court as one
of great public importance: WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF DAM-
AGES IN A FIRST-PARTY ACTION FOR BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE
AN UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE CLAIM?). Id. at 2787. On January
10, 1991, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified the identical question to the
Florida Supreme Court in Jones v. Continental Insurance Co., 920 F.2d 847 (11 th Cir.
1991).
15. Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815,184 So. 852, (1939).
16. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339, 341 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
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between the defendant and the defendant's insurer.17 Throughout the
United States, courts have rendered a plethora of decisions in bad faith
cases - particularly third party bad faith cases. The same is not true of
first party bad faith", which has arguably existed for less than 20 years
in the United States and only since 198219 or 198320 in Florida.
While the insurer/insured relationship in third party bad faith
cases is relatively settled,21 the same cannot be said for the insurer/
insured relationship in first party bad faith cases,22 where an insured
seeks payment of his own claim from his insurance company. Within
the past decade, cases such as Jones, Wahl, McLeod, and Cocuzzi v.
Allstate Insurance Co. 23 have drawn the attention of the insurance in-
dustry and the trial bar. Of particular interest to both plaintiffs and
defendants are those decisions addressing the damages recoverable in a
first party bad faith case, especially damages in excess 24 of the unin-
sured motorist coverage. "
This Note will first provide a brief overview of bad faith law in the
United States and particularly in Florida. The overview will begin with
17. Cardenas v. Miami-Dade Yellow Cab Co., 538 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
18. First party bad faith exists where "the insured is seeking payment of his own
claim from the insurance company." Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp. 937,
940 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
19. FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1982).
20. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 69 n.5, (4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983), petition denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983).
21. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Guttierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, (Fla. 1980), on
remand, 388 So. 2d 54, (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922
(1981); Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975).
22. Compare, Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1973), cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975) (There is no fiduciary relation-
ship between he insured and insurer with respect to an uninsured motorist claim. In-
sured and insurer occupy a debtor-creditor relationship - excess damages in a first
party claim denied.) with Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 69
n.5, (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (First party action unavailable because it arose prior to
section 624.155, however, Judge Hurley's concurring opinion recognizes the statute's
applicability to both first and third party claims.); Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 670 F.
Supp. 937 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
23. No. 89-613-Civ-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
24. The author addresses only those damages assessed in excess of the stated
policy limits. Excess damages are those types of damages which exceed the policy lim-
its but would be covered under the terms of the policy as opposed to punitive damages
assessed as a penalty for prohibited conduct. See FLA. STAT. § 624.155(4) (1989).
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third party bad faith through its evolution into first party bad faith,
including a discussion of the availability of excess damages - essential
to an understanding of the Jones v. Continental Insurance Co.s5 cases.
Next, this Note will examine the court's opinions in Jones along with
reference to Cocuzzi, McLeod and Wahl. Finally, the impact of Jones
as well as prior and subsequent cases and section 624.155 will be ana-
lyzed. The author will present an argument that the language of sec-
tion 624.155 leaves no other reasonable conclusion except that excess
damages are recoverable, as a matter of law, in first party bad faith
cases and that Florida courts should permit insureds to recover excess
damages in first party bad faith cases.
II. Background
Uninsured motorist coverage, also referred to as underinsured mo-
torist coverage,2 6 is unlike any other type of insurance. In Florida, 27 as
in most states, 8 uninsured motorist coverage is mandatory in all insur-
ance policies, subject to the express rejection of such coverage by the
insured.29 Uninsured motorist coverage has been described as a "hy-
brid" or a blending of first and third party insurance."0 It bears a re-
semblance to first party insurance, specifically medical insurance, but it
also functions in the third party form because it becomes effective when
the uninsured motorist is legally at fault.3' Uninsured motorist cover-
age then becomes, in effect, the liability insurance coverage for the un-
insured motorist.
A clear understanding of the current status of Florida first party
bad faith 2 law must begin with a brief review of the principles of Flor-
25. Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp 937 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Jones v.
Continental Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Jones v. Continental Ins. 920
F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1991).
26. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3)(b) (1989).
27. Id. § 627.727 (1989).
28. All states require some form of uninsured motorist coverage. The District of
Columbia, although not requiring uninsured motorist coverage to be purchased by in-
sureds, does require insurers to contribute to an uninsured motorist fund. See, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-2114 (1988).
29. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1989).
30. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.9(e) (1988).
31. Id.; Florida Statute section 627.727(l) (1989) requires uninsured motorist
coverage "for the protection of persons insured hereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles .... "
32. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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ida third party bad faith law.3 3 The Florida Supreme Court, in Auto
Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw,34 first pronounced that an insurance
contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
between the parties in the context of a third party claim.3 5 The insurer,
in conducting the defense of its insured, must exercise that degree of
care which a person of ordinary care and prudence would exercise in
the management of that person's own business.3 6
A. Duty of Good Faith Extended to First Parties
In 1980 the Florida Supreme Court expanded the parameters of
bad faith in Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. v. Guttierrez.3 7 Building
on the fiduciary relationship announced in Shaw, the court in Boston
Old Colony recognized that in a third party situation, where the in-
sured's fate was in the hands of the insurer, 8 the insurer must "exer-
cise such control and make such decisions in good faith and with due
regard for the interests of the insured."3 9 If the insurer breaches this
common law duty of good faith in a third party situation, the insurer
may be liable for amounts in excess of the policy limits"0 and for puni-
tive damages, if the insurer's conduct so warrants. "' In Florida, there-
33. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (defining third party bad faith).
34. Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852, (1939).
35. Id. at 830, 184 So. at 859.
36. Id.
37. 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981).
38.
For when the insured has surrendered to the insurer all control over
the handling of the claim, including all decisions with regard to litigation
and settlement, then the insurer must assume a duty to exercise such con-
trol and make such decisions in good faith and with due regard for the
interests of the insured.
Id. at 785.
39. Id.; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 4*75 (5th Cir. 1969);
The Boston Old Colony court recognized that the good faith duty required an insurer
to "investigate the facts, give fair consideration to a settlement offer that is not unrea-
sonable under the facts, and settle, if possible, where a reasonably prudent person,
faced with the prospect of paying the total recovery would do so." Boston Old Colony,
386 So. 2d at 785.
40. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 412 F.2d 475.
41. Compare Travelers Indem. Co. v. Butchikas, 313 So. 2d 101, (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) aff'd, 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1977) (conduct not warranting punitive
damages) with Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 525 (Fla.
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fore, an insured in a third party bad faith action may recover not only
amounts in excess of the policy limits,42 but also extra-contractual
damages.43
In contrast to third party bad faith, there was no common law
cause of action for first party bad faith prior to 1982. In Baxter v.
Royal Indemnity Co.," the First District Court of Appeal distin-
guished first party insurance from third party insurance, stating that
the fiduciary relationship interest in the third party scenario was not
present in the first party context.45 Rather, the relationship was actu-
ally that of debtor and creditor"4 where the parties occupied an adver-
sarial relationship toward one another,47 preventing any extra-contrac-
tual recovery by the insured." Justice Dekle, in his dissent, pointed out
the fallacy of disparate treatment of first and third party bad faith:
[I]t would be anachronistic to hold that an insurer owes a duty of
good faith in handling the liability claim of a third person totally
unrelated to the parties to the contract of insurance while at the
same time holding that the insurer owed no such obligation of good
faith to its own insured, who has paid premiums ... for the specific
purpose of protecting himself . . .
1974) (insurer concealed and misrepresented facts to the insured - punitive damages
warranted); Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, No. 88-0629-CIV-Spellman
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
February 12, 1990 - excess damages in the form of punitive damages not warranted);
See generally Annotation, Recoverability of Punitive Damages in Action By Insured
Against Liability Insurer For Failure to Settle Claim Against Insured, 85 A.L.R.3d
1211 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
42. See, e.g., Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1973); Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Judgments in excess of the policy limits will usually wind up in the hands
of the third party in a third party bad faith case. Neyer, Prepared For Any Contin-
gency; Casualty Contingency Protection; Reinsurance, 90 Best's Review 60 (No.8,
1989).
43. Extra-contractual damages typically wind up in the pocket of the insured as
opposed to a third party. Neyer, supra note 42.
44. Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1973), cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975).
45. Id. at 656.
46. Id. at 657.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 68
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
49. Baxter, 317 So. 2d at 731 (Dekle, J., dissenting).
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With one exception50 , it remained the rule in Florida until 1982 that a
cause of action for first party bad faith did not exist.
In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted section 624.155, which
has come to be known as the "bad faith" statute.5 1 This statute pro-
vides that "[a]ny person may bring a civil action against an insurer
when such person is damaged" 52 by several specifically delineated acts.
For purposes of first party bad faith in general and for this note in
particular, section 624.155(1)(b)1 is the focus. This section permits
any person to bring an action against an insurer when damaged by the
insurer "[n]ot attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all
the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly
and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for his
interests." 53
However, the insurer is not left without protection. As a condition
precedent to a bad faith action pursuant to section 624.155, the insured
must give 60 days prior notice to the insurer and the Department of
Insurance,54 on a form provided by the Department of Insurance. 55
This notice must delineate the specific statutory provision allegedly vio-
lated, 56 the facts and circumstances of the violation,57 the name of any
individuals involved in the alleged violation,58 reference to any specific
relevant policy language59 and a statement that the notice is given in
order to pursue the remedy authorized by section 624.155.6o With the
passage of section 624.155, Florida had codified the previously an-
nounced common law cause of action for third party bad faith. 1
But this codification had little practical effect on the common law
prohibition against first party bad faith. It was a year until the federal
courts in Florida began recognizing a statutory cause of action for first
50. Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D.
Fla. 1976).
51. FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1982).
52. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1).
53. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)1.
54. FLA. STAT. §§ 624.155(2)(a),(b).
55. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b).
56. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)1.
57. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)2.
58. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)3.
59. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)4.
60. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)5.
61. See, e.g., Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1939);
Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922
(1981); Baxter, 285 So. 2d 652.
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party bad faith under section 624.155(1)(b)1. The first such decision
was Rowland v. Safeco Insurance Co. 62 The plaintiffs alleged that
Safeco had violated section 624.155(1)(b)1 when it refused to pay a
claim for uninsured motorist benefits. Safeco moved to dismiss, alleging
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. In deciding whether a cause
of action existed, the court acknowledged that prior to the enactment of
section 624.155 there was no first party bad faith absent any indepen-
dent tort.63 However, section 624.155 created such a cause of action for
first party bad faith because section 624.155(1)(b)1 enabled any person
to sue an insurer.6 4 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on sup-
porting dicta from Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Romer. 5 The Romer court stated:
Although it need not be decided here, it is arguable that with the
passage of this legislation, Florida has joined the ranks of those
states which impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in insurance contracts. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973). If
this is so, then proof of a breach of the covenant would permit
recovery in tort in first party, as well as third party, insurance
claims.66
The Rowland court also made reference to legislative history
which arguably showed a legislative intent to create a cause of action
for first party bad faith. The House Committee On Insurance stated in
its 1982 Staff Report that section 624.155
[S]ubparagraph (f) (1.) requires insurers to deal in good faith to
settle claims. Current case law requires this standard in liability
claims, but not in uninsured motorist coverage; the sanction is that
a company is subject to a judgment in excess of policy limits. This
section would apply to all insurance policies.67
This language, it was urged, evinced the legislature's intent to create a
62. 634 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
63. Id. at 614.
64. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
65. 432 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
66. Id. at 69 n.5 (Hurley, J., concurring).
67. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REvISION (HB 4F; As
Amended by HB 10G) at 12 (June 3, 1982).
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first party cause of action for bad faith.68 The court held that even in a
first party case, the insured was entitled to the damages provided for in
section 624.155(3).69 What the court failed to address is the equally
compelling language which supports the applicability of section
624.155 to first party actions. Specifically, section 624.155(2)(b) pro-
vides that "[i]f the person bringing the civil action is a third party
claimant, he shall not be required to reference the specific policy lan-
guage if the insurer has not provided a copy of the policy to the third
party claimant pursuant to written request."7
This language is conspicuously absent from first party decisions
relying in whole or in part on the plain language of the statute. The
logic is inescapable. Why would the Legislature draft legislation (urged
by the insurer not to apply to first party cases) and specifically exclude
compliance with section 624.155(2)(b)4 for third party claimants if
section 624.155 did not apply to first party claimants as well? Ac-
cepting the insurer's argument leads to the illogical conclusion, that be-
cause section 624.155 applies only to third party cases and section
624.155(2)(b)4 excuses third party claimants from compliance with
that subsection, no one need comply with the provisions of section
624.155(2) (b)4. The Legislature intended that section 624.155 apply to
first and third party causes of action and excuse only third party claim-
ants from compliance with section 624.155(2)(b)4.7 1
In 1986, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida decided United Guaranty Residential Insurance Co. v. Alli-
ance Mortgage Co. 72 The case was before the court on United Guar-
anty's motion to dismiss Alliance's counterclaim alleging breach of con-
tract and bad faith.73 Alliance argued that although there existed no
common law first party bad faith, the enactment of section
624.155(l)(b) 1 did provide such a cause of action.74 The court recog-
nized the lack of controlling state court decisions, and looked to the
Romer75 and Rowland 6 opinions.
68. Rowland, 634 F. Supp. at 615.
69. Id.
70. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)4 (1982) (emphasis added).
71. Telephone interview with Eric Tilton, Esquire, Editor-in-Chief of the 1982
version of section 624.155.
72. 644 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 340.
75. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66.
76. Rowland, 634 F. Supp. 613.
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United argued that section 624.155 did not specifically refer to
first party claims, and therefore, only codified third party bad faith law.
The court rejected that argument, based upon the language of section
624.155(1) and the holding in Baxter." Furthermore, application of
section 624.155 to first and third party claims was consistent with the
legislative scheme to impose liability on insurers who act "inequitably
vis-a-vis their insureds. 17  The Legislature chose not to exclude first
party coverage from section 624.155(1)(b)(1) and therefore stated, as
set forth in the 1982 Staff Report "[t]his section would apply to all
insurance policies. ' 79
The first Florida state court decision permitting a first party bad
faith cause of action was Opperman v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Co.80 In Opperman, the court held that section 624.155 created a
first party cause of action, and further, that the duty of the insurer to
act in good faith in the first party situation was akin to the duty to act
in good faith when handling third party claims.81 Subsequent Florida
decisions, both state8 2 and federal, 83 followed Romer, Rowland and
Opperman.
The courts had now solidified the common law concept of first
party bad faith. The Legislature affirmed the existence of a first party
cause of action when it passed section 624.155. Despite the settling of
the issue of availability of a first party action under section 624.155 by
the courts and Legislature, insurers continue to maintain that no such
77. "Under the rationale of Florida's third party bad faith decisions, because the
insurer has the right to completely control the defense and act as attorney-in-fact on
behalf of the insured, a duty of good faith arises out of the insurer-insured relation-
ship." Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. discharged, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975). United Guar., 644 F. Supp. at 341 n.3.
78. Id. at 341.
79. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REVISION (HB 4F; As
Amended by HB 10G) (June 3, 1982).
80. 515 So. 2d. 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 523 So. 2d. 578
(Fla. 1988).
81. Id. at 266.
82. See, e.g., McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785 (1990);
Cardenas v. Miami-Dade Yellow Cab Co., 538 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988) rev. denied, 549 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1989); Wahl v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 87-
1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Taylor,
No. 84-18844-CA(02) (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1984).
83. See, e.g., Jones, 670 F. Supp. 937; Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New
York, No. 88-0629-Civ-Spellman (S.D. Fla. 1988); Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
89-613-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
1991]
304
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/14
Nova Law Review
cause of action exists."4
B. Damage Assessment in First Party Bad Faith Actions
The issue of what types of damages are proper in a first party bad
faith case is not as settled. Florida Statute section 624.155(3) provides,
"[u]pon adverse adjudication at trial or upon appeal, the insurer shall
be liable for damages, together with court costs and reasonable attor-
ney's fees incurred by the plaintiff."8 5
The legislative history of section 624.155(3) implies that the legis-
lative intent was to permit the recovery of judgments in excess of the
policy limits, and that this applies to all insurance policies.86 Yet,
Florida court decisions conflict as to whether damages in excess of the
policy limits are available in first party bad faith cases, and if so,
whether they are available as a matter of law87 or whether they must
be proven.88
In the first party bad faith case, the insured typically demands
that the insurer settle his claim for a specific dollar value. The insurer
refuses to settle and either party demands arbitration or they litigate
the claim.' If the insured receives an arbitration award or jury award
84. Brief of Appellant at 25, Continental Ins. Co. v. Jones, No. 89-5911 (11th
Cir. 1989).
85. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3) (1989).
86. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REvISION (HB 4F, as
amended by HB lOe)(emphasis added).
87. Jones, 716 F. Supp. 1460; Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct.
1987).
88. Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 89-613-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. 1989);
McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 FLA. L. WEEKLY 2785 (1990) -
89. As a procedural caveat, it must be noted here that as of the date of the
writing of this note, there exists a conflict as to whether a bad faith claim made pursu-
ant to section 624.155 must be filed contemporaneously with the underlying claim for
first party benefits. See, e.g., Schimmel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 506 So. 2d 1162
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (filing of bad faith claim subsequent to breach of prop-
erty insurance contract claim barred by rule against splitting causes of action);
Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 903 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1990) (in view
of Schimmel and other Florida cases indicating a division of reasoning, the Eleventh
Circuit certified the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court:
1. DOES AN INSURED'S CLAIM AGAINST AN UNINSURED MO-
TORIST CARRIER UNDER SECTION 624.155(l)(b)I., FLORIDA
STATUTES, FOR ALLEGEDLY FAILING TO SETTLE THE UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST CLAIM IN GOOD FAITH ACCRUE BEFORE
THE CONCLUSION OF THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION FOR
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in excess of the policy limits, the damages sought are referred to as the
"shortfall", 90 that is, the difference between the policy limits and the
awarded amount.
The first Florida decision to implicitly address the issue of excess
damages was Opperman v. Nationwide Mutual Life Insurance Co.91 In
Opperman, the insureds received an arbitration award in excess of their
uninsured motorist limits and sued the insurer for bad faith refusal to
settle. 2 In arriving at the holding that a first party action existed under
the statute, the court examined the legislative history 3 and other deci-
sions in Federal courts,94 and found that the statute clearly provided a
first party cause of action for bad faith.95 Implicit in the court's opinion
is that the remedy for first party bad faith is the same as for third
party bad faith, that is, the excess award.9 6
A Florida circuit court case broke ground by holding that the
shortfall was the proper amount of damages in first party bad faith
cases. In Wahl v. Insurance Co. of North America,9 7 the insured was
rendered comatose as the result of an automobile accident.98 Although
the insurer recognized the value of the policy to be in excess of the
policy limits, it made no offer to settle. 9  The matter was arbitrated,
resulting in an excess award.' The judge heard arguments and held
that the shortfall was recoverable as a matter of law upon proof of bad
THE CONTRACTUAL UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE
BENEFITS?
2. IF SO, IS JOINDER OF THE CLAIM UNDER SECTION
624.155(1)(b)1. IN THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION FOR CON-
TRACTUAL UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS PERMISSIBLE?
3. IF SO, IS JOINDER OF THE SECTION 624.155(1)(B)1. CLAIM
WITH THE CONTRACTUAL CLAIM MANDATORY?
Blanchard, 903 F.2d at 1400.
90. Brief of Appellant at 27, McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785.
91. 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) rev. denied, 523 So. 2d 578
(Fla. 1988).
92. Id. at 264.
93. Id. at 265.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 29.
97. No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987); Brief of Appellant at 29,
McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 30.
100. Id.
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faith. 1 ' At least one other Florida circuit court has held similarly,10 2 as
has one federal district court.10 3
Another federal district court has held that although the shortfall
may be a proper element of damages, it is not available as a matter of
law, but must be proven in accordance with traditional tort and con-
tract law.'04 A Florida circuit court has refused to instruct the jury
that the shortfall is, as a matter of law, the appropriate measure of
damages. 0 5
III. First Party Bad Faith Damages as Applied in Jones v.
Continental
Jones v. Continental Insurance Co.'06 was one of the first deci-
sions, applying Florida law, which permitted insureds to recover
amounts in excess' 0 7 of their uninsured motorist' 018 coverage limits for
bad faith refusal to settle'09 an uninsured motorist claim. Continental
insured Thomas and Mary Ann Jones under a uninsured motorist pol-
icy. 1 0 This policy was in effect on January 29, 1984, when the Jones'
daughter Karen was killed when the car in which she was a passenger
was struck by a drunk driver."' The uninsured/underinsured" 2 limits
of coverage were $300,000."'3 Because the policy covered two of the
Jones' automobiles, Florida law permitted stacking of limits based upon
the number of vehicles.' 1 ' Therefore, there was a total of $600,000 in
uninsured motorist benefits available."15
101. Id. at 30-31.
102. Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New
York v. Taylor, No. 84-18844-CA (02) (Fla. l1th Cir. Ct. 1984).
103. 716 F. Supp. at 1460.
104. Order at 10, Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 89-613-Civ-ORL-19 (M.D.
Fla. 1989).
105. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 20.
106. 716 F. Supp. 1456.
107. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
108. FLA. STAT. §§ 624.155(1),(3).
109. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)1.
110. Jones, 670 F. Supp. at 938.
111. Brief of Appellees at 1, Continental Ins. Co. v. Jones, No. 89-5911 (11th
Cir. 1989).
112. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3)(b).
113. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 2.
114. FLA. STAT. § 627.4132.
115. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 2.
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The Plaintiffs made a written demand on Continental for the en-
tire $600,000 limit.'16 "Their attorney sent a five page letter to Conti-
nental detailing: (1) Karen's lack of fault because she was a passenger;
(2) the limited insurance available from the tort feasors; and (3) the
emotional loss sustained by Mr. and Mrs. Jones. 11 7 Their counsel re-
ceived a reply denying the demand for the $600,000 limits and advising
them to get ready to arbitrate. 18 Continental, on its own evaluation of
the claim, established a $600,000 reserve. 119
The Plaintiffs demanded arbitration and their depositions were
taken.120 A scrapbook highlighting important points in Karen Jones'
life was provided to Continental. "Thus, by the middle of May, Conti-
nental knew that Karen was a model daughter-she was a college level
tennis player, a respected piano player, an excellent student, and she
had just transferred colleges just to be close to her parents."'' Even
Continental's counsel's evaluation of the case detailed the risks of liti-
gating the claim:
In a letter dated May 7, 1984 Continental's own counsel evaluated
the case as follows: '[B]oth parents made very good witnesses. The
girl is a model daughter in all respects. The scrapbooks and photo
albums present a detailed emotional picture of their daughter's life,
and the accident is one of aggravated liability. 1 22
Still, there was no offer of settlement. Continental failed to make an
offer until the eve of arbitration, when Continental offered $250,000
per parent for a total of $500,000.123 The Plaintiffs rejected this offer
and the matter proceeded to arbitration. 2
4
During the arbitration, Continental defended the claim by alleging
that Karen was negligent for not wearing a seat belt.'25 The arbitrators
rendered a $1,000,000 award, $500,000 per parent."2" Continental peti-
tioned to limit the amount of the arbitration award to the $600,000
116. Id
117. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 1-2.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id.
120. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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policy limit, and the Plaintiffs challenged the petition to modify claim-
ing that the award was not defective. 127 The trial court entered judg-
ment against Continental for the policy limits. 28
The Plaintiffs filed a bad faith action in state court against Conti-
nental seeking damages for Continental's alleged bad faith refusal to
settle their claim for the death of their daughter. 2 ' While the action
was pending on Continental's motion to dismiss,130 Continental re-
moved the action to federal district court.' 3' Continental claimed that
section 624.155 did not recognize an action for bad faith involving a
claim for first-party benefits such as uninsured motorist coverage. 132
The Plaintiffs argued to the contrary, that the bad faith statute applied
equally to first and third party claims alike. 33 The judge agreed with
the Plaintiffs, M and in his Opinion and Order on Continental's Motion
to Dismiss held that section 624.155(1)(b)1, which made it illegal for
an insurer not to attempt in good faith to settle claims, applied to first
party actions as well.' 3 5
The case proceeded to trial on the bad faith claim and at the close
of evidence, the Plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict'- 6 asserting that
as a matter of law, if Continental was found to have violated section
624.155(l)(b)1, they were entitled to the excess arbitration award of
$366,750.137 The court ruled that this was a proper element of damages
to be submitted to the jury. 8" A verdict form comprised of special in-
terrogatories was submitted to the jury.3 9
127. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1457.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Continental moved to dismiss the first party bad faith claim, maintaining
that section 624.155 did not recognize a first party cause of action for bad faith, a
position that Continental has steadfastly maintained, even in the irstant appeal. Brief
of Appellant, supra note 84, at 4.
131. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1457; 28 U.S.C. § 1332; 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
132. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
133. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 4.
134. 716 F. Supp at 1457.
135. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84 at 4.
136. FED. R. CIv. PRO. 50(a).
137. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1457-58.
138. Id. at 1458.
139.
The special interrogatories submitted and the jury's responses (in italics)
are set forth in their entirety as follows:
I. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Continental
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The jury returned a special verdict against Continental, finding
that it did not attempt to settle the Jones' claim in good faith.1 40 How-
ever, the jury found "zero" damages.1 41 The Plaintiffs filed motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict1 42 and for new trial.143 The judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict motion concerned the determination
of damages and requested judgment be entered for $366,750.00.144 The
motion for new trial alleged that the damages assessed, or rather, not
assessed, were grossly inadequate and contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence. 145
After stating the proper standard for deciding a motion for judg-
Insurance Company did not attempt in good faith to settle claims of Plain-
tiffs when, under all the circumstances, it could have and should have done
so, and had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insureds and with due
regard for their interests?
YES Yes NO _
2. Do you find from the totality of the circumstances that Continental
Insurance Company committed or performed any or all of the following
acts with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice:
a) fail to adopt and implement standards for the proper investigation
of claims?
YES - NO No
b) fail to acknowledge and act properly upon communications with
respect to claims?
YES - NO No
c) deny claims without conducting reasonable investigations based
upon available information?
YES - NO No
d) fail to promptly provide a reasonable explanation in writing to the
insured of the basis in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or ap-
plicable law, for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise
settlement?
YES Yes NO
If you answered "No" to both questions 1 and 2, you need not answer
question No. 3. If you answered "Yes" to question 1 or question 2, please
answer question 3 below.
3. What is the total amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiffs and
caused by the acts of Continental Insurance Company. 0
SO SAY WE ALL THIS 20 day of April, 1989.
Id. at 1458 n.2.
140. Id. at-1458.
141. Id.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
143. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1458; FED. R. CIv. PRo. 59.
144. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1458.
145. Id.
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ment notwithstanding the verdict," the court succinctly presented the
issue of what the proper measure of damages should be in a first party
bad faith insurance action under section 624.155.147 This was the same
issue raised by Continental in its motion for partial summary judgment
and the Plaintiffs in their post trial motions. The court noted that in
third party bad faith actions, it was unassailable that damages may
properly include amounts in excess of the stated policy limits.1 48
The court went on to note that first party bad faith actions were,
until 1982, distinguished from the third party action; 149 there was no
fiduciary relationship in first party claims8 0 and as a result, no cogni-
zable common law action for bad faith.' In 1982, the Florida Legisla-
ture enacted the "Bad Faith Statute,"'8 2 and thereafter, both state 53
and federal courts8  have extended a bad faith cause of action to first
party claims.'88
The court looked first to the language of the statute856 and then to
the legislative history, 157 and deduced that the full contours of the stat-
ute should be determined by Florida insurance law including third
party doctrine. 8 The court analyzed other Florida courts' construc-
146. Id. at 1458-59.
147. Id. at 1459.
148. Id. at 1459 n.5. (citing Butchikas v. Travelers Indemnity Corp., 343 So. 2d
816, 817-818.
149. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1459.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1973)).
152. Id. at 1459; (citing FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1982)).
153. See, e.g., Rowland v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 634 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Fla.
1986); United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Jones, 617 F. Supp. 937; Opperman v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 523 So. 2d
578 (Fla. 1988); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Taylor, No. 84-18844-CA(02)
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1984); Wahl v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th
Cir. Ct. 1987).
154. See, e.g., Opperman, 515 So. 2d 263; Fidelity, No. 84-18844 CA(02);
Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17).
155. See, e.g., Rowland, 634 F. Supp. 613; United Guar., 644 F. Supp. 339;
Jones, 670 F. Supp. 937.
156. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1460.
157. Id.
158. "The Legislature's comments support the conclusion that it intended the
full contours of the statute to be determined by reference to general principles of Flor-
ida insurance law including third-party doctrine." Id.
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tions of section 624.155 as applicable to first party bad faith claims and
those courts going further, holding that an excess award may be recov-
erable in a first party action.'59 The court used this analysis to form the
basis for granting Jones' motion for judgment not withstanding the
verdict.160
The court determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled, as a matter
of law, to the $366,750 excess1"' damages as well as prejudgment inter-
est. 62 Continental has appealed both of the court's rulings that: (1)
there exists a first party. bad faith cause of action; and (2) that the
proper measure of damages in a first party bad faith case is the differ-
ence between the policy limits and arbitration award.1 13
IV. In Defense of the Bad Faith Statute
Once an uninsured motorist carrier is determined to have acted in
bad faith by failing to settle a claim "when, under all the circum-
stances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and hon-
estly toward its insured and with due regard for his interests,"'" 4 the
issue then becomes one of a determination of damages.16 5 Specifically
with regard to the first-party bad faith 66 action, the question is
whether the damages assessed against the insurer and in favor of the
insured may exceed the policy limits. The legislative history of section
159. Id. The court analyzed: Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17); Fidelity, No. 84-
18844-CA(02); Opperman, 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); United
Guar., 644 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla 1986).
160. The court ordered, inter alia:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict be, and the same is, hereby GRANTED; the
damage verdict entered by the jury in this cause on April 20, 1989 is
hereby SET ASIDE and JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of the
Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $366,750.00 with pre-
judgment interest on this liquidated sum at a rate specified by law (12%
per annum) commencing from the date of the state court judgment (Octo-
ber 31, 1984). Plaintiff is also awarded a judgment for COSTS OF THIS
ACTION TO BE TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT upon
the filing of an appropriate bill of cost form.
Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1460.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Jones, 920 F.2d 847.
164. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(I)(b)I.
165. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3).
166. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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624.155, current Florida decisions, sound social policy concerns, and
reference to decisions in other states present a compelling rationale that
damages in excess of the policy limits should be permitted in a first
party bad faith action under section 624.155(1)(b)1.
Florida's bad faith statute is a remedial statute, intended to pro-
vide a remedy for first party bad faith where none existed before. 1 7
The purpose of the statute is to provide redress for insureds and to
impose damages upon insurers as a result of their bad faith. Remedial
statutes, like section 624.155 are required to be liberally construed in
favor of those parties for whose benefit the statute was enacted. Be-
cause section 624.155 provides a first party cause of action, the remedy,
excess damages, is likewise applicable.168 Prior to the enactment of sec-
tion 624.155, first party insurers could intentionally refuse to pay first
party benefits with impunity. 6 9
Florida Statute section 624.155(3) makes the insurer "liable for
damages .. ".. ,170 Since the term "damages is undefined, and is suscep-
tible to varied definitions, 71 each with its own unique implications,"
resort to the legislative history of section 624.155 is necessary to deter-
mine the intent of the Legislature with respect to the definition of
"damages" as used within section 624.155(3). 17 2
167. A remedial statute "is designed to correct existing law, redress existing
grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good; it may also be defined
as a statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong where he had none, or a
different one, before." Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1981). Prior to the
enactment of section 624.155, there was no common law cause of action for first party
bad faith. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
168. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339, 342 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
169. See, e.g., Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975); Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brasecker, 311 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 31
(Fla. 1976).
170. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3) (1989).
171. Judge Friedman specifically held that, "[iun reviewing F.S. section 624.155,
the Court is of the opinion that the Statute is not clear or unambiguous." Fidelity &
Cas. Co. of New York v. Taylor, No. 84-18844-CA(02) (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1984),
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3 (emphasis added).
172. According to the court in Foley:
If the language employed by the Legislature in the law itself is clear ...
the Legislative intent is to be found therein .... Of course, il' the phrase-
ology of the act is ambiguous or is susceptible of more than one interpreta-
tion, it is the court's duty to glean the legislative intent from a considera-
tion of the act as a whole, 'the evil to be corrected, the language of the act
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Although the Legislative history of section 624.155 is brief, it spe-
cifically addresses the issue of excess damages:
"Subparagraph (f) (1.) requires insurers to deal in good faith to
settle claims. Current case law requires this standard in liability
claims, but not in uninsured motorist coverage; the sanction is that
a company is subject to a judgment in excess of policy limits. This
section would apply to all insurance policies.''l73
This history combined with the plain language of section 624.155,
cannot possibly convey more clearly the intent of the drafters that Flor-
ida's Bad Faith Statute applies to first party actions." 4 The language is
as plain as it could possibly be.17 5
Therefore, since the drafters of the statute intended, and court de-
cisions held,' that the Legislature intended to make section 624.155
applicable to the first party actions as well as third party actions, it is
logical that the Legislature intended to apply the same remedy.177 As
further evidence of the Legislature's intent that excess damages be re-
coverable in first party actions, section 624.155 was amended on June
1, 1990.178
Amending section 624.155 F.S.: clarifying Legislative intent with
respect to the issues of ... the definition of damages; ... (7) ..
.[t]he damages recoverable pursuant to this section shall include
those damages which are reasonably foreseeable as a result of a
... the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in exis-
tence bearing on the subject . .. .'
Foley v. State, 50 So. 2d 179, 184 (Fla. 1951).
173. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REvIsION, at 12 (HB 4F;
as amended by HB 10e June 3, 1982).
174. Telephone interview with Eric Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982
version of section 624.155 and member of the drafting committee for the 1990 amend-
ments effective October 1, 1990 (October 1, 1990). (Paraphrasing of statements of Eric
Tilton, Esquire).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Rowland v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 634 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Fla.
1986); Jones, 670 F. Supp. 937; WahI, No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
177. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 16; Telephone interview with Eric
Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982 version of section 624.155 and member of
the drafting committee for the 1990 amendments effective October 1, 1990 (October 1,
1990). Mr. Tilton expressed the opinion that the language could not have been made
any clearer to apply the bad faith statute to first and third party claims alike.
178. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(7) (1990).
1991]
314
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/14
Nova Law Review
specified violation of this section by the insurer and may include an
award or judgment in an amount that exceeds the policy limits. 17 19
Thus, the Legislature again pronounced that excess damages are avail-
able in actions under section 624.155 and because section 624.155 ap-
plies to first and third party claims, so does the availability of excess
damages. 80
The insurer is not without protection under the statute. The in-
surer is given sixty days, from the time the insured gives notice to the
Department of Insurance and the insurer of the alleged violation, to
conduct its investigation, evaluate the case and respond to offers of set-
tlement. 8' If the damages are paid or the alleged violation corrected
within this sixty day period, no action for bad faith is permitted. 82
This period is important to any action for bad faith. The conduct of the
insurer throughout the entire period up to trial or arbitration is the
gauge of bad faith.
In Jones,'8" despite the overwhelming evidence of no fault on the
part of Karen Jones,8 the limited insurance available from the tort
feasor,' 8 ' the potential for excess damages, and the insurer's attorney's
evaluation of the case, 86 Continental never responded to settlement de-
mands, even with a one dollar offer, until the eve of arbitration. 87 Sim-
ilarly, in Wahl v. Insurance Co. of North America (INA), 88 the in-
sured was comatose for two weeks with resultant brain damage.'89
Despite INA's evaluation of the value of the case as being in excess of
the policy limits, it made no offer during pre-suit negotiations or during
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Because the drafters intended section 624.155 to apply to both first and
third party causes of action, it is obvious that the new damages provision applies as
well. The drafters could not have made it any clearer. Telephone interview with Eric
Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982 version of section 624.155 and member of
the drafting committee for the 1990 amendments effective October 1. 1990 (October 1,
1990).
181. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(a) (1989).
182. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(d) (1989).
183. 716 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
184. 650 F. Supp. at 939; Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 1.
185. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111 at 1-2.
186. See supra, note 122 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
188. No. 87-1187 CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
189. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 29.
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the 60 day period.190 INA did offer $69,000 on the eve of arbitration.
The arbitrators awarded a total of $787,468.20. After trial, the judge
held that the "shortfall" was recoverable as a matter of law. 19'
Other jurisdictions permitting recovery for first party bad faith
have defined the obligation on the part of the insurer as follows:
[Alt the very least, . . . the insurer will diligently investigate the
facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is Valid, will fairly
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably
in rejecting or settling the claim .... These performances are the
essence of what the insured has bargained and paid for, and the
insurer has the obligation to perform them. When an insurer has
breached this duty, it is liable for damages suffered in consequence
of that breach l912
In Bucholtz v. Safeco Insurance Co.,9 3 the insured sued the in-
surer for an excess judgment allegedly due to Safeco's bad faith in fail-
ing to settle the case. 194 The court affirmed the summary judgment in
favor of the carrier because Safeco did handle the claim reasonably. 19 5
Judge Tursi, in dissent, described the duty of good faith as including
"the requirement that the insurer investigate the factual predicates of
the claim of liability and not unreasonably persist in defenses that are
without foundation in either fact or law."'19 In Jones,91 the defendant
presented no evidence to support its only defense which was that Karen
Jones was negligent in failing to wear her seat belt. 19
Not every transgression by an insurer or complaint by an insured
will suffice to sustain a cause of action for bad faith. Admittedly, an
insurer is not in business to lose money. The insurer wants to minimize
190. Id. at 30.
191. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 31.
192. Weese v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1989). (First
party recovery available under West Virginia's Unfair Trade Practices Act but not on
a tort theory).
193. 773 P.2d 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
194. Id. at 592.
195. Id. at 593; cf. Martin v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., No. 87-CV-19335 (Denver
County, Colorado) ($255,000 verdict against insurer who acted in bad faith in refusing
to pay $50,000 uninsured motorist claim).
196. Id. at 594. (Tursi, J., dissenting).
197. 716 F. Supp. 1456.
198. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 3.
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payment while the insured wants to maximize his recovery."' However,
when an insurer embarks on a course of conduct as in Jones,200 WahP01
or McLeod 02 where liability is clear and an award of damages in ex-
cess of the policy is foreseeable, 203 it should not complain when an ex-
cess verdict is rendered.
Insurers maintain that any damages awarded were due to the acts
of the uninsured driver and not the insurer. Therefore, the insurer
should not be liable for the excess verdict. 04 However, this reasoning
ignores the fact that the insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage
for this specific eventuality. Had the insurer dealt with its insured in
good faith, there would be no bad faith suit and no excess verdict. But
for the unreasonable acts of the insurer, there would be no excess judg-
ment.2 °5 Curiously the second district's recent opinion in McLeod
seems to dismiss this question of causation. According to the McLeod
court, the best an insured can hope for, following lengthy litigation of a
bad faith claim, is interest on unpaid benefits (up to the policy limits),
attorney fees, and costs. 06 This holding sends a clear message to any
insurer who is faced with a legitimate serious damage claim and a
large policy: feel free to withhold payment on the policy and litigate.
Liability is limited, roll the dice. This was not the legislature's intent
when it drafted section 624.155.
199. Weese, 879 F.2d at 118.
200. 716 F.2d 1456.
201. No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
202. No. 89-2586 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
203. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(7) (1990).
204. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 22; Brief 3f Appellees, supra
note 111, at 13; McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785.
205. "Reasonably foreseeable," as used in the 1990 amendment, means exactly
what it says. It is reasonably foreseeable that if an insurer, first or third party, is found
liable for a violation of Section 624.155, that insurer will be liable for damages, and
these damages may exceed the policy limits. The drafters did not differentiate between
first and third party bad faith because the statute applies equally to both. Telephone
interview with Eric Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982 version of section
624.155 and member of the drafting committee for the 1990 amendments effective
October 1, 1990 (October 1, 1990).
206. McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785, 2786. Contra Opperinan, 515 So. 2d at
267 (citing 15A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 58.1 (1983))("The function of the bad
faith claim is to provide the insured with an extra-contractual remedy.")
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V. Conclusion
As a matter of policy, excess judgments in first party bad faith
actions should be recoverable as a matter of law. The remedial purpose
of section 624.155 cannot be satisfied without the imposition of dam-
ages, including excess judgments. To do otherwise would take the teeth
out of the statute.0 7 If excess judgments are not permitted, there is
little or no reason to require insurers to act in good faith when handling
a first party claim.
It was the actions of insurers which prompted the Legislature to
enact section 624.155. Insurers were reaping the benefits of premiums
from uninsured motorist coverage, and refusing to pay valid claims. Af-
ter all, what did they have to lose? An insurer could intentionally re-
fuse to pay a valid claim and place the insured in a position where his
medical bills would not be paid. This conduct may also take its toll on
the insured's emotional well being. The insurer could take a chance on
arbitration or a jury. If the award was lower than the policy limits, the
insurer wins. If the award was in excess of the policy limits, the insurer
would pay no more than the policy. Prior to the enactment of section
624.155 it was a win-win situation for insurers. 0 8
Insurance companies do not prosper by paying claims - this is a
fact. As a response to the abuses of insureds by insurers, the Florida
Legislature enacted section 624.155 to provide a remedy for insureds.
207. "To hold other than that the remedy is an award of the excess would emas-
culate the remedial purpose of the statute regarding first party claims." Brief of Ami-
cus Cariae, Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers at 6, McLeod, No. 89-2586 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App.).
208. In an excerpt from the trial in Wahl, counsel for INA aptly described the
state of first party bad faith law prior to the enactment of section 624.155:
Before this statute [section 624.155] was passed, an insurance com-
pany could say to a plaintiff 'Hey, I'm not going to pay you, I am - I
don't - I think your case is worth ten bucks less than you say it is and
I'm still going to make you arbitrate.' They could go ahead, get hit for a
$250,000 award, write him a check for two hundred and say 'That's all she
wrote, I don't owe you another nickel.' There was no basis for anything.
They couldn't get any costs back, except arbitration costs, couldn't get
emotional distress, anything incurred for having to litigate something that
should have been settled.
The Legislature came along and said 'Well, we're going to amend
that. Now you're going to have a statutory claim for any damages that are
caused by that bad faith.'
Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987) (Excerpt of Proceedings, page
16, dated June 6, 1989).
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The Legislature and the courts have applied section 624.155 to first
party claims as well as third party claims. There is no differentiation in
the statute concerning damages that can be awarded in first party
claims as opposed to third party claims. The recent amendments to sec-
tion 624.155 support the position that damages should be measured by
the excess award over the policy limits in first party claims as well at
third party claims. The federal and Florida trial courts have held that
these damages are recoverable as a matter of law The rationale for
these holdings is compelling. The Florida Supreme Court will have an
opportunity to squarely address and put to rest the question of what the
measure of recovery in a first party bad faith action should be.
209
Marc S. Buschman
209. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for the exact language of the
certified question.
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Breakstone v. MacKenzie: In a Case Where Fear of
Bias is Raised by Judicial Election Campaign
Contributions, There are no Clear Winners
"[W]ould not a lawyer coming before a recently elected judge be
concerned if opposing counsel had contributed to the judge's campaign
...particularly if the concerned lawyer had not contributed to that
campaign?"' That question, posed by Florida Supreme Court Justice
Ben F. Overton in an address delivered in April 1989,2 was prophetic.
The following September, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal re-
sponded, holding in Breakstone v. MacKenzie that a lawful campaign
contribution to a judge or even to the judicial campaign of a judge's
spouse is legally sufficient grounds for disqualification of a judge upon
a motion by the non-contributing party.4 In January 1990, however,
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal aligned itself with the dissent
in Breakstone, holding in Keane v. Andrews,5 that a legal campaign
contribution by a lawyer to a judge is not legally sufficient grounds for
disqualification when the contributing lawyer appears before the recipi-
ent judge.6
Justice Overton had the opportunity to answer his own question
when the Florida Supreme Court recently decided the issue.7 In Break-
stone,8 the court could either eviscerate the state's system of choosing
its trial court judges through competitive nonpartisan elections9 or
1. Overton, Trial Judges and Political Elections. A Time for Re-examination, 2
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 10 (1988-89).
2. Id.
3. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en
banc); consolidated with Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc. v. MacKenzie.
4. Id. at 1166.
5. Keane v. Andrews, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Keane, and
a subsequent case, also styled Keane v. Andrews, 561 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990) and involving the same parties as well as the same issue is currently pending
before the Florida Supreme Court. In both cases Dr. Moulton Keane moved for the
disqualification of Broward County Circuit Court Judge Robert L. Andrews on
grounds that opposing counsel had contributed to the judge's campaign.
6. Keane,'555 So. 2d 940.
7. MacKenzie v. Breakstone, 15 Fla.L. Weekly 397 (1990).
8. Id.
9. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b). Section 10(a) was amended to provide for merit
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spare the system that no one really wants, a system that draws breath
directly from the yawn of public apathy.10 With the exception of Jus-
tice Overton, the court chose the status quo," but not without reserva-
tions. "I concur in the majority's opinion because I believe it endorses
the lesser of the evils from which we must choose," Justice Kogan said
in his concurring opinion.' "And in so concluding, I have many re-
grets," he added.' 3
The majority held that a lawful contribution to the election cam-
paign of a judge or the judge's spouse is not legally sufficient grounds
for disqualification.' 4 However, the court upheld the third district's
grant of writs of prohibition to disqualify Judge MacKenzie on other
grounds. 5 Justice Overton concurred in the result, but set forth in a
separate opinion his view that a $500 contribution to a judicial election
campaign may be legally sufficient grounds for disqualification of a
judge.' 6
retention of supreme court justices and district court judges. Section 10(b) provides for
the election of circuit and county court judges as follows:
Circuit judges and judges of county courts shall be elected by vote of the
qualified electors within the territorial jurisdication of their respective
courts. The terms of circuit judges shall be for six years. The terms of
judges of county courts shall be for four years.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
10. See Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges'
Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 (1985).
Voter apathy and unawareness in the area of judicial elections has been docu-
mented by several studies. Examples offered by the author include a 1976 Texas elec-
tion exit poll in which just 15.4% of the voters were able to name a supreme court
candidate, 4.9% could name a district court candidate, and only 2.4% were able to
name a county court candidate. Not so suprisingly, 69 percent of those asked said they
preferred the election of judges over appointment. Id. at 86-88.
Even those closest to the existing system of picking trial court judges, lawyers and
the judges themselves, dislike the system. See Overton, supra note 1, at 21-22.
11. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
12. Id. at 400.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 397-98.
15. The supreme court upheld the third district's ruling in Breakstone that Judge
MacKenzie impermissibly passed on the facts contained in the motion for disqualifica-
tion and should be disqualified on that basis. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399-
400. The supreme court also upheld the district court's ruling in Super Kids that Judge
MacKenzie should have granted a motion for disqualification rather than granting an
ore tenus motion for withdrawal of the counsel who had contributed to the judicial
campaign of Judge MacKenzie's husband. Id.
16. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401.
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This comment examines the rationales on both sides of the Break-
stone controversy. Part I summarizes the facts of the case as well as
the majority and dissenting opinions of the Third District Court of Ap-
peal. Part II focuses on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Break-
stone, analyzing what the court said as well as what the court did not
say. Policy considerations involved in this controversy are discussed in
Part III. Finally, Part IV concludes that the Breakstone decision failed
to recognize the potential for infringement on litigants' due process
right to judicial imparitiality in its conclusion that a lawful contribu-
tion to a judicial election campaign is not legally sufficient grounds for
disqualification.
Part I
This section separately summarizes the facts of Breakstone v.
MacKenzie'7 and Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc. v. MacKenzie. 8 Part
I also summarizes the majority and dissenting opinions of the Third
District Court of Appeal.
A. Breakstone
The Florida Supreme Court's consideration of judicial disqualifica-
tion in cases involving campaign contributors sprang from a chance en-
counter in the anteroom of Dade County. Circuit Court Judge Mary
Ann MacKenzie.' 9 Arthur Breakstone, the defendant in a postjudg-
ment garnishment proceeding, was in the anteroom with his counsel
and plaintiff's counsel awaiting a hearing before Judge MacKenzie
when the judge's husband paid a visit to his wife in chambers.2" The
judge's husband was at that time a candidate for circuit court judge.'
Two days after the anteroom encounter Breakstone's attorney learned
that opposing counsel had contributed $500 to the husband's judicial
campaign and promptly filed a motion to disqualify Judge MacKen-
zie.12 "The suggestion is that there was a specific opportunity for the
17. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1164.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1164 n. 2. The third district stated that its analysis was based on the
contribution itself, not the circumstances under which the contribution became a cause
of concern to Arthur Breakstone and his counsel.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1166.
22. Id. at 1164 n. 2.
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husband to mention the $500 contribution by the plaintiff's counsel sit-
ting in the anteroom, and that such information, however innocently
imparted, would inevitably create a favorable bias toward the $500
contributor," the court stated.
23
Judge MacKenzie denied Breakstone's motion for disqualifica-
tion.24 After finding the motion to be legally insufficient, the judge
stated:
I cannot address your motion as far as the truth or misinformation
that you may have or not have or anything like that. But I will
state for the record that I kept absolutely clear of my husband's
campaign, had nothing to do with it whatsoever. Couldn't go to a
judicial luncheon-went to one and it was followed all over by The
Miami Herald, and that's the last time I went to anything. And
who donated to his campaign and who did not donate to his cam-
paign, I don't know. I have not looked at his records. So in no way
could I be prejudiced. 25
During the same hearing Judge MacKenzie expressed "frustration
for not being in my husband's campaign. . . . In fact, if I had been in
it, he would have won, and that's for real."26 On the basis of the
judge's comments, Breakstone renewed his motion for disqualification
on the grounds that the judge had impermissibly passed on the merits
of the original motion for disqualification.2 1 Judge MacKenzie also de-
nied the renewed motion.28
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1166. Under Florida law, judicial disqualification in civil cases is gov-
erned by Rule 1.432 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Applicable standards for
disqualification are contained in Florida Statutes section 38.10 and Canon 3(C) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Florida statutes pertaining to judicial disqualification and
judicial elections are considered in Part II.
The issue of whether a judge should decide a motion for his or her own disqualifi-
cation is beyond the scope of this note. For a full discussion of the matter, see
D'Agostino, Recusal of Judges for Reasons of Bias or Prejudice: A Survey of Florida
Law - Proposal for Reform, 11 NovA L. REv. 201 (1986).
25. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d 1164.
26. Id.
27. Id. See Rule 1.432(d), FLA. R. Civ. P.; Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, (Fla.
1978) ("[A] judge who is presented with a motion for disqualification 'shall not pass on
the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question of disqualification.' ") Id. at
442 (quoting FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.230(d)).
28. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d 1164.
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B. Super Kids
Super Kids29 was a subsequent, separate case before Judge Mac-
Kenzie and the plaintiff's lawyer was the same contributing counsel
who had represented the plaintiff in Breakstone.30 Based on the law-
yer's same $500 campaign contribution and the third district's panel
holding in Breakstone that Judge MacKenzie should have disqualified
herself,3' defendant Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., moved for disqual-
ification.32 During a hearing on the motion, plaintiffs counsel offered to
withdraw from the case and made a motion for substitution of
counsel. 33
After stating that on the basis of the third district's panel holding
in Breakstone the motion for disqualification was legally sufficient,
Judge MacKenzie granted the ore tenus motion for substitution and
then denied the motion for disqualification. 4
C. Opinions of the Third District Court of Appeal
The third district's en banc hearing and rehearing of the two con-
solidated cases produced a sharply divided 5-4 decision in which the
majority held that a lawful campaign contribution of $500 to either a
judge or the judge's spouse is legally sufficient grounds for disqualifica-
tion.3" Judge Nesbitt's dissenting opinion argued that since the legisla-
ture set a $1,000 limit on contributions to trial court judicial cam-
paigns, a $500 contribution could not be the basis of a reasonable fear
of prejudice.3 6 In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Schwartz
emphasized policy considerations, including concern that the majority
opinion endorsed an unsubstantiated public cynicism about and distrust
of the judiciary.37
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
32. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1166.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1172-73.
35. Id. at 1166.
36. Id. at 1174 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting) (citing FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e)
(1987)).
37. Id. at 1178.
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1. The Majority
The third district majority opinion written by Judge Cope stated
that both Florida's codified law,38 and case law3 9 require a judge's dis-
qualification when a party reasonably fears bias.40 Judge Cope further
stated that the litigant's fear must be taken as being reasonable so long
as the allegations are neither frivolous nor fanciful.41
The majority reasoned that because a $500 campaign contribution
is both substantial and beyond the financial means of the ordinary liti-
gant, a reasonable person would fear prejudice on the part of the recip-
ient judge in favor of the contributing party.42
The majority went on to argue that the statutory S1,000 limit on
contributions to trial court judicial campaigns43 is not a legislative
statement which implies no reasonable fear of prejudice could stem
from contributions of $1,000.or less.44 Judge Cope pointed to state elec-
tion law requiring disclosure of campaign contributions and expendi-
tures45 as evidence that the legislature recognized the potential for bias
in lawful contributions, requiring disclosure so the public can make its
own assessments. 46
2. The Dissent
Judge Nesbitt's dissenting opinion argued that a lawful campaign
contribution cannot form the basis for a reasonable fear of bias because
the amount contributed is within the limits established by the legisla-
ture as being permissible.' 7 Nesbitt noted that if the legislature's intent
in enacting the contribution cap and the disclosure laws was to permit
members of the public to "draw their own conclusions," then the pur-
pose would be accomplished by the disclosure laws alone and there
would be no need for a limit on campaign contributions."
38. Id. at 1167 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432; FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1987)).
39. See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1085-1086 (Fla. 1983); Dickenson
v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 582, 140 So. 459, 462 (1932).
40. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1166-73.
41. Id. at 1167.
42. Id. at 1168.
43. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1987).
44. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1171.
45. Id. (referring to FLA. STAT. §§ 105.08, 106.07 (1987)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1175.
48. Id. at 1174.
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The opinion also stated that electing trial court judges through
contested nonpartisan elections reflects the will of the people and that
campaigns and campaign funding are "necessary evils."149 If the public
is dissatisfied with the system, Nesbitt said, it is the legislature, not the
courts, which must respond to those concerns. 50
In his separate dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Schwartz opined
that the majority replaced a presumption that lawful campaign contri-
butions were proper with a "conclusive presumption of impropriety."51
Schwartz added that the appearance of impropriety to the uninformed
does not amount to legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.52 "We
cannot operate a judicial system, or indeed a society, on the basis of the
factually unsubstantiated perceptions of the cynical and distrustful,"
Schwartz wrote.53
The third district certified the following question to the supreme
court:
IS A TRIAL JUDGE REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY HERSELF
ON MOTION WHERE COUNSEL FOR A LITIGANT HAS
GIVEN A $500 CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITI-
CAL CAMPAIGN OF THE TRIAL JUDGE'S SPOUSE?54
Part II
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the
negative,55 but affirmed the lower court's writ of prohibition disqualify-
ing Judge MacKenzie on other grounds.56 The court, speaking through
Justice Ehrlich, held that a legal campaign contribution to a judge or
to a judge's spouse is not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification
of a judge.5 7 Justice Overton concurred in the result, but wrote sepa-
rately, arguing that the majority had reached the wrong conclusion on
that a lawful campaign contribution could spawn a reasonable fear of
judicial bias.58 Justice Kogan concurred in the majority opinion but
49. Id. at 1176.
50. Id. at 1177.
51. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1178.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id at 1173.
55. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399.
56. Id. at 399-400.
57. Id. at 397-98.
58. Id. at 401.
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wrote separately to express his concerns over the troubling policy con-
siderati.ons which he would anticipate stemming from the adoption of
Overton's view.5"
This part of the article is divided into two sections. The first deals
with what the majority opinion said. The second deals with what the
majority chose to ignore. Justice Kogan's concerns are addresed in Part
III under the heading of public policy considerations.
A. What the Majority Said
The court arrived at its conclusion in Breakstone by applying first
amendment freedom of association principles which were enunciated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, ° and adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court in Richman v. Shevin.6 ' In determining the
constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of
1971,62 the Buckley Court stated that congressional limits on campaign
contributions did implicate freedom of association,6" but upheld the
$1,000 limitation on contributions as a means of checking the two evils
which the Court saw as being associated with campaign contributions:
1) The creation of a quid pro quo between contributor and recipient,
and, 2). the appearance of a quid pro quo. 4
Justice Ehrlich concluded in Breakstone. that the twin evils of
campaign contributions (corruption and the appearance of corruption)
are adequately managed by Florida election laws and Florida's Code of
Judicial Conduct.65 The court cited the statutory provisions limiting
contributions to candidates for *circuit and county court judgeships to
$1,000,16 and requiring public 'disclosure of campaign contributions in
59. Id. at 400-01.
60. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
61. 354 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1977). The court held inter alia that the Dade County
Judicial Trust Fund was a political committee within the definition of Florida Statutes
section 106.011(2). Id. at 1265. The ruling effectively ended the attempt by the Dade
County Bar Association to fund judicial election campaigns through a trust fund rather
than through direct contribution from lawyers to judicial candidates.
62. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1988).
63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976).
64. Id. at 26-27.
65. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 398.
66. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1989) states in part:
(1) No person, political committee, or committee of continuous existence
shall make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this
state, for any election, in excess of the following amounts:
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excess of $100.6'
The court also pointed to Canon 7(B) of Florida's Code of Judicial
Conduct as providing an additional safeguard against corruption or the
appearance of corruption which might stem from judicial campaign
contributions.6" Canon 7(B)(2) provides as follows:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial of-
fice that is filled by public election between competing candidates
should not himself solicit campaign funds, or solicit attorneys for
publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of respon-
sible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his
campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candi-
dacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign
contributions and public support from any person or corporation
authorized by law. A candidate's committees may solicit funds for
his campaign only within the time limitation provided by law. A
candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contribu-
tions for the private benefit of himself or members of his family. 9
Canon 7(B)(2) is designed to insulate judicial candidates from the
financial aspects of their campaigns through the use of campaign com-
mittees to solicit and accept contributions. However, the Breakstone0
court failed to account for the contradiction of purpose between Canon
7(B)(2), which tries to isolate the judicial candidate from knowledge of
(e) To a candidate for county court judge or circuit judge, $1,000.
Id.
67. Florida Statutes section 106.07(l)(4)(a) states in part:
(1) Each campaign treasurer designated by a candidate ... shall file reg-
ular reports of all contributions received ... by or on behalf of such can-
didate...
(4)(a) Each report required by this section shall contain:
1. The full name, address, and occupation, if any, of each person who has
made one or more contributions to or for such committee or candidate
within the reporting period, together with the amount and date of such
contributions. However, if the contribution is $100 or less or is from a
relative, as defined in section 112.3135(1)(c), provided that the relation-
ship is reported, the occupation of the contributor need not be listed, and
only the name and address are necessary.
FLA. STAT. § 106.07(I)(4)(a) (1989).
68. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 398.
69. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 7(B)(2) (1988).
70. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
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campaign contributions, and Florida Statutes section 106.07, which re-
quires that contributions be made public for all, including the candi-
date, to inspect.71
Even without the public disclosure of campaign contributions man-
dated by statute, elected judges can not help but know who their sup-
porters are because those supporters attend campaign functions such as
fundraisers. 72 Consequently, despite the existence of Cannon 7(B)(2),
judges are not insulated from knowledge of who backs their campaigns
and, therefore, the Breakstone court's reliance on Cannon 7(B)(2) was
misplaced. The majority stated that not all suspicions of judicial bias
are legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.73 "There are countless
factors which may cause some members of the community to think that
a judge would be biased in favor of a litigant or counsel for a litigant,
e.g., friendship, member of the same church or religious congregation,
neighbors, former classmates or fraternity brothers," the court
explained.7 4
However, courts have held that circumstances which give the ap-
pearance of bias may rise to the level of legally sufficient grounds for
disqualification. In Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co.,7 5 for ex-
ample, the court held that where the father of a judge is a partner in a
law firm which represents a litigant before the judge, disqualification is
required.76
In the context of judicial election campaigns, it was held in Caleffe
v. Vitale77 that disqualification was warranted where the counsel for
one of the litigants in a divorce action was running the judge's ongoing
campaign for re-election. 8
71. Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impar-
tial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Cam-
paign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REv. 382, 385 (1987).
72. Id.
73. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399.
74. Id.
75. 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 1113.
77. 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The majority opinion in
Breakstone does mention Caleffe in a footnote. "Although a motion for disqualification
based solely upon a legal campaign contribution is not legally sufficient, it may well be
that such a contribution, in conjunction with some additional factor, would constitute
legally sufficient grounds for disqualificaiton upon motion." 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 400
n.5 (emphasis in original).
78. Caleffe, 488 So. 2d at 629. But see Raybon v. Burnette, 135 So. 2d 228, 230
(Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1961) (Plaintiff and plaintiffs attorneys campaigned for unsuc-
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The Breakstone majority found support in other jurisdictions for
its position that a lawful campaign contribution by an attorney to a
judge is not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.79 In Ains-
worth v. Combined Insurance Co. of America,"0 the Nevada Supreme
Court held that involvement of plaintiff's lawyer in the re-election cam-
paign of the court's former chief justice some years earlier did not con-
stitute legally sufficient grounds for disqualification. 1 The Breakstone
court quoted Ainsworth for the proposition that:
[L]eading members of the state bar play important and active roles
in guiding the public's selection of qualified jurists. Under these
circumstances, it would be highly anomalous if an-attorney's prior
participation in a justice's campaign could create a disqualifying
interest, an appearance of impropriety or a violation of due process
sufficient to require the justice's recusal from all cases in which
that attorney might be involved.82
The Breakstone court also found support for its position in Frade
v. Costa,83 and quoted the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as
saying a lawful, ordinary campaign contribution "'does not tend to in-
dicate any closer relation between the contributor and the recipient
than would ordinarily exist between members of the same local
bar.' -84
However, the Breakstone majority did not consider several Texas
cases on point, perhaps due to that jurisdiction's well known willingness
to see no evil when it comes to judical campaign contributions.8 5 In
Rocha v. Ahmad,88 the Texas court held that disqualification was not
cessful judicial candidate who was one of plaintiff's lawyers, and defense attorneys en-
dorsed and contributed finahcially to campaign of the judge. Held, insufficient grounds
for disqualification.).
79. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399.
80. 774 P.2d 1003 (Nev. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 376 (1989).
81. Id. at 1020.
82. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399 (quoting Ainsworth, 774 P.2d at
1020).
83. 171 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. 1961).
84. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399 (quoting Frade, 171 N.E.2d at 865).
85. Texas precedent on the issue dates back to Coker v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 100
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (plaintiff's attorney active in judge's reelection campaign was
insufficient grounds for disqualification, especially in light of participation in same
campaign by one of defendant's attorneys).
86. 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
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warranted where counsel for a litigant had contributed "many
thousands of dollars" to two justices' election campaigns and held vic-
tory celebrations for those justices in his law offices. 87 The court dis-
missed the matter, saying:
It is not surprising that attorneys are the principal source of contri-
butions in a judicial election. We judicially know that voter apathy
is a continuing problem, especially in judicial races and particul~ry
in contests for a seat on an appellate bench. A candidate for the
bench who relies solely on contributions from nonlawyers must rec-
oncile himself to staging a campaign on something less than a
shoestring. If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a countributing
lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who have been elected would
have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority of the cases filed in
their courts. Perhaps the next step would be to require a judge to
recuse himself in any case in which one of the lawyers had refused
to contribute or, worse still, had contributed to that judge's
opponent.88
Similarly, in River Road Neighborhood Association v. South
Texas Sports, Inc.,89 the same court ruled, in a case involving the same
contributing counsel and the same recipient justices, that disqualifica-
tion was not required even though the attorney had contributed 21.7 %
of one justice's total reported contributions, and 17.1 % of the other
justice's total campaign war chest. 90
The most widely known example of the Texan approach to this
issue came in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co.,91 in which the appellate
court dismissed Texaco's contention that a $10,000 contribution from
Pennzoil's lead attorney to the election campaign of the presiding judge
two days after the suit was filed did not warrant disqualification. 2
B. What the Majority Did Not Say
The court's opinion in Breakstone9 3 is based on the right of free
87. Id. at 77-78.
88. Id. at 78.
89. 673 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
90. Id. at 952-953. In River Road the contributing attorney was a party, not
counsel.
91. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
92. Id. at 842-843.
93. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
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association guaranteed by the first amendment, but the court did not
directly deal with the competing constitutional principle of due process
which requires judicial impartiality. 4 The due process approach to the
issue is at the heart of the Third District Court of Appeal's majority
opinion in Breakstone,95 and is the argument advanced by Justice
Overton in his separate opinion.9 6
State law regarding the disqualification of judges is rooted in the
principle of due process.97 The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Tumey v.
Ohio,"' that:
Every procedure which.would offer a possible temptation to the av-
erage man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.99
In In re Murchison,100 the Court added that "a fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course re-
quires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfair-
ness." 10 1 The Court went on to say that, "to perform its high function
in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "102
The theme that due process requires not only impartiality, but the
appearance of impartiality, is present in Canon 3(C)(1) of Florida's
Code of Judicial Conduct,10 3 in state statutes on the disqualification of
judges in civil cases,104 and case law interpreting disqualification stat-
94. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. ("nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
95. 561 So. 2d at 1166-73.
96. 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401.
97. See Note, supra note 71, at 391.
98. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
99. Id. at 532.
100. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
101. Id. at 136.
102. Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
103. FLA. CODE JUD. COND'UCT, Canon 3(c)(1) (1988).
104. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432.
(a) Grounds. Any party may move to disqualify the judge assigned to the
action on the grounds provided by statute.
(b) Contents. A motion to disqualify shall allege the facts relied on to
show the grounds for disqualification and shall be verified by the party.
(c) Time. A motion to disqualify shall be made within a reasonable time
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utes. °5 As explained by Overton in his opinion in Breakstone: "The
Code of Judicial Conduct, in Canon 3(C)(1), states that, '[a] judge
should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might be reasonably questioned.' " Overton went on to cite case law
in which the court has construed Canon 3(C)(1) as being consistent
with precedent holding that in a motion for disqualification, a judge
need only consider whether the fear of bias exists in the mind of the
moving party and whether that fear is well grounded.10" Overton also
quoted Dickenson v. Parks,x08 for the proposition that public confidence
in the integrity of its judiciary is crucial:
after discovery of the facts constituting grounds for disqualification.
(d) Determination. The judge against whom the motion is directed shall
determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion. The judge shall not pass
on the truth of the facts alleged. If the motion is legally sufficient, the
judge shall enter an order of disqualification and proceed no further in the
action.
(e) Judge's Initiative. Nothing in this rule limits a judge's authority to
enter an order of disqualification on the judge's own initiative.
Id.
Florida Statutes section 38.10 provides in part:
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding makes and files an affidavit
stating that he fears he will not receive a fair trial in the court where the
suit is pending on account of the prejudice of the judge of that court
against the applicant or in favor of the adverse party, the judge shall pro-
ceed no further, but another judge shall be designated in the manner pre-
scribed by the laws of this state for the substitution of judges for the trial
of causes in which the presiding judge is disqualified. Every such affidavit
shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that any such bias or
prejudice exists and shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith.
FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1989).
105. See, e.g., Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983); Dickenson
v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 582-584, 140 So. 459, 462 (1932).
106. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401 (emphasis in original). For a critical
look at Canon 3C(1), see Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28
REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 694 (1973). Then-Justice Rehnquist stated that, "though the Ca-
nons of Ethics are extrordinarily detailed and specific about what constitutes a 'finan-
cial interest,' they have virtually nothing to say about what constitutes 'bias.'" Rehn-
quist suggested that the use of the word "favoritism" would be clearer than "bias." Id.
at 708-711.
107. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401 (citing State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell,
131 Fla. 566, 573, 179 So. 695, 697-698 (1938)); Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083,
1086 (Fla. 1983); Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
108. 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932).
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Prejudice of a judge is a delicate question to raise but when raised
as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predicated on grounds with a
modicum of reason, the judge against whom raised, should be
prompt to recuse himself. No judge under any circumstances is
warranted in sitting in the trial of a cause whose neutrality is
shadowed or even questioned.109
In weighing the effects on impartiality and the appearance of im-
partiality created by lawyer contributions to judicial election cam-
paigns, courts should consider the amount of the contribution, the tim-
ing of the contribution, and whether there is a pattern of support
between the contributor and recipient. Consideration of these factors is
useful in determining whether the recipient has an interest in the out-
come of a particular case involving the contributor, and therefore is
useful in determining the potential due process infringement.110 In
Florida, the maximum dollar amount of a contribution to a trial court
judicial campaign is limited to no more than $1,000.111 However, the
amount of a contribution may have particular significance to the recipi-
ent because of its size in comparison to other contributions received. As
Overton noted in Breakstone, the $500 contribution in question was the
second largest received by the candidate.11 2 Considering the timing fac-
tor, Overton noted that the judicial election campaign of Judge Mac-
Kenzie's husband was ongoing at the time the disqualification motion
was made.113 Although Florida limits contributions to trial court judi-
cial campaigns to $1,000,114 and requires public disclosure of contribu-
tions, 1 5 the potential exists for an infringement on due process. De-
pending on the proportionate size of the campaign contribution, the
timing of the contribution and the existence of a pattern of support, the
lawful contribution could affect the judge's impartiality as well as the
public perception of impartiality. The court's holding in Breakstone116
that an attorney's lawful campaign contribution to a judicial candidate
is not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification ignores the potential
109. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401 (quoting Dickenson, 104 Fla. at 582-
584, 104 So. at 462).
110. See Note, supra note 71 at 403.
111. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1987).
112. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401.
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1987).
115. FLA. STAT. § 106.07(4)(a) (1987).
116. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
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for due process infringement.
Part III
Justice Kogan, in his concurring opinion in Breaksione, calls the
majority's position on judicial disqualification "the lesser of evils from
which we must choose."' "17 Kogan goes on to describe what evil lurks on
the side of the issue chosen by Overton."18 According to Kogan's view,
the dangers include the possibility that contributions to judicial cam-
paigns would be made by lawyers or litigants soley for the purpose of
avoiding particular judges who Would be required to grant a motion for
disqualification. 1" 9 This, Kogan notes, would have the double negative
impact of securing contributions for those inferior candidates that con-
tributing lawyers and litigants would seek to avoid through disqualifica-
tion, and would promote "judge-shopping."' 120 The combined effect
would be "an administrative nightmare" in the judicial system.'l2 Fi-
nally, Kogan suggests that well-motivated lawyer contributions to the
best qualified judicial -candidates would dry up, and as a result, only
the wealthy or those supported by special interests could afford the cost
of a judicial election campaign. 22 An answer to the dilemma presented
by Breakstone rests in the hands of Florida voters and their legislators,
Kogan said, suggesting a merit retention system for trial court judges
along with public financing of judicial election campaigns.123 "So long
as judicial seats can be filled by elections financed by private campaign
contributions, we in Florida must live with a system that opens the door
to some type of ab use," Justice Kogan wrote.1 24
Florida is not alone in its struggle to solve the problems inherent in
electing judges.'25 As one author noted, "[iit may well be that no sub-
ject in American law has provoked more articles, more speeches and
meetings, more hearings and struggles in legislatures and for constitu-
117. Id. at 400 (Kogan, J., concurring). -
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 400-01.
121. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Cam-
paign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REv. 449, 452-66 (1988).
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tional revision, than judicial selection." '26
The practice of electing judges by popular vote was not instituted
by the founding fathers of our nation, 127 but rather emerged after 1832
as part of the Jacksonian era's wave of democratization of the Ameri-
can political scene.
128
Today, forty-two states elect some portion of their judiciary. 29
Twenty states, including Florida hold nonpartisan judicial elections. 30
Florida, thirty-three other states, and the District of Columbia use the
"Missouri Plan" process of merit selection and retention for at least
some of their judiciary.' 3' Florida employs merit selection and retention
for its supreme court justices and district court judges. 32 While
twenty-four states now use some form of merit selection and retention
for trial court judges,133 Florida continues to elect its circuit and county
court judges in competitive elections.
A. The Nature of the Judicial Election Problem
Voter apathy and unawareness in the area of judicial elections
have been well documented in a number of studies. 35 As a result of
public apathy, judicial elections are decided not on the issues or the
candidates' records, but on name recognition. 36 The 1982 primary race
of incumbent Alabama Supreme Court Justice Oscar Adams provides
an example of how the name game operates in judicial politics.' 37 Al-
though Adams' challenger was a three-year practitioner from an unac-
credited law school, the challenger had the same name as a popular
bakery and Adams only won the primary by a narrow margin. 138 "Our
survey showed a substantial number voted for him because they
126. Schotland, supra note 10 at 72.
127. Overton, supra note 1, at 11.
128. Atkins, Judicial Elections: What the Evidence Shows, 50 FLA. BJ. 152
(Mar. 1976).
129. Note, supra note 125 at 452.
130. Id.
131. Overton, supra note 1 at 12, 14.
132. Id. at 12-13.
133. Id. at 14.
134. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
135. Schotland, supra note 10, at 86-88.
136. Overton, supra note 1, at 18-19.
137. Schotland, supra note 10 at 89.
138. Id.
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thought he was the bakery man," Justice Adams said."'9
Buying name recognition in a contested election is an expensive
proposition. The price tag for an average campaign for a Dade County
circuit court judgeship is $150,000, but, in one race a judicial candi-
date spent $600,000, while his opponent spent $350,000.140 In jurisdic-
tions in which competitive judicial elections are held, the national trend
is toward more contested elections at a steadily escalating cost.141
These increasingly expensive judicial elections will require more
campaign contributions to pay the bills and a high percentage of the
contributions to judicial campaigns come from lawyers. 4 2 A 1982
study showed that in Florida, 50 % of the contributors to judicial cam-
paigns were lawyers and that lawyers gave 50 % of the money raised by
judicial candidates from outside sources. 14 3
Lawyer contributions to judicial campaigns raise concerns about
the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 4 4 Concerning the ethi-
cal dilemma, one judge said, "I very much appreciated the contribu-
tions I received from others. However, it makes me feel uncomfortable
dealing with them in court.' '1 45
B. The Merit Selection and Retention Solution
Extending merit selection and retention to trial court judges is the
most frequently mentioned solution to the problems posed by Break-
stone.46 The move has been endorsed by The Florida Bar, the League
of Women Voters, and the Circuit Judges Conference. 1 7 The 1978 re-
port of the Constitutional Revision Commission recommended the
139. Id.
140. Report of the Florida Bar Commission on Merit Selection and Retention
of Trial Judges, 11 app. (Jan. 1990). (Comments of Miami politicial consultant Gerald
Schwartz before the Commission in a public hearing in Miami) [hereinafter Report].
141. Schotland, supra note 10, at 77.
142. Id. at 136.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 120. (Schotland writes, "I reject the proposition that practices ...
inherent in judicial elections can be called corrupt. Present campaign financing prac-
tices put undue strain on actual judicial integrity and independence, on the judiciary's
and the bar's appearance of intregrity and independence .... ")
145. Note, The Ethical Dilemma of Campaigning for Judicial Office: A Pro-
posed Solution, 14 FORDHAM UaB. L.J. 353, 402 (1986).
146. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
147. Overton, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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change, as did the 1984 report of the Article V Review Commision. 14
The Florida Bar Commission on Merit Selection and Retention
recommended extending the process to trial court judges as a means of
upgrading the quality of judges and eliminating the public perception
of impropriety spawned by judicial election campaigns. 149
The predominant contributors to judicial elections are attorneys.
The collection of large sums of money from those who will be rep-
resenting clients before the judges creates the appearance [of] im-
propriety in the eyes of the general public. Although the commis-
sion did not find that this, in fact, does create'widespread problems
of favoritism; the perception of favoritism by the public is a very
real and serious problem which poisons the public's attitude toward
our justice system generally. 50
However, even supporters of the move to extend merit selection
and retention to Florida's trial judges admit that problems would re-
main,151 because those judges would still face election to retain their
positions. But the major problem with the view that merit retention will
ease the present dilemma is that extending merit retention to trial court
judges requires a constitutional amendment, which requires legislative
action. The most recent attempt to pass legislation placing such a con-
stitutional amendment on the ballot was House Joint Resolution 9,
which was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, 52 where it died
in June 1990. Therefore, for the present and forseeable future, the
courts should not look to the legislature for solutions to the problems
Breakstone'53 represents.
Part IV
Justice Kogan's lesser evil approach to this issue is only necessi-
tated by the court's all-or-nothing answer to the Breakstone dilemma.
A more sensible alternative is a case-by-case approach which balances
148. Id.
149. Report, supra note 140, at 18-19.
150. Id.
151. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 400. Justice Barkett, in a brief concurring
opinion, stated that, "merit retention elections requiring judges to solicit campaign
funds are subject to the same concerns as those presented here. Therefore, although
merit retention improves the situation, it is not the answer to the problem." Id.
152. Journal of the House of Representatives, No. I, at 9 (April 3, 1990).
153. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
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the freedom of association of campaign contributors against the due
process requirement of judicial impartiality.
Such a case-by-case analysis would require consideration of at
least three relevant factors relating to the judicial campaign contribu-
tion. Those factors are the proportionate size of the contribution in re-
lationship to other contributions received, the timing of the contribu-
tion, and whether any pattern of support exists between the contributor
and the judge.
While the Court chose not to consider such circumstances in
Breakstone, the facts of Keane v. Andrews154 offered the court another
opportunity to look beyond the mere fact that the contribution was
within the legal limit. In Keane, Dr. Moulton Keane moved for the
disqualification of Broward County Circuit Court Judge Robert L. An-
drews on grounds that opposing counsel had contributed to the judge's
campaign.1 55 But while opposing counsel contributed $500 to the
judge's campaign, contributions by his firm and members of the firm
brought the total contribution to $3,850.156 These contributions, made
during a two-month period of 1988, represented 17.25 % of the judge's
campaign contributions through the first eight months of that year.157
Only by assessing the circumstances surrounding the lawful contri-
bution is it possible to determine the importance of the contribution to
the recipient judge. The greater the importance, the greater the poten-
tial for due process infringement. By not considering the relevant cir-
cumstances surrounding judicial campaign contributions the Court is
opening the door to due process violations created by the appearance of
judicial bias.
Peter Cooke
154. 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, (1990 Fla.
LEXIS 1090).
155. Id.
156. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, Keane v. Andrews, 555 So. 2d 940
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (No. 75,378), review denied, (1990 Fla. LEXIS 1090).
157. Id. at 2-3.
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